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PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  TRAINING  SCHOOL  AT  VINEL-* 

NEW  JERSEY 

DEPARTMENT  OF    RESEARCH 


THE  INTELLIC  '  ,      „ 

OF   THE   FeEBLE-MiNDED 

FEEBI  -^ologique,  1909,  pp.  1-14?) 

PAoa 

5 

..ebellious  and  the  Docile 13 

tJie  Point  of  View  of  its  Concentration 29 

/t 34 

Writing 46 

ALFRED  nd  Perception 53 

X  Pain 60 

jn  of  Ideas  in  tlie  Feeble-Minded 66 

of  the  Intelligence  Distinguished  from  the  Level  of 

intelligence 75 

Number  Sense  and  the  Arithmetical  Faculty 88 

dsoning 97 

suggestibility  through  Docility 106 

low  a  Moron  may  have  an  Esprit  Faux 120 

X.  A  Scheme  of  Thought 130 

Part  II 

The  Language  op  the  FEEBLE-MI^rDED 

(L' Annie  Psychologique,  1908,  pp.  284-839) 

I.  A  New  Psychogenetic  Method 159 

II.  Aphasia  and  the  Psychology  of  Language 162 

III.  An  Observation  of  an  Imbecile.     Scientific  Determination  of 

her  Level 164 

IV.  Analysis  of  the  State  of  Language  of  this  Imbecile 170 

V.  Discussion  of  Three  Hypotheses  upon  the  Absence  of  Speech  in 

our  Subject 177 

VI.  The    Psychological    Condition    of   Speech.    Experiments    and 

Theory 181 

VII.  Comparison  between  Aphasia  properly  so-called  and  the  Poverty 

of  Language  of  the  Low  Grade  Imbecile 188 

VIII.  The  Function  of  Language  as  a  Sign  of  Human  Intelligence 193 

IX.  The  revolution  of  Language 198 

X.  The  Relation  between  Language  and  Thought 210 


D 


^//.^■^ 


CONTENTS 

Part  I 

The  Intelligence  of  the  Feeble-Minded 
(L'Annee  Psychologique,  1909,  pp.  1-147) 

CHAPTERS  PA.GB 

Introduction 5 

I.  Character — The  Rebellious  and  the  Docile 13" 

II.  Attention  from  the  Point  of  View  of  its  Concentration 29 

III.  Voluntary  Effort 34_ 

IV.  Movements  in  Writing 46 

V.  Intelligence  and  Perception 53 

VI.  The  Sense  of  Pain 60 

^-  VII.  Association  of  Ideas  in  the  Feeble-Minded 66 

^VIII.  Activity  of   the  Intelligence  Distinguished   from  the  Level  of 

the  Intelligence 75 

IX.  The  Number  Sense  and  the  Arithmetical  Faculty 88 

X.  Reasoning 97 

XI.  Suggestibility  through  Docility 106  ' 

XII.  How  a  Moron  may  have  an  Esprit  Faux 120 

XIII.  A  Scheme  of  Thought 130 

Part  II 

The  Language  of  the  Feeble-Minded 

(L'Annee  Psychologique,  1908,  pp.  284-SS9) 

I.  A  New  Psychogenetic  Method 159 

II.  Aphasia  and  the  Psychology  of  Language 162 

III.  An  Observation  of  an  Imbecile.     Scientific  Determination  of 

her  Level 164 

IV.  Analysis  of  the  State  of  Language  of  this  Imbecile 170 

V.  Discussion  of  Three  Hypotheses  upon  the  Absence  of  Speech  in 

our  Subject 177 

VI.  The    Psychological    Condition    of    Speech.     Experiments    and 

Theory 181 

VII.  Comparison  between  Aphasia  properly  so-called  and  the  Poverty 

of  Language  of  the  Low  Grade  Imbecile 188 

VIII.  The  Function  of  Language  as  a  Sign  of  Human  Intelligence 193 

IX.  The  Evolution  of  Language 198 

X.  The  Relation  between  Language  and  Thought 210 


6  INTRODUCTION 

have  preferred  to  use  the  more  popular  generic  term,  Feeble- 
ISIinded,  as  on  the  whole  better  expressing  the  meaning  of  the 
authors  and  convej'ing  a  clearer  idea  of  the  scope  of  the  work. 

It  was  originallj^  intended  to  publish  this  volume  and  The  De- 
velopment of  the  Intelligence  in  Children  as  one,  hence  all  that  was 
said  there  of  the  faithful  work  of  the  various  members  of  the 
Research  Department  should  be  repeated  here.  Miss  Kite's 
translation  will  speak  for  itself. 

Biographical  Note.  No  one  will  read  these  volumes  without 
desiring  to  know  something  of  the  distinguished  authors. 

Alfred  Binet  was  born  in  Nice,  July  11,  1857.  His  mother 
was  an  artist;  his  father  a  physician. 

Binet  went  early  to  Paris  and  studied  first  law  then  medicine. 
He  worked  in  the  biological  laboratory  of  the  noted  Balbiani. 
But  he  was  strongly  drawn  toward  Experimental  Psychology. 
In  1889  he  created  at  the  Sorbonne  the  first  Psychological  Labo- 
ratory in  France. 

He  was  remarkably  versatile  and  worked  and  wrote  in  many 
fields. 

He  was  an  indefatigable  worker,  but  he  worked  easily  and 
always  with  that  keen  insight  which  enabled  him  to  see  quickly 
the  significance  of  his  facts,  so  that  little  energy  was  wasted  on 
useless  hypotheses. 

He  died  in  Paris,  October  18,  1911,  from  an  acute  attack  of 
cerebral  apoplexy. 

Dr.  Th.  Simon  was  born  at  Dijon,  July  10,  1873.  He  took 
his  degree  in  medicine  in  Paris.  His  thesis  received  Honorable 
Mention. 

Since  1908,  he  has  been  physician  at  the  Hospital  for  the  Insane 
at  Saint-Yon. 

After  the  death  of  Binet  Dr.  Simon  was  made  President  of  the 
Society  for  the  Psychological  Study  of  the  Child. 

Henry  H.  Goddard, 

Editor. 


PART  I 

The  Intelligence  of  the  Feeble-Minded 


10        THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  particular  psychological  modifi- 
cation which  constitutes  "un  aliene,"  has  at  least  three  funda- 
mental causes  (without  prejudice  to  other  mechanisms,  which 
are  unknown  to  us,  or  rather  of  which  we  have  only  a  presenti- 
ment). 

1 .  An  alteration  of  mental  synthesis — we  shall  not  speak  of  this. 

2.  A  defect,  an  arrest,  or  an  insufficiency  of  intellectual  develop- 

meni. 

3.  A  defect,  an  arrest,  or  an  insufficiency  of  intellectual  func- 
tioning. 

To  the  study  of  these  last  two  mechanisms,  two  distinct  arti- 
cles will  be  devoted,  one  upon  Imbeciles,  the  other  upon  Dements. 

This  article  will  deal  only  with  the  intelligence  of  imbeciles, 
or  rather,  taking  in  our  title  the  species  for  the  genus,  we  shall 
set  forth  what  is  peculiar  to  the  intelligence  of  all  types  of  de- 
fectives. There  is  in  particular,  as  everyone  knows,  a  lack 
of  development ;  and  apropos  of  this  we  shall  present  a  new  method 
of  psychology,  which  may  be  called" psychogenetics.  For  it  will 
suffice  for  us  to  put  into  a  series,  in  the  order  of  the  develop- 
ment of  their  intelligence,  a  certain  number  of  these  backward  sub- 
jects, and  to  study  throughout  this  series  a  particular  phenomenon; 
for  example,  the  sense  of  pain  or  the  attention,  to  see  what  are 
the  necessary  stages  of  development  which  this  phenomenon 
presents,  and  how  it  evolves.  Looked  at  from  this  psychological 
point  of  view,  the  study  of  the  imbecile  approaches  that  of  the 
normal  child  and  even  of  animals.  We  find  here  a  means  of  re- 
newmg,  developing,  and  perfecting  our  former  investigations 
upon  children.  This  comparing  of  a  backward  intelligence  to 
that  of  a  child  of  a  certain  age,  might  have  passed  ten  years  ago 
as  simple  literary  comparison;  but  since  today  we  have  acquired 
the  power  to  fix  within  a  few  months  at  least  the  age  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  defectives,^  since  we  can  with  good  reason  consider  a 
certain  idiot  of  thirty  years  as  the  equivalent  of  a  child  of  one, 
or  an  imbecile  of  twenty  as  the  equivalent  of  a  child  of  six,  and 
since  these  defectives  are  so  many  children  arrested  in  a  certain 
phase  of  their  development,  we  have  only  to  arrange  these  de- 
fectives in  an  ascending  series  of  evolution,  in  order  to  make 
with  it  and  because  of  it,  the  psychogenesis  of  a  function. 

'  See  our  preceding  article  upon  "The  Development  of  the  Intelligence 
Among  Children"  (p.  108). 


PRELIMINARIES  11 

The  critics  of  tomorrow,  who  surely  will  not  fail  to  appear, 
will  teach  us  what  must  be  corrected  and  gone  over  in  our  plan 
of  studies;  for  the  som'ces  of  error,  little  by  little,  will  have  been 
disclosed.  That  is  a  secondary  work.  But  first  it  must  be  demon- 
strated, and  this  is  what  we  are  going  to  attempt,  that  the  new 
method  to  which  we  are  calling  attention  really  exists;  and  that 
to  make  this  demonstration,  nothing  is  simpler  than  to  put  it 
in  operation.  ,We  shall  therefore  trace,  by  means  of  a  study  of 
imbeciles,  the  mental  evolution  of  the  following  phenomena: 
character,  attention,  effort,  motor  ability  and  writing,  the  intel- 
ligence of  perception,  the  sense  of  pain,  association  of  ideas,  in- 
tellectual activity,  the  arithmetical  faculty,  reasoning,  suggesti- 
bility and  docility,  and  how  an  unbecile  may  have  "V esprit  faux." 

Afterwards,  leaving  the  details,  or  rather  by  synthesizing  them, 
we  shall  try  to  discover  exactly  in  what  mental  development 
consists,  by  what  mechanism  it  is  produced,  and  how  a  superior 
intelligence  differs  from  an  inferior  one.  Apropos  of  this  we  shall 
be  led  to  describe  a  new  scheme  of  thought  in  order  to  under- 
stand thoroughly  the  manner  in  v/hich  it  develops. 


I.    CHARACTER— THE   REBELLIOUS   AND   THE 

DOCILE 

A  question  very  little  studied,  vague  and  difficult  to  state, 
is  that  of  the  relation  which  exists  between  character  and  intel- 
lectual development.  This  relation  has  been  the  subject  of  some 
thought  and  has  been  examined  from  various  points  of  view. 
Thus,  it  has  been  asked  if  character  changes  with  age,  or  if  on 
the  contrary  the  adult  is  not  ahogether  in  the  child.  It  is  very 
possible  that  the  instinctive  part  of  the  child  is  conserved  in  the 
adult,  but  better  direct e_d_bji^rea.son,  and  especially  better^sup- 
pressed  in  the  presence  of  others.  It  has  been  asked  if,  among 
individuals  of  superior  intelligence,  the  character,  like  the  rest, 
does  not  undergo  an  ascending  evolution,  and  if  men  of  genius 
are  not  also  geniuses  in  character.  But  in  whatever  fashion  this 
vague  proposition  be  imderstood,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  it  be  true. 
Too  many  examples  have  demonstrated  to  us  that  the  most 
splendid  geniuses  can  be  the  sorriest  characters.  In  short  the 
relation  between  character  and  intelligence,  in  spite  of  the  at- 
tention it  has  received,  remains  very  little  known  and  very  poorly 
formulated. 

We  shall  not  here  treat  this  subject  fully;  certain  material 
conditions  have  hindered  us;  it  is  not  the  imbecile  in  a  hospital, 
it  is  the  imbecile  in  his  family  or  in  a  family  colony  that  one  must 
know.  We  have  seen  our  subjects  only  in  the  unnatural  surround- 
ings of  a  hospital,  or  worse  in  the  narrow  limits  of  our  office, 
where  we  harl  called  them;  seated  near  a  table,  repljnng  1o  ques 
tions,  talking,  or  submitting  to  different  tests,  they  were  some- 
what like  students  at  an  examination.  A  professor  would  form 
a  very  narrow  view  of  the  youth  of  his  time,  if  he  saw  them  only 
during  an  examination.     We  resemble  somewhat  such  a  professor. 

It  is  therefore  essential  to  commence  by  limiling  our  subject  of 
study  in  remarking  that  we  have  not  in  view  that^sum  total  of 
phenomena  which  fmni-^i^'i^"--  ■'■'■■ii-if1er,  l^iit  Ihe  manifestations 
of  cliaiacter  wliijili  '"■■'■  I.im"|''^J  ■■■"  I'v-^'in-  personality.  Let  us 
say  more  .-inijdy  that    our  attention  has  been   (lircctcd   toward 

13 


14 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


the  tloc'ilo  or  hostile  dispositions  which  imbeciles  have  assumed 
in  relation  1o  us  ;nul  we  have  tried  to  discover  if  their  dispositions 
hear  any  relation  to  their  intellectual  levels.  Are  the  rebellious 
ones  the  idiots  and  the  docile  ones  the  imbeciles?  Or  again  are 
there  more  rebellious  ones  among  the  idiots,  and/  more  docile 
ones  among  the  imbeciles?  We  do  not  think  so.  vWe  shall  show 
by  some  very  clear  examples  that  both  these  forms  of  character 
are  to  be  foimd  in  all  the  degrees  of  deficiency. 


fig.  1.   vouzix,  idiot,  twextv  years  old,  mute  from  lack  of  in- 
telligence: he  is  below  the  level  of  a  child  of  two  years. 

The  Character  of  Idiots 

Let  us  start  at  once  with  illustrations,  or  rather  let  us  sketch 
a   portrait. 

\'ouzin  is  a  young  man  of  twenty-seven  years,  whose  external 
appearance  is  not  marred  })y  any  apparent  physical  stigmata. 
He  is  small;  his  face  is  beardless,  child-like,  without  a  wrinkle; 
the  expression  is  sweet  and  at  first  sight  does  not  seem  abnormal. 


CHARACTER    OF   IDIOTS  15 

The  portrait  which  we  give  of  him  (fig.  1)  is  made  from  a 
snapshot;  the  wrinkles  of  his  forehead  are  due  to  blinking 
caused  by  the  direct  light  of  the  sun.  This  must  be  taken  into 
account.  The  portrait  is  of  value  only  as  it  represents  the  regu- 
larity of  his  features.  "^  On  the  other  hand  Vouzin  has  a  number 
of  tics,  which  are  like  so  many  stigmata  added  to  a  normal  anat- 
omy. He  almost  constantly  emits  gutteral  sounds;  he  moves 
a  quantity  of  saliva  about  in  his  mouth;  when  seated,  he  sways 
his  body  backwards  and  forwards;  frequently  he  looks  at  the 
ends  of  his  fingers  with  flitting  attention.  All  these  tics  seem 
to  us  explainable  in  part  in  the  same  way  as  those  of  certain  blind 
persons;  thej^  are  motor  tendencies  which  might  arise,  under  very 
exceptional  conditions,  among  normals;  but  normals  arrest  and 
suppress  them.  The  blind  do  not  succeed  in  suppressing  them, 
because  they  do  not  see  them,  and  are  therefore  unconscious 
of  their  existence.  Thus  a  blind  musician  shows  an  expression 
of  suffering  when  he  is  executing  a  difficult  passage.  The  idiot 
does  not  isuppiiess^  these  ti«»-iQi_various  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  although  being  able  to  perceive  them,  he  ha»~aet_enough'- 
intelligence-t^- realize  tha^  ^i""!'  flptinns  arp  nnt  pi2<»pfrr.  Again,  ^ 
ceilaii)_-tk«--aj:£_pxobal>ly  uncontrollable.  Finaity^tTie  number 
of  -tics  aiid-theki^culiarities  are  the  expression,  of  a  j)articular 
comlition  of  the  ncrvou;;  ayotem. 

y\\'  i:)hotographed  Vouzin  in  an  enclosure  surrounded  by  a 
wooden  paling:  this  had  for  us  almost  a  symbolic  value,  our  idiot 
being  confined  like  an  animal  in  the  zoological  garden.  ''Almost 
in  spite  of  ourselves  we  compare  him  to  an  animal  whose  training 
has  just  commenced.  If  you  call  liiin  he  comes;  if  he  is  in  the 
house,  he  runs  whenever  a  door  is  opened;  he  presents  himself 
at  the  door  to  see  who  is  entering,  showing  us  the  naive  curiosity 
of  an  animal.  If  one  says  "good  day"  1o  him,  holding  out  the 
hanrl,  he  floes  not  reply  verbally,  for  he  does  not  know  how  to 
speak,  but  he  uiulcrstaiids  the  significance  of  the  extended  hand; 
he  gives  you  a  finger,  only  one,  which  would  be,  in  another,  a  lack 
of  culture  or  intended  disdain,  but  is  only  awkwardness  in  him. 
If  an  object  is  presented  to  him,  sometimes  he  does  not  take  it, 
somelimes  on  the  contrary  he  seizes  it  with  an  awkward  gesture; 
he  holds  his  hand  flat,  with  the  fingers  close  together.  One  would 
say  that  he  was  oxix-cling  1o  receive  a  jionny  in  the  palm  of  liis 
hand.     At  other  times  he  does  not  use  his  hands  or  arms,   which 


IG 


THH    INTKLLKiKNCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


lie  allows  to  iuuiy;  awkwardly  at  his  side;  if  food  is  offered,  ho 
thrusts  his  mouth  forward  to  seize  it  reminding  one  of  an  animal. 
Figure  2  represents  him  in  one  of  these  attitudes.  Vouzin  did 
not  take  this  pose  in  response  to  a  connnand,  but  spontaneously. 
Furthermore,  he  does  not  understand  a  verbal  order  so  compli- 
cated as  this.  His  prehension  is  extremely  defective;  if  an  object 
is  presented  to  him.  he  holds  it  in  his  hand;  if  a  second  is  offered 


FIG.  2.  ON'E  PRE.SENTS  A  BISCUIT  TO  THE  IDIOT  VOUZIN,  WHO  INSTEAD  OF 
TAKING  IT  WITH  HIS  HAND,  PUTS  FORWARD  HIS  MOUTH  AND  TAKES  IT  ANI- 
MAL FASHION. 

he  takes  it  without  letting  go  the  first.  A  third  object  is  received 
in  the  same  way  and  so  on  and  on,  without  his  ever  having  the 
idea  of  rirUling  himself  of  them  by  depositing  the  objects  on  a 
table. 

;  Vouzin  is  obedient.  If  an  order  is  given  him  by  gestures,  he 
can  execute  it.  When  he  is  seated,  he  understands  the  gesture 
which  orders  him  to  stand  up;  when  he  is  standing  if  we  show  him 
a  chair  and  invito  him  to  be  seated,  he  unfleistanfls  and  seats 


CHARACTER    OF    IDIOTS 


17 


himself  abruptly,  folding  his  logs  under  the  cliaii'  with  an  awk- 
ward movement. 

If  Vouzin's  cap  is  taken  off  his  head  and  he  is  told  to  go  and 
himt  it,  he  does  so  without  remonstrance,  finds  his  cap  and  puts 
it  on  his  head.  We  repeat  the  same  play  a  dozen  times.  In 
the  end,  ^'ouzin  shows  a  timid  resistance;  he  leans  his  head  awaj^ 
from  us  to  save  his  cap;  but  he  does  not  defend  himself  with  his 


/ 


FIG.  3.  CKKTIN,  YOUNG  IMHIXILE  OF  Ayi)I)LK  CHAUK.  OK  SKVENTEEN 
YEARS.  SHE  CAN  TELL  HER  NAME.  .SEX,  POINT  TO  HER  NOSE.  BUT  CANNOT 
COMPARE  TWO  WliKHirs,  COPY  A  SQUARE  NOR  COUNT  FOUR  SOUS.  CHAR- 
ACTER REBELLIOUS.    INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL  FOUR  YEARS. 

hands  nor  does  he  gel  up  1o  go  away  tVoin  us.  if  his  cap  is  hid- 
den before  his  eyes  under  a  pile  of  hooks,  he  will  go  and  get  it. 
We  placed  his  cap  upon  lli<'  liorizonlal  bar  of  a  measuring  rod. 
He  refused  to  go  and  take  it  and  shook  liis  head  as  a  sign  of  ne- 
gation. Was  he  afraid?  T1  is  possible.  In  any  case,  at  last 
he  rebelled.  But  he  is  f;ir  fioin  rebellious  iji  Ihe  .same  way  as 
little  M ,  a  turbulent  youjig  idiot,  six  years  of  age  whom  a 


18  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

skin  ilisease  has  left  conipletelj'  bald.  She  enters  our  office 
without  lookhig  at  us  and  walks  up  and  down  grinding  her  teeth. 
We  draw  near  to  her  and  hand  her  a  biscuit.  She  takes  it  with 
a  quick  movement,  and  throws  it  on  the  ground.  Many  other 
objects  offered  to  her  have  the  same  fate;  they  are  taken,  then 
thrown  forcibly  to  the  ground.  The  child  in  doing  this  does 
not  express  any  anger.  Furthermore  her  face  remains  totally 
inexiM'cssive.  She  spends  her  time  putting  her  hands  in  her 
mouth  and  grinding  her  teeth.  We  try  to  awaken  some  feeling 
in  her,  and  we  put  our  fist  under  her  nose,  but  she  does  not  seem 
to  understand  this  mimicry,  at  all  events  she  remains  impassive. 
We  follow  her  into  the  room.  She  goes  hap-hazard,  seats  her- 
self in  a  corner  and  fixes  upon  us  a  voluntary  gaze;  then  seeing 
a  chair  in  front  of  her  she  turns  it  over  without  saying  a  word. 
A  little  farther  on  she  encounters  an  apron  placed  upon  a  chair; 
she  takes  the  apron  and  throws  it  on  the  ground.  She  next 
finds  a  basket  containing  a  biscuit;  she  takes  the  biscuit  and 
throws  it  away;  one  is  obliged  to  watch  her  to  prevent  her  from 
destroying  fragile  objects. 

Thus  here  are  two  idiots  one  of  whom  is  gentle  enough,  while 
the  other  is  a  disagreeable  example  of  a  rebellious  subject. 

Characters  of  Imbeciles  and  Morons 

There  are  the  same  distinctions  in  imbeciles  and  morons; 
there  are  imbeciles  who  are  docile,  who  execute  the  orders  given 
to  them  and  from  whom  we  obtain  their  best  in  the  diverse  experi- 
ments to  which  we  subject  them;  and  there  are  others  who  sub- 
mit to  nothing,  who  are  rebellious,  and  who  do  not  wish  to  exe- 
cute any  of  our  orders,  and  w4io  out  of  ill-will  reply,  "I  do  not 
know,"  to  all  our  questions.  One  must  be  well  aware  of  the  exist- 
ence of  these  two  types  of  character  and  their  psychological 
significance. 

Let  us  cite  several  examples  which  will  show  the  great  variety 
of  characters  that  may  be  included  under  the  same  term.  Among 
the  rebellious  we  note  Cretin,  an  imbecile  of  twenty  who  has 
the  fierce  air  of  an  untamed  animal,  who  is  always  on  the  defen- 
sive, distrusts  us,  is  afraid  of  us,  and  at  every  moment  wishes 
to  get  away.  When  she  rises  it  is  almost  impossible  to  make 
her  sit  down   again.     Beauvisage,   another  imbecile  of  twent}^. 


CHARACTEK  OF  IMBECILES  AXD  MORONS 


19 


but  of  a  somewhat  higher  degree  than  the  other  (middle  grade  im- 
becile), shows  very  much  the  same  savage,  timid  character; 
she  is  nevertheless  rather  less  surly,  and  is  more  easily  made  to 
weep.  When  the  measurement  of  her  head  was  to  be  taken, 
she  became  alarmed,  refused  to  come,  beginning  to  cry;  it  finally 
required  two  sous  to  make  her  decide  to  submit  to  this  harmless 
operation.     Duguet.  another  imbecile  woman  of  the  same  men- 


FIG.  4.  HFALVl.SAGE.  VOUXG  IMBEriLE  OF  lllC.U  CJUADE,  A(iED  TWENTY 
YEARS.  SHE  CAN  COUNT  FOUR  SOLS.  COMPARE  TWO  WEIGHTS,  DO  THREE 
ERRANDS,  ETC.    INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL  OF  SIX  YEARS. 

tal  l(;vel  us  Hcauvisagc,  and  older  than  she,  evinced  no  emotion 
that  could  properly  be  called  feai'.  She  smiled  constantly,  a 
simpering  sort  of  smile,  and  when  asked  to  <1()  the  easiest  test 
invariably  rej)lic(|,  "Don't  know,"  llicn  licgan  td  laufili,  plung- 
ing iier  head  into  her  aims.  X(\cit lieless  she  would  generally 
be  able  to  reply  if  slic  made  the  slightest  cIToit.  Another  example 
is  Oaliard,   a    moron,   who  suffers    fi-oni    .attacks  of  ei)ilcpsy  and 


20 


rilK    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


who,  after  one  of  these  attacks,  completely  chang;ed  her  attitude 
towards  us.  In  the  bejiinninp;  she  seemed  eager  and  full  of  interest 
in  spite  of  a  little  intellectual  apathy.  But  after  her  attacks 
her  character  changed;  she  is  taciturn,  diagreeable,  scarcely 
replying  to  our  questions,  and  then  only  in  monosjdlables,  and 
when  we  insist,  she  pretends  to  be  looking  elsewhere. 

Here  is  still  anothei-  example,  but  of  a  very  different  sort; 
Laraz6,  a  young  girl  of  fourteen,  wlio  is  almost  normal  as  regards 


FIG.  5.    LARAZfi.   YOUNG   GIRL  OF  FOURTEEN,   NORMAL  INTELLIGENCE, 

BUT  UNSTABLE. 


intelligence,  but  who  has  been  confined  because  of  ''-perversion  des 
instincts."  She  is  a  singular  person,  with  no  apparent  intellec- 
tual deficiency.  She  is  quick  of  speech,  makes  sensible  replies, 
in  marked  contrast  with  the  mute  stupidity  of  our  habitual 
defectiv&s.  She  responds  to  all  our  little  attempts,  she  is  there- 
fore not  rebellious  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  Neverthe- 
le.ss  she  is  of  a  peculiar  character,  as  we  can  see  from  her  his- 


CHARACTER  OF  IMBECILES  AND  MORONS 


21 


toiy  outside  of  the  institution.  She  has  been  in  thirty-six  places, 
leaving  each  time  impulsiveh'  and  finally  she  was  imprisoned 

at  F for  an  escapade  about  which  she  does  not  care  to  talk. 

In  the  institution  she  is  noisy,  and  in  the  wa}^;  with  us  she  is 
far  too  familiar  and  says  anything  that  passes  through  her  head. 
One  dav  when  we  had  made  her  believe  that  she  could  not  so 


fk;.  r.   pi{()fii.k  ok  i.ahazi^;. 


quickly   get   away,   she   became   over-excited.     "I    am   going   to 

write  to  Judge  M.  X to  let  me  have  my  Iii)erty,  and  if  he 

doesn't  give  it  to  me  I  will  do  him  harm,  or  I  will  kill  myself, 
but  I'll  harm  him  first.  Uather  llian  live  in  miseiy  like  they 
make  me  live  Iutc  I'll  break  everything,  I'll  pifk  up  anything 
I  can  lay  hands  on,  to  strike  him  in  the  montli.     (li\'c  me  pa|)er 


22  THK    TXTEUJCKXCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

SO  1  can  write  to  him."  It  required  the  greatest  effort  to  calm 
her  and  to  prove  to  her  that  saying  such  stupid  things  to  the 
judge  would  be  a  very  poor  way  to  obtain  her  freedom.  She  seems 
at  such  moments,  incapable  of  reasoning.  It  is  an  intelligence 
which  does  not  resist  emotional  stress,  she  is  like  a  com.pass 
which  the  storm  has  turned  so  that  it  no  longer  points  true; 
it  is  here  in  these  disorders  of  intelligence  produced  by  frequent 
emotions  that  we  must  look  for  a  definition  of  the  state  known 
under  the  name  of  inental  instability. 

\  It  can  thus  be  seen  from  this  simple  enumeration  through 
how  many  shades  the  rebellious  character  passes.  In  regard  to 
this  it  is  curious  and  even  important  to  remark  that  the  resist- 
ance of  subjects  to  the  tests  does  not  show  itself  with  the  same 
violence  for  all.  There  are  certain  ones  which  they  always 
refuse  to  do,  and  others  to  which  they  submit  more  willingly. 
In  this  they  resemble  normals.  A  normal,  ordinarily  very  un- 
wilHng,  submits  to  any  test  which  appeals  to  his  vanity.  There 
are  many  who  consent  to  read  out  loud  but  who  are  not  willing 
to  sing,  etc.  With  imbeciles,  we  have  noticed  the  following 
facts /the  most  rebellious  do  not  in  general  refuse  to  da  the  tests 
which  require  no  effort,  like  naming  a  color  or  a  piece  of  money; 
they  do  not  refuse  to  judge  weights  or  lines;  they  do  not  refuse 
to  copy  a  figure  with  a  pencil.  But  tests  which  require  an  effort, 
for  example  to  repeat  figures,  or  better  still,  those  which  require 
an  effort  of  invention,  as  finding  the  most  words  possible  in  three 
or  five  minutes,  are  repugnant  to  them. 

But  since  the  tests  requiring  the  most  effort  and  containing  the 
most  serious  difficulties  belong  to  the  higher  degrees  of  our 
scale  of  intelligence,  an  important  consequence  for  the  measure 
of  intelligence  results,  which  is  that"  tfee-i*ebelliaus- are  likely  to 
respond  only  to  the  lower  tests  and  are  therefore  jiidged  less 
intelligent  than-4hey-  really  are.  The  character  which  is  rebel- 
lious, sulk}-,  sullen,  in  a  word  who  is  unwilling  to  submit  to  our 
psychological  tests,  produces  the  effect  of  an  apparent  abase- 
ment of  intellectual  level  and  causes  us  to  underestimate  such 
individuals. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  the  docile  group;  they  are  perhaps  less 
varied  than  the  rebellious.  First  notice  Denise,  a  low  grade 
imbecile,  a  short  little  woman  of  twenty-five  years  with  small 
black  eyes  brilliant  and  mobile,  who  is  extremely  pleasant.     The 


CHARACTER  OF  IMBECILES  AND  MORONS 


23 


moment  she  enters  the  office,  she  holds  out  her  hand  and  begins 
to  laugh,  showing  her  beautiful  white  teeth.  ''She  laughs  at 
everything  and  nothing;  she  is  very  docile,  even  affectionate. 
The  first  time  that  she  saw  us  she  was  less  exuberant,  more  res- 
pectful, wished  to  kiss  the  hand  that  we  held  out  to  her;  little 


FIG.  7.  DENISE.  IMBECILE  OF  I.(  )U  (  ;kaDE,  AGE  TWENTY-SIX  YEARS.  SHE 
UNDERSTANDS  LANGUAGE  BUT  DOES  NOT  SFKAK  MORE  THAN  THREE  OR 
FOUR  WORDS.    INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL  OF  TWO  AND  ONE  HALF  YEARS. 


by  little  she  began  to  fool  at  homo,  got  up  and  sat  down  as  it 
pleased  hor,  laughed  coiitiini.illy  with  :iii  ;iii-  of  mockery,  and  on 
one  occasion  l^ecame  so  f.iiniliar  as  to  attempt  to  tickle  us  under 
the  chin.  But  if  strange  visitors  enter  the  room  where  we  are, 
she  immediately  follocts  herself,  remains  in  licr  chair  without 
saying  anything,   watches  them   seriously,   even   with  some  dis- 


24 


THK     INTKLl.KilONC'IO    OK    THE    FEEBLT<>M1NDED 


trust,  and  doos  iu)t  ahaiuloii  lu'isclf  to  her  habitual  foolish  laughter 
before  thoni  even  wIumi  (nu'ouraged  to  do  so. 

Victor,  a  middle  j>ra(le  imbecile  of  fifty,  has  more  gravity, 
especially  in  the  beginnin«2;,  ])ut  is  equally  docile.  Little  by  lit- 
tle he  grew  familiar  with  us,  to  the  point  of  losing  his  sense  of 
propriety;  at  the  end  of  the  second  interview,  seeing  that  one 
of  us  asked  him  difficult  questions,  he  addressed  his  questioner 


FIG.  8.     DENISB  MIMICKING      SHE  IMITATES,  WHILE  LAUGHING,  ALL  THE 
GESTURES  THAT  ONE  MAKES  IN  FRONT  OF  HER. 


in  these  terms,  "toi  ficelW^  and  seeing  that  we  laughed  he  ac- 
quired the  habit  of  this  familiarity.  Another  time  we  asked  him 
to  notice  and  afterwards  to  recount  all  that  we  had  done  before 
him.  This  game  amused  him;  on  seeing  us  take  from  the  table 
an  object  which  we  ostentatiously  put  in  our  pocket,  he  sprang 
forward  seizing  our  arm  and  crying,  "T"ai  I'M,  yiceZie,  .... 
Toule  au  clou,^^  and  similar  expressions.  In  spite  of  these  tran- 
sient familiarities  he  remains  always  respectful  and  perfectly 
willing  to  tr\-  our  experiments. 


CHARACTEK    OF    IMBECILES    AND    .MUUOXti 


25 


The  deference  of  Albert  is  still  more  marked,  and  he  is  one  of 
our  most  brilliant  imbeciles.  We  have  never  found  a  more  docile 
school  boy,  nor  one  more  submissive.  Never  a  movement  of 
impatience,  an  expression  of  weariness  nor  fatigue.  Albert 
would  be  a  model  laboratory  sul:)ject,  such  as  foreign  psychological 
laboratories  made  a  specialty  of  some  time  ago. 

Finally  a  moron,  Griffon,  carries  his  wilHngness  to  the  point 
of  servilitv. 


FIG.  9.    VICTOR,  IMBIiCILE  OK  FII  rV-rirUKE  YEARS.  WHO  HAS  THK 
INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL  (Jl'  A  CHILD  OF  FIVE  YEARS. 


It  iim.st  not  be  thouglit  thai  <l<4erenc('  is  nocess'aiTly  a  sign  V 
of  good  will  or  of  altruism.  We  arc  infoinied  (hat  (Iriffon,  so 
docile  with  us,  is  a  fiank  egotist  in  his  family.  U'hcn  one  of  his 
relatives  comes  to  sec  him  at  the  inslit  ut  ion,  lie  innnediately 
holds  out  his  hand  to  tlic  new  arrival  to  take  what  has  been 
brought   for   liini. 

*    DociiUy  tind  ^^AHdi-Muuuiaui-  Uhk^*'  oti   mi.  abnujiiLaLdiUUiacki'  only 
when   they   are- -m- fxe'CHK,     Docilitx-    .ind    nliclliousness   arc   pri- 


26  THE    TNTELLIOENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

nuirily  social  ciualities,  because  they  manifest  themselves  when 
an  iiulividual  enters  into  relation  with  his  kind,  and  they  have 
someone  outside  themselves  for  their  principal  object.  The 
equivalents  of  these  qualities  are  found  among  the  majority  of 
people;  they  are  qualities  which  should  be  considered  normal. 
Aiuoni:;  ordinary  individuals  they  may  often  be  the  result  of 
calculation  or  after-thought,  or  they  may  manifest  themselves 
chiefly  in  response  to  certain  persons  or  certain  events.  Our 
observation  of  defectives  shows  us  that,  although  these  qualities 
may  vary  somewhat  according  to  the  individuals  and  the  occa- 
sions which  are  the  exciting  causes,  they  correspond  to  the  gen- 
eral disposition,  giving  the  tone  to  all  the  reactions  of  the  indivi- 
d«3l ;  they  have  therefore  a  deep  source  and  a  fundamental  char- 
acter.   i/In  a  word,   it  is  not  toward  a  certain  person  that  the 

idiot  ^I is  snappish  and  ugly,  she  is  that  toward  all 

and  in  a  perfectly  constant  way.  Albert  — — ,  on  the  contrary, 
is  charming  toward  everybody  although  he  may  have  a  particular 
fondness  for  certain  persons. 

We  notice  that  these-^eeiftl-ieelings  are  distinetive-amQug  de- 
fectives only  on  account  of  their  strength;  and  it  is  this  which 
marks  them  subnormal.  There  are  docile  and  restive  persons 
among  those  with  whom  we  rub  elbows  every  day  of  our  lives, 
but  they  hold  their  feelings  in  better  control  than  do  the  imbeciles. 
We  cited  a  short  time  ago  the  young  idiot  who  did  not  even  look 
at  us  but  broke  everything  that  came  in  her  way.  This  degree 
of  turbulency  has  in  itself  something  abnormal.  A  school  child 
who  acted  thus  with  his  master,  who  neither  obeyed  nor  listened, 
who  laughed  at  authority,  who  was  ugly  with  his  comrades, 
would  be  looked  upon  as  an  abnormal,  incorrigible  child.  At 
this  moment  the  public  schools  are  trying  to  rid  themselves  of 
such  children  by  sending  them  to  special  classes.  In  the  same 
way  tho  oxtromo  docility  of  certain  subjects  is  chai'acteristic 
of-  the  lypical  (Iclcctivos.  One  must  be  an  imbecile  to  carry 
amiability  beyond  certain  limits,  but  since  excess  in  this  line 
does  not  annoy  others,  it  is  not  so  often  noticed;  thus  in  the 
school  no  one  ever  complains  that  a  child  is  too  docile;  and  prob- 
ably this  excess  of  docility  is  often  taken  for  application  to  work, 
and  is  favorably  judged  as  a  sign  of  attention.  Here  again  the 
study  of  the  defective  brings  each  thing  to  a  focus,  and  permits 
us  to  see  in  the  eiCCSS-ci-Uie  quali4y--a.^g+>-«f-a:bTrortttality. 


CHAIL\CTER    OF    IMBECILES   AXD    MOROXS  27 

As  a  conclusion  to  all  these  observations,  we  must  admit  that 
there  is  no— mbiJDn  .  between  thpsp  HifFp.miit  typp>;  pf  f^Vigrapfpr 
and  any  certain  mental  level.  We  find  rehQllir^i^s  nnd  alnn  dftrilr 
beings  at  (■v(My  degrco  of  defectiveness. 

This  proposition  is  contrary  to  an  idea  which  is  actually  very 
widespread.  A  contemporary  has  defined  "idiot"  as  an  extra- 
social  being  and  "imbecile"  as  an  anti-social  being.  These  are 
curious  and  suggestive  definitions  which  have  been  so  success- 
ful that  they  have  passed  from  the  medical  domain  to  the  do- 
main of  philosophy'.  One  finds  them  today  reproduced  in  some 
classic  manuals  of  philosoph}-,  which  gives  them  indeed  supreme 
sanctity.     In  our  opinion  the  truth  is  less  simple  than  this. 

An  extra-social  being  is  one  who  lives  on  the  margin  of  society 
because  he  is  incapable  of  adapting  himself  to  it.  It  is  clear 
that  idiots  are  more  extra-social  than  imbeciles,  because  their 
intellectual  level  is  lower,  ^ut  social  adaptatioii^is  not  in  an}- 
sense  a  f acultxi it  is  a  result;  and  that  result  depends  upon  many 
factors  besides  that  of  intellectual  level.  These  factors  are:  /xaD 
_thfi_siirr£LUn dings,  the  family^jthe^  financial  condition,  etc.  We 
have  met  a  low  grade  imbecile  who  was  nearly  capable  of  adapPx^ 
ing  himself  for  he  earned  a  franc  a  da\^  blowing  the  bellows  of 
a  forge;  while  some  imbeciles  of  higher  grade,  and  consequently 
much  more  intelligent,  could  not  gain  a  livelihood  for  themselves. 
In  that  which  concerns  the  quality  anti-social,  we  shall  make 
not  only  some  reservations,  but  some  criticisms  upon  the  appli- 
cation of  this  term  to  the  imbecile  alone.  This  is  a  quality  which 
depends  upon  character;  it  consists  in  being  rebellious  and  even 
harmful,  l^ut  we  believe  and  we  have  demonstrated,  that  among 
imbeciles  there  are  quite  as  many  docile  as  rebellious  ones,  and 
that  these  indivifluals  do  not  deserve  therefore  to  be  classed  as 
a  whole  and  without  distinction  among  the  anti-social.  The  ^ 
character  has  no  relation  to  the  intellectual  level. 

One  day  there  was  a  discussion  in  regard  to  a  piece  of  decora- 
tion to  b(!  pl.'iccd  in  a  piil.ljc  square.  No  agreement  could  be 
reached.  An  architect  came  \\\)i>\\  the  scene  and  said,  "Nothing 
is  sometimes  a  good  thing  in  architecture."  This  is  equally 
true  in  psychiatry.  In  the  ])lac(!  of  these  beauliful  expressions 
of  extra-social  and  (inti-social,  we  shall  ])u\  nothing;  tlien>  is 
nothing  to  jjut. 


II.     ATTENTION   CONSIDERED  FROM  THE  POINT 
OF  VIEW   OF   ITS   CONCENTRATION 

Many  erroneous  statements  have  been  made  in  regard  to  the 
attention  of  defectives.  Some  have  claimed  that  the  idiot  is 
absohitely  lacking  in  attention,  that  he  is  an  imbecile  without 
attention,  in  a  word,  that  it  is  the  failure  of  attention  which 
produces  the  idiot.  Other  authors  have  objected  to  this.  The 
attention  of  idiots  they  say  is  not  reduced  to  zero;  there  exists 
a  little,  a  verj'  little  to  be  sure,  but  there  is  more  in  the  imbecile 
and  still  more  in  the  moron. 

We  shall  treat  this  question  of  attention  by  a  very  different 
method.  We  do  not  like  these  distinctions  of  little  and  much; 
and  we  cannot  see  what  advantages  would  be  gained  by  prov- 
ing that  the  attention  is  better  among  morons  than  among  im- 
beciles. This  distinction  is  not  false,  but  the  idea  is  so  vague 
that  it  is  scarcely  worthy  of  an  attendant  in  a  hospital.  We 
>  shall  endeavor  to  analyze  the  state  of  attention  in  idiots,  imbe- 
ciles, and  morons,  and  we  hope  to  be  able  to  show  the  precise 
characteristics  by  which  the  attention  of  an  idiot — because  he 
undeniably  has  attention — differs  from  that  of  an  imbecile.  The 
characteristic  to  which  we  shall  attach  the  most  importance  is 
that  of  the  concentration  of  the  attention.  We  shall  ask  our- 
selves, (1)  Can  the  attention  of  this  subject  be  excited,  awakened, 
and  fixed  upon  a  particular  point?  (2)  Can  this  attention 
once  attracted  be  held  for  a  certain  time?  (3)  If  a  cause  of 
distraction  occurs,  and  the  attention  is  diverted,  can  it  spon- 
taneously return  to  the  first  object  which  it  quitted?  (4)  Can 
it  even  resist  the  cause  of  distraction,  and  remain  fixed  upon  the 
same  object,  in  spite  of  all  influences  which  would  turn  it  aside? 
These  are  the  four  degrees  which  we  shall  study,  and  which  cor- 
respond to  an  ever  higher  and  higher  organization  of  the  attention. 

Let  us  bei^  with  idiots.     We  shall  again  mention  Vouzin , 

the  3'oung  idiot  of  twenty  years  in  whom  we  have  especially  studied 

,  the  phenomena  of  attention  during  a  whole  sitting.     We  have 

said  before  that  his  character  is  docile.     Except  on  very  rare 

28 


CONCENTRATION   OF   ATTENTION  29 

occasions  he  shows  no  resistance  to  the  orders  given  him.     But 
what  can  he  do  in  the  way  of  attention? 

Let  us  consider  him  as  he  is  seated  by  our  side.  He  is  not  at 
all  attentive,  he  does  not  look  at  us.  His  glance  wanders  from 
one  object  to  another  without  fixing  itself  upon  any.  Vouzin 
resembles  a  person  who  is  waiting  for  his  turn  in  the  reception 
room  of  a  doctor  or  dentist,  and  remains  in  almost  absolute 
idleness,  the  attention  relaxed,  the  look  wandering.  /  From  time 
to  time,  there  is  produced  in  him  a  brief  act  of  attention  without 
our  intervention.  For  example:  we  turn  before  him  the  handle 
of  a  music  box,  which  produces  a  strong  grinding  sound.  Greatly 
perplexed  by  the  sound,  Vouzin  seizes  the  music  box  and  turns 
the  handle  as  he  has  seen  us  do  in  order  to  produce  the  same 
sound,  but  very  soon  abandons  this.  When  we  wish  to  again 
attract  his  attention,  we  have  considerable  trouble.  He  does 
not  look  at  us  when  we  call.  We  are  obliged  to  shout,  to  make 
violent  gestures  in  order  to  attract  his  attention  which  is  ex- 
tremely fleeting.  His  look  rests  upon  us  for  a  moment,  then 
we  continue  to  call  and  gesticulate  in  vain.  Vouzin  looks  over 
our  shoulder  into  the  depths  of  the  court  where  absolutely  nothing 
is  going  on.  Another  example:  we  give  Vouzin  a  biscuit  and 
let  him  eat  a  part  of  it,  then  we  take  it  away  and  holding  the 
end  of  the  biscuit  in  our  hand  under  his  nose,  we  walk  backwards. 
Quite  naturally  Vouzin  looks  at  the  biscuit  and  follows  it,  tak- 
ing a  few  steps  and  making  a  little  guttural  cry,  but  very  soon  his 
look  wanders;  he  fixes  it  elsewhere  and  acts  as  though  he  had 
forgotten  the  biscuit.  It  is  not  even  a  passing  distraction;  he 
goes  elsewhere,  and  bothers  himself  no  more  about  us,  nor  does 
he  return  to  us.  On  the  contrary  we  are  obliged  to  go  and  hunt 
him,  to  put  the  biscuit  again  under  his  nose  to  make  hun  con- 
sent to  look  at  it.  If  he  were  normal,  this  falling  off  of  atten- 
tion might  be  explained  by  preoccupation  or  distraction  or  by 
a  particular  attitude.  Show  a  biscuit  to  a  school-boy,  and  then 
move  away  and  it  is  not  likely  that  he  would  follow  you.  Even 
a  normal  boy  of  the  primary  school  would  be  a  little  ashamed  to 
follow  you,  thus  showing  that  he  was  obeying  a  gluttonous  de- 
sire. But  it  is  evident  that  Vouzin  is  not  held  back  by  any  com- 
plex motive.  This  is  the  advantage  of  these  inferior  brains  that 
all  secondary  and  disturbing  factors  arc  suppressed  in  them. 
For  this  reason  the  psychology  of  the  idiot  would  be  so  profitable 


30  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

if  one  could  fathom  it.  It  is  evident  that  Vouzin  shows  no  sus- 
^  tained  attention  even  for  that  which  is  of  most  interest  for  him, 
food.  He  acts  in  a  more  senseless  manner  than  a  dog  to  whom 
one  shows  a  lump  of  sugar.  The  dog,  if  he  is  fond  of  sugar, 
stops  and  looks  at  it;  it  does  not  hold  his  attention  indefinitely; 
now  and  then  he  turns  his  head,  looks  elsewhere  as  though  he 
had  a  moment  of  distraction,  or  need  of  rest,  but  soon  his  look 
comes  back  spontaneously  to  the  lump  of  sugar.  With  the 
animal  there  is  a  particular  orientation  of  the  attention  which 
persists  in  spite  of  its  temporary  lapses.  It  is  this  persistence 
that  Vouzin  lacks.  Strictly^pfia-kingj  it  is  jmt  aiault_Qf  ^Sjemory, 
that  is  to  say  a  fault  of  reproduction  after  anjinterval  of  forget- 
fulness;  it  is  a  more  elementary  process,  consisting  in  the  per- 
^sistene&-vf  a-  direction.  It  is  a  question  of  always  returning  to 
the  same  state,  of  following  the  same  direction,  and  Vouzin 
cannot  do  it. 
^  We  find  in  him  therefore  a  weakness  of  the  power  of  attention, 
which  manifests  itself  by  the  following  signs;  it  is  difficult  to 
>  arouse  his_  attention,  and  more  difficult  still  to  hold  it.  We 
may  say  that  he  attains  the  first  degree  of  concentration  of  the 
attention  with  very  little  fixation. 

A  means  of  reinforcing  the  attention  of  an  idiot.  Nevertheless, 
quite  by  chance  we  encountered  a  situation  where  Vouzin  gave 
us  quite  prolonged  attention  instead  of  forgetting  us.  This  is 
true  when  we  give  him  orders  to  execute.  We  have  said  before 
that  he  executed  the  order  to  sit  down  when  shown  a  chair  with 
an  imperious  gesture.  We  complicate  the  orders  by  putting 
five  or  six  chairs  in  a  circle.  Then  standing  like  an  animal  tamer, 
we  give  our  orders  with  a  gesture  of  the  hand,  and  Vouzin  seats 
himself  successively  in  all  the  chairs.  He  shows  no  desire  to 
resist,  and  goes  the  round  of  the  circle  of  chairs  three  or  four  times, 
which  makes  him  repeat  the  act  of  sitting  some  fifteen  times. 
But  we  are  obliged  to  give  him  an  order  before  each  act;  if  we 
do  not  renew  the  gesture,  he  remains  seated  and  does  not  get 
the  idea  of  taking  the  next  chair.  We  remark  again  how  much 
his  docility  depends  upon  the  intensity  of  the  gesture.  If  we 
are  two  meters  from  him  or  if  we  are  seated,  circumstances  which 
obviously  diminish  the  energy  of  our  order,  Vouzin  does  not 
execute  it. 

In  this  connection  we  recall  having  proved  some  time  back 


/ 


CONCENTRATION   OF   ATTENTION  31 

that  when  a  suggestion  to  a  hysteria  patient  is  given  in  a  soft 
voice,  or  with  only  a  shghtly  imperative  word,  the  order  is  only 
partially  executed. 

It  can  thus  be  seen  that  the  "mental  relation  established  be- .   ^ 
tween  Vouzin  and  ourselves  is  prolonged  when  we  cause  him  v        '^ 
to  execute  successive  acts  in  a  series.     This  is  a  means  of  exerting 
a  power  over  his  intelUgence.     This  resembles  the  pedagogical 
procedure  of  La  Martiniere  who  keeps  the  pupil  moving  in  order 
to  make  him  attentive.^ 
i      It  is  undeniable  that  tlie-imbecile  and  th^-  -moron  are  more 
attentive  to  us,  to  our  gestures,  and  above  all  to  our  words  than 
the  idiot  is,  and  tbia~is-©»siiy~^TplaTned.     They  understand  our  <  '^ 
wordsH^^hilc,  an  idiot  does  not.     The  principal  indication,  wholly 
external,  of  this  difference  in  the  power  of  attention  is  that  the 
imbecile  is  capable  of  assuming  the  attitude  of  a  well-behaved  pupil  ^ 
in  school.     He  listens  when  we  speak  to  him,  remains  seated, 
often  looks  at  us  with  deference;  remains  at  our  disposal,  and 
does  what  we  ask  of  him;  with  this  condition,  it  must  be  under- 
stood, that  in  character  he  belongs  to  the  docile  type.     This 
external  difference  between  the  idiot  and  the  imbecile,  does  not 
strikingly  manifest  itself  unless  one  has  taken  pains  to  isolate 
the  subject  in  a  room  where  the  causes  of  distraction  are  not 
numerous.     Let  us  say  first  of  all  that  tbe-ftttention-ef-tfae-im-  -i 
becile  is  more  easily  aroused  and  otwtained  thairfliul  xA  tliu  idlOtT"^ 
This  is  the  translation  into  psychological  language  of  this  ol)ser- 
vation  which  we  have  just  made  upon  the  attitude  of  a  well 
behaved  pupil.     Let  us  suppose  now  that  a  cause  of  distraction 
is  produced.     A  door  opens  while  we  are  talking  with  our  imbecile 
and  a  person  enters  the  room.     Or  perhaps  an  attendant  passes 
in  the  court  before  us.     What  becomes  of  the  attention  of  our 
imbecile?     The  result  depends  upon  his  intellectual  level.     Denise 
is  a  low  grade  imbecile.     She  understands  well  enough  what  we 
say  although  she  scarcely  knows  how  to  talk.     She  is  very  at- 

'  Thus  a  multiplication  is  given  to  a  class  to  do  on  their  slates.  As  soon 
as  each  p>ipil  finishes,  he  leaves  his  plaee,  p;<ies  to  the  desk,  shows  his  slate 
to  the  professor,  who  tells  him  if  his  result  is  correct  or  false;  all  those 
whose  results  are  correct  line  up  on  the  right,  those  incorrect  on  the  left. 
These  comings  and  goings,  which  have  the  sanction  of  the  intellectual 
work,  augment  its  int(;rest  and  hold  the  mind  active,  on  tin*  condition  of 
course  that  the  change  of  place  is  not  permitted  to  be  I  he  occasion  of 
disorder. 


32  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

^tentive  in  general  to  all  that  we  say  to  her,  but  her  attention  is 
of  short  duration.  For  instance  the  window  offers  an  attraction 
for  her.  She  never  fails  to  turn  her  head  as  soon  as  the  door  of 
the  office  opens.  She  wishes  to  see  who  enters,  and  in  that  case, 
she  forgets  us,  because  after  having  looked  at  the  door  her  atten- 
tion does  not  return  to  us.  This  is  a  lack  of  good  manners  of 
which  she  is  wholly  unaware.  It  is  for  the  same  reason  that  she 
vigorously  scratches  her  head,  and  puts  all  the  fingers  possible 
in  her  nose,  even  in  our  presence.  Does  she  belong  to  the  idiot 
class?*  No,  not  altogether,  because  even  though  her  attention 
is  fleeting  and  without  spontaneous  return,  one  can  easily  enough 
govern  this  attention,  and  make  it  return  to  its  point  of  depar- 
ture.    Denise  passes  quite  easily  the  first  two  degrees  of  attention. 

Nothing  is  more  variable  than  the  adaptation  which  attention 
presupposes.  But  we  believe  in  a  general  way  that  the  four 
degrees  which  we  have  just  distinguished  are  a  measure  of  in- 
tellectual level.  Thus  we  have  distinctive  characteristics  with 
a  definite  meaning  upon  which  it  is  possible  to  agree;  while  such 
expressions  as  "little  attention,"  "much  attention"  which  we  wish 
to  aboHsh,  have  so  to  speak  no  precise  sense  at  all. 

Finally;  the  species  of  attention  which  we  have  just  studied, 
<^night  be  called  social  attention.  It  is  this  which  we  try  to  arouse 
and  which  has  for  its  object  ourselves,  our  personality.  We 
have  not  spoken  of  attention  to  food,  nor  of  a  host  of  other  species 
of  attention,  because  we  have  made  our  observation  and  experiment 
only  in  our  office,  and  because  to  have  studied  other  species  of 
attention  would  requii-e  a  larger  field  of  observation.  It  will 
suffice  here  to  note  the  difference  between  the  two  questions. 
We  have  established  a  hierarchy  in  the  concentration  of  atten- 
tion; we  can  establish  similarly  a  hierarchy  among  the  objects 
which  provoke  and  retain  the  attention,  according  as  the  acts 
which  result  are  more  or  less  useful  to  the  individual  or  to  the 
species.  It  is  from  this  last  point  of  view  that  in  general  one 
must  judge  if  a  person  has  or  has  not  attention.  When  the  ob- 
ject of  his  attention  is  frivolous,  one  says  that  he  is  not  attentive. 
A  school  boy  who  passes  his  time  catching  flies  is  very  justly 
called  inattentive;  he  is  attentive  to  the  flies,  but  not  attentive 
to  the  lesson  which  would  be  infinitely  more  profitable  to  him 
if  he  listened  to  it.  ■  One  judges  also  of  the  attention  of  a  per- 
son according  to  the  difficulty  of  the  acts  of  attention  of  which) 


CONCENTRATION    OF   ATTENTION  33 

he  is  capable.  Attention  to  ideas,  or  more  properly  speaking 
reflection,  is  more  difficult  than  attention  to  external  objects 
and  consequently  the  mathematician,  attentive  to  his  problem  P 
of  calculation,  appears  to  us  to  exercise  greater  attention  than 
the  booby  who  with  open  mouth  looks  at  what  is  going  on  in 
the  street.  We  have  made  a  special  point  of  recalling  these 
distinctions  and  phenomena,  to  show  that  the  appreciation  of 
the  degrees  of  attention,  and  a  hierarchy  of  these  degrees  is  not 
a  simple  thing,  and  that  in  this  work  on  defectives  we  have  only 
had  in  view  a  single  one  of  the  nmnerous  distinctions  which  might 
be  made.  This  one  which  we  have  proposed  on  the  different 
degrees  of  concentration  of  attention,  seems  to  us  one  of  the  most 
convenient  to  follow  in  a  rapid  study  made  upon  the  intelUgence 
of  defectives. 


III.    VOLUNTARY  EFFORT 

J  .  .  . 

The  thing  which  dominates  the  whole  question  is  that  defectives 

are  incapable  of  voluntary  effort  in  every  domain -(imbeciles  can  ^ 
remain  attentive,  but  it  is  an  attention  which  is  not  acute  nori 
very  active.)  When  it  requires  more  than  an  attitude  of  atten- 
tion, one  sees  that  they  cannot  succeed.  Their  faces,  moreover, 
never  express  effort,  and  their  brows  have  no  vertical  wrinkles. 
Among  the  tests  which  put  in  clear  light  this  incapacity  for 
strong  attention,  we  shall  study: 

1.  The  time  of  reaction,  where  the  voluntary  effort  consists 
in  replying  as  quickly  as  possible  to  a  signal.  This  is  a  volun- 
tary psycho-motor  effort. 

2.  The  tests  of  quickness  of  movements,  with  the  voluntary 
effort  of  moving  as  quickly  as  possible. 

3.  Tests  consisting  in  calling  up  the  greatest  possible  number 
of  words,  tests  where  the  voluntary  effort  bears  upon  the  power 
of  calling  up  ideas. 

4.  The  immediate  repetition  of  figures,  where  one  makes  a 
voluntary  effort  to  retain  in  the  memory  elements  which  are 
fleeting. 

One  could  devise  many  other  tests  where  the  effort  of  attention 
would  be  shown;  for  example,  the  operation  with  money,  cal- 
culation, or  the  simple  act  of  counting  backwards;  but  we  have 
eliminated  these  tests,  because  they  presupppose  a  certain 
degree  of  instruction,  and  one  could  not  make  them  with  all 
defectives.  Those  which  we  have  chosen  have  the  advantage 
of  being  suitable  for  the  most  ignorant  of  ignoramuses. 

Every  voluntary  effort  sets  two  factors  at  work;  for  the  pres- 
sure of  the  dynamometer,  there  is  the  force  of  contraction  of  the 
muscles,  and  there  is  the  effort  of  will;  in  the  same  way, for  the 
calling  up  of  words,  the  number  of  words  found  depends  at  the 
same  time  upon  the  extent  of  the  vocabulary,  and  the  effort  put 
forth.  One  could  say  the  same  of  the  repetition  of  figures;  the 
memory  of  figures  works  with  the  effort  of  attention.  It  results 
from  this  that  the  total  result  does  not  depend  solely  upon  the 

34 


VOLUNTARY   EFFORT  35 

factor  of  voluntary  effort.  If  for  example  a  person  has  a  good 
memory  for  figm-es  he  could  repeat  a  great  number  without  being 
obliged  to  make  an  effort.  Thus  an  isolated  experiment  of  a 
single  kind  would  be  difficult  to  interpret  and  one  would  be  in 
doubt  as  to  what  part  each  of  the  two  factors  played.  '  To  guide 
this  interpretation  it  is  necessary  to  explore  the  voluntary  effort 
in  several  different  fields,  muscles,  speech,  memory.  (Jt  is  thus 
that  one  arrives  at  the  realization  that  st  defective  is  iiit?apable  ) 
of  an  intense  and  continued  voluntary  effort. ,  a  >k>-=v-w .^' 

Posing  foi^-a-JBhoio^ruph.  Let  us  begin  by  citing  a  very  simple 
observation.  We  wished  to  photograph  most  of  our  subjects 
in  order  to  have  more  examples  and  we  attempted  to  pose  them. 
A  person  that  can  be  posed  for  a  photograph  must  be  capable 
of  some  slight  effort,  since  it  is  necessary  to  keep  the  body  mo- 
tionless during  several  seconds.  Not  all  of  our  imbeciles  are 
capaiiLe-Di.xemaining  motionless  and  we  were  obhged  to  make 
snap  shots  for  the  lowest  grade  cases.  *Afr-for  the-id^iots,  it  wa,g" 
of  no  avail  to  tell  them  to  keep  quiet,  not  to  stir — they  did  not 
obey  the  cuiuinand.  Middle  grade  imbeciles  like  Victor  and 
Cretin,  and  the  high  grade  imbecile,  Albert,  could  keep  a  re- 
markable immobility  of  body;  they  showed  only  a  shght  tendency 
to  move  the  eyes;  their  glance  wandered  from  right  to  left,  as 
though  that  was  the  part  of  the  body  most  difficult  to  render 
immovable. 

This  little  observation  of  a  photographer  only  shows  the  diffi- 
culty which  our  defectives  have  in  making  an  effort.  Now  we 
give  more  demonstrative  and  particularly  more  analytical  exam- 
ples. 

The,  qyickness  of  n>n^}(>fnpnf.  Quickness  is  a  motor  quality, 
in  which  the  effect-Of  attention  is  best  seen.  It  is  for  this  reason 
^  that  we  have  chosen  it  as  a  means  of  measuring  the  attention. 
The  instrument  which  we  use  is  simply  a  music  box  which  one 
plays  by  turning  a  handle.  Fifty  turns  are  necessary  to  produce 
the  complete  nu^lody.  One  listens,  watch  in  hand,  and  the 
time  divided  by  50  gives  the  necessary  time  for  one  revolution; 
it  is  very  convenient  and  quite  inexpensive.  Slight  preliminary 
exerci.ses  proved  to  us  that  one  can  with  a  little  effort  turn  the 
50  revolutions  of  the  handle  in  10  seconds,  which  makes  the  time 
for  one  revolution  two-tenths  of  a  second. 

With  our  defectives  we  are  obliged  to  encourage  them   con- 


/ 


30  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

tinually.  We  repeat  a  great  number  of  times,  "faster,  faster." 
The  duration  is  constantly  longer  than  among  normals,  being 
from  15  to  30  seconds.  They  have  never  reached  the  record 
of  10  seconds.  '  Besides  if  the  handle  is  turned  so  that  the  same 
air  is  repeated  several  times  they  do  not  gain  in  speed.  Thus 
Cabussel  gives  the  following  succession  of  periods;  17",  20", 
23",  20".  Even  if  we  admit  that  the  duration  of  23"  was  pro- 
duced accidentally  by  an  awkward  movement,  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  he  loses  in  speed  instead  of  gaining.  The  same 
observation  holds  good  for  Duneize  14"  14,",  18",  and  it  is, 
moreover,  easy  to  explain.  It  is  not  likely  that  the  cause  is  fatigue 
so  much  as  it  is  lack  of  emulation.  It  does  not  interest  them  to 
turn  the  handle;  they  do  not  put  into  it  any  "amour-propre" 
as  a  normal  would  willingly  do.  '  Never  have  we  heard  an  imbecile 
make  a  joyous  exclamation,  nor  utter  a  word  which  indicated 
in  him  the  desire  to  succeed.  In  this  indifferent  attitude  one 
sees  in  strong  relief  their  inability  to  give  themselves  wholly 
to  any  experiment.     Imbeciles  are  not  sports. 

T4m&-o.j  j^^sGsUon.  When  one  wishes  to  make  rapid  reactions 
in  from  ten  to  twelve  hundredths  of  a  second,  it  does  not  suffice 
to  remain  sitting  passively  awaiting  a  signal;  one  must  picture 
to  one's  self  the  signal  before  it  is  given ;  one  must  also  prepare 
one's  muscle,  and  put  it  in  a  state  of  tension.  All  this  prepara- 
tion, at  once  the  ideational  and  motor — thanks  to  which  one  is 
like  a  charged  cannon  on  the  point  of  exploding — demands  a 
great  effort,  and  this  effort  is  painful.  One  cannot  maintain 
it  long;  there  are  successive  oscillations  in  the  attention  thus 
over-stimulated;  now  it  is  fixed,  now  it  relaxes.  Let  us  see  how 
our  defectives  behave.  Albert  has  great  difficulty  in  under- 
standing that  he  must  close  his  eyes,  wait  for  the  signal  and  make 
his  movement  in  response  to  the  signal  as  quickly  as  possible.  It 
was  necessary  to  repeat  to  him  each  time  "raise  your  hand," 
(so  that  he  would  be  ready  to  respond)  "close  your  eyes,"  "pay 
attention."  He  held  the  lever  waiting  for  the  response  with 
the  greatest  awkwardness,  and  many  reactions  had  to  be  dis- 
carded because  he  did  not  succeed  in  shutting  off  the  current. 
The  most  striking  feature  iri  this  series  of  reactions  is  that  they 
are  e?rtf cmoly .  long.  They  attain  an  average  of  50  hundredths 
of  a  second,  while  the  reaction  of  a  normal  adult  requires  only 
from  15  to  20  hundredths.     We  did   our  best  to  excite  Albert, 


VOLUNTARY   EFFORT  37 

scolding  him  and  ordering  him  to  go  faster.  All  our  attempts 
were  useless,  and  failed  to  obtain  any  appreciable  increase  of 
speed.  His  attention  has  therefore  much  less  strength  than 
one  would  have  believed.  He  has  the  physical  attitude  of  volun- 
tary attention,  and  in  external  appearance  he  resembles  an  at- 
tentive pupil.  But  a  school  child  has  a  more  rapid  reaction  y 
time.  TSo-what  characterizes  the  attention  of  an  imbecile  is 
that  it  has  the  outward  semblance,  and  a  certam  duration,  since 

ii-ma^.  continue  during  several  hours.     What  is  lackmg  is  depth. 1. . 

With  the  moron  Griffon  we  encountered  in  the  beginning  the 
same  difficulties  of  explanation.  In  the  first  experiments  some- 
times he  would  react  before  the  signal;  again,  when  it  was  given 
he  would  not  attempt  to  react  until  a  considerable  time  had 
elapsed.  And  every  time  the  same  orders  had  to  be  given,  "raise 
the  hand,"  "close  the  eyes,"  "attention,"  but  after  a  time  he 
adapted  himself  and  made  more  rapid  reactions  than  Albert. 
Here  is  the  series: 

105  30  20 

anticipated  28  46  (Faster!) 

160  40  18 

anticipated  40  22 

72  45  17 

anticipated  50  (Faster!)  26 

anticipated  24  32 

forgotten  43  (Faster!)  33 

120  19  43 

29  20 

These  last  figures  tend  to  approach  those  of  normal  subjects. 
We  remark  in  passing  that  Griffon  is  able  when  required,  to  make 
an  effort  of  acceleration.  If  one  says  "Faster!",  the  following 
reaction  is  always  shorter.     Albert  does  not  succeed  in  this. 

Supplementary  to  the  experiments  made  with  Albert  and 
Griffon,  let  us  give  that  which  we  made  with  the  young  Beauvisage. 
She  had  in  her  hands  the  same  apparatus;  the  same  means  were 
taken  to  prepare  her,  we  gave  her  the  same  explanations  repeat- 
ing them  a  great  number  of  times. 

Here  is  the  series  of  reactions  that  were  o))tained: 


38  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


75" 

neglect 

anticipated 

l'4o" 

1'15" 

2' 

65" 

anticipated 

4' 

52" 

1' 

4' 

anticipated 

4' 

4'50" 

neglect 

neglect 

3' 

These  singular  results  have  but  one  point  of  interest  which 
is  to  show  how  the  rebellious  type  of  imbecile  behaves.  One 
would  commit  a  singular  error  in  supposing  that  Beauvisage 
gives  here  all  the  attention  of  which  she  is  capable,  and  in  ac- 
counting for  her  slow  reaction  by  her  intellectual  level.  The 
comparison  with  Albert  prevents  this  error.  These  are  the  re- 
actions of  a  sullen  girl  and  not  of  an  imbecile  mentality.  Fur- 
thermore we  have  been  able  to  assure  ourselves  of  this  by  the 
following  means.  The  experimenter  who  had  taken  the  series 
of  reactions  cited  above  was  replaced  by  another  whose  age  and 
familiarity  with  the  technique  gave  him  greater  advantage. 
The  times  of  reaction  obtained  by  him  were  better,  and  this 
proves,  let  it  be  said  in  passing,  that  in  certain  cases  the  personality 
of  the  experimenter  influences  the  rapidity  of  the  reaction  of  a  sub- 
ject. Here  are  some  of  these  new  reactions;  they  are  about  a  half 
minute  while  the  preceding  ones  generally  exceed  two  minutes. 

46"  anticipated  anticipated 

65"  43"  45" 

There  are  no  more  cases  of  neglect  and  the  time  is  very  much 
reduced.  We  cite  these  facts  first  because  they  show  curiously 
the  influence  of  an  attitude,  and  more  than  this  they  prove  that 
in  spite  of  the  precision  of  figures,  the  times  of  reaction,  like  all 
other  psychological  measurements,  have  only  a  relative  value. 
\  Oq— fcbo  whole-the  times  of  simple  reactions  are  longer  with 
defectives  than  with  normals,  even  when  they  thoroughly  under- 
stand the  experiment  and  know  what  is  wanted  of  them.  This 
proves  that  the  times  of  reaction  remain,  in  grave  cases,  a  good 
measure  of  the  attention  .y 

Calling  up  of  the  maximum  number  of  words  in  a  given  time. 
"You  are  going  to  say  the  greatest  number  of  words  possible; 
you  can  say  any  words,  the  first  that  come  to  your  mind,  words 
like  hat,  house,  etc.     I  am  going  to  give  you  the  signal.     'Now.'  " 

After  this  explanation  which  one  repeats  seVeral  times  in  order 


VOLUNTARY   EFFORT  39 

( 

to  impress  it,  the  normal  subject  can  find  in  3  minutes  a  hundred 
words;  the  number  varies  as  can  be  easily  understood  according 
to  a  number  of  conditions.  The  principal  of  these  are:  Fu'st,  a 
general  condition,  good  will,  emulation,  zeal,  courage,  etc.  Second,  a 
more  special  condition,  the  extent  of  the  vocabulary;  this  we  learned 
from  extended  investigation  among  normals.  On  the  whole 
this  test  is  as  good  as  the  dynamometer,  or  the  chronometer. 
It  measures  the  effort,  but  an  effort  bearing  upon  a  special  object, 
the  awakening  of  ideas.  This  is  a  sort  of  dynamometer  of  ver- 
bal ideation. 

How  do  our  defectives  behave?  However  lacking  they  may 
be  in  intelligence,  they  possess  in  their  heads  more  than  two 
thousand  words,  at  least  high  grade  imbeciles  and  morons  do. 
It  might  therefore  be  expected  that  they  would  easily  pass  this 
test,  which  does  not  require  great  intelligence.  Far  from  it, 
however.  They  show  the  greatest  possible  signs  of  distress,  and 
thus  demonstrate  their  inability  to  make  the  effort  of  ideation. 
The  effort  which  they  cannot  make  with  their  muscles  they  can- 
not make  any  better  with  their  verbal  imagination. 

^"ote  first  Beauvisage,  high  grade  imbecile,  but  rebellious  in 
character,  who  did  not  like  this  test  at  all.  She  could  not  bring 
herself  to  hunt  for  words;  she  cited  after  us  "picture"  and  then 
added  "table."  That  was  the  end.  She  declared  that  she  could 
find  none.  It  was  impossible  to  obtain  another  word  even  at 
the  end  of  3  minutes.'  It  is  evident  that  this  was  a  case  of  ill- 
will  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  intellectual  level.  Albert, 
high  grade  imbecile  who  is  full  of  good  will,  did  all  in  his  power 
to  please  us,  but  was  unable  to  find  more  than  20  words  in  3 
minutes.  He  often  repeated  "I  don't  know  any  more,"  and 
yet  this  was  not  because  he  was  short  of  words,  for  if  we  carried 
on  the  experiment  for  6  minutes  more  he  found  41.  *We  inter- 
pret this  small  number  of  20  words  as  a  proof  of  the  weakness  of 
his  voluntary  power. 

Duncize,  middle  grade  imbecile,  cited  18  words;  she  often 
repeated  the  same  ones  (of  which  we  kept  no  count). 

Galiard,  low  grade  moron,  who  was  also  very  willing,  but  who 
was  intellectually  apathetic,  succeeded  less  well;  in  3  minutes 
she  gives  only  17  words. 

Let  us  cite  also  Griffon,  another  moron,  whose  vocabulaiy  is 
well  developed.  We  were  not  able  to  obtain  from  him  more  than 
22  words. 


40  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

On  the  whole  the'TTumBef"  o7~words  cited  by  our  defectives  is 
inferior  to  that  of  normals.  There  are,  however,  exceptions. 
One  of  these  is  Cabussel,  a  high  grade  imbecile  of  some  thirty- 
years. 

Cabussel  is  microcephalic' 

He  is  like  the  greater  number  of  microcephalics,  interesting 
on  account  of  the  vivacity  of  his  manners,  and  above  all  by  his 
loquacity.  Whatever  question  is  put  to  him,  he  enters  im- 
mediately, almost  without  reflection,  into  endless  details  which 
generally  are  for  the  purpose  of  boasting  of  his  own  ability. 

We  had  supposed  that  in  spite  of  this  abundant  verbosity, 
Cabussel  would  be  incapable  of  calling  up  voluntarily  a  great 
number  of  words.  We  were  mistaken.  He  willingly  accepted 
our  invitation,  and  said  to  us  with  his  habitual  harmless  vanity, 
"Ah,  that's  what  I  know,  words,"  and  in  fact  he  cited  30  in  3 
minutes,  which  is  a  great  number  for  an  imbecile.  We  inter- 
pret this  result  in  the  following  manner:  this  test  of  calling  up 
words  requires,  as  we  have  said,'^two  factors,  the  extent  of  the 
vocabulary  and  the  voluntary  effort.  Cabussel  probably  exer- 
cised no  more  effort  than  the  other  imbeciles  but  having  a  larger 
vocabulary  he  easily  found  more  words.  His  case  once  inter- 
preted comes  under  the  general  rule. 

CX)utside  the  small  number  of  words  cited  there  are  other  facts 
which  show  that  our  defectives  are  incapable  of  an  effort  of 
ideations  ^^or  example  they  give  only  names  of  ordinary  ob- 
jects, they  often  repeat  the  same  word,  and  again,  a  very  char- 
acteristic circumstance,  they  search  for  their  words  by  looking 
about  them  and  often  name  the  objects  they  see,  which  is  a  sign 
of  poverty  of_ideation^ 

'  Although  it  is  not  a  question  of  cephalometry  in  this  article,  we  think 
it  useful  to  describe  our  method  of  estimating  the  development  of  the 
head.  Instead  of  citing  the  figures  of  the  measurements,  which  signify 
nothing,  we  substitute  a  comparison  of  the  figures  representing  the  normal 
cranial  development  among  children.  Thus  Cabussel,  who  is  1.685  m 
in  height,  a  little  superior  to  that  of  the  normal  adult,  has  a  normal  face, 
and  a  head  equal  in  development  to  that  of  a  child  of  seven  years.  It  is 
evident  that  this  comparison  with  a  child  of  seven  is  much  more  significant 
than  if  we  simply  said:  Cabussel  has  an  anterior-posterior  diameter  of 
168  millimeters,  transversal  of  137  millimeters,  frontal  of  97  millimeters, 
biauricular  of  122,  and  vertical  of  126,  etc.  These  figures  mean  nothing 
without  commentary. 


VOLUNTARY   EFFORT  41 

Memory-fer  figures.  This  is  the  last  of  the  tests  which  we  use 
to  measure  the  capacity  for  effort.  It  will  be  remembered  in 
what  this  consists.  A  person  repeats  a  series  of  figures,  without 
intonation  or  rhythm  at  a  rate  of  two  figures  a  second.  Immedi- 
ately after  having  been  heard  they  are  to  be  repeated  in  the  order 
given.  One  must  go  quickly  for  the  memory  of  figures  which 
have  no  meaning  is  very  fleeting.  A  normal  subject,  according 
to  the  pains  he  takes,  can  repeat  from  6  to  9  figures  or  even  more. 
Probably  7  is  about  the  average  number. 

To  this  test  defectives  adapt  themselves  easily  enough.  They 
understand  that  they  must  repeat  the  figures,  and  they  do  so 
as  soon  as  they  are  pronounced.  Certain  ones,  nevertheless, 
find  difficulty  in  grasping  the  order.  Thus  Cabussel  begins  to 
repeat  each  figure  as  soon  as  it  is  pronounced.  If  we  explain 
laboriously  to  him  that  that  is  wrong,  that  he  must  wait  until 
we  have  finished  giving  the  series,  before  commencing  the  repeti- 
tion, he  responds  bj'  a  prolonged  silence,  he  allows  precious  time 
to  pass  before  beginning  to  repeat  the  figures.  He  often  cannot 
reproduce  a  single  one.  But  Cabussel  is  an  exception.  ^  In  gen- 
eral, imbeciles  listen  to  us  in  silence  and  commence  to  repeat 
the  moment  that  we  have  finished. 

What  is  the  number  of  figures  which  they  are  capable  of  re- 
peating? Although  this  test  seems  to  demand  but  a  slight  de- 
gree of  intelligence,  yet  our  defectives  succeed  very  poorly  with 
it.  According  to  our  notes  we  find  the  results  are  very  far  from 
brilliant;  Denise  (low  grade  imbecile),  Victor  (middle  grade  im- 
becile), Beauvisage  (high  grade  imbecile).  Cretin  (middle  grade 
imbecile),  repeated  in  general  only  one  figure,  sometimes  2. 

Albert  and  Lanerie  (high  grade  imbeciles)  repeat  4.  Guliard, 
Griffon,  Birn  (morons)  repeat  5  or  6.  Therefore,  all  without 
exception  are  below  normal.  There  almost  seems  to  be  a  rela- 
tion between  the  intellectual  level  of  a  subject,  and  the  num- 
ber of  figures  he  can  repeat.  Victor  (middle  grade  imbecile) 
repeats  fewer  than  Albert  (high  grade  iml)ccilc),  and  he  in  turn 
fewer  than  Griffon  who  is  a  moron.  More  need  not  be  said;  all 
our  results  confirm  those  given  above  and  show  again  the  in- 
capacity for  effort  which  exists  among  defectives. 

As  in  other  cases  this  incapacity  betrays  itself  not  only  in  the 
weakness  of  the  numerical  results;  it  manifests  itself  by  incidental 
phenomena.     Here   are  some   of   them.     First   the   automatism 


42        THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

of  some  repetitions.  It  is  a  common  occurrence  among  normals 
that  when  they  forget  a  figure  they  have  a  tendency  to  replace  it 
by  a  figure  of  their  invention  which  is  the  continuation  of  the 
preceding.  In  repeating  3,  8,  2,  7,  5,  if  they  hesitate  after  2, 
they  have  a  tendency  to  cite  a  figure  which  will  be  3,  or  4  conse- 
quently one  nearer  than  7  and  betray  a  tendency  to  evoke  the 
figures  in  their  natural  order.  Ziliez,  one  of  our  students,  who 
was  the  first  to  remark  this  tendency  among  normals,  resorted 
to  complicated  calculations  and  numerous  documents  in  order 
to  make  this  clear.  He  would  not  have  taken  so  much  pains 
with  defectives,  because  with  the  latter  the  tendency  to  follow 
the  nat«rai  order  is  very  much  more  marked;  or  rather,  without 
^  being  stronger  it  is  not  corrected  by  the  critical  sense;  one  often 
meets  those  who,  after  hearing  a  series  like,  3,  8,  2,  5,  9,  4,  say 
to  you  with  a  naive  seriousness,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9  .  .  .  . 
and  they  insist  when  questioned,  that  they  have  repeated  what 
was  just  said  to  them.  Do  they  beUeve  it?  Probably  not, 
but  all  this  must  be  very  vague  in  their  minds,  v  Another  kind 
of  error,  which  frequently  occurs  among  them,  consists  in  for- 
getting~thB~^rst~~figures  of  the  series.  They  repeat  only  the 
last  like  echoes.  With  normal  subjects  the  distribution  of  errors 
is  slightly  different.  It  is  the  middle  of  the  series  which  shows 
the  signs  of  weakness.  The  beginning  and  the  end  are  better 
retained.  It  has  seemed  to  us  that  this  difference  is  significant 
and  deserves  an  attempt  at  interpretation.  Here  is  ours.  To 
recall  the  last  words  of  a  series  heard  is  natural  for  the  reason 
that  one  word  heard  disperses  those  heard  previously  and  the 
last  word  covers  all  the  rest.  In  order  to  remember  the  end 
figures  it  is  necessary  only  to  remain  passive.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  one  wishes  to  recall  the  first  figures  one  must  struggle 
against  forgetfulness,  and  repeat  the  figures  energetically  to 
oneself  while  the  experimenter  is  saying  others.  This  is  a  very 
active  exercise  which  a  zealous  normal  subject  readily  performs. 
Thanks  to  these  supplementary  repetitions,  he  succeeds  in  re- 
viving the  memory  of  the  first  figures.  As  to  those  of  the  middle, 
he  has  not  the  time  to  revive  them  and  cannot  give  them  this 
secondary  help.  Naturally,  an  imbecile  who  has  less  activity 
and  especially  less  ingenuity  than  a  normal  does  not  even  dream 
of  employing  this  reinforcement  of  his  first  memories,  and  con- 
sequently he  loses  them   along   with  the  middle  of  the  series, 


VOLUNTARY   EFFORT  43 

retaining  only  the  last,  like  an  echo,  because  he  does  not  actively 
intervene  to  preserve  them. 

One  may  be  astonished  that  some  imbeciles,  however  incapable 
of  effort  one  supposes  them,  should  be  reduced  to  repeating  a 
single  figure.  Is  this  then  a  measure  of  their  field  of  consciousness 
for  verbal  repetitions?  We  disregard  Beauvisage,  who  is  rebel- 
lious and  could  do  better  probably  if  she  applied  herself.  But 
Victor  and  Duneize  are  docUe  subjects.  How  does  it  happen 
that  when  we  recite  three  figures  and  they  understand  very  well 
what  they  ought  to  do  they  recite  only  one,  the  last,  like  an  echo? 
Evidently  one  does  not  need  to  be  a  psychologist  to  reaUze  that 
this  monosyllabic  repetition  is  a  very  small  return. /it  is  all 
the  more  surprising  because  imbeciles  are  capable  of  spontaneously 
making  sentences  of  many  more  than  one  syllable.  Victor 
can  make  sentences  of  from  8  to  12  syllables;  and  as  for- Duneize, 
when  questioned  about  her  home,  she  replied  thus*: 

Q.  From  what  country  are  you? 
A.  From  the  plain  of  St.  Denis. 

Q.  Where  do  you  live  now?  -  -» ■ 

A.  In  the  plain  St.  Denis. 
Q.  What  street? 

A.  By  the  red  ball    ....    near  the  wine  merchant     .... 
there  is  a  great  door,  and  then  it  is  there. 

Here  is  a  collection  of  little  sentences  which  contain  at  least 
24  syllables,  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  a  subject  who 
is  capable  of  constructing  a  sentence  of  such  length  should  be 
reduced  to  a  monosyllabic  repetition.  This  same  Duneize  who 
repeats  only  one  figure,  can  repeat  a  number  of  syllables  when 
they  make  sense.  Here  is  a  fragment  of  attempts  made  upon 
her,  as  well  for  the  memory  of  figures,  as  for  that  of  sentences. 


Words  of  the  experimenter 

Replies  of  the  subject 

2 

2 

4,7 

7 

4,7 

ca,  7 

5,  8 

8 

Before?  what  did  I  say? 

(Silence) 

3,  9 

9 

Before? 

(Silence) 

5,  1 

1 

shoe 

shoe 

44 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


Words  of  the  experimenter — Con. 
I  am  cold,  I  am  very  hungry. 
Ta  poum 
Racao 

Pif  Pouf  Paf 
Mac  ferlan 
2,3,9 
6,7,4 
6,  2,  8 

I  have  a  beautiful  bird 
I  have  a  green  frog 
I  have  a  red  and  blue  Polichinelle 
Do,  mi,  sol,  do 

Some  coffee  with  milk  and  some 
good  chocolate 


Replies  of  the  subject — Con. 
I  am  very  hungry. 
Ta  pou 
Racao 
Pouf  Paf 
Mac  ferlan 
2,  3,  9, 
(Silence) 
8 

Beautiful  bird 
Green  frog 

Red  and  blue  Polichinelle 
Do,  mi,  sol,  do 

Some  good  chocolate  then  some 
coffee  with  milk. 


These  little  attempts  show  us  that  our  imbecile  can  repeat 
sentences  longer  than  two  syllables.  She  even  repeated  7  syllables. 
In  this  case  the  sense  of  the  words  aided  their  retention.  But 
the  figures  have  no  meaning,  they  do  not  speak  to  the  imagination ; 
they  are  absolutely  forbidding.  To  retain  them  one  must  strug- 
gle against  their  uninteresting  character,  v  In  a  word  one  must 
make  an  effort,  and  this  is  always  the  point  to  which  we  return; 
'  /the  defective  is  incapable  of  effort. 
V  I  QmLcbisJjPn.  The  results  which  we  have  just  cited  are  almost 
a  confirmation  of  the  experiments  upon  the  effort  of  attention. 
The  utihty  of  all  this  chronometry  which  the  psychological  labora- 
tory has  so  much  abused,  has  often  and  with  reason  been  con- 
tested. But  nevertheless  it  remains  well  demonstrated  that  with 
pathological  cases  of  the  nature  of  defectives  these  experiments 
upon  intensive  and  forced  attention  are  of  incontestable  value 
because  they  show  the  weakness  of  attention  in  a  place  where 
it  might  have  been  least  suspected.  Our  imbecile  Albert,  as 
we  have  said,  is  the  image  of  a  perfect  pupil,  who  listens  motion- 
less in  his  seat,  and  might  be  taken  as  a  model  for  restless  chil- 
dren. At  first  sight  he  seems  to  be  extremely  attentive,  but 
this  is  only  in  appearance  and  quite  superficial.  The  test  upon 
the  time  of  reaction,  among  others,  shows  this  clearly.  The  time 
of  reaction  of  a  good  pupil  is  from  12  to  15  hundredths  of  a  second, 
,  while  that  of  our  imbecile  is  50  hundredths,  which  is  an  enor- 
mous difference.  This  is  not,  by  the  way,  peculiar  to  Albert, 
whom  we  take  as  an  example.  Griffon,  a  moron,  has  longer  times 
than  a  normal,  although  more  rapid  than  Albert.     This  is  easily 


VOLUXTARY    EFFORT  45 

understood;  his  times  of  reaction  are  better  because  he  is  more 
intelUgent.  /  These- tests- -a-lso-sliow^  44s- that  there-is- a-  certain 
qutrht^'  in  the  intelhgerrce  Trhich  is  distinct  from  those  which 
we_JiaA:e-dQscribod  above,  such  as  excitation,  fixation,  iC'sisiarice 
to  distractioiis  and  spontaneous  returns.")  These  are  quahties 
of  the  concentration  of  attention.  There  exists,  besides,  a  more 
intimate  quahty,  more  effective,  whicli  may  bo  called  the  in- 
tensity-ey-tho  de}>t-h  o^  atteutioii.y  It  is  indeed  by  the  depili  of  ♦' 
attentioft-tlHit  our  defectives  differ  tiie  most  from  normals.  This 
is  the  decisive  point,  the  thing  which  we  have  simply  supposed 
up  to  the  present,  which  our  tests  first  clearh-  bring  to  light. 

What  seems  singular,  when  one  thinks  a  little,  is  that  all  these 
tests  of  effort  of  attention  are  difficult  and  even  painful,  but  they 
do  not  demand  a  particularly  great  intelligence;  they  are  easy  to 
understand,  and  in  any  case,  if  one  takes  a  little  pains,  one  can 
make  them  understood  by  imV)eciles.  Besides  they  do  not 
demand  a  great  expendittu'e  of  judgment  nor  invention ;  does  it 
require  these,  for  instance,  to  tin-n  a  handle?  Evidently  not. 
One  might  have  supposed  that  the  capacity  for  effort  is  distinct, 
independent  of  the  intellectual  level,  and  that  the  most  stupid, 
the  most  limited  being,  is  therefore  capable  of  effort. 

This  would  be  an  error,  as  we  have  just  seen.  Without  attempt- 
ing to  explain  anything,  without  even  having  the  right  to  explain 
anything,  since  we  have  not  made  a  study  of  the  intimate  nature 
of  effort,Ave  shall  simply  say  that  effort  depends  upon  intellec- 
tual_leyel^  and  that  for  this  reason,  it  is  denied  to  defectives. 

It  is  probable  that  in  other*  pathological  states,  where  the  sub- 
jects are  recognized  as  incapable  of  effort,  the  genesis  of  the 
phenomena  would  be  entirely'  different;  a  state  of  fatigue  for  in- 
stance, may  render  the  effort  impossil)le  or  ineffectual.  Recent 
descriptions  have  strongly  insisted  upon  the  relation  of  fatigue 
to  the  aljsence  of  effort.  Let  us  admit  il.  But  remember  that 
these  same  facts  may  be  explained  in  other  cases  in  a  quite  differ- 
ent manner,  and  that  the  impossibility  of  effort  may  Ik;  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  lowering  of  tlie  intellectual  level. 


IV.     MOVEMENTS— WRITING 

After  the  psychogenesis  of  attention  and  of  effort,  let  us  attempt 
to  enter  into  that  of  movement,  or  rather  into  one  particular  act, 
the  very  complicated  act  of  writing.  We  may  roughly  conjec- 
/ture  that  this  act,  in  proportion  as  it  is  executed-by  persons 
I  more  and  more  intelligent,  will  become  more  delicate,  more  pre- 
V  cise,  more  conformable  to  the  end  proposed.  It  is  curious  to 
find,  that  in  working  with  a  graded  series  of  defectives  we  ob- 
tain a  series  of  hand-writings  more  and  more  complex,  which 
very  much  resemble  those  which  can  be  obtained  from  a  series 
of  normal  children  of  different  ages.  This  is  curious,  and  in 
practice  it  might  be  convenient  for  a  diagnosis.  If  one  is  in 
doubt  as  to  the  intellectual  level  of  an  imbecile,  if  one  supposes, 
for  instance,  that  he  could  reply  to  questions  but  that  he  does 
not  reply  because  of  a  rebellious  character,  it  would  often  be  suffi- 
cient to  slip  a  pencil  into  his  hand  and  to  let  him  write,  in  order 
to  judge.  Someone,  perhaps  Richelieu,  said  "With  two  lines 
of  a  man's  writing  one  could  have  him  hung."  We  willingly 
add,  with  a  line  of  writing  we  can  establish  the  intellectual 
level  even  among  those  who  do  not  know  how  to  write. 

We  will  begin  with  the  idiot,  Vouzin,  who  cannot  pronounce 
a  single  word.  We  give  him  a  sheet  of  white  paper  and  a  shar- 
pened pencil.  He  takes  the  pencil,  which  he  holds  awkwardly 
in  his  right  hand,  but  he  has  no  hesitation  in  recognizing  the 
sharpened  end  of  the  pencil,  and  he  uses  only  that  end.  He  im- 
mediately begins  to  scribble.  He  traces  on  the  paper  with  an 
incredible  activity,  great  curvilinear  movements,  employing  not 
only  his  fingers,  but  his  hand,  and  even  his  forearm.  As  soon 
as  he  has  finished  we  give  him  another  sheet  of  paper;  he  com- 
mences his  work  with  the  same  animation  and  seems  to  take 
the  greatest  pleasure  in  it.  A  specimen  of  his  scribbling  is  repro- 
duced in  our  figure  10  which  represents  about  one  quarter  of 
the  page  scribbled  over. 

At  first  sight  there  appears  to  be  no  plan,  no  directing  idea  in 
■  the  scribbling,  and  one  might  attribute  it  to  a  blind  play  of  some 

4G 


MOVEMENTS— WRITIXG 


47 


physical  phenomenon;  but  by  looking  closely  one  can  see  a  trace 
of  adaptation.  Tlie  movement  in  spite  of  its  extent,  remains 
within  the  border  furnished  by  the  dimensions  of  the  paper,  and 
though  occasionally  the  line  crossed  the  border,  Vouzin  never 
attempted  to  make  lines  on  the  table  upon  which  the  paper  rested. 
Passing  next  to  low  grade  imbeciles,  we  place  a  pen  in  the  hands 


FIG.  10.    SCRIBBLING  OF  THE  IDIOT  VOUZIN  ON  A  LARGE  SHEET  OF  PAl'KU. 


of  Dcnise,  and  we  ask  hoi-  to  write  upon  the  white  paper.  She 
traces  no  letter,  no  design,  noUiing  but  strokes  all  in  the  same 
direction  but  without  (M-dcr.  ^\'lu'Il  her  iid<  is  exhausted,  which 
soon  happens,  she  finds  Ihc  ink  well  but  dips  her  pen  with  so 
little  attention  ihat  it  frec|uently  passes  outside  without  her 
perceiving  i(.  I'igurc  II  rcpidiluccs  this  cIcMientary  calligraphy. 
It  is  not  tlu;  sinii)l('st  that  could  be  imagined.  \V(^  have  seen 
the  scribbling  of  Vouzin,  which  is  still  simjiler,  and  bedsides,  Vouzin 
pre  bably  ennld    not    h;ive   used   ;i    pm.     The   lines  of   nenis(;  arc 


48        THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

better  organized;  they  more  nearly  resemble  writing.  Notice 
also  that  Denise  does  not  cover  one  of  her  strokes  by  another 
as  \'ouzin  docs.  Note  in  passing  that  Denise  can  copy  nothing; 
a  circle  had  been  traced  on  her  paper  which  she  had  been  asked 
to  imitate  but  spite  of  a  long  insistence  nothing  was  obtained  but 
little  strokes,  which  she  i)ut  like  feet  to  the  circle. 

Gentil,  a  low  grade  imbecile,  slightly  superior  to  Denise  in 
that  he  pronounces  more  words,  has  also  very  rudimentary 
ivriting.  With  a  great  deal  of  satisfaction,  he  traces  zig-zag 
lines  with  a  pencil,  the  point  of  which  he  had  first  put  in  his 
mouth.     If  a  pen  is  given  him,  he  makes  the  same  design,  hold- 


/ 


r 


/ 

FIG.  11.    HANDWRITING  OF  DENISE,  LOW  GRADE  IMBECILE. 

ing  the  pen  backwards,  and  pushing  upon  the  point,  without  ever 
taking  more  ink  when  the  pen  becomes  dry.  He  continues  thus 
his  zig-zag  during  a  long  time,  although  his  pen  traces  no  visible 
line.  One  might  imagine  that  his  zig-zags  are  of  the  same  rudi- 
mentary character  as  the  sweeping  lines  of  Vouzin.  But  they 
differ  by  at  least  two  characteristics;  first  they  are  formed  of 
short  strokes  which  are  quite  regular,  and  in  the  second  place 
they  do  not  cover  one  another.  The  Hnes  are  made  in  any  direc- 
tion but  they  do  not  cross  each  other. 

With  imbeciles  of  the  middle  grade  we  obtain  scribblings  which 
more  nearly  resemble  writing.     Victor  constantly  carries  about 


MOVEMEXTS^WRITING 


49 


with  him  a  soiled  note  Ijook  of  130  pages,  which  are  methodicalh^ 
covered  by  horizontal  hnes  of  small  zig-zags,  carefulh'  made 
from  left  to  right;  each  page  has  at  least  some  thirty  of  these 
little  lines;  they  are  in  order,  fairlj'  parallel,  and  none  overlap- 
ping.    They  are  made  with  a  pencil  which  is  kept  between  the 


^^^/^, 


^j- 


FIC;.  J2.     HAXDWKITING   OF    GEXTIL.    LOW  GRADE  IMBECILE.    HE  KEEPS 
WITItIN  THE  EDGES  OF  HIS  PAPER. 


page.>^  of  the  book.  I'^ory  page  bears  in  addition  a  circle  traced 
by  following  the  outline  of  a  sou.  We  have  begged  and  implored 
Victor  to  make  us  a  present  of  his  note  book  or  of  at  least  one 
page.  He  has  refused  with  continued  persistency.  -Ml  that 
lie  has  consented  to  do,  in  order  to  be  agreeable  tons,  lias  been 


50 


TllK    INTELLUiENfK    OK     PUK    FEEBLE-MINDED 


to  make  a  copy  ol  oiu"  ul'  the  i)ages  upon  a  slieet  of  paper  which 
we  have  furnished  him.  He  traced  the  hnes  with  the  gravity  of 
a  Minister  of  State. 


v//  ^^■ 


u 


^/' 


c./ 


FIG.  13.     A  PAGE  FROAI  THE  NOTE  BOOK  OF  VICTOR,  MIDDLE  GRADE 

IMBECILE. 

His  writing  is  much  superior  to  that  of  Gentil,  to  which  one 
should  compare  it  for  the  two  are  somewhat  similar.  In  the  first 
place  the  lines  traced  by  Victor  are  constantly  parallel,  like  the 
lines  of  a  manuscript,  while  those  of  Gentil  are  divergent  and 
go  in  every  direction.     Besides  Victor  is  not  limited  to  rudimentary 


MOVEMENTS — WRITING 


51 


zig-zags;  his  seem  like  letters  more  or  less  well  traced;  e,  u,  and 
p,  can  even  be  recognized. 

Cretin  is  a  yomig  girl  who  belongs  to  the  same  degret;  of  im- 
becility as  Victor.  She  does  not  take  to  writing  like  Victor 
but  she  consented  to  do  something  for  us.     Her  writing  is  not 


FIG.  14.     WRITING  OK  AI,Hi:i<T,  A  HIGH  GRADE  IMBECILE.     UK  UISHKI)  TO 
WRITH  HI.S  NAME  AND  A  SERIES  OF  rffUTRES. 


unlike  his,  although  it  is  more  elegant  and  neater  and  is  also 
shaded;  one  can  almost  recognize  the  shapes  of  certain  letters. 
As  can  be  seen,  we  approach  constanlly  nearer  to  writing. 
Duneize,  high  grade  imbecile,  when  asked  to  write,  tiaces  one 
after  another  the  letters  a.  n,  and  ii,  that  can  be  easily  recognized. 


52  THE.  INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

One  would  say  it  was  a  page  belonging  to  a  school  child  learning 
to  write.  In  the  same  way  Albert  traces  figures  or  letters.  Here 
ends  the  history  of  illiterate  writing.  One  degree  more  and  we 
have  specimens  of  normal  writing. 

We  have  considered  it  worth  while  to  publish  with  brief  com- 
ments these  graphisms  of  defectives,  because  they  clearly  show 
the  evolution  of  the  writing  movement,  which  as  it  becomes 

^more   and   more   organized   approaches   the   normal   movement. 
But  what  is  most  remarkable  in  this  series  of  graphisms  is  that 

l^  it  reveals  to  us  a  law  of  evolution  which  governs  not  only  the 
movements  but  still  more  the  ideas.  We  are  not  yet  able  to 
fully  understand  that  law,  but  we  shall  return  to  it  later,  and 
formulate  it  as  clearly  as  possible,  when  we  treat  of  ideation. 
For  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  constitutes  a  transi- , 
tion  from  the  vague  to  the  definite. 


V.     INTELLIGENCE  AND  PERCEPTION 

It  is  worth  noting  that  idiots,  who  are  not  helpless,  and  who 
can  walk,  move  about  without  colliding  with  the  furniture,  which 
proves  that  they  are  capable  of  perceiving  distances  and  the 
direction  of  nearby  objects.  The  psychologist  may  be  aston- 
ished that  processes  so  complex,  so  difficult  to  define  as  those  of 
spatial  perceptions,  should  be  capable  of  organization  in  the 
nervous  system  of  an  idiot.  This  organization  presupposes  as- 
sociations, sensations,  comparisons,  fine  perceptions  of  differences 
and  of  resemblances;  think  for  a  moment  of  the  complicated 
physiology  of  the  eye  alone  that  is  necessary  to  the  perception 
of  distance.  There  exists  therefore  a  perceptive  intelligence, 
which,  upon  anatysis,  is  foimd  to  be  very  complicated,  but  which, 
nevertheless,  may  be  developed  among  the  lowest  defectives, 
so  low  indeed  that  they  do  not  understand  the  meaning  of  the 
simplest  words. 

From  all  this  we  may  draw  a  first  conclusion;  since  the  intel-\ 
ligence  of  language  is  not  developed  in  idiots  but  only  in  imbe- 
ciles, we  have  here  the  proof  that  the  acquisition  of  language 
is  something  very  much  more  difficult  than  the  intcUigcDce  of 
perception.  This  is  not  surprising,  however,  if  one  recalls  that 
even  animals  have  extremely  fine  perceptions;  dogs,  for  example, 
and  carrier  pigeons  know  so  well  the  way  to  their  home  that  a 
special  sense  of  direction  is  often  attributed  to  them. 

We  are  going  to  study  this  intelligence  of  perception  among 
imbeciles,  availing  ourselves  of  their  abihty  to  speak.  We  shall 
employ  a  convenient  and  usual  method,  the  investigation  of  the , 
sensibility,  although  we  realize  that,  in  spite  of  its  classic  charac- 
ter, this  method  has  serious  faults.  It  transposes  and  alters  the 
phenomena  to  be  studied.  In  reality  we  ask  the  sul)ject  to  ex- 
plain what  he  feels,  and  we  force  him  to  translate  his  state  of 
sensibiHty  into  words.  But  this  verbal  translation  cannot  give 
us  a  faithful  image  of  what  that  sensibility  really  is.  In  order 
to  know  what  it  is,  one  must  let  it  live.  We  must,  in  other  words, 
see  what  a  subject  docs  in  the  presence  of  a  stinuiliis,  and  sludy 

53 


54  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

the  acts  of  adaptation  which  he  executes  in  response  to  this 
stiniuhis.  This  is  quite  another  thing.  It  may  happen  that  a 
person  plainly  perceives  some  very  slight  stimulus,  and  that  he 
is  incapable  of  explaining  it  or  even  of  giving  an  account  of  it. 

If  the  distinction  which  we  have  made  seems  subtle  to  those 
whose  study  has  been  limited  to  normal  subjects,  the  study  of 
the  imbecile  will  quickly  prove  to  them  that  this  is  a  well  founded 
distinction.  In  the  first  place  some  of  these  defectives  are  so 
low  in  intelligence  that  they  understand  nothing  of  what  is  asked 
of  them.  How  can  we  explain  to  Denise  that  she  must  speak 
when  we  prick  her,  and  must  remain  silent  when  we  do  not? 
She  is  anxious  to  please  but  will  reply  at  random,  anything  to 
be  agreeable,  even  though  her  state  of  sensibility  may  be  normal, 
which  is  by  no  means  certain.  Even  high  grade  imbeciles  do 
not  adapt  themselves  easily  to  investigations  about  their  sensitivity. 

Let  us  recall  the  case  of  Albert  who  is  the  gentlest,  most  defer- 
ential, most  docile  imbecile  that  can  be  imagined.  We  begin 
by  asking  him  to  close  his  eyes;  he  obeys  immediately,  closing 
them  with  such  energy  that  his  face  is  all  wrinkled.  We  graze 
the  back  of  his  hand  with  a  pen-holder  and  ask  if  he  feels  our 
touch.  He  replies  that  he  feels  nothing.  We  continue  increas- 
ing the  force  of  the  contacts,  and  Albert  still  continues  to  affirm 
that  he  feels  nothing.  ^ 

Q.  Do  I  touch  you? 

A.  Not  at  all. 

Q.  What  am  I  doing  to  you? 

A.  Nothing. 

Is  this  insensibility?  One  might  think  so.  It  is,  however, 
simply  a  misunderstanding,  easy  to  produce  with  imbeciles.  It 
is  sufficient  to  open  Albert's  eyes  and  to  let  him  see  that  we 
touch  him  to  make  his  language  change. 

Q.  Well  now? 

A.  You  are  only  using  the  head  of  a  pin. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  it? 

A.  A  little. 

Now,  his  eyes  once  raor^  closed,  he  responds  exactly  as  the 
sensation  is  produced;  he  says  "You  touch  me,"  and  adds,  when 
we  ask  it,  the  localization  of  the  contact,  and  it  is  nearly  correct. 


INTELLIGENCE    AND    PERCEPTION  55 

Q.  But  a  little  while  ago  we  touched  you,  why  did  you  say  you  felt 
nothing? 

A.  I  felt  nothing. 

It  is  impossible  to  obtain  from  him  any  other  explanation. 

We  do  not  affirm  that  the  difficulty  is  insurmountable,  but  it 
exists  nevertheless,  and  it  is  well  to  be  on  one's  guard  so  that 
errors  may  be  avoided. 

Before  every  sensorial  experiment  one  must  become  master 
of  the  intelhgence  of  his  subject;  not  only  does  an  imbecile  have 
trouble  in  understanding,  but,  again,  being  very  open  to  sug- 
gestion, he  will  often  reply  out  of  desire  to  please.  One  must 
therefore  find  experiments  easy  to  understand  and  free  from  all 
suggestion.  If  successful  one  perceives  a  very  remarkable  fact. 
This  is  the  contrast  between  the  weakness  of  the  intelligence  which 
we  call  verbal  and  social,  and  the  delicacy  of  perception.  Albert, 
who  knows  his  letters  a  little,  easily  lends  himself  to  an  examina- 
tion of  vision  by  means  of  an  optometrical  scale.  He  indicates 
clearly  at  5  meters,  in  the  open  air,  3  letters  (out  of  7  presented) 
having  the  height  of  7  mm. 

Below  we  give  several  quite  characteristic  cases. 

Take  the  experiment  of  weights  and  let  us  see  what  is  the 
slightest  perceptible  difference.  We  use  boxes  weighing  10  gr., 
11  gr.,  12  gr.,  13  gr.,  14  gr.,  15  gr.  These  boxes  are  alike  and 
measure  24  millimeters.  They  do  not  rattle  when  they  are 
shaken.     We  present  the  boxes  in  the  following  order: 

First  series:  10-15,  10-14,  10-13,  10-12,  10-11. 

Second  series:  15-10,  15-11,  15-12,  15-13,  15-14. 

The  two  series  present  increasing  difficulties,  the  second  being 
the  more  difficult,  for  although  the  absolute  differences  of  the 
boxes  are  equal,  the  relative  differences  are  smaller.  Each  time, 
the  two  boxes  are  presented  in  such  a  way  that  the  subject  does 
not  perceive  that  one  of  them  remains  the  same  for  all  the  pres- 
entations. 

For  the  perception  of  lengths  of  lines  there  are  pairs  of  lines 
placed  end  to  end,  traced  in  ink,  that  nnist  be  comjiarcd.  The 
absolute  length  varies  from  5  to  35  centimeters,  and  the  difference 
varies  from  0.5  to  0.1  cm. 

What  is  tin;  difficulty  of  appniciatioii  which  (he  comparison 
of  these  lines  and  weights  supposes?  We  shall  take  as  the  type 
a  normal  subject  of  twenty-three  years,  a  cook,  whose  social  con- 


56  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

dition  is  consequently  analogous  to  that  of  our  hospital  defectives. 
This  young  girl  compares  all  the  lines  without  an  error  but  finds 
certain  pairs  extremely  difficult,  and  often  repeats,  "They  cer- 
tainly are  alike,  those  lines."  She  goes  over  the  series  twice. 
In  the  test  of  the  weights  she  runs  over  both  series  twice  also. 
She  commits  no  error  but  in  one  case  she  refused  to  pass  judgment 
finding  the  difference  too  small  to  be  perceived.  She  repeats 
that  the  test  is  very  difficult.  The  difference  14-15  grams  seems 
to  be  her  limit,  because  we  presented  it  to  her  five  succeeding 
times  and  out  of  five  attempts  she  made  one  error  and  one  refusal 
to  pass  judgment.  During  the  whole  operation  her  attention 
was  very  good. 

We  can  therefore  conclude  from  this  experiment,  which  has 
been  confii-med  by  many  others,  that  a  normal  subject  of  moderate 
social  condition,  if  not  hurried,  can  by  a  great  effort  of  attention 
succeed  in  making  all  these  comparisons  correctly,  but  only  by 
paying  strict  attention  and  by  not  going  beyond  a  certain  limit, 
15  to  14  grams — which  causes  her  doubt,  suspension  of  judgment 
and  even  error.  What  do  our  defectives  do?  The  manner  in 
which  they  generally  undertake  the  comparison  of  weights  does 
not  prepossess  us  in  their  favor.  They  show  an  awkwardness 
of  judgment  in  handling  and  in  comparing  them  which  is  very 
amusing.  When  the  two  boxes  are  handed  them  and  they  are 
asked  which  is  the  heavier,  certain  of  them  without  weighing 
either  put  the  finger  upon  one  and  say  expressly,  "This  is  the  one 
that  is  heavier."  Then,  naturally,  we  explain  that  they  must  weigh 
the  boxes  before  judging  them.  They  obey;  but  let  us  examine 
their  manner  of  weighing.  In  the  first  place  there  are  those  M^ho 
seem  to  notice  the  weight  less  than  the  form.  Duneize  (middle 
grade  imbecile)  looks  curiously  at  the  boxes,  turns  them  over  and 
has  more  the  appearance  of  measuring  their  size  than  seeing  which 
is  the  heavier.  Others  often  raise  only  one  box  and  that  suffices 
them  for  deciding  that  it  is  heavier  than  the  other.  Albert  has  a 
manner  all  his  own  for  weighing,  which  is  to  put  the  boxes  side 
by  side  in  the  same  hand  extended  flat.  It  is  not  impossible — we 
have  ourselves  verified  it — ^to  appreciate  thus  a  difference  of  weight, 
but  this  manoeuver  does  not  facilitate  the  comparison,  far  from  it. 
One  might  therefore  conclude  that  our  defectives  have  a  very 
pooj-  perception  of  weight.  This  is  an  error.  We  shall  see  that 
J/  nothing  is  so  curious  as  the  contrast  between  their  awkwardness 


INTELLIGENCE   AND    PERCEPTION  57 

in  adapting  themselves  to  a  new  experiment,  and  the  cleverness 
that  certain  ones  of  them  show  for  the  perception  of  very  fine 
differences. 

Let  us  note  the  imbecile  Cabussel.  He  has  truly  remarkable 
skill  in  discovering  slight  differences.  We  made  him  go  twice 
over  the  first  and  second  series  described  above.  In  twenty- 
three  comparisons  he  made  but  six  errors,  of  wliich  three 
were  spontaneously  corrected  by  him  and  should  be  elimi- 
nated. There  remain  three  errors,  made  on  the  couples  10-11, 
10-14,  and  10-15,  two  of  which  are  among  the  easier  series; 
which  proves  that  his  was  an  error  of  pure  inattention,  since  it 
was  not  dependent  upon  the  smallness  of  the  difference  to  be 
perceived.  This  subject,  by  the  way,  is  very  inattentive  and  we 
should  not  have  expected  such  delicacy  of  perception  in  him. 
This  delicacy  is  equal  to  that  of  a  normal  subject.  This  was 
an  unexpected,  almost  unbelievable  fact.  Is  it  unique?  No. 
The  same  observation  applies  to  Albert.  He  was  not  submitted  to 
exactly  the  same  procedure  as  Cabussel;  we  contented  ourselves 
^\dth  making  some  tests  with  the  weights  10,  11,  12,  13,  14,  15 
presented  in  pairs  so  that  the  absolute  difference  was  1,  2,  3,  or 
4  gr.  We  took  no  account  of  the  relative  difference.  Below  we 
sum  up  the  results  given  by  Albert. 

Difference  of  weights  No.  of  true   perceptions   in    10   trials 

1  gr.  4 

2gr.  8 

3  gr.  '                             7 

4  gr.  8 

Each  time  Albert  gave  the  weight  putting  his  finger  decisively 
and  unhesitatingly  on  the  box  which  seemed  to  him  the  heavier. 
It  can  be  seen  that  he  was  able  to  perceive  a  difference  of  2 
grams  when  the  weights  varied  between  10  and  15.  This  is  a 
little  below  normal,  but  considering  his  intellectual  level  the  result 
is  altogether  remarkable. 

Let  us  pass  to  the  comparison  of  hnes — rcmonilxM-ing  that 
they  arc  traced  in  the  continuation  one  of  the  other,  and  that 
they  occupy  in  consequence  the  right  and  the  left  of  a  white  page 
and  that  all  are  contained  in  a  copy  book, 

Albert  after  explanation  acted  as  though  he  pcceived  no  dif- 
ferences even  the  greatest.     He  was  successively  shown  the  10 


58        THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

pairs;  first  he  indicated  the  hne  on  the  right  as  the  longer,  then 
for  the  9  other  pairs  he  indicated  constantly  the  line  on  the  left. 
It  is  evident  that  his  attention  is  not  awakened  and  that  he  re- 
sponds mechanically;  we  explain  to  him  his  error.  We  tell  him 
that  he  must  not  always  point  to  the  same  side  that  sometimes 
the  longer  line  is  on  one  side  and  somecimes  on  the  other,  he  must 
look  every  time.  After  this  explanation  he  solemnly  points  ten 
times  in  succession  to  the  lines  on  the  right.  New  explanations 
are  given.  We  urge  him  sharply  to  compare.  Again  Albert 
shows  constantly  the  line  on  the  right;  he  is  seized  with  automa- 
tism, nothing  can  be  done. 

We  were  more  fortunate  with  Beauvisage,  who  is  an  imbecile 
of  the  same  grade  as  Albert.  Out  of  21  presentations  she  made 
only  three  errors.  This  implies  a  truly  remarkable  accuracy 
of  perception.  Later  when  we  wished  to  repeat  the  experiment, 
some  obstacle  had  intervened.  Was  it  that  Beauvisage  was 
fatigued,  or  indisposed  or  distracted  by  some  circumstance  which 
escaped  us?  We  do  not  know;  whatever  the  cause  she  was  the 
victim  of  the  same  automatism  of  the  right  side  that  we  had 
observed  with  Albert.  During  20  presentations  of  pairs  of  lines 
she  indicated  constantly  those  to  the  right.  It  is  curious  to 
see  such  stupidity  mingled  with  such  fineness  of  perception. 
Imbecility  never  abdicates. 
/  In  proportion  as  we  take  subjects  of  higher  mentality,  so  much 
nearer  do  we  approach  normality.  Griffon,  a  moron,  shows 
a  certain  delicacy  in  the  perception  of  slight  differences  of  weights. 
He  does  each  of  our  two  series  twice,  and  fails  only  on  the  single 
difference  14-15,  exactly  like  our  normal  subject.  All  this  goes 
to  show  that  in  the  experiments  made  upon  the  perceptions  of 
^  defectives,  in  order  to  estimate  truly,  one  must  recognize  two 
*/  sorts  of  phenomena  which  manifest  themselves  at  the  same  time 
and  complicate  the  situation,  on  the  one  hand,  the  perceptions 
and  on  the  other,  inattention  and  automatism.  We  must  make 
a  distinction  between  the  perception  and  the  disturbing  element, 
as  one  separates  the  precious  almond  from  the  bitter  shell.  If 
one  succeeds  isx  doing  i4iis,  he  perceives  that  in  all  grades  of  de- 
fectiveness the  fineness  of  perception  equals,  or  nearly  equalsj  that 
of  the  normal  individual. 

Why  is  the  intelligence  of  perception  among  defectives  almost 
equal  to  that  of  normals?     This  is  a  question  easily  asked  but  not 


INTELLIGENCE  AND  PERCEPTION  59 

easily  answered.  Darwin's  theory  furnishes  something  of  a 
solution;  the  necessities  of  adaptation  and  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence have  produced  this  useful  result;  for  in  order  to  live  it  was 
necessary  that  every  being  should  know  the  surroundings  to  which 
he  tried  to  adapt  himself;  otherwise  he  would  succumb  and  dis- 
appear. But  this  solution  is  a  very  vague  explanation  and  cer- 
tainly cannot  satisfy  a  psychologist  who  is  amazed  at  the  strik- 
ing contrast  between  the  intellectual  level  of  the  defective  and 
the  acuteness  of  his  perceptions. 

We  have  ourselves  proved,  as  anyone  may  prove  for  himself, 
how  difficult  it  is  to  distinguish  between  13  gr.  and  15  gr.  and 
especially  14  gr.  and  15  gr.  One  is  perplexed  and  lacks  confidence 
in  the  accuracy  of  his  own  judgment.  One  cannot  help  asking 
how  this  imbecile,  who  cannot  even  count  the  number  of  his 
fingers,  masters  the  difficult  operation  of  comparison  of  weights. 

We  reply  with  this  hypothesis;  the  perception  of  a  difference 
of  tV  between  two  weights  is  a  difficult  operation,  but  it  is  also  a 
simple  operation.  It  consists  properly  speaking  in  feeling  and 
recognizing  a  slight  elementary  sensation.  There  is  no  need  of 
superior  processes,  of  critical  sense,  or  of  judgment;  it  requires 
only  that  one  be  attentive  for  a  moment,  that  every  other  idea 
be  dropped  and  the  attention  centered  on  the  sensation,  which 
one  seizes  as  it  passes.  The  proof  of  this  is  that  our  normal  sub- 
jects oftentimes  say  "I  dare  not  keep  on  testing  the  weights  or  I 
become  bewildered."  In  other  words,  intelligence  is  notnecessary,*^ 
and  one  who  is  limited  to  sensation  and  attention  docs  better. 
This  is  why  an  imbecile  who  does  not  reflect  nor  try  the  weights, 
succeeds  so  well.  In  any  case,  whether  our  interpretation  be  true 
or  false,  there  still  remains  this  important  fact  observed  years 
ago  by  us  among  children,  that  the  intelligence  of  perception 
does  not  undergo  any  evolution  comparable  to  that  of  the  atten- 
tion, of  effort,  or  of  language.  It  is  much  more  precocious. 
One  is  surprised  to  learn  that  an  imbecile,  so  inferior  in  swiftness 
of  action,  in  repetition  of  figures,  in  holding  himself  motionless, 
in  squeezing  a  dynamometer,  in  short  in  all  experiments  requiring 
effort,  succeeds  in  the  exact  comparison  of  lines  and  weights  which 
seems  to  us  normals  very  rlifricuH. 


VI.     THE   SENSE   OF   PAIN 

The  study  of  the  sensibility  to  pain  is  still  more  difficult  than 
that  of  general  or  special  sensibility.  Pain  is  more  closely  re- 
lated to  the  personality  than  all  other  sensibilities.  The  in- 
dividual is  not  indifferent  to  it,  as  to  weak  sensations  of  sight 
and  touch.  Pain  provokes  morejyiyid  feelings  of  apprehension, 
fear,  anger,  or  even  courage,  or  bravado  through  vanity;  and 
all  this  contributes  to  form  a  special  attitude  of  the  subject  in 
regard  to  suffering.  There  is  therefore,  a  distinction  to  be  made 
between  pain  and  the  personal  attitude.  When  we  study  nor- 
mals they  reply  to  our  questions,  and  can  more  or  less  give  us 
an  idea  of  their  feelings,  but  this  is  not  the  case  with  idiots  or 
imbeciles. 

Let  us  first  speak  of  what  we  have  observed  ameftgrdiotfr.- 
If  one  suddenly  pinches  the  skin  of  the  arm,  he  quickly  draws 
it  back,  often  uttering  a  little  cry,  and  draws  back  again  if  we 
attempt  to  repeat  the  experiment.  This  is  a  natural  reaction 
like  that  of  an  animal  whose  tail  has  been  stepped  upon.  This 
reaction  in  the  idiot  is  not  hidden  by  a  peculiar  mentality, 
determining  him  to  take  an  attitude  of  bravado.  In  this  respect 
the  reaction  is  very  instructive  in-  its  brevity. 

Let  us  go  farther  replacing  this  mild  excitation  of  pinching 
J  by  an  extremely  painful  one,  that  of  burning.  If  we  bring  a 
lighted  match  near  to  the  nose  or  the  hand  of  most  idiots  what 
happens?  Either  they  allow  themselves  to  be  burned  without 
doing  anything,  or  they  scarcely  react  to  the  pain.  In  any  case 
their  reactions  compared  to  those  of  a  normal  whose  nose  one 
attempts  to  burn,  are  extremely  moderate.  What  is  the  cause 
of  this  difference?  We  see  several  possible  causes. 
"^  1.  The  brain  of  the  idiot  is   a   diseased   brain;    it   presents 

lesions  in  keeping  with  the  symptoms  of  paralysis  and  contrac- 
tion which  one  encounters  in  the  limbs.  It  is  possible  that  the 
idiot  presents  zones  of  analgesia  and  that  we  have  stumbled 
unintentionally  upon  one  of  these  zones;  the  analgesia  would 
explain   the    weakness   of    their   reactions.     Evidently    this    is 

60 


SENSE    OF    PAIN  61 

possible,  but  scarcety  probable,  because  in  our  multitude  of 
experiments  upon  different  subjects  we  always  obtain  similar 
results  without  a  single  exception.  It  is  not  probable  that  we 
always,  by  chance,  encounter  a  zone  of  analgesia. 

2.  The  idiot  assumes  an  attitude  of  courage.  He  does  not  react 
because  he  controls  himself.  This  interpretation  seems  to  us 
still  more  improbable.  An  idiot  is  not  sufficiently  intelligent, 
we  think,  to  assume  such  a  complicated  attitude.  This  is  not 
even  worthy  of  discussion. 

3.  Pain  is  not  simply  a  physical  sensation;  it  is  reinforced  bj^ 
mcu:al_ieYerberatiQii;_  ph.yi5lcal-  pain  -ca44s-  up  fc^-,  disqui^ide, 
the  image  of  great  danger,  and  it  is  all  this  contribution  of  the 
imagination  and  of  the  feelings  which  gives  to  a  painful  sensatioa 
its  enormous  volume.  Suppose,  as  an  hypothesis,  that  the 
mental  reinforcement  of  pain  be  suppressed  in  an  individual, 
would  not  such  an  individual  be  rendered  almost  insensible  to 
pain?  And  would  this  not  be  the  case  with  idiots,  who  are  in- 
tellectually inert,  incapable  of  anxiety,  or  of  an  act  of  imagina- 
tion which  exaggerates  the  pain? 

This  last  hypothesis  seems  to  us  good  as  far  as  it  goes  and  it 
must  have  its  part  in  the  total  explanation.  The  pain  felt  by  an 
idiot  must  evidently  be  insignificant.  But  let  us  not  exaggerate. 
There  are  cases  where  without  psychic  reinforcement,  a  pain  is 
intolerable.  Let  one  -attempt  to  burn  the  end  of  his  nose  with 
a  lighted  match,  and  he  will  be  quickly  convinced.  Animals 
react  with  great  force  to  pain  of  this  kind  without  needing  the 
aid  of  irriagination.  We  Ijelieve  certainly  that  idiots  are  less 
sensitive  than  animals.  They  feeFpain  but  the  weakness  of 
their  reactions  indicates  slight  development  of  the  sense  of  pain. 
They  show  at  the  same  time  poverty  of  imagination  and  poverty 
of  the  sense  of  pain. 

Let  us  pass  on  to  imbeciles.  We  have  tested  four  of  these; 
Denise,  Cretin,  Albert,  Griffon.  If  one  were  satisfied  with  the 
first  results  one  would  be  led  to  conclude  that  the  sensibility  to 
pain  in  Denise  and  Alljert  is  cxtromcly  weak  wliilo  that  of  Cretin 
is  on  the  contrary  exaggerated.  The  facts,  however,  require 
a  closer  study,  by  which  it  will  l)e  seen  that  the  solution  is  nuich 
more  complex.  The  present  study  has  no  other  purpose  llian 
to  show  the  difficulty  of  investigation  ant!  to  analyze  certain 
attitudes  of  our  subjects. 


62  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Let  US  take  fost  Denise,  a  low  grade  imbecile.  We  turn  back 
her  sleeve  to  which  she  makes  no  resistance  and  even  aids  us 
in  so  doing.  We  then  roughly  pinch  her  skin;  she  cries  out, 
evidently  a  cry  of  pain,  jerks  her  arm  away  and  moves  away 
from  us.  Immediately  we  call  her  back.  She  comes  running 
and  again  aids  us  with  much  interest  to  lift  her  sleeve,  and  allows 
herself  to  be  pinched.  She  utters  a  cry  of  pain  and  moves  away. 
Has  she  then  forgotten  the  first  experience,  since  she  is  so  willing 
for  the  second?  We  begin  again;  she  comes  running  to  our  call 
showing  the  same  interest;  she  laughs  and  repeats  comically 
with  her  mimicry  the  gesture  which  we  had  made  in  calling 
her  to  us;  for  the  third  time  she  lifts  her  sleeve,  with  the  same 
willingness,  not  offering  to  protect  herself,  seeming  not  to  suspect 
the  least  in  the  world  that  she  is  going  to  receive  a  painful  sensa- 
tion. The  pinching  takes  place,  she  cries  out  and  moves  away. 
This  is  very  curious,  we  admit,  very  obscure.  What  is  it  that 
happens  in  that  little  brain?  We  have  made  the  test  as  many  as 
ten  times  and  Denise  always  comes  back  eagerly,  with  the  same 
laugh,  offering  her  arm  to  the  slight  pain  of  pinching.  A  mystic 
would  not  march  more  bravely  to  martyrdom,  but  here  there 
can  be  no  question  of  courage  or  of  vanity  put  forth  to  brave 
suffering.  Denise  is  too  gay,  too  laughing  when  she  comes 
running  for  one  to  suppose  for  an  instant  that  she  is  using  any 
voluntary  effort  of  control.  In  that  case  she  would  have  a  dif- 
ferent expression.  Can  one  say  she  is  analgesic?  It  is  possible, 
at  least  in  part,  because  we  have  plunged  her  hand  in  very  hot 
water,  and  we  ourselves  were  forced  to  draw  it  out  to  prevent 
serious  burning.  Moreover  she  has  so  little  fear  of  flame  that 
she  scarcely  draws  back  when  a  lighted  match  comes  in  con- 
tact with  her  nose;  she  even  allows  herself  to  be  burned  without 
a  word.  On  the  other  hand,  her  little  cry  on  being  pinched 
shows  that  she  has  a  certain  amount  of  sensibility  to  pain.  One 
can  also  suppose  that  her  lack  of  apprehension  comes  from  her 
inability  to  imagine  in  advance  the  pain  of  pinching  which  is  to 
be  inflicted  upon  her.  She  foresees  the  pinching  but  not  the 
pain;  it  must  be  the  memory_oi_thejp_ain_tliat  is  lacking.  All 
these  explanations  are  possible,  and  we  even  believe  that  all  of 
them  contain  a  part  of  the  truth.  One  must  also  take  into  ac- 
count the  childish  character  of  Denise,  she  attaches  importance 
to  nothing,  she  allows  herself  to  be  easily  distracted.     Her  joy- 


SENSE   OF   PAIN  63 

ous  nature  has  the  same  result  as  an  attitude  of  bravery;  it  covers 
the  perception  of  pain  and  prevents  its  reahzation. 

To  resume:  our  conchision  is  here  almost  the  same  as  with 
the  idiot.  Weakness  of  the  sense  of  pain,  weakness  of  the  mental  - 
reverberation;  there  is  also  a  third  influencing  circumstance,  the 
gay  and  careless  character  of  Denise.  Cretin,  middle  grade 
imbecile,  behaved  altogether  differentty.  In  order  to  learn 
her  sensibility  to  pain,  we  raised  her  sleeve,  slightly  pinching 
her  arm.  At  first  she  seemed  amused,  and  smiled;  indeed  it 
was  her  first  smile  that  day.  Then  when  we  attempted  a  second 
time  to  pinch  her,  she  defended  herself  drawing  back  her  arm 
vigorousl3^  We  seized  her  wrist  without,  however,  causing 
her  pain.  It  was  nevertheless  the  beginning  of  a  contest;  the 
child  began  to  cr}^  loudty,  and  to  sob,  hiding  her  face  behind  her 
sleeve.  At  the  end  of  several  seconds  the  sobs  stopped  of  them- 
selves. We  gave  her  a  sou  which  she  eagerly  took  and  pocketed. 
But  in  spite  of  the  gift  her  sullen  attitude  only  increased,  she 
stood  up  and  insisted  upon  leaving  us,  repeating  several  times 
"me  go." 

Q.  Where? 

A.  Eat. 

Q.  Eat  what? 

A.  They  are  eating. 

Q.  You  are  going  to  eat? 

A.  Yes,  it  is  time. 

Q.  But  stay  just  a  minute,  are  you  afraid  of  us? 

A.  I  go  eat. 

While  giving  these  pretexts,  she  was  gradually  nearing  the 
door  undoubtedly  desiring  to  open  it,  but  not  daring  to  put  her 
hand  on  the  knob.  Finally  we  opened  it  ourselves  and  she  left 
eagerly  almost  running. 

The  explanation  must  differ  from  that  which  we  gave  for  Denise; 
the  sensibilily  to  pain  undoubtedly  exists,  hni  there  is  added  to 
it  a  mental  reverberation  that  was  lacking  in  Denise,  that  is  fear. 
Cretin  was  really  afraid  of  us;  note  also  the  element  of  aversion; 
not  only  was  she  afraifl  of  us  but  she  disliked  us. 

Let  us  conchulc  with  Albert,  the  most  intelligent  of  our  im- 
beciles. 

Raising  his  sleeve,  without  giving  him  any  warning  we  pinch 
him  sharply  or  prick  him  with  a  pin  in  a  way  to  produce  what 
would  be  a  real  pain  to  a  normal  person.     We  ask  him: 


64  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  What  was  done  to  you? 

A.  You  pricked  me. 

Q.  Tell  us  when  it  pains  you.     (Fresh  pricking — very  pronounced) 

A.  (In  a  quiet  voice)  Ah,  I  feel  that. 

Q.  But  does  it  pain  you? 

A.  Yes. 

Albert  is  so  little  annoyed  that  he  holds  out  his  arm  for  us  to 
continue.  Other  prickings  which  bleed  do  not  even  call  out  a 
cry.  We  make  him  plunge  his  index  finger  in  water  so  hot  as 
to  be  intolerable;  he  does  not  even  wink,  he  holds  his  finger  plunged 
a  full  minute  in  boiling  water.  For  fear  of  serious  results,  we 
are  obliged  to  intervene,  drawing  out  his  finger  which  is  a  vivid 
red.  His  countenance  is  unmoved — the  smile  is  still  there  upon 
his  thick  lips. 

Q.  Is  it  hot? 

A.  I  felt  nothing. 

Begged  to  try  again,  he  does  so  without  hesitation,  plunging 
his  finger  once  more  into  the  water.  Again  we  are  obliged  to 
draw  it  out.  Taking  our  turn,  we  plunge  our  own  finger  before 
him  in  the  boiling  water,  making  gestures  of  pain  to  influence  him. 
But  this  mimicry  scarcely  moves  him  and  does  not  act  at  all  as 
a  suggestion.  Invited  to  begin  again,  he  shows  no  hesitation, 
leaving  his  finger  in  the  water  until  we  draw  it  out.  *  If  a  lighted 
match  is  brought  close  to  his  nose  or  eyes,  he  draws  back  a  little, 
but  very  slowly  although  he  feels  the  pain;  we  could  easily  burn 
him  seriously  if  we  were  not  more  careful  than  he. 

How  can  we  interpret  this?  It  is  complicated.  We  cannot 
ask  for  an  explanation  from  Albert,  because  he  would  always 
agree  with  us.  We  suppose  that  he  really  feels  the  pain  although 
doubtless  not  so  much  as  a  normal  person.  He  does  not,  how- 
ever, possess  great  fear,  no  quivering  ideas  of  apprehension; 
consequently  we  believe  he  assumes  an  attitude  of  bravery,  which 
is  quite  possible,  since  it  dominates  a  sensibility  which  is  not  at 
all  exaggerated.  A  last  example;  it  is  the  moron.  Griffon,  upon 
whom  we  now  experiment.  He  is  seated  before  us,  both  elbows 
on  the  table,  and  we  begin  to  speak  of  indifferent  things.  With- 
out warning  we  reach  out  and  pinch  him  severely.  He  utters  a 
slight  cry  and  tries  to  draw  back  his  arm.  Since  he  is  very  docile, 
however,  and  since  he  sees  that  we  have  a  very  serious  attitude, 


SENSE    OF   PAIN  65 

he  replaces  his  arm,  and  seeing  us  take  a  pin  to  prick  him  he  vol- 
untarily submits  to  this  attempt,  enduring  without  winking  the 
pain  of  scratching  him  with  the  pin.  It  is  evident  that  with 
Griffon  the  same  as  Albert  this  is  the  result  of  an  attitude  of 
bravery,  because  he  first  gave  a  cry  and  now  remains  impassive. 

Two  conclusions  result  from  all  this.  First  that  an  attitude  *- 
of  fear  or  bravery,  depending  upon  the  character  of  the  subject, 
always  cooperates,  more  or  less,  with  an  experiment  upon  pain 
and  may  completely  disguise  the  reactions  to  such  sensibility. 
This  is  an  undeniable  conclusion  which  our  imbeciles  have  clearly 
demonstrated. 

As  to  the  state  of  the  sensibility  to  pain  it  is  much  more  diffi- 
cult to  fix  with  precision.     But  we  willingly  admit  that  imbeciles^' 
have  generally  a  certain  obtuseness. 

This  second  conclusion  has  been  verified  by  many  different 
experiments  upon  school  children.  We  have  proved  conclusively, 
according  to  different  authors,  that  the  threshold  of  sensibility 
to  pain  in  the  most  intelligent  pupils  is  lower  than  in  the  least 
intelligent;  in  other  words,  to  provoke  in  them  a  minimum  of 
pain  requires  a  slighter  pressure.  This  finding,  compared  with 
that  which  we  have  made  upon  our  imbeciles,  clearly  shows  that  ^ 
sensibility  to  pain  develops  with  the  intelligence;  by  pain  wq' 
must  here  understand  not  only  a  sensation  localized  and  ap- 
preciated in  its  mtensity,  but  also  all  the  psychic  reverberations- 
of  this  pain,  the  ideas  and  emotions  it  provokes,  which  increase 
it  like  an  avalanche.  In  truth  the  highest  intelligences  have  more*^' 
merit  in  being  courageous  than  grosser  natures;  they  are  in  fact 
braver,  though  not  by  absence  of  fear,  not  by  obtuseness  of  the 
sensibilities,  but  by  domination  over  a  delicate  sensibility,  as 
in  the  ca.se,  for  instance,  of  Turenne. 


VII.     THE  ASSOCIATION  OF   IDEAS  AMONG 
THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

Our  object  is  to  discover  how  association  of  ideas  among  de- 
fectives is  formed,  and  if  the  mechanism  of  the  production  of 
ideas  presents  in  them  any  particular  traits  worthy  of  psychologi- 
cal consideration.  The  procedure  to  be  followed  has  been  de- 
scribed by  several  authors;  we  have  made  only  slight  changes, 
which,  however,  were  quite  necessary.  Here  is  the  ordinary 
instruction  given  to  our  subjects.  "We  are  going  to  say  a  word, 
and  for  every  word  you  hear  you  are  to  say  one,  but  the  word 
that  you  say  must  not  be  the  same  as  om's."  Ordinarily  the 
directions  are  more  precise,  the  word  is  required  to  be  in  relation 
with  the  word  of  the  experimenter  but  we  cannot  make  this 
recommendation;  our  imbeciles  would  not  understand  it. 

The  young  cook  of  twenty-three  whom  we  have  taken  as  a 
normal  subject  for  comparison,  is  very  much  embarrassed  by 
the  vagueness  of  the  instructions.  This  young  woman  was 
constantly  annoyed  and  dissatisfied  with  her  replies,  asking  us 
what  she  ought  to  say,  and  if  her  words  ought  to  relate  to  those 
given  by  us  or  not.  And  certainly  she  was  quite  right  in  asking. 
Her  distress  showed  clearly  the  ambiguous  character  of  the 
test.  Of  course,  we  did  not  reply  to  any  of  her  questions,  we 
made  the  expermient  without  explaining  anything,  and  we 
give  below  the  results.  The  times  are  extremely  variable,  be- 
tween a  minimum  of  2  seconds  and  a  maximum  of  18.  The 
median  value,  which  is  here  much  better  than  the  average,  is 
5.5."  The  words  that  she  gives  are  in  the  most  diverse  relation 
to  the  stimulus  words;  but  all  obeyed  the  fundamental  law  of 
completing  the  sense.  Sometimes  it  might  be  a  definition: 
"serpent — a  creature  that  stings,"  or  an  effect:  "shoe — ^for  walk- 
ing; water — ^refreshment;  sun — warmth;  garden — pleasure;  paper 
— ^to  write."  Or  the  whole  suggested  by  the  part:  "nose — ^face; 
hair — woman;"  or  supplementary  connection  "hat— coquetry;" 
sometimes  a  familiar  association  "knife — bread."  This  logical 
evocation,  which  was  in  no  way  demanded  of  her,  however,  proves 

66 


ASSOCIATIOX    OF   IDEAS 


67 


that  logic  is  easier  to  follow  than  chance;  just  as  a  worn  path  is 
easier  to  follow  than  a  direct  course  over  the  fields.  We  consider 
it  worth  while  to  give  the  series  of  replies  as  a  standard,  although 
necessarily  it  bears  the  stamp  of  individualitj-,  and  does  not  present 
so  general  a  bearing  as  one  could  desire. 

Stimulus  uords  Time  Reaction 

Singer 14"  Actor  (after  a  moment  of  em- 
barrassment) 

I  run 18"  The  beautiful  path 

Revolt 5"  War 

Hat 4"  Coquetry 

Bottle 7"  Liquid 

Picture 6"  Landscape 

Moustache 7"  Chinaman 

Knife 6"  Bread 

Paper 6"  Write 

Hair 9"  Woman 

Red 4"  Flag 

Dog 2"  Four  feet 

Rain 8"  Bad  weather 

Water 4"  Refreshment 

Garden 3"  Pleasure 

Omelet 3.5"  Food 

Shoe 4"  For  walking 

Syrup 4"  Sweetened  liquids 

Tobacco 5"  It  is  dried  leaves 

The  nose 2.5"  Face 

Sausage 9"  Food 

The  sun 4"  Warmth 

Soldier 4"  Army 

Newspaper 2"  Reading 

Serpent 7"  A  creature  that  stings 

Misery 5"  The  opposite  of  luxury 

Justice 17"  To  give  what  is  right 

Virtue H"  It  is  a  quality 

Snow 5"  Rain 

Handkerchief 7"  Cloth 

Maximum  time  18",  minimum  time  2".     Median  time  5.5". 

Our  defectives  are  distinguished  froih  normals  by  many  ciiar- 
actcriHtit>;,  fir^t-ol^l  by  thoir  goiipral  attitude.  We  have  said 
that  our  norma!  sul)joct  was  troubled  and  felt  quite  embarrassed. 
This  embarrassment,  so  characteristic  of  a  normal  person  who 
is  a  novice,  was  not  in  the  least  shared  by  our  imbociloFi,  who 
showed  the  greatest  Herenity  and  cvidon:  fact  ion  in  all  tlicir 

rei)iies. 


68  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

All  bcgaii_hy_sijQiply  repeating  the  stimulus  word;  if  no  obser- 
vation had  been  made  to  them  they  would  have  continued  the 
repetition,  which  has  no  interest  whatever.  It  is  curious,  but 
it  is  not  peculiar  to  defectives.  We  have  sometimes  encountered 
normals  in  previous  experiments  who  with  good  faith  repeated 
the  stimulus  word  without  adding  anything  and  who  did  not  per- 
ceive the  absurdity  of  this  repetition. 

We  intervene  after  a  certain  time  and  urge  our  defectives  to 
use  a  different  word  from  the  one  pronounced  by  us.  Sometimes 
it  is  necessary  to  insist  quite  a  little  in  order  to  break  up  this 
habit.  Some  are  embarrassed.  They  do  not  know  what  to 
say.  For  a  time  they  are  satisfied  to  repeat  the  words  which 
they  have  already  used  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment; 
but  this  stock  is  soon  exhausted;  they  must  draw  new  words 
from  their  imagination.  The  words  they  find  vary  greatly  and 
depend  upon  their  mental  level. 

Let  us  first  mention  a  high  grade  imbecile  girl,  Duguet,  who 
resorted  to  a  singular  expedient.  After  having  passed  the  pre- 
liminary period  of  repetition,  which  we  have  just  described,  she 
cites  words  which  have  no  relation  with  ours,  and  which  probably 
she  prepared  beforehand.  It  can  easily  be  seen  because  she 
always  chooses  from  the  same  category  of  objects,  either  the 
names  of  garments  or  the  names  of  objects  present  before  her. 
She  seems  to  have  hesitated  a  little  before  following  this  direc- 
tion; but  it  becomes  evident  towards  the  last,  and  the  reaction 
times  are  very  short,  which  is  proof  that  she  has  prepared  the 
word  of  reply. 

Stimulus  words  Time       Reaction 

Singer 3"  Singer 

I  run 1"  I  run 

Revolt 2"  Revolt 

Hat 8"  Hat 

New  explanations  are  given  so  that  the  subject  may  lose  the 
habit  of  repeating. 

stimulus  words  Time  Reaction 

Bottle 35"  Don't  know— ah— the  table 

Picture 4"  Chair 

Moustache 4"  Bottle 

Knife 4"  Plate 

Paper 4"  Fork 


ASSOCIATION    OF   IDEAS 


69 


Stimulus  words  Time 

Hair 3" 

Red 5" 

Dog 5" 

Rain 4" 

Water 4" 

Garden 5" 

Omelet 8" 

Shoe 3" 

Syrup 4" 

Tobacco 1.5" 

Sausage 1" 

Sun 16" 

Soldier 2" 

Newspaper 2" 

Serpent 6" 

Misery 1" 

Justice 2" 

Virtue 1" 

The  snow 2" 

Handkerchief 3" 

Maximum  time  35",  minimum  time  I", 


Reaction 

Knife 

Spoon 

Carafe 

Umbrella 

A  boat 

Dress 

Light 

Carpet 

On  the  floor 

Hat 

A  bed 

Hat 

Dress 

Apron 

Boot  maker 

Stockings 

Slipper 

Carpet 

The  door 

Square 

Medium  time  3.5". 


From  time  to  time,  e.g.,  ''rain"  and  "water,"  a  slight  associa- 
tive influence  let  itself  be  felt,  but  more  often  there  is  no  con- 
nection, as  is  seen  with  such  couples  as  misery — stockings;  jus- 
tice— slipper.  This  ^xiOftco  of  i'ektt4oiL.is- quite  characteristic,  v 
A  normal  would  never  think  of  replying  thus,  for  he  would  rcidize 
that  it  rendered  the  experiment  quite  useless;  at  lease,  he  would 
uol  unless  as  a  result  of  an  attitude  of  mockery.  In  the  case 
of  Duguet,  the  result  proves  the  weakness  of  the  association  of 
words;  the  word  pronounced  l)y  us  does  not  stand  oul  because 
she  is  looking  for  another.  The  times  are  shorter  lliaii  lliose 
of  a  normal  but  we  have  explained  the  reason. 

A  middle  grade  iml)ecile,  Mctoi',  shows  a  form  of  transition. 
He  conmiences  like  Duguet,  l)y  giving  words  without  bearing 
upon  those  pronounced;  then,  Ijcginning  willi  llie  worrl  tobacco, 
he  changes  his  tactics.  The  associative  innueiicc  of  1  he  words 
makes  itself  fell . 

stimulus  woTd.H  Time       liiaclion 

Singer 3"  Singer 

I  run 3"  I  run 

Revolt 3"  Revolt 

Hat 0"  Hat,  a  cap 


70 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


Wc  urge  him  not  to  repeat  the  word  that  we  have  said  but  to 
find  another. 


stimulus  words  Time 

Bottle 7" 

Picture 6" 

Moustache 4" 

Knife 5" 

Paper 

Hair 

Red 

Dog 

Rain 

Water 5" 

Garden 4" 

Omelet 5" 

Shoe 5" 

Syrup 5" 

Tobacco 4" 

The  nose 4" 

Sausage 0" 

The  sun 4" 

Soldier 4" 

Newspaper 4" 

Serpent 4" 

Misery 2" 

Justice 4" 

Virtue 8" 


5" 

Ah     .     .     . 

.     socks 

7" 

Ah     .     .     . 

.     cravat 

4" 

Ah    .     .     . 

.     shirt 

5" 

Socks     .     . 

.     .     night  shirt 

5" 

Ah     .     .     . 

.     night  shirt 

Snow 4" 


Handkerchief 4" 


Reaction 

Belt  to  put  around  the  body 

Table     ....     girdle,  cravat 

Mous-   ....     a  watch 

Kni-  ....  knife  put  in  the 
post 
h  . 
h  . 
h  . 
)cks 
h     . 

Drawers 

A  spade 

A  wheelbarrow  to  gather  dirt 

Spade — to  dig 

Rake — to  gather  dirt 

Tobacco  to  smoke  in  a  pipe 

To  put  tobacco  in  his  pipe 

Sausage  to  light  the  pipe  and 
tinder  to  light  the  pipe 

The  sun  to  set  up  there 

I  never  was  a  soldier 

Newspaper.  To  read  the  news- 
paper in  bed 

Siphon  (?) 

Misery,  yes  (makes  sorrowful 
countenance) 

Just  for  the  saving  (he  means  for 
the  saving  bank) 

To  put  on  ground,  to  eat  in  sum- 
mer (understood  lettuce,  simi- 
lar sound  in  French  "vertu — 
laitue") 

The  snow  ....  to  fall  on 
the  world 

To  blow   (gesture) 


Maximum  time  8".     Minimum  time  2",     Median  time  4". 

Victor's  times  are  short,  shorter  than  those  of  our  normal 
(4"  instead  of  5.5")-  One  might  remark  that  the  nature  of  his 
associations  does  not  consist  in  grouping  beside  the  spoken  word  a 
word  having  an  entirely  different  sense,  for  instance,  red-black, 
sun-moon,  etc.  Victor  rather  tends  to  develop  the  idea  given 
to  him,  but  he  naturally  employs  very  elementary  processes. 


ASSOCIATION    OF   IDEAS  71 

"With  Albert,  a  high  grade  imbecile,  after  the  preliminary 
period  of  repetition,  all  at  once  there  is  produced  the  association 
of  ideas.  There  are  here  veritable  associations,  with  heterogeneity 
of  the  elements.     Let  the  reader  judge. 

Stimulus  words  Time                                      Reaction 

Singer Singer 

I  run I  run 

Revolt Revolt 

Hat Hat 

Bottle Hat 

Picture Bottle 

Moustache 12"  Cravat 

Knife 5"  Fork 

Paper 10"  Picture 

Hair 9"  The  head 

Red 9"  White 

Dog r,"  Cat 

Rain Ress'on  (?) 

Water 13"  The  Seine 

Garden 30"  There  are  flowers 

Omelet o"  Some  eggs 

Shoe 5"  Eggs 

Syrup 5"  Cod  liver  oil 

ToVjacco .")"  Cigarette 

The  nose Needles    (probably    had    under- 
stood thimble  (le  nez . . .  .  !e  de) 

Sausage S"  Pudding 

The  sun 5"  The  moon 

Soldier o"  Military 

Newspaper 35"  Magazine 

Serpent 5"  serpe  (pruning  honk) 

Misery .50"  Anger  (?) 

.Justice The  Justice 

Virtue Don't  know  what  to  say 

The  siHiw The  snow  it  falls,  the  snow 

Hamlkerchief 20"  'I'o  blow  one's  nose 

Maximum  time  .50".     .Miiiimuin  lim(!5".     Median  time  8". 

Albert's  limes  are  longer.  The  associations  are  <»i  >\\rh  i»r- 
(iTTmrj'  (•haraet+*»";  or  rather,  so  clement ar}',  that  one  niiiilii  li.ive 
foreseen  many  of  llicm.  WC  Iimnc  here  results  ili;ii  do  7101 
seem  I0  u-  clearly  subnormal.  An  cxixTiinriilci-  who  \\;is  not 
forewarned  might  have  alliiliuicd  llicm  lo  a  iioriniil.  We  will 
finish  with  Ihe  association  of  ideas  of  (liirt'on,  a  nidron.  These 
seem  to  us  to  Ix-  of  an  absolutely  normal  level,  execpl  for  one  or 
two  impropiict  i(>  of  Icrm  or  of  thought. 


72 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


Stimulus  u'l.rds  Time  Reaction 

Singer 3"    Singer 

I  run 5"    To  walk 

Revolt 6"    Someone  who  jostles 

Hat 7"    Hatter 

Bottle 7"    Broken  glass 

Picture 3"    Images    which    represent    land- 
scapes 

Moustache 6"    A  man  who  has  a  moustache 

Knife 12"    Which  is  made  with  a  wooden 

handle 

Paper 7"    It  is  made  with  rags  from  the 

factory 

Hair 7"    Which  is  on  the  head  of  a  man 

Red 13"    A  cloth  that  is  red 

Dog 6"    An  animal  that  is  cross 

Rain 3"    That  falls  on  the  earth 

Water 7"    Which  is  found  in  springs 

Garden Which  is  found  in  the  fields 

Omelet 3"    Which  is  made  of  eggs 

Shoe 7"    Which  is  made  of  leather 

Syrup 5"    Which  is  made  in  factories 

Tobacco 7"    Which  is  made  with  tobacco  from 

the  Caroline  Islands 

The  nose 7"    Which  is  above  the  chin 

Sausage 7"    Which  is  made  with  fat  of  pork 

The  sun 10"    Which  makes  the  earth  go 

Soldier 10"    Represents  the  earth 

Newspaper 5"    Which  is  made  in   the   printing 

shop 

Serpent 6"    Which  is  found  in  the  fields 

^Misery 2"    A  man  who  is  unhapp}' 

Virtue 8"    A  man  who  is  good 

The  snow 3"    That  falls  on  the  earth 

Handkerchief 6"    Which  is  made  with  rags 

^laximum  time  13".     Minimum  time  2".     ]\Iedian  time  7". 


«r 


The  replies  of  Griffon  have  the  form  of  appreciations,  of  judg- 
ment ,  of  definitions,  much  more  than  true  associations.  The  times 
are  quite  long. 

Let  us  smaJiJi  now,  what  these  experiments  upon  the  associa- 
tion of  ideas  have  taught  us.  The_xlifference  between  the  defec- 
.tive  and_llia  normal  is  seen  constantly  in- the-attituda^taken, 
particularly  in  the  beginning  of  the  experiment.  While-t-fee 
nornj;il  -iibjcct  is  embarra.-.-cd  and  luotc-i-  ihat  he  does  not 'kfiSw 
whal  i.-  icquiicd  of  liiii).  i  he  imln'cilc  and  the  moron,  adapt  them- 


ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS  73 

selves  at  oric^  to  the  instructions  of  the  n^w  "-^ppTT";2^rit^     There 
is  in  this  uneasiness  at  the  beginning  a  mental  state  of  higher  — 
order,   which  unfortmiatel}'   cannot   be  written  down  with  the 
repHes  of  the  subject,  and  which,  so  to  speak,  evaporates.     It  is 
a  phy,  for  it  forms  a  most  characteristic  difference.     The  length-^- 

of  ±tu>-^>-*>i^H-rnrv    liriiA^    io   '»-|g<r--<aary    gipi^ifipn-iii        If    \yQ    take    the 

median  times,  we  can  see  they  are  verj^  much  shorter  with  the-- 
defectives  who  are  of  low  level,  or  who  give  reactions  of  an  inferior> 
quahtj';  let  us  put  these  median  times  into  a  series;  we  have 
3. 5 "-4 "-8 "-7".     This  series  is  too  short  for  us  to  be  aljle  to  inter- 
pret it  safely.     We  venture,  however,  to  conchide  from  it  that 
the-time  depends  npon  the'inore  or  less  elementary  character^ 
of  the  reaction,  and  that,  considered  separately,  the  reaction 
time  signifies  nothing  more  than  the  time  required  to  do  a  cer- 
tain problem  when  we  are  not  told  in  what  the  problem  con- 
sists.    Let  us  add  that  similar  studies  upon  eight  normal  school 
children,  aged  from  ten  to  twelve  years,  have  furnished  us  with 
the  following  median  times,  which  represent  each  about  thirty 
association  experiments:  4"-o.3"-5.7"-6.7"-7.3"-7.5"-12.1"-19" 
of  which  the  median  would  be  7.     This   is  a  new  argument  to 
demonstrate  that  the-a^uciat ion  lime.-  aic  loimvr  with  nurmals 
tfain  with  imljui'ltes,  without  doubt  bee?rasellM'  rniinci -have-mare 
idtiit*r4<T^oose  from.    From  this  we  can  draw  the  following  im-        2, 
poitant  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  ideation  of  the  imbecile—,- 
WTien  a  normal  reflects  upon  something,  he  does  not  content 
himself  with  evoking  an  image,  but  he  has  an  end  towards  which 
he  tends,  anrl  he  tries  to  adjust  liis  images  to  this  end,  and  for 
this  adjustment  he  chooses  among  his  images,  he  seeks  for,  he/ 
rejects,  and  he  retains.     Tiiis  work  of  selection  is  one  in  whicli^ 
the  intelligence  of  tlic  agent    manifests  itself.     When  asked  1o 
say  a  word  after  the  word  pronounccti,  ho  seeks  more  or  less  1o 
find  a  suitable  woj'd;  this  causes  frequent  embarrassment  and 
often   rather   long  times   beff)re   re|)lying.     With    imbeciles,   th(>    _ 
work  of  ideation  seems  to  })e  much  more  siini)le.     'Hie  iinlu'cih" 
|)robably  says  the  first  word  that  comes  to  his  mind;  al    ill  events 
if  he  rejects  certain  words  as  inapproj)riate,  this  woik  of  s(^Iec- 
tion  is  very  short ,  \'ei-y  rot  rid  cd  ;  lie  docs  not  posse.ss  nuidi  choice 
of  woids,  lie  is  not   embarrassed.  ;ni{|   c()iisc(|iiciit  I\'  llic  work   is 
Mioic  element  ;iry.  more  r;ipiil.      If  one  g;ive  a  prize   for  rapidily 
it    is  the    imltccilcs   who    wouM    win.      As  to  the    ||;|t  iii-c  fif   tint 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


associations,  it  is  evident  that  it  can  serve  to  diHtiiiguish  oiih: — 
extremely  low  defectivfiHtke  Victor  and  Diigiiet.     We  have  seen 
that  with  tluiii  iliat  which  we  have  called  "the.  associative  action 

.    of  words"  docs  not  talce  ])lace  for  some  time;  but  with  Albert 

and  with  Griffon,  the  associations  formed  present  nothing  peculiar, 

that  is  have  no  fixed  relation  to  deficiency    One  can  conclude 

from  this  that  it  is  not  by  the  word  of  the  innerTairguage  thac  the 

^defective  is  differentiated  from  the  normal;  it  is  by  the  sentence 

C  rather  than  by  the  word;  by  the  thought  rather  than  l^y  the  image; 
by  the  organization  rather  than  liy  the  nature  of  the  elements 
which  are  to  be  organized. 


VIII.     THE  ACTIVITY  OF  THE  INTELLIGENCE  DISTIN- 
GUISHED   FRO:VI    THE    LEVEL    OF 
THE   INTELLIGENCE 

The  purpose  of  this  short  chapter  is  to  point  out  an  error  or 
rather  to  note  a  necessary'  distinction  which  is  often  unrecog- 
nized, the  distinction  between  the  intellectual  activity  and  tlie 
intellectual  level.  Ordinarily  the  two  are  confotJhcTed ;  one  ini- 
aginesrthat  the  activity'  and  the  level  are  on  a  par  and  that  a 
being  who  has  an  active  intelligence,  one  who  talks  much  and 
who  has  many  ideas,  is  an  intelligent  l)eing.  Observations  made 
upon  defectives  will  throw  light  upon  this  point. 

In  general  imbeciles  have  a  sluggish  intelligence,  and  the  con- 
versation which  one  can  hold  with  them  is  extremely  flat.  They 
have  nothing  to  say,  nothing  to  relate;  they  can  imagine  nothing, 
and  hence  are  very  brief;  for  instance  there  is  Albert,  a  high  grade 
imbecile,  of  whom  we  have  already  spoken.  Let  us  converse  with 
him  and  examine  his  remarks  which  show  an  extreme  poverty  of 
ideas.  The  first  time  we  saw  him  the  following  dialogue  took 
place  between  us: 

(i.  What  is  your  name? 

A.  Albert  Ernest. 

0-  How  old  are  you? 

.1 .  Twenty-six  years  old. 

(^.  \\  I13'  were  you  sent  to  this  insl  il  iil  ion? 

A.  You  see,  my  sister  had  a  dispiifc  with  my  lirol  hcr-in-law,  she  \)\v- 
fcrred  to  put  iik;  awaj'. 

Q.  \\  li3'  did  your  sister  disjjute  thus  with  your  Ijrothcr-iu-law? 

.1 .  IJecause  he  is  a  man  who  drinks. 

Q.  Ah!  and  then? 

.1.   He  did  nof  want  rne  witli  Iiiin. 

Q.  Truly? 

.1.  And  ye(   I  did  all  the  work. 

(J.  What  did  he  say  to  make  you  leave? 

A.  Drearlfiil  wnrds.  Tfr-  oven  wcul  and  said  al  the  ^'frcfcrliirc"  I  was 
full  of  lire. 

Information  fjbl Mined  sliowcd  us  lliaf  llic  brolhcr-iii-l.-iw  (h;iid<, 
.'infl  }i;id  sevcr.'il  tiiiics  been  locked  up  ,'is  ;iri  ;dcoliolir.      Alhcrl's 


76 


Till',    INTKLLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


sister  is  now  getiinji;  a  tlivoice  from  lier  liiis])and.  It  is  easy 
to  under  stand  how  it  hapi)ened.  Albert  up  to  that  time  had 
])een  kept  by  his  family,  l^issension  had  arisen,  pecuniary 
difficulties  followed,  and  the  imbcfik"  could  no  longer  remain 
in  their  chariie. 


FIG.  15.    ALBERT,  HIGU  CiUADE  IMHKGILE,  TWENTV-SIX  YEARS  OLD. 
MENTAL  LEVEL  OF  CHILD  OF  SEVEN. 


Q.  What  was  your  trade? 

A.  My  trade  was  to  woik  in  tlie  inark(>t  in  the  morning.     I  loaded  the 
wagons. 

Q.  Were  you  strong? 

A.  Very  strong. 

Q.  How  much  did  you  make  at  the  market? 

A.  Twenty  sous  a  (hiy  and  the  customers  gave  me  tips. 

Q.  How  much  money  did  you  get  for  tips? 

A.  Fourteen  sous. 


ACTIVITY    OF,    VS.    LEVEL    OF    I.VTELLIGENCE  77 

Q.  Altogether,  how  mucli  did  you  make? 
A.  In  all  29  sous. 

Q.  What  did  you  do  with  that  mone}'? 
A.  I  gave  it  to  my  sister. 
Q.  Why  did  you  give  it  to  her? 

A.   (With  some  emphasis).     Because  it  w-as  my  dut}-. 
Q.  But  everyone  does  not  give  his  money  to  his  sister. 
A.  Not everybod}\ 
Q.  What  persons  do  it? 

A.  It's  those  who  get  married,  those  who  drink  too  much,  who  spend 
their  mone3\ 

Q.  You  were  getting  married? 
A.  Ah,  no. 

We  learned  that  Albert  willingly  got  up  early  in  the  morning 
to  gouliLlheinarket^  He  was  vec}'  fond  of  his  work.  He  quar- 
reled with  no  one  luiless  it  was  with  his  brother-in-law,  whom 
he  could  not  endure.  He  took  long  trips  through  the  streets 
and  found  his  way  easily  enough.  He  could  go  out  alone  with- 
out causing  iu\y  troii])le,  because  he  did  not  take  up  with  people 
whom  he  did  not  know;  in  a  word,  a  very  good  subject,  verj' 
affectionate,  very  gentle.  He  wept  at  the  death  of  his  mother, 
which  had  recently  occurred,  but  his  sorrow  did  not  last  long. 
He  was  careful  of  his  person,  even  foppish  for  he  liked  to  be  well 
dressed.  He  often  cariied  flowers  to  the  women  living  in  the 
same  house  as  himself.  We  said  to  him  jokinglj-  that  he  ought 
to  marry;  the  idea  pleased  him,  he  had  chosen  many  women 
to  whom  he  made  love  i)latonieally,  with  tiowers  and  bouquets. 

Q.  From  wliat  country  arc  you? 

.1.  From  tlic  Batignollcs.     (A  quarter  of  Paris). 

Q.  Is  that  in  a  city,  Batignollcs? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  In  which  city? 

A.  It  is  a  city  of  Marseilles. 

Q.  Yes,  but  wli(  II  one  is  in  Batignollcs,  can  one  say  "I  .uii  lOnglish?" 

.'1.  I  am  Parisian,  I  am  not  lOnglish. 

Q.  What  is  (he  date  of  your  hirtli? 

A.  Ah!  I  do  not  know. 

Q.  When  did  you  come  here? 

A.  \'cstcrday.  (correct) 

Q.  What  day  is  today? 

A.  Wednesday,     (correct) 

Q.  And  what  was  yesterday? 

A.  Tuesday. 


78         THK  IXTKLLIOENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.   Aiul  tomorrow? 
.1.  Thursday. 

Q.  How  many  days  in  tlic  week? 
.1 .  Five  ilays. 

Q.  Is  it  niorninj!;  or  afternoon? 
,1.  Afternoon,     (correct) 
Q.  Wliy? 

.1.   Because  it  is  afternoon. 
Q.  What  year  is  it? 
,1.  The  month  of  April. 
Q.  But  the  year? 
.1.  I  do  not  know. 

Q.  What  is  the  name  of  the  President  of  the  Republic? 
A.  Ah!     I  do  not  know. 
Q.  You  have  been  to  school? 
A.  Yes,  in  the  street  I'Arbre-Sec. 
Q.  ^Yhat  does  your  father  do? 

A.  My  father  had  a  butcher  shop  in  Paris,  rue  du  Jour. 
Q.  Who  has  his  shop  now? 
A.  A  man  who  used  to  work  in  the  shop. 
Q.  And  your  mother? 

A.  She  was  a  trades  woman.     It  is  my  sister — who  has  had  the  medal. 
Q.  You  have  brothers? 
A.  Ah!  my  brothers  are  dead. 

Q.  But  you,  you  arc  not  dead,  even  if  you  have  come  into  the  world? 
^4.  Ah!  no  "msieu." 
Q.  Does  everyone  die? 
.1.  Yes. 

Q.  How  is  one  when  he  is  dead? 
,1.  One  never  comes  back. 
Q.  And  God,  where  is  He? 
.1.  He  is  in  heaven. 
Q.  Does  He  concern  Himself  al)out  us? 
A.  It  is  on  Him  that  we  call. 
Q.  How  is  that? 
A.  It  is  our  soul  that  calls  us. 
Q.  Ah!  Where  is  our  soul. 

A.  Our  souls,  that  is  where  our  heart  is  ....  It  is  our  soul  that 
speaks. 

He  replies  neither  lapicUy  nor  slowly;  and  we  would  not  have 
noted  the  quickness  of  his  responses  if  we  had  not  needed  to 
take  it  as  a  basis  for  comparison  with  other  subjects. 

Let  us  examine  his  verbal  spontaneity.  It  is  weak.  He  can 
only  find  a  few  words  by  himself.  After  a  long  absence  on  our 
part,  we  saw  him  again. 


ACTIVITY    OF,    Y>S.    LEVEL    OF    IXTELLIGENCE  79 

Q.  What  have  3'ou  done  im-  friend,  in  this  k)ng  time  since  I  have  had 
the  pleasure  of  seeing  you? 

A.  I  have  swept. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  And  then  I  cleaned  the  tiles — the  tiles  in  the  hall. 

Q.  And  then? 

.4.  And  then  I  began  again — after  breakfast. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  And  j^esterday?  What  did  you  do  yesterday?  Tell  me  about  it, 
give  me  the  details. 

.4.  Yesterdaj^  I  swept  too. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  And  then  when  I  had  finished  sweeping  the}' sent  me  to  the  garden. 
{"jardiii").     (He  meant  the  attendant  "gardiea"). 

Q.  And  then? 

.4.  Ah!  I  don't  know. 

It  is  impossible  to  obtain  any  other  explanation.  If  this 
imbecile  had  been  the  only  witness  of  a  complicated  scene,  and 
one  wished  to  know  what  had  happened,  it  would  have  ])een 
terribh"  difficult  to  find  out. 

One  da}'  Albert  came  to  us  with  a  blue  kitchen  apron  knotted 
around  his  waist.     We  feigned  amazement. 

(J.  Why  have  j'ou  that  :ipron  around  your  waist? 

^1.   (With  a  stupid  smile)     I'm  a  plunger. 

Q.  You  bathe,  do  you?     Is  there  a  basin  nf  water  that  you  plunge  into? 

.4.  No,  I  wash  the  dislics. 

He  is  very  proud  of  this  new  duty,  and  we  are  assured  tliat 
.since  he  has  filled  it  he  carries  his  head  differently.  But  it  is 
impossible  to  make  him  express  this  feeling;  oi-  anylhiiiu,  analofjous 
to  it. 

Q.  Vou  like  to  wash  the  dishes? 

.4.  Yes. 

(J.  Weill,  Icll  us  about  it — say  something. 

.1.   I  don't  know  what  to  say. 

Another  lime  we  succeeded  in  making  liim  icIl  ;i  slciry  (if 
his  own  invention.  I1  waslhcfir>t  liniclliat  lie  had  ever  donc^  il 
and  we  suppo.-e  lliat  we  owe  the  .sloi'v  lo  liis  exlrenie  docility-. 
Here  it  i>.  lit eially  reproduced.  "A  dog  a  while  dog  thai  I 
look  1()  walk  in  ihe  woods  that  ran  after  the  rabbits.  The  (i(ij> 
KOt    awav   from    ni\-   hands  and    I    lo-t    him    in    the   woods.     Tiie 


80  I'lIK    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

rabbit  cniii(>  aiul  fouiul  me,  and  ai^ked  me  how  it  happened  that 
I  had  that  ial)bit.  It  was  my  dog  that  caught  it.  I  go  home 
with  the  rabbit.  INT}^  relatives  ask  me  how  I  came  by  it.  I 
tell  them  that  my  dog  caught  it  and  I  was  almost  arrested  by  a 
policeman.  My  relatives  told  me  that  I  ought  not  to  have  done 
it." 

Q.  Is  that  a  made-up  story? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Some  one  told  it  to  you,  or  have  you  told  it  before? 

A.  No,  nobody,  because  I  saw  it  in  a  picture. 

It  is  evident  from  the  turn  of  the  sentences,  the  foundation 
of  the  story,  and  the  final  conclusion,  that  this  is  the  story  of  a 
child. 

Contrast  this  with  a  loquacious  imbecile,  Cabussel,  a  big 
jovial  fellow,  1.685  meters  (67.4  in.)  in  height,  with  the  little 
head  of  a  child  of  seven  years.  He  has  very  brilliant,  black  eyes, 
and  a  great  black  moustache,  which  he  smooths  and  combs 
from  time  to  time  with  the  greatest  care.  The  moment  he  is 
spoken  to,  one  is  struck  with  his  loquacity.  He  talks  so  rapidly 
that  we,  who  wished  to  record  verbatim  the  replies  of  our  imbeciles, 
were  unable  to  follow  him  and  for  the  first  time  were  obliged  to 
emploj^  a  stenographer. 

Let  us  give  a  sample  of  his  abundant  conversation. 

Q.  What  is  your  age? 

A.  Me,  monsieur?    Twenty-eight  the  month  of  April.     I  belong  to 79. 

Q.  You  know  how  to  read? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur,  I  can  read  and  count  money  and  everything.  And 
I  can  do  errands  and  everything. 

Q.  What  is  your  business? 

A.  Me,  tailor.  I  work  with  my  father.  I  know  how  to  make  overcoats, 
dress  coats,  jackets.  I  also  carry  the  coal.  I  know  politics,too.  When 
I  go  to  get  the  paper,   I  see  what  is  going  on. 

He  praises  himself.     He  is  a  great  braggart. 

Q.  Where  were  you  at  school? 

A.  Rue  Domct. 

Q.  Have  you  a  certificate? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur.     (Absolutely  false) 

Q.  Can  you  count? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur.     I  can  do  problems,  subtractions,  divisions. 


ACTIVITY    OF,    VS.    LEVEL    OF    IXTELLIGEXCE 


81 


Q.  Write:   (one  of  us  dictates)  The  pretty  little  girls  have  studied  the 
flowers.     (He  takes  the  pen  but  does  not  \vrite). 

A.  Ah!  I  have  fiftj'  of  them,  me     .... 

Q.  Fifty  what? 

,-1.  Fifty  women.     I  had  one  twenty  years  old.     (Several  rather  loose 
remarks  follow). 


FIG.  10.    CABr.S.SEL.  HIGH  GH.\1>L   LMBECILF.  OF  TWKNTV-KKHIT   VEAH.S. 
VERY  LOQUACIOUS;  LEVEL  .MEN'TAI-  OF  A  OHIIJ)  <)I'  SEVE.N'. 


Q.  Very   we 


1)U(    write   what    I    dictate.     Tin'   i)retty   lit- 


tle 


A.  (With  a. smile).  .Vli!  I  <loii'i  know  very  well  how  to  write  .  .  .  . 
I  haven't  been  in  school  mudi. 

Q.  You  can  at  lea.st  write  your  iiaiiif. 

i4.  I  know  how  to  write,  me  ....  ( He  coiiuiicMccd  i  n  print  some 
letters.)     I  bcnin  with  a  ("     (Me  writes  hi.s  name). 

Q.  Write  I'ap.i. 


82  Til  10    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

.4..  (With  u  roguisli  air).  That  Jx'gins  with  a  P.  (He  tries  but  cannot 
write  Papa).  Paris,  1  cau  write  that  very  well.  (He  prints  the  word 
Paris.)     Ah!  I  know  how  to  count.     If  you  wish  I  can  count  up  to  100. 

Q.  Well,  fio  ahead. 

.4.  (IMakinji;  a  show)  I  ))ef2;in  with  1.  (He  counts  correctly  up  to  65, 
then  he  says  Go,  G7,  08,  80,  81,  82,  83,  84,  85,  86,  87,  88,  89,  100.  He  is 
well  satisfied). 

Q.  And  read?     Can  you  read? 

,4.  (He  take§  the  newspaper  that  we  hand  him  and  follows  the  lines 
with  his  finger  without  saying  anything). 

Q.  No,  read  out  loud.     How  do  you  expect  me  to  hear? 

A.  Ah!  (with  a  coaxing  smile)  that  is  a  little  difficult. 

Q.  Spell  out  the  letters. 

.4.  I  learned  the  a,  b,  c's. 

Q.  Very  well,  spell. 

,4.  (He  spells  and  commits  numerous  errors;  besides  he  skips  the  letters 
he  does   not  know). 

Q.  Who  is  President  of  the  Republic? 

A.  Fallieres,  and  before  him  it  was  Loubet.  And  they  say  that  the 
one  who  is  deputy  at  Javel  is  worth  nothing  at  all.  He  had  more  than 
1000  firemen  killed.  He  is  an  assassin,  that  man.  It  was  like  Casimir- 
Perier  ....  he  did  not  stay  long.  He  gave  in  his  dmission.  Philo- 
sophore  (Felix  Faure)  was  poisoned,  he  was.  He  poisoned  like  that  his 
friends     ....     He  made  a  good  dinner  with  poison  in  it. 

Q.  How  do  you  know  that? 

A.  It  was  in  the  Petit  Journal.     (Note  that  he  cannot  read.) 

Q.  You  read  it? 

.4.  Yes,  yes. 

Q.  Who  was  Gambetta? 

A.  He  was  a  great  man.     Went  in  a  balloon     ....     Field  of  battle 

.  .  .  .  And  then.  Savaro  died  with  his  mechanician  ....  he 
fell  upon  a  place,  from  25  meters  high.  And  then  Santo  Dumont  took  a 
bath  in  the  sea.  He  was  saved,  he  was.  He  is  a  good  fellow.  When  he 
goes  out  he  gives  pieces  of  a  hundred  sous,  to  get  the  clothes  that  are  at 
the  Mont  de  Piete,  sheets,  handkerchiefs,  housekeeping  things.  It  is 
he  who  does  that. 

Q.  How  did  you  know  that? 

A.  It  is  in  the  i)ai)er.     That  is  well  known. 

Q.  And  Monsieur  Thiers? 

.4.  Thiers?  He  was  good  for  ncjthing,  he  was.  He  had  everybody  killed 
with  paving  stones,  in  his  carriage.     He  put  them  to  the  edge  of  the  sword. 

Q.  How  do  you  know  that? 

A.  I  heard  them  talk  at  home.  And  Napoleon  the  1st.  He  was  a  good 
fellow,  he  was.  He  died  at  St.  Helena  in  1840,  the  defeat  of  Waterloo. 
I  knew  him,  I  did.     I  was  at  the  Invalides  as  guard. 

Q.  As  guard  at  the  Invalides?     What  did  you  do  there? 

.4.  I  answered  everybody's  questions. 

Q.  What  cl.se? 


ACTIVITY    OF,    VS.    LP:VEL    OF    IXTELLIGEXCE 


83 


A.  I  said,  '"Don't  touch.  I'll  hit  you  in  the  face."  (It  is  highly  im- 
probable that  he  ■\vas  ever  a  guard  at  the  Invalidcs). 

Q.  And  Louis  XIV '? 

A.  Ah  I  Louis  XIV  he  reigned  a  lot,  he  did.  Antl  Louis  XV  too.  Louis 
XIV  a  bad  type,  he  was.  He  passed  to  the  guilk)tine,  bj^  Deibler,  rue 
de  la  Roquette.  The  guillotine  it  was  Dr.  Guillotin  who  invented  that 
to  cut  the  neck. 


ik;.  17.   cAMUssEi,  TH'*  i\(;  I'D  \s  urn;  i  hum  dk  r\i  id. \. 


<.}.    .\iid  lieforc,  whal   did  llic\'  do".' 

.1.  It  was  like  it  was  in  .\inerica.  They  liiiim  tlinn  wilh  ;i  lpi)i  idpe, 
and  llien  thfy  filing  llniii  into  a  Ik.Ic.  Il  was  like  Kocliefoil .  'i'licy  senl 
liiin  aw;iy,  and  \\v.  was  for  politics.  'I'licy  wouldn't  Id  liiin  talk.  an<l  lliey 
shut  liiiii  up  licic  wlicic  I  :mi  \iid  then  from  licic  tlicy  i-xilcd  him  to 
Xumca. 


84  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  And  Charlemagne,  do  you  know  him? 

A.  No.  It  was  Louis  XIV,  Charlemagne  and  Charles  the  Bold  and 
Louis  XVII  and  Alphonse  XIII,  they  are  the  new  kings. 

This  dialogue  shows  the  loquacity  of  Cabussel.  Once  started, 
he  scarcely  stojis.  With  him  there  is  no  need  of  constant  urging 
as  there  is  with  the  other  imbeciles  who  speak  only  when  one 
keeps  saying  "And  then?"  His  loquacity  is  not,  however  ver- 
bal excitation,  analogous  to  that  of  maniacs.  Cabussel  does  not 
speak  imless  he  knows  or  thinks  he  knows.  His  naive  vanity 
and  boastfulness  are  quite  apparent  but  too  unconscious  to  be 
harshh^  criticised.  He  knows  many  things,  but  he  knows  them 
badly  and  he  distorts  them  in  the  reproduction.  One  wonders 
how  he  could  learn  all  that;  we  should  not  have  supposed  that 
he  knew  the  names  of  Thiers,  Rochefort,  and  still  less  who  were 
Louis  XIV  and  Dr.  Guillotin. 

"At  home,"  he  said  one  day,  "they  call  me  orator.  And  then  every 
Sunday  I  go  to  the  Deputy  Chamber;  the  Minister  receives  me."  Taking 
advantage  of  the  occasion,  we  ask  him  to  deliver  a  discourse;  he  willingly 
consents. 

A.  I  will  talk  to  you  about  war. 

(He  rises,  adjusts  his  coat,  twists  his  moustache,  crosses  his  arms.  Then 
he  delivers  the  discourse  which  we  give  below.  He  speaks  slowly  and 
pauses  constantly  to  find  words  and  ideas.  One  should  read  this  discourse 
carefully.     It  is  a  choice  expression  of  vanity  in  an  imbecile). 

"Once  upon  a  time  the  war  ....  to  die  ....  on  the 
field  of  battle  ....  it's  my  idea  ....  hem  ....  much 
squabbling  ....  in  case  of  war  ....  much  squabbling 
.  .  .  .  Ah!  the  one  who  will  be  with  me  ....  him,  like  a  good 
boy:  I'll  know  how  to  defend  him     ....     plead  his  cause  for  him 

.  .  .  .  I  will  plead  to  his  God  for  myself  ....  Perhaps  in 
two  weeks  I  will  be  no  more  in  Paris.     I  will  be  perhaps  an  exile  in  prison 

.  .  .  .  I  shall  not  be  able  to  get  away  from  it  ....  I  shall 
be  able  to  get  away  in  chains  ....  I  shall  not  be  able  to  get  out 
of  them  in  prison     ....     thoy  will  give  me  black  bread  and  water 

.  .  .  .  on  a  board  .  .  .  ,  If  I  go  out  again  I  shall  be  very 
miserable  ....  And  then,  when  I  am  among  the  chiefs  ....  I 
shall  be  decorated  ....  I  shall  pass  as  minister  of  war  ....  I 
shall  pass  as  minister  of  the  Interior,  of  Finance.  And  when  there  is 
mone3',  it  is  I  who  shall  dal>ble  in  it.  I  shall  gain  money.  I  shall  be 
admiral  ....  After  that  I  can  marry  a  pretty,  beautiful  woman. 
I  shall  have  children  ....  I  shall  rest  in  a  beautiful  castle  .... 
coast  of  France  ....  and  it  will  be  a  beautiful  castle  .... 
there  will  be  kings  and  lords  and  then  soldiers  about  me  to  regard  me 

.     .     .     .     and  then  I  shall  have   servants,   and  carriages  and  horses. 


ACTIVITY   OF,    VS.    LEVEL    OF   INTELLIGENCE  85 

And  then  one  could  go  to  the  country  to  the  watering  place.  Ah !  especially 
it's  cake  that  I  want;  at  least  fifteen  thousand  francs  ....  After 
that  I  shall  be  happy  ....  I  shall  live  to  be  eighty  years  old  .  .  . 
even  a  hundred  and  two  years  old  ....  fifty  five  years,  fifty  six 
years,  fifty  eight,  fifty  nine,  fifty  seven,  fifty  eight,  fifty  nine,  sixty,  one 
hundred  .  .  .  .  up  to  a  thousand  years  I  shall  live.  I  shall  do  like 
Jesus  Christ. 
Q.  And  then? 

A.  He  was  baptized,  thirty  five  years  ....  Jesus  Christ ;  it  was 
in  a  Protestant  temple  ....  he  wasn't  French,  they  made  him 
Catholic,  and  Roman.  The  priest  he  said.  Eat  my  flesh  and  drink  my 
blood.     Do  this  in  memory  of  Jesus  Christ.     Amen." 

This  discourse  is  a  precious  morsel  of  eloquence  which  cannot 
easily  be  obtained  from  an  unbecile.  It  is  precious  because  it 
reveals  to  us,  better  than  any  test  of  association  of  ideas,  how 
the  ideation  of  Cabussel  develops.  This  ideation,  on  the  whole 
very  poor,  is  dominated  by  a  single  thought  which  makes  unit}^ 
of  the  fragment,  that  is  the  glorification  of  his  own  personality.-— 
Cabussel  truly  speaks  only  of  himself,  thinks  only  of  himself. 
It  is  a  vanity  at  once  naive  and  enormous;  notice  carefully  in 
passing  that  this  vanity  is  neither  pride  nor  self  respect,  it  pro- 
duces no  emulation,  no  generous  effort.  The  vanity  of  Cabussel 
gives  him  at  times  a  sentiment  of  pity  for  himself,  as  when  he 
sees  himself  in  prison;  mostly,  however,  another  sentiment  domi- 
nates, that  of  expansion,  grandeur.  There  is  no  delirium,  for 
Cabussel  affirms  nothing,  he  only  wishes,  imagines,  dreams,  but 
he  lives  in  his  dreams.  The  sentences  which  he  employs  have 
often  a  precise  and  clear  significance;  sometimes  he  alters  them 
and  involuntarily  gives  them  a  comic  sense,  as  when  he  says  ^ 
the  soldiers  would  regard  him.  Doubtless  he  intended  to  say  / 
"guard"  him.  He  does  not  hesitate  to  use  set  formulas  as  "plead 
his  cause  for  him,"  "plead  to  his  God  for  me,"  and  he  is  so  com- 
pletely controlled  by  automatic  associations,  that  having  com-"" 
menccd  by  speaking  of  war,  he  ends  by  entertaining  us  about 
Jesus  Chri.st.  In  spite  of  his  desire  to  be  grandilociuent,  he  is 
obliged  to  make  so  many  pauses,  waiting  for  ideas  which  do  not 
come,  that  the  effect  of  his  discourse  is  spoiled.  Even  before  a 
great  crowd  he  would  make  but  a  mediocre  impression  l)ccause 
of  the  slowness  of  his  dcliver3\ 

Wbat  we  have  just  said  of  Cabussel  proves  that  he  has  an  in- 
tellectual  activity   which   is  very   great.     'J'he  (piestioii    now   is 


86  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

what  does  he  owe  to  this  intellectual  activity  and  what  are  the 
— •  results  which  come  from  it.  Is  he  more  attentive?  No,  and  it 
is  interesting  to  note  this.  Cabussel  has  no  more  voluntary 
attention  than  other  imbeciles  of  the  same  level;  rather  he  has 
less.  Thus  in  the  experiment  of  repetition  of  figures,  which  is 
one  of  the  measures  of  the  voluntary  effort  of  attention,  he  re- 
peats only  2  figures;  Albert  who  is  about  the  same  level  repeats  4. 
Cabussel  is  not  more  successful  in  the  repetition  of  sentences, 
and  does  not  go  beyond  6  words,  which  is  little  for  this  level. 
It  seems  probable  that  the  force  of  attention  is  not  in  proportion 

""^  to  the  intellectual  activity.  Perhaps  it  may  even  be  that  a 
very  great  activity  is  detrimental  to  the  attention,  which  is  the 
power  of  co-ordination.  It  is  more  difficult  to  drive  six  mail 
coach  horses  together,  than  one  cab  horse;  so  it  seems  to  us  more 
difficult  to  co-ordinate  a  strong  activity  than  a  weak  one.  The 
differentiation  of  thought'  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  all 
adaptation,  is  in  our  subject  wholly  independent  of  his  activity 
because  it  remains  very  weak.  If  a  picture  is  placed  before  him, 
he  speaks  with  his  habitual  volubility,  but  his  comments  are 
childish,  and  do  not  go  beyond  a  monotonous  naming  of  the 
sexes.  Exactly  like  Albert,  he  repeats  "That  is  a  man;  that  is 
a  woman;  there  are  some  men,"  while  we  are  showing  him  in 
succession  16  different  pictures.  He  has  barely  the  beginning 
of  description  for  one  or  two  of  them,  as  "There  they  are  just 
sitting  down  to  the  table."  His  definitions  of  objects  present 
the  same  monotonous  character.  Like  Albert  and  so  many 
^  others,  he  defines  only  by  use.  On  the  whole,  in  spite  of  his 
-.^  activity,  his  thought  does  not  develop,  it  does  not  differentiate 
itself  in  view  of  a  better  adaptation. 

Here  is  the  conclusion  which  we  wished  to  reach.  This  con- 
clusion has  been  alreadj^  anticipated  in  studying  the  normal  state, 
where  one  often  has  the  opportunity  to  make  a  distinction  be- 

. —  tween  the  quantity  and  the  quality  of  psychological  phenomena. 
Who  has  not  encountered  persons  who  busy  themselves  with  a 
host  of  questions,  have  a  great  deal  of  information,  speak  of 
everything  with  warmth  and  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  words, 
are  fertile  in  views,  hypotheses,  distinctions,  neologisms?  Verj' 
often  they  deceive  as  to  their  true  value.     They  are  thought  very 

'  We  allude  here  to  experiments  of  which  we  shall  speak  farther  on. 


ACTIVITY   OF,    VS.    LEVEL   OF   INTELLIGENCE  87 

intelligent,  while  in  realitj^  they  possess  only  intellectual  activity" 
In  mental  alienation  we  encounter  certain  cases  where  the  in- 
tellectual activity  may  be  great,  but  the  level  remains  very  low. 
This  is  often  the  case  in  maniacal  excitation.  This  is  charac- 
terised by  enormous  expenditure  of  gestures  and  of  words,  which 
constitutes  indeed  intellectual  activity,  but  the  words  have 
scarcely  any  sense,  and  follow  one  another  only  according  to 
the  caprice  of  the  phonetic  organs,  or  an  association  of  ideas 
scarcelj^  thought  out.  The  contrast  is  sometimes  enormous 
between  the  verbal  exuberance  of  such  patients  and  the  weak- 
ness of  their  minds.  These  facts  are  known  by  alienists  but  the 
distinction  which Ve  make  between  intellectual  activity  and  the 
intellectual  level  has  not  always  been  recognized.  In  fact,  the 
error  of  confounding  them  has  sometimes  been  committed.  One 
must  remember  that  the  faculty  of  adapting  oneself  is  the  prop- 
erty of  the  intelligence  and  that  the  power  of  adaptation  is  the 
measure  of  it;  it  is  evident  that  from  this  point  of  view  any  con- 
fusion between  the  activity  and  the  level  is  impossible. 


IX.    NUMBER  SENSE  AND   THE  ARITHMETICAL 

FACULTY 

According  to  the  general  opinion  current  among  competent 
J  authors,  imbeciles  have  no  notion  of  number.  To  us  this  state- 
ment seems  too  absolute  to  be  exact. 

When  one  talks  with  imbeciles,  he  notices  that  even  small 
numbers  give  them  no  exact  ideas.  Certain  ones,  like  Victor, 
who  have  an  extended  vocabulary,  cannot  even  count  their 
fingers.     We  ask  Victor, 

Q.  How  many  fingers  have  you? 
A.   (Opening  his  hand)     Three. 
Q.  On  the  other  hand? 
A.  Seven. 

Victor,  by  the  way,  replies  in  the  most  imperturbable  manner 
to  any  question  asked  him,  even  if  it  be  hopelessly  beyond  his  in- 
telligence or  degree  of  instruction. 

Q.  6  from  19  leaves  how  many? 

A.  Two. 

Q.  2  and  1,  how  many  is  that? 

A.  Two. 

Q.  5  sous  and  1  sou,  how  many  sous  does  that  make? 

A.  1  sou. 

He  is  never  embarrassed.  Albert  is  equally  absurd  although 
he  knows  more. 

Q.  How  many  fingers  have  you  on  the  right  hand? 

A.  Five. 

Q.  Altogether  on  the  two  hands? 

A.  Six. 

Q.  How  many  eyes  have  you? 

A.  Two. 

Q.  And  how  many  ears? 

A.  Two. 

Q.  2  eyes  and  2  ears,  how  many  ears  does  that  make? 

A.  Three. 

88 


t 


NUMBER   SENSE  89 

To  Victor  who  does  not  know  how  to  tell  time,  we  say  showing 
the  clock,  which  points  to  half  past  five: 

Q.  What  time  is  it? 
A.  It  is  exactly  four. 

That  last  reply  is  a  little  gem. 

In  the  same  way  they  give  us  the  most  extravagant  figures 
concerning  their  age;  and  by  pressing  them  a  little,  they  can  be 
made  to  make  enormous  errors.     Victor  willingly  admits  that 
he  is  one  hundred;  and  Albert  assents  to  our  affirmation  that 
Dr.  Simon  is  eighteen  hundred  years  old.     Such  observations  have* 
given  the  idea  chat  imbeciles  have  no  notion  of  number.     Never- 
theless the  errors  which  they  commit  can  be  easily  explained  in — 
two  ways,  which  are  quite  distinct  from  the  development  of 
the  arithmetical  faculty.    In  the  first  place,  they  do  not  understand-" 
the  precise  meaning  of  the  names  of  the  numbers,  these  names 
do  not  waken  in  them  any  but  the  vaguest  ideas,  and  conse- 
quently the  crying  absurdity  of  certain  replies  exists  much  less 
for  their  intelligence  than  for  ours.     They  are  like  ignorant  per- 
sons who  say  rude  things,  by  using  haphazard  words  from  an 
unknown  language;  their  only  error  is  that  of  employing  words 
whose  meaning  they  do  not  know.     In  the  second  place,  their*- 
defective  manner  of  replying  is  aroused,  and  should  be  excused,  /" 

because  of  their  desire  to  please  us.     Imbeciles  of  the  rebellious 
type,  when  asked  something  of  which  they  are  ignorant,  as  for  "^ 

example  the  number  of  fingers  on  the  two  hands,  reply  readily, 
"I  do  not  know." 

Our  studies  have  led  us  to  propose  the  following  distinction. 
In  the  arithmetical  faculty  there  are  tjvo  operations:  the  onc"^ 
sensorial,  consisting  in  the  perception  of  plurahties  in  concrete 
form,  that  is  the  number  represented  by  the  objects;  the  other, 
verbal,  consists  in  applying  the  names  of  numbers  to  these  plurali- 
ties, in  counting  them,  and  in  making  numbers  undergo  various    / 
arithmetical   modifications.     These  two  operations  arc  distinct/ 
one  from  the  other.     The  first  is  animal,  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
found    in    a    nulinientary    form    among    creatures    deprived    of 
language.     The   second    is   more   especially   lium.-m,    bccjiusc^    it 
presupposes  the  intervention  of  language  for  luiining  the  plurali- 
ties, from  whence  has  come  the  whole  development  of  the  irleas 
and  operations  which  constitute  mathematics.     From  not  having 


90  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

made  this  distinction,  naturalists  have  committed  a  grave  error; 
they  have  supposed  that  the  higher  animals  have  no  notion  of 
number,  or  at  least  cannot  count  beyond  3  or  4,  while  man  can 
count  numbers  indefinitely  great;  this  is  not  correct  and  the  con- 
trast here  presented,  gives  rise  to  confusion.  If  man  with  a 
certain  development  possesses  the  conception  of  number,  he 
owes  it  very  largely  to  language;  deprived  of  the  service  which 
the  word  renders,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  be  unable  to  count 
even  small  numbers. 

Let  us  make  use  of  this  distinction  in  order  to  study  among 
defectives  the  state  of  their  number  sense.  We  shall  begin  by 
considering  the  animal,  sensorial  faculty,  that  which  dispenses 
with  language. 

Some  time  ago,  one  of  us  experimented  with  children  of  from 
3  to  5  years,  before  they  had  learned  the  names  of  the  figures, 
to  see  if  they  could  nevertheless  recall  a  number  of  similar  ob- 
jects. We  put  upon  the  table  sous,  or  beans,  in  a  group,  side 
by  side,  without  forming  any  figure,  then  we  said  to  the  child, 
"Look  and  see  how  many  there  are."  Sometimes  we  put  3 
or  4,  sometimes  5.  Then  taking  all  these  objects  in  our  hand, 
we  deposited  one  on  the  table,  saying  ,"Are  there  any  still  in 
my  hand?"  Same  question  for  the  second,  third,  for  all;  after 
several  tests  made  with  many  precautions,  we  learned  how  many 
objects  the  child  could  hold  in  mind.  It  is  evident  for  instance, 
that  if  we  had  shown  20  at  first,  he  could  not,  when  we  placed 
the  20th,  say  that  was  the  last.  We  found  that  a  normal  child 
of  five,  without  the  help  of  language,  could  retain  a  number  repre- 
sented by  five  similar  objects.  These  experiments  on  animal 
memory  were  given  to  Victor,  whom  they  amused  very  much, 
with  the  following  results.  We  placed  4  single  sous  in  the  form 
of  a  square.  Then  taking  them  in  our  hand,  made  the  move 
indicated,  demanding  a  reply  for  each  piece.  When  the  fourth 
sou  was  placed  Victor  declared  there  were  no  more.  We  tried 
again  with  five  coins,  placed  on  a  curve  so  as  not  to  form  a  char- 
acteristic figure.  The  same  success.  When  the  fifth  coin  is 
placed  Victor  declares,  "There  are  no  more." 

We  took  six  coins.  Failure.  The  sixth  placed,  Victor  declares 
there  are  more. 

Same  game  with  seven  coins.  Success.  At  the  seventh, 
Victor  declares,  "There  are  no  more." 


NUMBER   SENSE  91 

Repetition  with  seven  coins.     Same  success. 

Same  game  with  eight  coins.     Failure. 

Repetition  with  eight  coins.     Failure. 

Thus  Victor  can  retain  a  number  represented  by  seven  objects. 

Albert  cannot  go  beyond  five  under  exactly  the  same  cir- 
cumstances. 

We  do  not  suppose  after  having  been  informed  of  such  experi- 
ments, one  could  still  say  with  W.  Ireland  that  an  imbecile  has 
no  notion  of  number. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  the  verbal  intelligence  of  number,  some- 
thing which  is  strictly  human,  and  see  in  what  state  this  is  to 
be  found  among  these  same  imbeciles;  it  is  indeed  in  a  miserable 
state  and  nothing  is  more  curious  than  the  contrast  between  it 
and  the  animal  faculty  which  we  have  just  seen  in  operation. 

Recitation  of  figures  and  counting.  Albert  can  recite  the  figures 
to  ten  and  a  little  beyond.  Victor  cannot  go  quite  so  far  and 
commits  errors.  It  is  not  difficult  to  recite  figures;  it  is  like 
reciting  a  fable  or  a  prayer;  it  requires  principally  memory  and 
but  little  intelligence.  But  they  cannot  recite  the  series  of  figures 
backward,  either  from  inability  to  make  the  voluntary  effort 
which  would  be  necessary  for  this  inversion,  or  through  lack  of 
facility  in  the  associations  connecting  the  names  with  the  differ- 
ent figures.  Furthermore  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  they  are  unable 
to  count  as  many  objects  as  they  can  recite  figures.  Thus  if 
they  can  recite  to  10  it  does  not  follow  that  they  can  count  to  10. 
Let  us  see  what  they  do. 

Already,  the  simple  idea  that  they  are  to  count,  is  difficult 
for  them  to  grasp.  We  say  to  Victor,  showing  him  a  bowl  full  of 
pins,  "Count  me  out  eight  pins."  He  gives  us  what  he  can  take 
with  his  thumb  and  finger  without  counting.  Let  us  admit 
that  he  does  so  through  carelessness.  We  continue.  Then 
we  ourselves  take  10  pins  from  the  bowl,  and  spread  them  upon 
the  table,  and  ask  him  how  many  there  are.  Without  counting 
he  replies  5.     Wo  repeat,  "How  many  pins?"     Ho   answers   4. 

At  another  time  Albert,  in  his  turn  asked  to  toll  the  number, 
replied  20.  Did  they  get  the  idea  that  they  wore  to  guoss? 
No.  We  rather  believe  that  they  did  not  suppose  anything  at 
all.  A  number  is  asked  and  they  say  any  one  that  occurs  to 
them.  The  number  is  suggested  t6  them  by  the  question  and 
the  appearance  of  the  things,  and  thoy  do  not  try  in  any  way 
to  verify  it. 


92        THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

But  let  US  oblige  them  to  really  count  one  after  the  other 
the  puis  spread  out  on  the  table  before  them  in  a  row.  They 
commit  a  host  of  improbable,  unexpected  errors  of  such  a  nature 
that  it  seems  as  if  they  did  it  on  purpose.  Thus  Victor  often 
puts  his  finger  on  two  pins  at  once,  and  counts  only  one;  or  again 
he  neglects  certain  ones  and  does  not  count  them;  or  again  there 
is  a  whole  group  to  which  he  returns  and  which,  consequently, 
he  counts  twice  without  noticing.  Duneize  (middle  grade  im- 
becile) proceeds  in  the  following  manner.  The  pins  are  in  a  pile 
before  her;  she  takes  them  one  at  a  time  and  forms  a  new  pile, 
and  with  every  pin  that  she  takes  she  says  a  number.  The  result 
would  be  correct  if  she  followed  this  program  to  the  letter;  but 
she  forgets  from  time  to  time  to  count  one  of  the  pins  which 
she  puts  in  the  new  pile,  so  that  the  total  sum  is  not  correct. 
More  than  this  she  does  not  give  the  last  number  which  she  counts; 
but  any  number,  haphazard.  For  example,  after  having  counted 
15  pins,  she  will  say  14.  Another  time,  she  counted  only  5 
pins  and  committed  the  following  error:  having  reached  5,  she 
continued  to  count,  5,  6,  7,  probably  because  she  allowed  her- 
self to  follow  the  suggestion  by  the  continuation  of  a  known  series. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  cause  of  most  of  these  errors. 
The  necessity  of  designating  the  objects  as  they  are  being  counted 
and  at  the  same  time  reciting  the  series  of  figures  may  disturb 
the  memory  of  the  order  of  the  figures,  because  there  is  a  division 
of  attention.  Albert  has  furnished  us  a  curious  example  of  this. 
We  put  before  him  6  pins,  well  separated  one  from  the  other. 
He  counts  them  with  his  finger  while  reciting  the  following  series : 
1,  2,  3,  4,  6.  Having  finished  he  perceived  there  was  one  more, 
at  the  same  moment  he  also  perceived  that  he  had  omitted  to 
count  5 ;  there  was  an  instant  of  hesitation  and  then  he  decided, 
and  touching  the  remaining  pin  he  said,  "five,  there  are  five  of 
them."  The  error  is  so  complicated  that  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  explain  it,  and  still  more  difficult  to  make  him  com- 
prehend it. 

It  can  thus  be  seen  that  to  count  objects  represents  a  much 
■"-snore  complex  operation  than  reciting  figures.  Let  us  go  farther 
and  see  what  our  imbeciles  and  morons  do  with  money. 

Money.  Money  gives  rise  to  much  more  difficult  operations 
than  pins  do,  because  pins  are  unities,  while  money  is  composed 
of  units,  of  tens,  of  twenties,  of  hundreds,  which  give  rise,  as 


NUMBER   SENSE  93 

we  shall  see,  to  operations  requiring  considerable  training.  Are 
imbeciles  familiar  with,  we  do  not  say  the  value,  but  the  names 
of  the  pieces  of  money?  They  know  them,  at  least  those  who 
are  older  and  have  had  time  to  learn  them;  they  know  them  even 
better  than  children  of  the  same  mental  level,  and  this  is  natural 
because  they  profit  from  a  longer  experience.  But  their  men- 
tality betrays  itself  especially  in  this,  that  they  constantly  make 
mistakes  in  naming  the  pieces,  and  give  the  correct  name  only 
once  or  twice  out  of  three  times. 

Here  are  the  names  given  by  Victor. 

Pieces  represented  Replies  of  Victor 

0  fr.  50 10  sous  (correct 

1  fr 20  sous  (correct) 

2  fr 20  sous  (incorrect) 

5  fr 3  fr.      (incorrect) 

A  new  sou 10  fr.      (incorrect) 

1  sou 2  sous  (incorrect) 

1  sou 1  sou    (correct) 

20  fr.  (gold) 1  fr.      (incorrect) 

Immediately  the  pieces  are  again  shown  to  him  in  the  same 
order,  and  the  difference  in  the  repHes  is  very  apparent. 

0  fr.  50 10  sous,  to  buy  tobacco 

1  fr 20  sous 

2  fr 20  sous 

5fr 1  fr. 

20  fr 3  fr. 

1  sou 1  sou 

5fr 1  fr. 

20  fr 3fr. 

1  sou 1  sou. 

5  f r 1  fr. 

1  fr 20  sous. 

0  fr.  .50 That  is  to  buy  a 

package  of  tobacco 
10  sous  (correct) 

2  centimes Ah!    don't    know, 

centimes     .     . 
you  phiy  mca  trick 

What  must  wc  think  of  these  designations?  In  the  l.cginning 
one  is  disposed  to  take  them  seriously,  all  the  moic  because  the 
imbecile  gives  them  without  hesitation,  and  with  a  profound 
assurance;  ho  seems   wholly   convinced  of   what   he   is  saying. 


94  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

\  One  supposes  therefore  that  he  has  learned  incorrectly:  that 
sometimes  happens.  But  it  is  not  what  most  frequently  happens. 
\^The  general  rule  is  that  the  imbecile  gives  any  name  haphazard 
to  what  he  does  not  know,  and  he  does  not  even  suspect  this; 
he  has  no  intention  whatever  of  guessing,  nor  has  he  the  trick  of 
wishing  to  hide  his  ignorance  under  an  air  of  assurance.  He  does 
not  perceive  that  he  often  contradicts  himself;  he  does  not  realize 
that  he  does  not  know.  He  seems  even  to  be  convinced  that 
he  does  know — if  it  can  be  that  in  a  mental  state  so  rudimentary 
as  his,  one  can  be  convinced  of  anything. 

Let  us  push  our  investigation  still  farther,  and  ask  the  value 
of  the  pieces  of  money,  how  many  sous,  for  instance,  it  requires 
to  make  a  franc.  Neither  Victor  nor  Albert  can  reply,  or  rather 
the  answers  which  they  give  are  extravagant,  and  as  though 
spoken  at  random.  On  the  contrary  Griffon,  a  moron,  gives 
the  correct  reply  every  time.  Between  these  two  groups  of 
defectives  is  it  possible  to  imagine  an  intermediate  state?  We 
do  not  suppose  so.  We  simply  think  that  we  might  find  an 
imbecile  X who  would  give  nearly  the  correct  value  of  cer- 
tain pieces,  exactly  the  correct  value  of  others,  and  fail  utterly 
on  still  others.  Observation  has  furnished  us  a  very  unexpected 
type  of  transition.  It  is  Beauvisage,  our  young,  high-grade 
imbecile.  She  belongs  to  a  family  engaged  in  the  business  of 
selling  crusts  of  bread  for  dogs;  her  services  have  certainly  been 
utilized,  and  she  must  have  received  money  and  learned  not  to 
make  mistakes.  In  effect,  she  knows  the  names  of  all  the  pieces 
of  money,  and  besides  she  has  some  relative  idea  of  their  value. 
She  cannot  say  that  the  5-franc  piece  is  worth  a  hundred  times 
1  sou,  or  that  the  2-franc  piece  is  worth  forty  times  1  sou,  but 
if  we  put  them  side  by  side  she  knows  positively  which  is  worth 
more. 

Thus  she  knows  that  2  francs  is  worth  more  than  1  fr.  and 
she  knows  that  1  fr.  is  worth  more  than  10  sous,  and  also  that  10 
sous  is  worth  more  than  a  nickel  5-sou  piece.  More  than  this, 
if  we  make  a  pile  of  8  sous  on  one  side  and  on  the  other  side  place 
a  10-sou  piece,  she  selects  the  10-sou  piece  as  more  valuable 
than  the  pile  of  8  sous.  Here  is  a  curious  appreciation  of  the 
value  of  money;  we  have  thought  it  interesting  to  note  this  fact 
in  passing. 

Let  us  come  now  to  the  act  of  counting  money;  it  involves 


NUMBER   SENSE  95 

a  great  complication,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken.  Cer- 
tain pieces  are  worth  more  than  others;  this  is  sufficient  to  be- 
wilder the  imbeciles.  Thus  Albert  can  generally  count  correctly 
a  line  of  a  dozen  pins  spread  out  before  him.  This  same  subject 
knows  the  value  of  a  2-sou  piece.  Give  hmi  sous  to  count  in 
which  there  are  single  and  double  sous,  he  makes  mistakes  be- 
cause he  counts  each  double  sou  as  a  single  sou.  Five  single 
sous  and  one  double  sou  are  counted  exactly  as  though  they  made 
six  sous.  The  natm-e  of  the  error  is  curious;  it  evidently  con- 
sists in  a  simplification;  it  is  easier  to  pass  from  5  to  6  than  from 
5  to  7.     Moreover  little  children  make  the  same  mistake. 

The  centimes  complicate  the  operation  still  more.  We  have 
remarked  in  the  case  of  Cabussel,  high  grade  imbecile  and  micro- 
cephalic, how  dangerous  it  is  to  give  to  these  beings  any  in- 
struction which  is  not  in  accord  with  their  degree  of  intelligence. 
It  is  a  question  of  high  pedagogical  importance,  which  would 
need  a  lengthy  explanation.  Perhaps  we  shall  return  to  it  later. 
Here  it  will  suffice  to  indicate  a  particular  application  of  it.  Ca- 
bussel is  capable  of  counting  correctly  10  pins,  or  even  15  pins; 
if  he  sometimes  makes  an  error  it  is  slight  and  caused  by  a  moment 
of  distraction.  When  he  is  given  a  mixture  of  double  and  single 
sous  to  count,  he  becomes  at  once  very  much  embarrassed,  grows 
confused  and  ends  by  giving  a  result  ridiculously  wrong.  This 
is  because  he  knows  the  value  of  the  money  not  only  in  sous 
but  also  in  centimes;  this  is  very  unfortunate  for  him;  if  he  knew 
only  the  sous,  he  could,  we  believe,  make  the  count  correctly; 
but  he  adds,  now  sous,  now  centimes,  from  which  comes  an  in- 
extricable confusion.  A  sum  of  11  sous,  composed  of  5  double 
and  1  single  sou,  is  counted  as  making  36  sous.  A  sum  of  15 
sous  made  with  double  and  single  sous,  is  counted  as  making  51 
sous,  or  another  time  53  sous.  It  is  difficult  to  give  the  details 
of  this  operation,  because  Cabussel  goes  so  fast  that  one  can 
scarcely  follow  him,  and  if  you  beg  him  to  begin  again,  he  never 
follows  the  same  operation. 

Schematically,  one  might  represent  the  work  which  he  executes, 
by  employing  the  following  terms:  he  counts,  "1  sou,  2  sous,  3 
sous,  4  sous,  5  sous;"  so  far  it  is  cornict;  then  he  encounters  2 
sous,  which  he  counts  for  10  centimes;  he  adds  10  centimes  and 
5  sous  which  make  for  him  15  sous,  and  so  on.  Arrived  at  the 
highest  figure,  he  says  one  time  that  they  are  sous,  at  another 


96  y^    THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

time  centimes.  In  truth  it  is  a  pitj''  that  any  one  took  the  pains 
to  teach  this  imbecile  the  value  of  money  in  centimes!  What 
trouble,  what  effort  it  must  have  cost!  And  with  what  results! 
He  counts  very  much  worse  than  if  he  had  remained  ignorant. 

Many  more  observations  might  be  made.  We  shall  stop 
with  this  one,  which  was  suggested  to  us  by  Lanterie,  a  high 
grade  imbecile.  She  can  count  quite  well  a  mixture  of  single 
and  double  sous,  or  at  least  when  she  is  wrong,  her  error  is  slight. 
Thus,  there  are  4  double  sous,  and  2  single  sous;  she  counts 
10  sous  correctly.  Nevertheless  if  one  asks  her  a  question  of 
abstract  addition,  for  instance,  "How  many  are  3  and  2?"  she 
shows  herself  incapable  of  adding  2;  she  succeeds  in  adding  1 
but  not  2;  out  of  6  questions  of  this  nature  she  made  4  mistakes. 
It  results  therefore  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  make  abstract 
additions  of  2  than  additions  of  double  sous.  In  the  latter  case, 
the  attention  is  doubtless  better  fixed  and  more  affected  by  the 
concrete  character  of  the  experirnent. 

It  can  easily  be  seen  that  our  imbeciles  are  not  brilliant  cal- 
culators; all  the  examples  that  we  have  cited  are  full  of  curious 
errors  which  they  commit;  and  what  completely  proves  that  their 
arithmetical  faculty  is  but  little  developed,  is  that  sub-normal 
children,  whom  we  have  brought  together  in  the  special  classes, 
are  all  weak  in  number  work,  much  weaker  than  in  spelling 
or  reading. 

There  exists  therefore  a  remarkable  contrast  between  the  ani- 
mal and  the  verbal  intelligence  of  number.  Victor,  who  cannot 
correctly  count  4  sous  placed  on  the  table,  shows  a  surprising 
ability  in  the  little  game  with  the  hand  which  consists  of  counting 
them  without  counting  them,  so  to  speak,  having  onlj^  a  simple 
sensorial  idea  of  their  number.  This  ability  resembles  that  which 
they  show  in  comparing  lines,  weights,  and  even  in  perceiving 
the  distance  and  the  position  of  objects.  They  have  without 
any  doubt  some  of  our  sensorial  faculties;  these  are  as  acute 
with  them  as  with  us.  That  which  is  specially  lacking  is  the 
word,  the  key  to  abstract  ideas  and  general  conceptions. 


X.    REASONING 
The  Intellectual  Acts  in  General 

We  shall  now  study  how  oui'  defectives  perform  certain  in- 
tellectual acts.  These  intellectual  acts  consist  in  understanding, 
judging,  explaining,  defining,  developing,  inventing,  imagining, 
deducing,  demonstrating  and  in  accomplishing  a  host  of  other 
operations  which  have  for  their  object  directly  or  indirectly 
the  solving  of  problems;  because  real  life  proposes  to  us  ques- 
tions without  ceasing  which  are  like  barriers  opposing  themselves 
to  our  activity;  our  intelligence  spends  itself  in  finding  a  solu- 
tion to  these  problems;  if  it  cannot  solve  them  more  or  less  well, 
we  cannot  adapt  ourselves. 

It  is  clear  that,  in  preceding  pages,  we  have  also  been  studying 
intellectual  acts.  To  find  the  longer  of  2  lines  or  the  heavier 
of  two  weights  is  to  compare,  to  judge,  to  comprehend.  There 
is  some  intelligence  in  all  our  acts;  only  the  proportions  of  the 
difficulty  vary;  we  have  created  up  to  this  point,  very  slight 
difficulties;  we  shall  now  consider  greater  ones. 

All  these  difficulties  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  formula: 
given  one  element,  a,  the  problem  consists  in  finding  another 
element,  6,  which  completes  it.  This  can  be  explained  by  several 
difterent  examples  of  which  we  shall  cite  only  three.  A  question 
is  put:  "What  is  a  horse?"  This  question  is  the  element  a.  In 
finding  the  suitable  definition  for  a  horse,  the  element  h  is  fur- 
nished. In  the  same  way  we  present  to  someone  a  picture  repre- 
senting persons  seated  around  a  table,  upon  whicli  are  glasses. 
The  picture  represents  the  element  a.  In  giving  the  subject 
of  the  picture,  in  saying  it  represents  a  drinking  scene,  the  ele- 
ment h  is  furnished.  Last  example;  "Game  of  patience."  Pieces 
of  a  card  are  shown  with  the;  instruction  to  reconstruct  the  card 
by  putting  the  pieces  together  in  IIh'  proper  m.inner.  TIk'  re- 
construction is  the  end,  the  element  to  be  fdiiiui,  element  b; 
the  data  of  llie  problem  foiin  tlu;  el('in''nt  a. 

97 


98  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Pictures.  For  the  perception  of  pictures,  defectives  behave 
almost  exactly  like  very  young,  normal  children ;  we  fear  we  shall 
repeat  what  we  have  elsewhere  said  of  the  latter^  if  we  report 
in  detail  all  that  we  have  found  true  with  imbeciles;  but  the 
study  is  so  important  for  explaining  the  insufficiency  of  imbecile 
thought,  that  we  shall  be  pardoned  if  we  go  back  to  it.     The 

/  defective  is  fond  of  pictures;  the  picture  is  an  excellent  test, 
which  catches  his  attention  and  amuses  him,  and  when  necessary 
dissipates  his  ill  hmnor.  In  general  the  picture  does  not  hold 
his  attention  long;  he  quickly  exhausts  it,  and  he  wishes  to  see 
another.  If  he  is  asked  to  describe  the  picture  presented  to  him, 
he  does  not  reflect  long;  he  finishes  his  description  in  a  few  words. 
/The  number  of  words  that  he  uses  might  almost  measure  his 
intelligence.  A  middle  grade  imbecile,  Duneize,  to  whom  we 
show  a  collection  of  16  pictures,  gives  on  an  average  2  words 
to  a  picture.  A  higher  grade  imbecile,  Albert,  gives  8  words 
on  an  average,  while  Griffon,  a  moron,  employs  an  average  of 
20.  It  is  nevertheless  the  same  collection.  All  this  proves 
that  one  interests  himself  in  things  only  in  the  measure  in  which 
he  himself  is  intelligent;  in  other  words,  our  interest  in  things 
comes  from  what  we  put  into  them  as  much  as  from  what  they 
offer  to  us. 

As  to  the  nature  of  the  work  done  on  the  pictures  by  defectives, 
it  shows  the  same  stages  as  among  normal  children.     The  lowest 

/  intellectual  type  is  that  of  the  enumerators,  those  who  content 
themselves  with  briefly  naming  the  principal  objects  which  they 
see.  Nearly  all  imbeciles  belong  to  this  type,  but  with  a  well- 
marked  selective  tendency.  We  have  never  encountered  one 
who,  like  certain  insane  subjects  mentioned  elsewhere,  described 
a  picture  from  left  to  right.  All  our  imbeciles  go  directly  to 
persons,  and  what  specially  interests  them  is  the  sex  of  the  per- 
sons. "That  is  a  man — There  are  men — That  is  a  woman — 
Those  are  women,  etc."  These  are  the  replies  that  we  most 
frequently  receive,  for  pictures  which  contain  many  other  things; 
from  time  to  time,  but  more  rarely,  they  designate  animals, 
horses  for  instance  and  dogs,  but  the  subject  of  the  picture  is 
passed  by  in  silence.  The  imbecile  does  not  bother  himself 
to  know  "what  that  signifies."     He  concentrates  upon  the  in- 

'  The  Development  of  the  Intelligence  among  Children. 


REASONING  99 

ventory  of  persons;  this  brevity  does  not  however  prevent  him 
from  making  many  errors.  One  of  them,  looking  at  a  scene 
of  insurgents,  where  there  were  more  than  thirty  persons,  said 
"That  is  a  man;"  another  looldng  at  a  picture  of  two  men  fighting, 
took  one  of  the  men  for  a  horse,  and  said  "There,  that  is  a  man, 
a  man  who  is  on  horseback,"  and  so  forth.  It. can  be  seen 
that  even  in  Umiting  oneself  to  enumeration  one  can  make 
mistakes. 

A  stage  higher,  the  enumeration  mingles  with  description. 
The  position  of  the  person  is  noted  with  the  action.  Then  among 
the  more  intelligent,  generally  the  morons,  there  are  true  des- 
criptions expressed  in  complex  sentences.  This  we  believe  is 
the  limit;  the  moron  does  not  go  beyond  descriptions,  he  never 
rises  to  general  interpretation.  Interpretation  is  a  matter  for 
normal  intelligence. 

What  do  these  experiments  upon  pictures  prove?  Two  princi- 
pal facts,  as  we  believe;  first,  the  astonishing  resemblance  be- 
tween our  imbeciles  and  normal  children  very  much  younger; 
besides  this,  a  certain  lack  of  intelligence  and  of  comprehension 
which  results  in  our  imbeciles  not  entering  into  the  meaning 
of  the  picture  as  they  should.  They  stop  at  the  first  and  most 
elementary  image  that  presents  itself  to  their  minds;  they  see 
in  the  picture  only  the  most  apparent  objects,  those  which  are 
the  most  striking  to  them,  and  they  do  not  at  all  attempt  to 
divine  what  is  not  seen  but  which  is  only  suggested.  Theirs 
in  an  intelligence  that  lacks  penetration. 

Definitions  of  ivords.  Here  is  another  subject  upon  which 
we  do  not  wish  to  expand  because  it  is  treated  elsewhere^  in  re- 
lation to  normal  children  and  it  turns  out  that  our  defectives 
give  definitions  that  are  absolutely  analogous  £o  those  of  children. 
Let  us  be  brief.  Recall  the  fact  that  normal  children  according 
to  age  and  intelligence  give  three  sorts  of  definitions. 

1.  Simple  r(;petitions:  a  chair  is  a  chair. 

2.  Definitions  in  terms  of  use. 

3.  Definitions  in  terms  superior  to  use:  A  chair  is  an  object, 
a  piece  of  furniture,  it  is  made  of  wood. 

Among  our  defectives  we  find  especially  an  abundance  of 
definitions  in  terms  of  use;  and  they  are  such  that  if  one  did  not 

*  The  Dcvclopirinit   of  the  Intelligence  amoiij^  ('liildnMi,  p.   101. 


t^ 


100  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

know  the  personality  of  those  who  gave  them,  they  would  be 
unhesitatingly  attributed  to  normal  children. 

Here  are  the  replies  of  Victor,  all  by  use.  Victor,  let  us  recall, 
is  an  imbecile  fifty-three  years  old. 

Q.  What  is  a  house? 
A.  To  sleep  in. 
Q.  What  is  a  fork? 
A.  To  eat  with. 
Q.  What  is  a  mama? 
A.  To  eat. 

Q.  What  is  a  snail?     (edible  snail) 
A.  To  eat,  monsieur. 
Q.  And  paper? 
A.  To  write  on. 
Q.  A  paper-cutter? 
A.  To  cut  paper. 
Q.  A  good  trade? 
A.  Don't  know. 
Q.  A  railroad? 

A.   (Imitates  the  whistle  of  a  locomotive) 
Q.  Goodness? 
A.  Don't  know. 
Q.  Justice? 
A.  For  men. 
Q.  Virtue? 

A.  It  is  salad,     (he  understood  lettuce — la  laitue) 
Q.  Charity? 

A.  To  give  bread.  (Eloquent  simplicity  which  certainly  was  not 
conscious). 

Q.  Solidarity? 

A.  To  be  a  soldier.     (Was  deceived  by  the  similarity  of  sound) 

Q.  Work? 

A.  To  dig  up  the  garden. 

Q.  Ambition? 

A.  For  soldiers. 

Q.  Hope? 

A.  Hope  is  for  men. 

Q.  Gluttony? 

A.  To  drink,  and  get  drunk. 

The  point  of  view  remains  constantly  the  same,  that  of  use; 
he  sees  things  in  the  most  ordinary  manner  and  one  feels  there 
is  no  reflection. 

The  definitions  of  Albert  belong  to  the  same  category;  defini- 
tions by  use,  with  a  childish  turn. 


REASONING  101 

Q.  What  is  a  house? 

A.  A  house    ....    well    ....    a  house  it  is  to  rent. 

Q.  A  fork? 

A.  It  is  to  eat  with. 

Q.  A  mama? 

A.  She  is  to  get  ready  things  to  eat. 

Q.  A  table? 

A.  It  is  to  eat  on. 

Q.  A  chair? 

A.  It  is  to  sit  on. 

Q.  A  horse? 

A.  It  is  to  work. 

Q.  A  snail? 

A.  It  is  to  eat. 

Q.  A  flea. 

A.  It  is  to  kill. 

Q.  Charity? 

A.  It  is  those  who  do  good  in  the  world. 

Q.  Justice? 

A.  It  is  those  who  do  evil. 

Q.  Goodness? 

A.  Ah,  goodness,  it  is  to  get  angry. 

Q.  Virtue? 

A.  (after  thinking  a  long  while)     I  don't  know. 

The  replies  of  Beauvisage  are  identical. 

Q.  A  house? 

A.  It  is  to  lodge  in. 

Q.  A  fork? 

A.  It  is  to  eat  with. 

Q.  A  mama? 

A.  (no  reply) 

Q.  A  carriage? 

A.  A  carriage  is  to  roll. 

Q.  A  horse? 

A.  A  horse,  it  is  to  draw  the  carriage. 

Q.  A  snail? 

A.  That  is  to  eat,  snails. 

Q.  A  flea? 

A.  A  flea  is  on  dogs. 

Q.  Charity? 

A.  To  beg  for  money. 

Q.  Justice? 

A.   (after  thought)     It  supports  tho  world. 

The  only   conclusion   which   can    ho  drawn   from   those   notes 
is  identical  with  what  we  have  presented  apropos  of  the  (^xperi- 


102  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

ments  upon  pictures.  It  can  be  seen  that  they  define  exactly 
like  a  young  child.  One  can  also  say  that  they  conduct  them- 
selves in  a  very  unintelligent  manner,  because,  in  truth,  to  resem- 
ble a  young  child,  and  to  conduct  oneself  with  but  little  intelli- 
gence, are  synonymous.  The  lack  of  intelligence  consists  here 
in  a  very  limited  vision ;  the  use  of  things  is  evidently  what  strikes 
them  the  moment  they  think  of  things;  it  is  what  is  obvious, 
what  one  sees  without  reflection;  and  this  is  why  children  and 
imbeciles  accept  the  idea  of  use  and  are  satisfied  with  it.  Con- 
cerning their  intelligence  let  us  repeat  what  we  have  already 
said  about  the  interpretation  of  pictures:  it  lacks  penetration. 

The  "game  of  patience.'^  The  last  experiment  which  we  shall 
cite,  chosen  from  many  others,  is  of  a  purely  sensorial  order; 
it  is  suitable  for  those  who  are  not  at  all  brilliant  in  the  exercise 
of  verbal  intelligence.  We  cut  a  visiting  card  into  ten  pieces  of 
the  most  varied  form,  triangles  and  polygons  of  different  sizes. 
The  problem  is  to  reconstruct  the  visiting  card  by  putting  to- 
gether the  fragments  in  the  required  order.  We  place  an  uncut 
card  on  the  table  and  invite  the  subject  to  reconstruct  a  similar 
one  from  the  pieces.  The  difficulty  of  this  test  is  not  measur- 
able; it  depends  not  only  on  the  number  of  fragments  but  upon 
their  size  and  form.  We  have  been  able,  by  proceeding  in  differ- 
ent ways,  to  make  easy  combinations,  and  others  very  much 
more  difficult.  At  first  sight  there  seems  no  directing  idea  that 
can  be  followed  as  a  guide  in  this  game;  one  must  attempt  all 
sorts  of  mechanical  combinations  until  one  happens  on  the  right 
one.  This  is  not  quite  true.  Notice  first  that  the  number  of 
fragments  is  10,  that  each  presents  on  the  average  3  sides; 
the  number  of  sides  then  is  30;  but  the  number  of  combinations 
which  one  could  make  with  30  elements  is  so  great  that  it  would 
take  a  whole  life  time  to  exhaust  them.  Nevertheless  we  have 
seen  persons  of  normal  intelligence  reconstruct  the  card  in  two 
or  three  minutes.  It  must  therefore  be  that  the  intelligence 
enters  unconsciously  into  these  attempts  which  seem  the  most 
mechanical.  But  how  does  this  intelligence  work?  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  discover.  The  subject  performs  a  mental  operation  which 
in  the  main  escapes  us,  because  he  does  not  speak.  The  study 
of  defectives  and  their  errors,  should  permit  us  to  analyse  these 
mental  operations.  All  that  we  can  verify  is  the  intellectual 
activity  of  the  subject,  the  reflections  that  he  makes,  the  num- 


REASONING  103 

ber  of  his  iinsuccessful  attempts,  the  manner  in  which  he  him- 
self judges  these  attempts;  all  this  is  impalpable  as  mechanism 
but  proves  a  mental  state  of  superior  quality.  This  mental 
state  is  so  important  that  when  it  is  found  it  should  have  more 
weight  than  success,  which  might  be  lacking.  It  cannot  be  demon- 
strated that  every  normal  person,  without  exception,  must  suc- 
ceed in  our  game  of  "patience."  There  is  always  chance  in  the 
game;  one  may  be  thrown  out  by  a  bad  combination,  to  which 
one  adheres,  or  again  one  may  repeatedly  pass  close  to  the  solu- 
tion without  noticing  it."  Anyone  may  have  his  mind  diverted. 
It  w^ould  never  occur  to  us  to  make  this  game  a  test  of  normal 
intelligence. 

Let  us  notice  now  our  defectives.  Duneize,  (middle  grade 
imbecile)  after  having  received  explicit  directions,  puts  the  pieces 
one  after  another  in  a  line,  like  soldiers,  and  does  not  even  dream 
of  putting  them  together.  One  might  question  if  she  understood. 
In  any  case,  the  game  consists  in  a  reconstruction,  the  recon- 
struction supposes  a  uniting  of  the  different  parts.  She  cannot 
form  even  a  remote  idea  of  all  this. 

Albert  does  better  because  he  puts  the  pieces  together,  and 
attempts  to  form  a  figure;  but  he  makes  no  serious  effort;  he 
puts  them  together  haphazard,  and  the  operation  once  accom- 
plished, he  does  not  change  their  position,  and  prevents  all  pos- 
sibility of  success  by  allowing  them  to  overlap.  His  figure  pre- 
sents two  faults:  the  first  is  that  in  its  exterior  form,  it  in  no 
way  resembles  an  oblong;  the  second  is  that  in  its  interior  it 
presents  empty  spaces.  We  point  out  to  Albert  the  two  defects 
of  his  construction,  then  we  show  him  the  card  which  ought  to 
serve  him  for  model: 

Q.  Is  itlike  this?     (showing  the  card) 
A.  Oh,  no,  because  it  is  broken  there. 
Q.  But  could  you  not  make  it  like  that? 
A.  (with  a  convinced  air)     Oh!  no. 

This  absence  of  continuation  of  effort  is  characteristic  of  such 
subjects;  they  do  not  make  a  series  of  trials  and  errors,  as  do 
so  many  normals;  they  dispo.sc  the  pieces  in  any  order  tliat  hap- 
pens, and  then  sit  motionless  before  their  failure,  inaUiiig  no  fur- 
ther attempt. 

Griffon  (moron)  is  more  clever,  lie  brings  the  edges  of  llic 
pieces  togcthfT  exactly,  and  is  careful  not  to  let  them  overlap. 


104  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

In  his  first  attempt,  he  works  completely  at  random,  as  though 
he  had  lost  sight  of  the  model  card,  and  his  construction  leaves 
an  empty  space,  without  in  any  way  forming  an  oblong  as  to 
exterior  form.  We  point  this  out  to  him.  He  begins  again. 
His  second  attempt  is  better  than  the  first,  he  succeeds  in  eliminat- 
mg  the  empty  space  and  thus  his  first  error  is  corrected.  But 
he  cannot  bring  the  whole  to  resemble  an  oblong.  After  many 
other  equally  fruitless  attempts,  we  are  convinced  that  Griffon 
cannot  succeed  because  he  does  not  improve. 

Finally  Bard,  high  grade  moron,  begins  the  work  with  more 
reflection.  She  compares  the  dimensions  of  the  pieces  with  those 
of  the  model;  she  fills  the  spaces  left  by  the  large  pieces  then 
she  brings  the  large  ones  together,  constantly  keeping  in  mind 
the  general  form.  "I  don't  believe  that  that  is  it,"  she  says, 
and  she  begins  again,  turns  and  returns  the  pieces,  and  finally 
succeeds. 

Here  is  certainly  a  simple  experiment — child  play  one  would 
say.  But  it  is  on  the  contrary  quite  complicated  and  we  shall 
find  difficulty  enough  in  completely  analysing  it.  What  we  have 
established  is  that  in  presenting  the  card  intact  we  set  a  definite 
end  to  be  attained,  that  end  being  to  construct  a  figure  having  the 
form  and  size  of  the  card.  One  must  adapt  oneself  to  that  end, 
and  this  experiment  has,  like  all  the  rest  which  are  made  in  psychol- 
ogy, though  in  a  more  marked  manner  perhaps,  the  character 
of  an  act  of  adaptation.  The  different  combinations  which 
are  made  are  the  means  employed  to  attain  that  end.  During 
the  test  the  hand  is  continually  directed;  there  is,  as  it  were  an 
irmer  critic  which  counsels  us,  guides  us,  prevents  us  from  commit- 
ting an  error  or  warns  us  when  one  is  conomitted.  Therefore  we 
make  no  combination  which  could  create  an  empty  space,  or 
if  we  commit  this  error  we  correct  it  immediately;  in  the  same 
way  we  do  not  lose  sight  of  the  general  form,  and  if  some  combina- 
tion causes  us  to  lose  the  outline  we  abandon  it  at  once.  It  is 
by  this  direction  and  this  control  that  we  bring  our  work  to  a 
good  end,  and  it  is  by  the  absence  of  control  that  Albert  and  Griffon 
fail;  like  us  the  two  defectives  bring  the  pieces  together  and  try 
combinations,  but  they  have  not  as  clear  a  view  of  the  end  to  be 
attained,  they  do  not  judge  as  surely  the  means  they  employ; 
with  them,  chance  takes  all  the  ground  which  with  us  is  occupied 
by  logic;  and  since  chance  cannot  alone  bring  the  result  they  fail. 


REASONING  105 

An  analogous  explanation  answers  for  other  tests  of  adjustment 
of  which  we  shall  cite  simply  two:  find  rhjTnes  for  a  given  word; 
construct  a  sentence  containing  three  given  words.  Here  again 
we  furnish  a  frame  to  fill,  an  end  to  attain;  and  our  defectives 
fail.  Certain  ones  are  incapable  of  finding  any  solution  what- 
ever, they  cannot  cite  a  single  rhyme,  or  they  cannot  imagine 
a  sentence  containing  the  three  words.  Others  like  Griffon, 
who  have  more  activity  of  intelligence,  find  many  solutions, 
but  they  are  false;  thus  the  words  the}'  give  do  not  rhyme,  and 
the  sentences  thej'  form  have  no  sense. 

What  conclusions  can  we  draw  from  all  this?  We  do  not 
say  absolutely  that  a  defective  cannot  adapt  himself,  that  he 
cannot  represent  to  himself  the  end,  and  that  he  does  not  try 
to  adjust  his  means  to  this  end.  What  we  do  say  is  that  he 
has  not  been  able  to  adapt  himself  to  the  very  special  difficulty 
which  we  have  empirically  chosen  for  him,  and  that  if  we  dimin- 
ish the  difficulty  he  will  adapt  himself.  Instead  of  cutting  the 
card  into  10  pieces,  let  us  be  satisfied  by  cutting  it  into  two  or 
three,  and  certainly  xMbert  would  succeed  in  reconstructing  it. 
There  is  therefore  in  all  this  only  a  question  of  degree.  The 
work  of  an  imbecile  has  this  great  fault  of  adopting  the  first 
combination  which  comes,  however  crude  it  may  be;  it  is  chance 
which  leads  him  to  put  one  piece  near  another;  he  holds  to  this 
and  does  not  change  the  combination  even  when  shown  that  it 
is  wrong.  In  other  words,  he  takes  what  is  nearest  him,  making 
no  effort  to  look  beyond;  his  intelligence,  let  us  say  it  once  more, 
lacks  penetration. 

Let  us  content  ourselves  for  the  moment  with  this  expression. 
Later,  at  the  end  of  the  work,  when  we  set  forth  a  scheme  of 
thought,  we  shall  return  to  this  analysis  and  push  it  farther. 


V' 


V 


XL     SUGGESTIBILITY  THROUGH   DOCILITY 

If,  according  to  our  custom,  we  attempt  to  divine  the  facts  be- 
fore investigating  them,  and  consequently  conjecture  the  influence 
that  age  and  mental  development  might  exercise  upon  sug- 
gestibility, we  shall  make  two  preliminary  remarks.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  incontestable  that  infei-io^-b©ings4i:ave-less-judg- 
m^it-tharii  -superior  ones,  and  we  have  seen  by  many  examples 
how  often  imbeciles  lack  judgment.  Sihee  it  is  by  the  accuracy 
of  his  judgment-as-mueh-as  by  the  quality  of  his  charac'Eerthat 
an  individual  combats  the  judgments  of  those  about  him^_jwe 
shall  expect  to  find  that  those  who  lack  judgment  are  more 
credulous  than  others.  Besides  every  one  knows  that  the  child 
is  more  credulous  and  more  suggestible  than  the  adult.  The 
"why"  of  his  curiosity  is  readily  satisfied  wdth  the  first  "because" 
that  comes  along;  and  nothing  is  easier  than  to  impress  him, 
intimidate  him,  and  render  him  obedient;  however  unaccustomed 
one  is  to  school  children,  one  must  recognize  that  the  power 
of  direction  which  is  exercised  over  them  is  made  possible  by 
their  age.  All  these  considerations  lead  to  a  provisional  con- 
clusion, which  is  this:  it  is  probable  that  suggestibility,  ather. 
>/  things  being  equal,  must  decrease  as  the  intellectual  level,  rises. 

Is  this  true?  Yes,  certainly.  But  observation  will  give  us 
some  instructive  details.  It  will  show  us  first  and  above  all 
y  that  twQ_Jonns --of- -suggestibility  exist,  the  orre~only "apparent, 
the^pther  very  real. 

To  appreciate  the  suggestibility  of  a  person,  one  must  be  able 
to  compare  him  to  some  one  else  taken  as  a  type,  who  has  been 
submitted  to  the  same  influence.  It  will  not  suffice  to  reproduce 
examples  and  incidents  of  suggestion  accomplished;  that  might 
be  amusing  but  it  does  not  constitute  a  criterion.  One  must 
find  out  whether  an  imbecile  placed  under  the  sway  of  the  same 
suggestion  as  a  normal,  reacts  in  the  same  way,  or  with  more 
intensity  or  with  less. 

Several  years  ago,  one  of  us  pubhshed  methods  for  submitting 
a  waking  adult  to  suggestion  and  for  measuring  his  suggestibility. 

106 


SUGGESTIBILITY  107 

Many  of  those  methods  are  not  appHcable  to  an  imbecile,  be- 
cause they  require  an  amount  of  intelHgence  and  of  attention 
that  he  does  not  have.  Thus  there  is  one  method  that  con- 
sists in  copying  Unes  of  increasing  length  presented  separately; 
the  subject  is  so  impressed,  after  a  time,  by  the  regular  increase 
that  when  presented  with  hues  equal  in  length  to  the  longest, 
he  beUeves  them  to  be  still  increasing  and  draws  them  constantly 
longer  and  longer.  Albert  is  not  sensible  of  this  increase  in 
length,  because  he  does  not  notice  it,  in  fact  when  a  line  is  given 
him  to  copy,  he  pays  no  attention  to  its  length;  and  if  two  unequal 
lines  are  shown  him,  the  inequality  does  not  show  itself  in  his 
copy.  One  cannot  be  surprised  then  if  he  remains  insensible 
to  the  increased  length  of  the  lines.  In^oadeiilo  subject  an  imbecile  <*- 
frf  s^j^pstinn,  ^"^  mngf.  plana  .<:^»<*w4-£.»»r  lnt;-hTvp1  "Without  this 
precaution  one  would  be  in  danger  of  beheving  that  an  imbecile 
is  not  suggestible,  and  that  would  be  the  very  opposite  of  the  truth. 

Another  method  which  we  have  before  indicated  for  the  study 
of  normals,  succeeds  equally  well  with  imbeciles.  One  shows 
them  for  a  certain  length  of  time,  a  card-board  presenting  a  great 
number  of  objects  and  designs;  then  one  questions  them  upon 
their  incomplete  recollection,  introducing  into  the  questions 
numerous  snares  for  suggestion;  for  instance,  one  makes  use  of 
an  alternative  question;  the  stamp  that  was  shown  was  green, 
and  one  asks,  "Was  that  stamp  red  or  green?"  or  one  asks  the 
shape  of  the  hat  worn  by  a  person  who  in  reality  was  bare-headed. 
An  adult,  submitted  to  these  leading  questions,  does  not  notice 
that  he  is  being  pushed  gently  in  a  definite  direction,  and  that 
a  hand  is  being  laid  upon  his  thought;  this  action  remains  un- 
conscious or  more  often  semiconscious.  He  has  a  vague  feeling  - 
of  uncertainty,  of  uneasiness,  almost  of  embarrassment;  and 
from  time  to  time,  he  resists  the  suggestion  completely,  or  else 
he  escapes  by  an  expression  of  doubt,  analogous  to  this:  "I  do 
not  know;  I  cannot  recall  exactly."  One  can  thus  count  tiie 
number  of  snares  he  has  avoided  and  approximately  measure  iiis 
suggestibility.  It  is  a  measure,  because  on  the  one  hand,  all  the 
questions  are  written  in  advance  and  the  experimenter  does  not 
change  a  single  word,  jukI  on  the  other  hand,  one  knows  the 
average  number  of  snares  avoided  by  the  sul)jects.  In  general 
they  avoid  a  good  half. 

Albert,  our  imbecile,  fell  promptly  into  all.     His  suggest il)ili(y 


108       THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

is  much  greater  than  the  average  for  adults;  and  what  is  more, 
he  has  none  of  those  states  of  doubt  and  uneasiness  so  frequent 
among  normals.  He  replies  immediately,  without  hesitation, 
and  with  a  perfect  tranquillity.  Beauvisage,  notwithstanding 
her  rebellious  character,  comes  under  the  influence  of  the  experi- 
ment and  falls  into  the  snare  many  times,  though  rather  less 
frequently  than  Albert. 

It  is  evident  that  these  methods,  arranged  for  normals,  are 
too  delicate  for  imbeciles.  They  must  have  less  delicate  ones 
and  we  are  going  to  present  a  series  of  tests  which  we  have  devised 
for  them,  and  which  are  for  them  like  garments  cut  to  measure. 
In  order  to  have  terms  of  comparison  we  have  repeated  each 
test  upon  other  patients  in  the  asylum. 

As&euLJLaiihout  motive.  There  is  a  first  sign  of  suggestibility 
which  is  easy  to  arouse  among  imbeciles;  it  is  giving  assent jtp 
an  obscure  affirmation  or  simply  to  the  interjection  "Isn't  that 
so?"  It  is  sufficient  to  look  at  them  and  remark  with  authority 
these  few  words  "Isn't  that  so?"  even  without  saying  anything 
else.  Immediately  they  reply  "Yes,"  as  though  one  had  proclaimed 
a  truth.  It  is  a  sign  of  suggestibility  which  can  be  brought  out 
among  school  children,  especially  among  those  very  young, 
from  seven  to  eight  years;  toward  fourteen  years,  a  pupil  often 
remains  unmoved,  does  not  reply,  or  looks  at  one  in  an  astonished 
way,  or  even  demands  an  explanation. 

The-jre^fiUing  of  a  box.  We  have  here  the  same  compliajicfi 
in  following  an  order  the  repetition  of  which  would  give  offense 
to  a  normal.  If  one  overturns  a  box  of  pins  before  them  and 
says,  "Gather  these  up,"  they  gather  them  with  whatever  skill 
and  activity  they  may  possess.  When  they  have  finished,  we 
overturn  the  box  again,  and  scatter  the  pins  on  the  table;  one 
does  not  even  need  to  renew  the  order;  they  understand  what  is 
expected  of  them,  and  they  willingly  gather  the  pins  up  again, 
without  showing  astonishment,  without  asking  why  they  are 
given  such  an  utterly  useless  task.  They  are  profoundly  serious, 
and  one  sometimes  sees  some  choice  examples  of  stupidity.  Albert, 
for  instance,  gathers  up  the  scattered  pins  with  the  greatest 
care,  and  is  even  so  scrupulous  that  as  he  collects  them  he  ar- 
ranges the  heads  to  stand  together,  and  holds  them  between  his 
thumb  and  forefinger;  then  when  a  little  bundle  is  collected,  he 
throws  them  pell-mell  into  the  box  which  causes  him  to  lose  all 


SUGGESTIBILITY  109 

the  benefit  of  the  arrangement.  How  far  could  one  carry  this 
experiment?  Albert  gathered  them  up  five  times  in  succession 
and  that  took  nine  minutes.  At  this  point  we  stopped,  not  be- 
cause his  docility  was  exhausted  but  our  patience.  Albert  had 
not  murmured  in  any  way  nor  made  the  least  observation.  Vic- 
tor gathered  up  the  pins  twelve  times  in  succession,  without 
any  remark,  showing  the  same  docility. 

Is  this  a  form  of  suggestibility  peculiar  to  imbeciles? 

Yes  and  no.  Many  normals  have  obej'-ed  us  when  the  experi- 
ment was  given  under  special  conditions  of  seriousness  and  decorum, 
as  when  they  were  sick  in  a  hospital,  or  called  in  by  a  doctor, 
or  when  they  imagined  that  there  was  the  interest  of  study  in 
the  exercise,  from  which  a  benefit  to  their  health  would  result. 

In  fact  many  dementia  patients  have  obeyed  us  when  we 
subjected  them  to  this  treatment,  and  have  refilled  the  box 
a  great  number  of  times.  Others  have  resisted,  or  have  made  a 
great  many  reflections  aloud,  showing  that  they  sought  for  but 
could  not  understand  the  purpose  of  our  order.  One  subject, 
a  victim  of  senile  dementia,  was  remarkable  for  his  resistance. 
In  a  word  it  has  seemed  to  us  that  one  need  hdI.  be.  clearly  sug- 
gestible to  refill  the  box. 

TJie  chair  is  called  a, cork  screw.  One  must  make  the  same  com- 
mentaries upon  the  following  experiment,  which  seems  to  realize 
one  of  the  most  daring  suggestions.  We  rise,  we  take  a  chair 
and  show  it  to  the  imbecile. 

Q.  What  is  that? 
A.  A  chair. 

Q.  Serious  mistake!  It  is  not  a  chair,  it  is  a  cork  screw,  (a  pause) 
Let  us  see,  what  is  this?     (and  we  present  again  the  chair)  ^   j[ 

A.  A  cork  screw.  /  y"-^  ""'" 

Q.  Upon  what  are  you  sitting?  r  v  1 1 1 

A.  Upon — a  cork  screw.  T^' 

This  test  succeeds  invariably  with  all  our  imbeciles,  even  the 
most  rebellious;  and  one  can  believe  that  it  would  require  a 
very  low  mentality  to  thus  consent  to  change  the  name  of  a 
familiar  object.  It  is  evident  that  in  a  company  of  friends 
one  who  attempted  to  try  this  experiment  would  have  very  little 
success.  But  it  is  altogether  different  at  the  hospital  and  in 
the  atmosphere  where  we  are  working.  We  have  repeated  the 
ceremony  of  this  sort  of  re-naming  with  very  many  dementia 


110  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

subjects  who  are  in  no  way  suggestible;  and  we  have  not  yet 
encountered  a  single  one  who  had  the  idea  of  not  submitting 
to  our  wish.  What  did  these  dementia  patients  really  think? 
Probably  that  it  was  a  caprice  on  our  part,  a  lack  of  seriousness. 
In  any  case  they  obeyed  like  our  imbeciles.  Therefore  these 
first  experiments  of  suggestion  prove  nothing,  because  they 
succeed  upon  a  host  of  patients  and  probably  upon  those  in 
health  as  well. 

The  suggestion  of  the  dog.  We  arrive  now  at  suggestions  very 
much  more  profound,which  shock  good  sense  and  cannot  succeed 
except  where  persons  are  really  suggestible. 

The  suggestion  of  the  dog  is  a  very  complicated  scene  which 
we  do  our  best  to  act  out.  In  the  first  place  we  talk  with  our 
collaborator,  and  ask  him  in  a  loud  voice  to  bring  the  dog  that 
is  in  the  yard  into  the  room.  He  consents.  We  open  the  door, 
and  call  Follette,  and  allow  the  imaginary  dog  to  enter,  and 
with  manj^  gestures,  and  much  demonstration  make  him  jump 
upon  a  chair  placed  near  the  imbecile.  Then  we  say  to  the 
latter : 

Q.  Do  you  see  the  pretty  dog? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur     .... 

Q.  He  is  nice,  isn't  he? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Caress  him 

Denise,  who  is  demonstrative,  takes  the  chair,  lifts  it  and 
brings  the  seat  to  her  mouth;  a  great  kiss  resounds. 

With  Albert  the  scene  is  prolonged,  and  takes  on  more  breadth, 
because  Albert  speaks. 

Q.  What  color  is  the  dog? 

A.  It  is  white. 

Q.  Is  its  hair  curly? 

A.  No,  it  is  white. 

Q.  Caress  it,  why  don't  you? 

Albert  passes  his  hand  gently  across  the  cane  of  the  chair. 

Q.  Here  is  a  biscuit.     Make  him  eat.     Does  he  eat? 
A.   (after  having  made  the  appropriate  mimicry,   but  soberly)   Yes, 
monsieur. 

Q.  Tell  me,  my  dear  Albert,  what  will  you  do  with  this  dog? 
A.  What  will  I  do?    I  will  feed  him. 


SUGGESTIBILITY  111 

Q.  Yes,  but  do  you  think  you  would  be  allowed  to  have  a  dog  in  this 
place? 

A.  Oh,  no. 

Q.  Well,  if  they  scold  you  what  will  you  say? 

A.  I  could  say  nothing. 

Q.  Do  you  think  they  would  see  it? 

A.  Oh,  yes,  they  would  see  it. 

Q.  Couldn't  you  hide  it? 

A.  Oh! no. 

Q.  Perhaps  you  could! 

A.  Perhaps  so. 

Q.  You  ought  to  give  him  a  little  walk  about  the  room     .... 

A.   (Rising,  and  whistling  to  the  dog)     Come,  come! 

Q.  Take  him  to  the  steps. 

A.   (To  the  dog)     Go  to  the  steps!     Go,  jump! 

We  see  that  the.mheiale. does  not  at  all  develop  the  sugges- 
tion  gjjrenjTJrn.  His  lack  of  vocabular}'  and  especially  of  imagina- 
tion, renderHim  brief;  he  keeps  the  hallucination  just  as  it  is 
given  to  him.  This  has  very  little  resemblance  to  the  mimicry 
and  the  loquacity  of  a  hysteric  under  suggestion,  especially  of 
Baret,  that  brilliant  subject  of  the  Salpetriere,  who  did  not  stop 
short  of  literature,  and  made  of  the  least  suggestion  a  romance 
or  a  poem. 

Griffon  (moron)  received  the  suggestion  of  the  dog  and  ac- 
cepted it  as  completely  as  Albert  did.  He  lowered  his  head,  and 
seemed  very  timid.  When  the  dog  had  jumped  upon  the  chair, 
Griffon,  at  our  invitation,  stretched  out  his  hand  toward  the 
chair  to  caress  the  dog,  but  he  did  it  with  only  the  faintest  ges- 
ture; he  seemed  abashed  by  what  was  asked  of  him. 

It  is  needless  to  add  that  patients,  other  than  cm-  defectives, 
are  not  siisr'cptil>le  to  this  suggestion.  An  old  woman,  with  senile 
dementia,  before  whom  we  played  the  scene,  looked  at  us  with 
disdain  and  shrugged  her  shoulders.  A  young  woman,  who 
shows  that  she  does  not  lack  intelligence  when  one  can  distract 
her  a  moment  from  her  maniacal  excitement,  laughed  in  our 
face  and  said,  "I  won't  do  anything."  Even  a  subject  very 
much  advanced  with  general  paralysis,  showed  himself  skeptical, 
"Where  is  your  dog?"  he  asked,  looking  under  the  table;  tiien 
he  sat  back  saying  with  assurance;,  "There  is  no  dog  here." 

The  suQ(f£^luin  -Of  the,  (Jciicml.  Here  is  another  hallucination 
which  succeeded  with  Allx'rt.  We  give  it  in  detail  because 
Alljert  here  plays  a  role  more  active  than  in  the  preceding  case. 


112  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

It  is  what  we  call  the  "hallucination  of  the  General."     It  ia 
so  audacious  that  we  did  not  dare  try  it  upon  any  subjects  that 
we  did  not  already  know  to  be  very  susceptible  to  suggestion; 
we  should  have  covered  ourselves  with  ridicule. 
We  said  very  seriously  to  Albert: 

Q.  I  have  something  very  interesting  to  tell  you.  A  General  is  com- 
ing here  very  soon.  The  General  comes  to  see  you.  Unfortunately  Dr. 
Simon  and  I  are  obliged  to  leave.  Will  you  receive  the  General  in  our 
place? 

A.  Yes,  Monsieur. 

Q.  Ah!  here  he  is! 

We  go  to  the  door.  An  exchange  of  salutations  takes  place 
with  the  imaginary  General.  Albert  is  presented  to  him.  Albert 
gets  up  and  bows  in  his  turn.  The  General  is  made  to  sit  down 
near  him.  Albert,  never  very  active,  says  nothing.  But  he  is 
serious  and  is  far  from  laughing  or  ridiculing.  We  wait.  Noth- 
ing happens.  As  the  silence  threatens  to  continue  and  as,  natur- 
ally, the  General  is  as  far  from  being  loquacious  as  the  imbecile, 
we  whisper  to  Albert — 

Q.  Talk  to  the  general,  why  don't  you    .... 

Then  Albert,  in  a  natural  voice,  speaks  to  him,  says  several 
words,  and  seems  to  wait  for  a  repl}^,  then  says  more  words; 
we  can  represent  this  dialogue  of  one  person  in  the  following 
manner : 

Albert — Monsieur  General    .... 
The  General — 

Albert — Monsieur  General,  things  are  going  very  well. 
The  General — 

Albert — Well  I  worked  in  the  market  every  morning,  I  made  20  sous. 
The  General — 

Albert — Yes,  I  had  an  employer 
The  General — 

Albert — It  suited  me  very  well. 
The  General — 

Albert — And  then  I  did  errands,  and  helped  in  the  house.     I  swept  the 
rooms,  and  I  acted  as  porter. 
The  General — 
Albert — That  is  all,  Monsieur  General. 

We  understand  by  that  last  sentence  that  the  conversation 
is  finished.     It  is  very  impressive.     One  would  think  he  was  in 


SUGGESTIBILITY 


113 


the  presence  of  some  high  personage  on  a  tour  who  visits  a  hospi- 
tal and  addresses  a  few  kindlj^  words  to  a  workman.  That  would 
take  place  about  as  Alfred  imagines  and  it  is  curious  that  the 
whole  of  such  a  conversation  could  have  been  carried  on  by  an 
imbecile. 

In  order  not  to  lose  this  scene,  we  photographed  Albert  and 
the  General  together.     Then,   as  the  presence  of  the  General 


FIG.  18.  THE  SCENE  OF  ALBERT  WITH  THE  GENERAL.  THE  J'lC'l  UIIE  WAS 
TAKEN  AFTER  SAYING  TO  ALBERT:  "THE  GENERAL  IS  SEATED  IN  THAT 
CHAIR.  SIT  DOW.V  BESIDE  HIM  AND  WE  WILL  TAKE  YOUR  PICTURES  TO- 
GETHER." 

might  become  burden.somc,  wc  made  him  leave  and  Albert. 
at  our  request,  accompanied  him  to  the  (joor,  b(»wing  as  he  left- 
In  order  to  knc)w  if  the  incinoiy  ol'  this  lijilluciimt  ion  (admit- 
ting that  it  was  one;  persisted  oi-  it'  all  was  forgotten,  uc  riucs- 
tioricd  Albert  twenty-one  days  alter  it  happcMied.  lie  icnienibered 
everything  and  sijcmed  convinced  ol  tht;  reality  oi  what  was 
suggested  to  him. 


114  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  What  did  I  show  you  on  that  chair? 

.4.  A  little  dofi. 

Q.  And  with  whom  did  I  photograph  you? 

A.  With  the  General. 

Q.  What  was  the  General  like? 

.4.  He  was  dark. 

Q.  But  his  costume? 

A.  It  was  maroon. 

Q.  And  his  hat? 

A.  It  was  maroon  also. 

Q.  What  else  do  you  remember? 

A.  I  took  the  little  dog  for  a  walk. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  I  made  him  jump. 

Q.  Here,  in  this  room? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  What  was  the  color  of  the  little  dog? 

A.  He  was  white. 

Are  there  any  limits  to  this  siiggestibiUty?  It  seems  so  easy 
to  handle,  even  without  preparation  of  any  kind,  that  one  would 
be  inclined  to  believe  that  an  imbecile  is  soft  wax.  But  we  are 
inclined  to  believe  rather  that  it  is  their  deference  for  us  which 
makes  them  so.  It  is  certain  that  we  do  not  succeed  in  making 
our  imbeciles  do  and  say  all  that  we  wish.  Thus  Albert  consents 
to  be  called  Victor  and  when,  after  giving  him  a  lesson,  we  ask 
his  name  he  says  Victor.  But  Mctor  will  not  accept  this  ex- 
change. He  refuses  to  say  that  his  name  is  Albert.  He  offers 
the  same  resistance  for  a  change  in  the  names  of  the  days.  One 
of  our  experiment  days  is  Satinxlay,  the  da}^  before  his  sister 
comes  to  visit  him;  as  she  always  brings  him  a  package  of  to- 
bacco this  visit  seems  to  him  verj^  important;  he  knows  that  it 
will  take  place  next  day  and  no  one  can  make  him  change.  Hear 
him  speak. 

Q.   Is  today  Thursday? 

A.  No,  monsieur,  it  is  Saturday,  (laughing  in  a  mischievous  way) 
You  Avant  to  tease  me. 

Albert  will  not  let  himself  be  taken  in  any  more  than  the  others. 

Q.  What  day  is  today? 

A.  Saturday. 

Q.  Are  you  sure? 

A.  Yes,  I  am  sure. 

Q.  I  have  heard  saj-  it  was  Friday. 


SUGGESTIBILITY  115 

.4.  No,  it  is  Saturday. 

Q.  Listen,  I  am  going  to  prove  to  you  that  it  is  Friday.  Yesterday 
was  Thursday.  But  the  day  which  comes  after  Thursday-  is  Friday.  So 
you  see  it  is  Friday. 

A.  No,  It  is  Saturday. 

Curiou.s  resistance  in  a  person  wlio  ordinarily  swallows  the 
greatest  absurdities.  Several  minutes  before  Dr.  Simon  had 
gone  out,  and  we  had  said  to  Albert. 

Q.  How  old  do  you  think  Dr.  Simon  is? 
.1.  I  don't  know  exactly. 
Q.  Well,  about  how  old? 
.4.  Perhaps  fourteen  years! 

Q.  Oh!  more  than  that!     Some  one  told  me  he  is  a  hundred.     Do  you 
believe  he  can  be  that  old? 
.4.  Oh!  yes. 

Whence  comes  this  striking  difference  of  attitude?  We  think 
we  have  discovered  it.  In  the  first  place,  Albert,  like  Victor 
and  Denise,  is  always  ready  to  acquiesce  in  what  he  does  not 
understand.  A  hundred  years  is  onh^  a  word  for  them,  a  word 
void  of  sense.  They  do  not  resist.  Besides  when  one  suggests 
to  them  a  dog  or  a  Genei-al  one  does  not  run  counter  to  any  well 
established  convictions;  but  they  insist  upon  Saturdaj'  because 
it  is  the  day  before  Sunday  when  their  relatives  visit  them,  they 
expect  their  relatives,  and  this  expectation  is  important  to  them; 
and  they  know  also  that  a  certain  piece  of  money  is  worth  ten 
.sous  and  they  will  not  peiniit  it  to  be  called  anj'thing  else.  They 
are  therefore  in  an  antagonistic  state  which  opposes  itself  to 
suggestion.  We  shall  cite  sevei'al  other  examples  quite  typical 
of  lack  of  suggestibilit}-. 

Q.  You  know  that  Dr.  Simon  has  gone     .... 

A.  Yes  ....  (In  reality  Dr.  Simon  is  tiicre  at  the  table,  writing 
our  dialogue). 

Q.  Sit  in  his  place  ....  You  shall  be  the  doctor.  (Albert  gets 
up,   but   is  embarras.se<i.J 

(i.  Sit  down  in  his  chair  since  it  is  vacant! 

In  the  end  Allx-rt  does  not  sit.     He  docs  not  speak,  he  seems 
confused,  like  a  child  caught  flf)ing  wrong. 
Another  suggestion:  a  theft. 

Q.  Here,  Albert,  do  you  see  that   iiiusic-liox  on  the  table? 
.1 .  Yea,  monsieur. 


116  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  When  no  one  is  looking  go  and  take  it.  You  will  steal  it  and  bring 
it  to  me  and  I  shall  put  it  in  my  pocket.  (Albert  goes  to  the  table,  but 
does  not  take  the  object.) 

Q.  See  here!     What  are  you  doing?     Why  didn't  you  take  it? 

A.   (Embarrassed)     Because  I  mustn't. 

Q.  But  no  one  will  know  you  have  taken  it. 

A.  The  watchmen. 

Thus  even  the  most  docile  imbeciles  can  resist  suggestion  when 
they  have  some  reason  for  resistance. 

Now  when  they  yield,  when  they  believe  or  seem  to  believe 
blindly  what  we  say  to  them,  is  it  because  of  the  weakness  of 
J  their  mental  level?  Does  their  suggestibility  depend  upon  their 
intelligence?  One  might  think  so;  and  we  admit,  moreover, 
that  there  is  a  partial  truth  in  this  supposition.  But  the  princi- 
pal  f-aetor  of  their  suggestibility'is~not-i-heiriTrteHigerrce-but  theif— — . 
docile  ■et>arFa<^tcr.  The  proof  of  this  is  that  we  have  encountered 
imbeciles  less  intelligent  than  Albert,  who  refuse  to  yield  to  our 
suggestion.  Cretin  would  not  even  look  at  the  dog;  and  Beau- 
visage,  asked  to  caress  it,  replies  directly,  "There  is  no  dog." 
This  is  sufficient  proof  that  the  suggestibility  of  Albert  does  not 
come  from  his  mental  level  but  from  the  deference  which  he  has 
for  us.  But  can  deference  render  any  one  susceptible  to  sugges- 
tion? This  is  a  delicate  point.  If  the  preceding  interpretation 
is  correct,  it  leads  to  the  following  conclusion.  Our  imbeciles 
have  done  for  us  what  we  asked  simply  to  give  us  pleasure,  and 
as  for  the  hallucinations  of  the  dog  and  the  General,  nothing 
proves  that  they  really  existed.  Their  entire  mimicry  may  have 
come  from  a  desire  to  be  agreeable.  An  American,  Sidis,  has 
well  sustained  this  last  curious  and  paradoxical  opinion,  cer- 
tainly false  in  general,  that  suggestions  acting  upon  hysterics 
determine  only  one  thing,  a  simulation  wholly  exterior  to  the 
phenomena  suggested.  This  may  be  true  of  certain  ones,  not 
of  all,  because  there  are  infinite  individual  variations  in  the  man- 
ner of  yielding  oneself  to  suggestion.  But  why  not  admit  the 
theory  of  Sidis  for  our  compliant  imbeciles? 

For  a  long  time  we  hesitated ;  in  order  to  decide  the  question,  it 
must  be  put  in  a  precise  manner  and  we  were  afraid  to  spoil  our 
subject,  Albert,  by  questioning  him;  because  to  speak  to  him  of 
his  hallucinations,  would  be  to  ask  him  to  analj'se  them,  to  give 
him  doubts,  to  put  him  in  the  way  of  the  truth.     When  the  experi- 


SUGGESTIBILITY  117 

ments  were  ended,  a  month  after  they  were  begun,  we  decided 
to  make  this  inquiry.  In  what  follows  we  reproduce  the  dialogue 
literally,  according  to  our  custom. 

Q.  Tell  me,  Albert,  do  you  recall  the  story  of  the  dog? 
A.  (He  Blushes  at  first  and  does  not  reply  for  a  long  while,  hanging 
his  head). 

Q.  What  color  was  it? 

A.  It  was  white. 

Q.  And  then  what  else  did  you  see? 

A.  The  General. 

Q.  What  was  he  like,  the  General? 

A.  He  was  brown. 

Q.  What  did  he  do? 

A.  He  talked  with  me. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.   (No  reply). 

So  far  Albert  seems  to  admit  the  reality  of  his  perceptions. 
Let  us  attempt  with  much  discretion  to  test  his  convictions. 

Q.  Very  well,  that  little  dog,  and  then  the  General,  were  they  people 
like  us? 

A.  Ah!  the  General,  yes.  (He  has  not  understood  the  point  of  the 
question,  he  wishes  to  say  that  we  are  not  like  dogs). 

Q.  But  is  it  true  that  you  have  seen  him? 

A.  Yes.     (He  smiles,  his  eyes  glisten). 

Q.  Well,  why  does  that  make  you  laugh? 

A.  Because  you  talk  to  me  of  the  General.  (Seems  confused — laughs 
as  he  lowers  his  head). 

Q.  But  why  do  you  laugh  in  speaking  of  the  General? 

A.  It's  a  joke  you  played  on  me. 

Here  then  the  truth  is  out. 

Q.  But  have  you  seen  him? 

A.   (With  hesitation)     No,  I  didn't  see  him. 

Q.  But  you  talked  with  him. 

A.   (Hesitating)     Yes. 

Q.  He  said  something  to  you? 

A.  He  asked  me  what  I  was  doing. 

Q.  You  heard  him? 

A.  (Timidly)  Yes. 

Q.  Then  you  heard  him? 

A.  Yqh,  I  heard  him. 

Here  again  it  would  seem  he  is  under  tlie  six'li  of  the  sugges- 
tion, even  though  in  our  questions  wc  put  no  accent  of  autliority. 


118  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  Tell  me  how  all  this  happened. 
A.  The  General  talked  to  me. 
Q.  But  you  thought  it  was  not  true? 
A.  (Embarrassment — smile — no  reply). 

Q.  But  at  the  time  you  thought  there  was  a  General  thei-e? 
A.  Oh!  no! 
Q.  But  why? 
A.  Oh,  I  do  not  know. 
Q.  But  the  dog,  you  believed  that. 

A.  The  dog?  Oh!  yes,  because  I  know  that  it  is  an  animal.  (Unintelli- 
gible reply.) 

Q.  You  thought  there  was  a  dog  on  the  chair? 
A.   (Timidly)  Yes. 
Q.  What? 
A.  No. 

Q.  But  you  caressed  it     ...     .     You  put  out  your  hand  like  that 
.     .     .     .     You  were  only  making  believe? 
A.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  Was  it  to  please  me  that  you  made  believe? 
A.  To  be  sure. 

Here  at  last  is  the  confession.  We  can  only  judge  it  by  an 
impression  of  the  whole.  We  believe  that  Albert  was  never 
duped.  And  now  he  is  a  little  ashamed  of  his  compliance  and 
is  in  a  very  troubled  and  complicated  mental  state  when  we 
question  him.  He  still  wishes  to  agree  with  us,  for  he  is  too  timid 
to  resist;  hence  his  contradictions.  All  the  time  he  tries  to  divine 
our  thoughts;  we  could  still  make  him  say  anything  we  wished. 
It  is  the  same  with  a  docile  pupil,  obedient,  industrious,  who, 
called  to  the  Director's  office,  conducts  himself  like  an  automaton. 
Thcre__is  therefoie.  a  particular  form  of  suggestibility  which  is 
wholly  superficial,  caused  by  compliance  and  which  depends 
upon  temperament.     It  is  what  might  be  called  docility.r 

It  is  important  to  emphasize  this,  because  the  error  that  we 
have  been  upon  the  point  of  making,  other  alienists  have  made. 
Kraepelin,  for  instance,  has  the  habit  of  testing  the  judgment 
of  certain  dementia  subjects,  by  studying  their  attitude  when 
an  absurd  affirmation  is  made  to  them.  One  day  he  asked  an 
old  woman,  a  dementia  case,  "Isn't  the  snow  black?"  And  she 
answered  playfully,  "Yes,  if  one  puts  soot  on  it,"  he  concluded 
very  justly  that  the  woman  did  not  lack  judgment.  We  think 
she  has  also  the  courage  of  her  opinion.  It  is  not  proved  by  any 
means  that  those  who  acquiesce  in  an  absurd  proposition,  spoken 
with  authority  by  a  doctor,  have  fallacious  minds ;  they  are  rather 


SUGGESTIBILITY  119 

the  extremely  docile,  who  do  not  dare  contradict.  It  is  impor- 
tant, therefore,  when  one  makes  studies  upon  judgment  not  to 
confound  false  judgment  and  dociKt3^ 

Precisely  what  is  docility?  One  may  consider  it,  as  we  our- 
selves have  considered  it  in  all  that  precedes,  as  an  appearance  I 
of  suggestibility,  a  sort  of  simulation  of  real  suggestibility^  But 
it  seems  to  us  more  philosophical  to  admit  that  it  constitutes 
a  suggestibility  of  a  particular  form.  There  are,  in  our  opinion, 
two..4orD^s  oL  suggestibility  which  have  not  been  sufficiently 
differentiated;  the.  suggestion  of  hallucinations,  of  ideas,  of  con- 
cepts on  the  one  hand,  and  the  suggestion  of  acts,  of  words,  of 
mimicri'  on  the  other.  Docility  is  a  suggestibility  which  shows 
itself  simply,  iiL^  acts,  words,  attitudeSv  The  fact  has  escaped 
notice  that  the  mental  conditions  of  the  two  orders  of  phenomena 
are  not  the  same;  the  formation  of  an  hallucination  supposes 
not  only  a  false  perception,  but  a  suspension  of  the  critical  sense; 
on  the  contrary,  for  the  execution  of  a  suggested  act,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  hav«  a  consistent  conviction.  This  latter  sugges- 
tion encroaches  less  upon  the  personality.  It  is  not  the  reason 
of  the  agent  which  bends,  it  is  his  will,  his  character.  One  may 
have  suggestibility  of  character  without  having  suggestibility 
of  reason. 

With  our  imbeciles  these  two  forms  of  suggestibility  exist; 
let  us  recall  the  experiments  with  alternative  questions;  Albert 
and  BeauvLsage  are  more  sensitive  to  this  than  some  normals; 
and  in  this  case  it  is  truly  a  question  of  a  suggestibility  which 
paralyses  the  critical  sense.  The  intellectual  level  certainly  has 
an  influence  upon  this  suggestibility;  it  is  proportionally  high- 
as  th^cvel  is  low.  Besides  this,  imbeciles,  at  least  those  who 
do  not  Jbelong  to  tlic  rebellious  type,  have  suggestibility  of  char- 
acter, in  other  words,  an  extreme  docility;  and  this  may  cause 
an  illusion  in  regard  to  their  suggestiljility  of  reason;  one  can 
believe  that  they  are  credulous  and  completely  duped,  when 
they  are  simply  pretending.  We  would  never  have  believed 
that  imbeciles  could  have  thus  played  the  comedy  of  complacency 
with  such  a  .serious  air.  In  truth  the  moral  of  this  story  of  the 
General  is  that  we  l)elieved  we  had  deceived  an  imbecile,  whereas 
it  was  the  imbecile  who  deceived  us.  And  with  modesty  we 
apply  to  ourselves  the  ancient  saying  of  Merlin  the  enchanter, 
"Whoever  seeks  to  deceive  others  often  deceives  himself." 


XII.     HOW  A  MORON  CAN  HAVE  L'ESPRIT  FAUX 

One  of  the  most  curious  of  the  psychological  problems  which 
J  are  set  for  us  by  imbeciles  is  that  relative  to  the  development 
of  their  judgment.  It  goes  without  saying  that  imbeciles  have 
but  little  judgment,  but  do  they  make  errors  of  judgment?  Or, 
to  speak  in  a  general  way,  does  mental  evolution  proceed  by  suc- 
cessive steps  in  which  one  finds  at  first  an  abundance  of  false 
judgments,  then  little  by  little,  more  correct  judgments?  Sup- 
pose two  beings  A  and  B  who  are  at  very  different  mental  levels. 
If  A  is  inferior  to  B  in  intelligence  will  he  be  more  liable  to  false 
judgment?  That  is  the  question.  Without  hoping  to  answer 
it  entirely  we  shall  try  to  look  at  it  closely  by  studying  a  very 
curious  defective,  named  Griffon. 

We  have  often  spoken  of  him;  it  is  necessary  to  indicate  briefly 
his  intellectual  level,  in  order  to  allow  the  fallaciousness  of  his 
mind  to  be  better  appreciated. 

He  is  a  moron  and  not  an  imbecile,  because  he  can  read;  he 
reads  fairly  well,  with  good  intonation;  he  writes  from  dictation 
and  spontaneously;  he  can  compose  a  coherent  letter  by  him- 
self if  one  gives  him  the  subject;  he  makes  many  mistakes  in 
spelling,  but  one  can  understand  the  text.  In  arithmetic  he 
can  add,  subtract,  and  multiply;  he  fails  in  a  problem  of  propor- 
tion. This  puts  him  at  the  level  of  instruction  of  the  second  year 
of  our  elementary  course;  it  is  about  the  level  of  a  child  of  eight 
years.  But  he  also  knows  a  good  many  things  that  are  taught 
in  the  higher  grades  and  even  many  that  one  learns  only  later 
in  life.  As  to  instruction  he  is,  therefore,  far  superior  to  an 
imbecile;  but  he  is  not  a  normal.  A  normal  might  have  had  less 
instruction,  but  he  would  succeed  in  the  psychological  tests  in 
which  Griffon  fails. 

In  fact  Griffon  cannot  arrange  five  weights  in  order;  he  cannot 
'succeed  in  "the  game  of  patience,"  nor  find  rhymes,  etc.,  tests 
easily  passed  by  children  of  from  eight  to  ten  years.' 

'  We  refer  to  some  results  furnished  by  our  measuring  scale  of  intelli- 
gence.    (See  "The  Development  of  the  Intelligence  of  Children,"  p.  182.) 

120 


L  ESPRIT   FAUX 


121 


Socialh'  also  he  is  a  moron,  because  lie  lives  at  the  expense 
of  his  family  and  is  not  capable  of  following  a  trade.  He  has 
been  hired  as  a  laborer  l)y  many  different  employers  and  has 
been  regularly  dismissed  at  the  end  of  two  or  three  months. 
For  a  long  while  he  has  stayed  at  home  where  he  busies  himself 
in  cleaning  the  apartment.     He  is  of  a  good  disposition,  but  selfish, 


FIG.  19.    GRIFFOX.  MORON  TWENTY-EIGHT  YE.MIS  OLD;  MENTAL  LEVEL  OF 

A  CHILD  OF  KfGHT  VEAIIS. 

and  shows  a  decided  aversion  lo  women.  lie  lias  no  vices  and 
does  not  drink.  His  chief  occupation  is  reading;  he  loves  read- 
ing, even  reads  at  night;  so  strong  is  tliis  lial)it  that  if  he  has  a 
book  in  his  hand  he  will  coniiinic  to  tuiii  the  pages  even  when  it 
is  quite  dark.  W'e  have  this  intoiinat  ion  IVoni  one  of  his  rela- 
tives. If  he  wer(!  not  a  moron  we  shouM  say  that  he  was  ""/( 
intellectuel." 


122  TIIK    INTELLKiENCK    OK     THE    FEEBLK-Ml  NOED 

We  have  spoken  of  liiin  as  an  cxtraortlinai'.N'  case  of  fallacious 
mind  {esprit  faux).  This  is  a  nuMital  type  which  is  I'arely  to  be 
met  with  in  such  a  (l(\2;rce  of  i)erfection  even  among  imbeciles 
and  morons.  Many  of  them  have  a  lowei'  level  than  Griffon; 
they  have  never  been  able  to  learn  to  read ;  but  thvy  do  not  talk  so 
much  nonsense.  Intellectual  inferiority,  and  what  mayH'^e-ealled 
a  fallacious  niind  (esprit  /aj<vr)--are-t4ierefot'C"twfr  very  different 
mental  states;  the  first,  at  least,  can  manifest  itself  independently 
of  the  second. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  our  conversation  with  him  Griffon 
utters  a  whole  swarm  of  absurdities.  Listen  to  him.  We  ask 
him  to  tell  us  about  his  apprenticeships;  he  replies  that  he  worked 
two  months  with  a  baker. 

Q.  Why  (lid  you  leave  the  baker? 

.1.  Someoiio  was  needed  to  take  my  phice. 

Ridiculous  reason!  He  takes  the  effect  for  the  cause.  He 
remained  several  years  in  Paris,  living  at  the  expense  of  his  mother 
and  not  even  attempting  to  find  a  place  to  earn  a  little  money. 
We  ask  him: 

Q.  Why  did  you  not  find  another  place  in  Paris? 

A.  We  thought  of  returning  to  Chalons  ....  As  I  had  still  28 
days  to  serve  and  13  days     .... 

Thus  it  was  for  such  a  motive  that  he  remained  doing  nothing 
until  he  was  almost  thirty;  because  it  was  a  (luestion  of  leav- 
ing Paris  to  return  to  Chalons,  wlier(>  he  had  a  military  term  to 
complete! 

He  has  served  two  years.     We  questioned  him  in  icgard  to  this. 

Q.  Were  they  sometimes  cross  to  you  in  the  regiment? 

A.  Oh,  no,  monsieur.     We  went  to  exercise  twice  every  day. 

The  rci)ly  has  no  bearing  upon  the  questions.  We  ask  him 
other  ciuestions  about  his  family. 

Q.   How  many  brothers  and  sisters  have  you! 
A.  I  have  three  brothers  and  one  sister. 
Q.  Give  me  the  names  of  your  brothers. 
A.  Eugene  (Iriffon,  Armand  (Irit'fon,  Valentine  Griffon. 
Q.  Eugene  ami  Armand,  that  makes  only  two  brothers,  and  then?     Who 
is  the  third? 
A.  It  is  I. 


l'esprit  faux  123 

He  is  therefore  his  own  brother.  We  ask  him  many  questions 
in  order  to  find  out  the  amount  of  his  information.  In  certain 
cases  his  errors  can  be  attributed  strictly  to  his  ignorance,  for 
instance  when  he  tells  us  that  Paris  is  the  capital  of  the  "Cote- 
D'or."  It  is,  however,  very  serious  ignorance.  But  in  other 
cases  the  absurdity  is  undeniable,  because  he  contradicts  himself. 

Q.  Who  is  the  president  of  the  R('pul)lic? 
A.  M.  Carnot. 
Q.  What? 

A.  At  Lyons,  assassinated  liy  Havaillac,  no,  Cesario,  in  the  month 
of  June,  '94. 

Q.  He  is  still  president? 

A.  No,  he  is  dead. 

Q.  Who  has  replaced  him? 

A.  M.  Feli.x  Faure,  who  is  tleputy. 

Q.  But  now?     Who  is  president  of  tiie  Republic? 

A.  It  must  be  M.  Casimir-Pcrier. 

Q.  He  is  still  president? 

,1.  Oh,  I  don't  think  so.     He  must  have  resigned. 

This  is  not  ignorance,  since  he  is  ([uite  well  instructed;  it  is  a 
singular  erior  to  name  Carnot,  then  Perier  as  actual  president; 
then  add  that  one  is  dead,  mid  that  the  other  has  resigned. 

Q.  Vou  read  tlie  paper? 

.4.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  You  are  interested  in  it? 

A.  I  read  about  the  accidents  and  the  concerts. 

Q.  Politics  a  little. 

.1.  ^'cs,  Monsieur. 

(J.  What  arc  your  political  opinions? 

.1.  Catholic.  ' 

Q.  And  then? 

.\.  I'rotcstant. 

(J.  And  tlicn".' 

.1.  Jew. 

He  .seems  not  t(»  uiideist.'ind  1  lie  sense  of  the  word  and  that  one 
cannot  bent  t  he  >;iliie  t  ilue  ( ';it  hdhe,  l'r(  >t  est  ;i  III  .•Hid. lew.  'I'lus 
does  not  iiie;in  lh;it  he  has  not  h.id  eiioiigli  iiist  iiiel  ion.  luif  he 
makes  a  singular  use  of  his  insi  imt  ion. 

(J.  What  rivrr  |),issr\K  tliiniiuli  i'.nis? 

.1 .  'I'lic  Seine. 

(J.  Where  does  the  Seine  empty? 

.t.  Into  the  Rhone. 


124  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  Where  does  the  Rhone  empty? 

.1.  Into  the  Lionne. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Lionne  empty^ 

.1.  Into  the  Durance. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Durance  empty? 

A.  Into  the  Mediterranean  Sea. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Mediterranean  Sea  empty? 

A.  Into  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Atlantic  Ocean  empty? 

A.  Into  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Pacific  Ocean  empty. 

A.  Into  the  Indian  Ocean. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Indian  Ocean  empty? 

.1.  Into  the  Arctic  Ocean. 

Q.  Where  does  the  Arctic  Ocean  empty? 

.4.  Into  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

His  historical  information  presents  the  same  incoherence. 

Q.  Who  is  Louis  XIV? 
A.  He  is  an  emperor? 
Q.  Do  you  know  something  of  him? 

A.  He  administered  justice  sitting  at  the  foot  of  an  oak  tree.     I  have 
seen  that  in  a  history,  going  to  school. 

Q.  What  else  do  you  know  of  Louis  XIV? 

-4.  He  was  a  Royalist. 

Q.  What  more? 

A.  He  held  the  government  of  the  Republic. 

Q.  How  long  were  you  in  school? 

A.  Until  I  was  thirteen. 

Q.  From  what  age? 

A.  From  seven  years. 

Q.  What  do  you  know  of  the  Revolution  of  '89? 

A.  It  was  the  working  man  who  revolted  against  the  people. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  They  killed  themselves. 

Q.  And  how  did  it  all  end? 

A.  In  a  proposition  of  peace. 

Q.  To  whom? 

A.  To  the  government. 

Notice  carefully  that  in  this  nonsense  there  is,  however,  a  basis 
of  instruction. 

Q.  Are  all  men  equal? 

A.  Sometimes.     That  depends  upon  the  party  to  which  they  belong. 
Q.  For  instance? 

A.  There   are   Catholics,    Protestants,    Jews,    clericals,    revolutionists, 
socialists,  anarchists. 


l'esprit  faux  125 

Q.  But  are  they  equal? 

A.  They  are  about  equal  in  death. 

Q.  And  in  life? 

A.  They  are  all  about  equal.  They  work  together  in  the  field,  in  the 
factories  of  the  town,  in  business. 

Q.  Is  justice  equal  to  all? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur,  there  must  be  someone  to  represent  it.  We  are  its 
representatives  on  earth. 

Q.  Who  represents  it? 

A.  The  man  and  the  woman. 

All  this  is  said  with  the  eyes  lowered,  in  a  gentle,  timid,  whining 
voice.  The  subject  has  not  at  all  the  manner  of  mocking  us 
nor  of  being  intoxicated  with  words.  Observe  that  we  do  not 
lead  him  on  to  all  these  absurdities,  we  do  not  exercise  any  pressure 
over  him,  we  make  no  suggestion.  We  know  already  and  have 
demonstrated  before,  that  in  addressing  an  individual  who  is 
at  the  same  time  defective  and  docile  (both  these  conditions  are 
equally  necessary)  and  asking  hmi  certain  questions  with  author- 
ity, we  can  obtain  from  him  unreasonable  replies.  Griffon  is 
no  exception  to  this  rule.  We  could  easily  induce  him  to  say  that 
his  name  was  Bertrand  and  not  Griffon,  that  a  thief  is  an  honest 
man  and  that  snow  is  red,  and  other  absurdities,  to  which  one 
might  readily  suppose  that  he  subscribes  for  the  sake  of  being 
agreeable.  But  what  we  are  now  describing  is  a  totally  different 
thing.  It  is  the  absurdities  which  we  do  not  suggest,  and  which 
come  from  Griffon  spontaneously,  and  for  which  he  alone  is  re- 
sponsible.    Let  us  cite  other  examples? 

Q.  Who  was  Pasteur? 

A.  A  great  savant  who  cured  the  rabies  with  the  virus. 
Q.  Tell  me  more  about  it. 

A.  Ho  invented  machines  for  curing  the  rallies,  usin^  animals  ami  rahl)its. 
Q.  And  Napoleon? 

A.  He  was  an  emperor  who  commanded  the  army. 
Q.  Gambctta? 

A.  Ho  was  a  savant,  a  deputy,  wlio  roprosontod  tlic  n-puhiic. 
Q.  Victor  HuKo? 

A.  He  was  a  senator,  deputy,  who  represented  peojile  at  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies. 

Q.  M.  Thiers? 

A.  He  was  a  deputy  of  the  Chamber  of  Doputios  in  Paris. 

Q.  M.  do  Sans-Souci?     (Name  invented  i)y  us) 

A.  Uo  is  a  Merry  Andrew,  who  plays  the  clown  in  Mio  circus. 

Q.  The  Duke  do  Trovisc?     (Name  invented  by  us) 


126  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

A.  A  man  who  represents  a  landed  property.     A  reactionary. 

Q.  M.  Durand?  (Name  invented  by  us) 

A.  He  is  a  commercial  traveler  who  deals  in  cloth. 

Q.  Ali  Bentailo?     (Name  invented  by  us) 

A.  He  is  a  king  who  represents  savages. 

Some  of  these  replies  are  grotesque,  others  are  quite  ingenious; 
the  last  three,  for  instance,  correspond  sufficiently  well  to  the 
nature  of  the  word  we  had  invented. 

Q.  Where  does  milk  come  from? 

A.  From  the  cow  that  feeds  on  the  grass  in  the  fields. 
Q.  Do  oxen  give  milk? 

A.  Not  much.  They  drag  the  plow,  they  are  made  to  work  in  the 
fields. 

Q.  Where  does  ink  come  from. 

A.  It  is  a  plant  they  cultivate  in  Africa  to  make  ink  of  in  the  factories. 

We  will  also  cite  his  remarks  upon  portraits  and  pictures. 
A  photograph  representing  an  operatic  singer  in  costume  ap- 
pears to  him  to  be  a  ''harlequin  in  a  boat  with  oars  on  a  river, 
going  to  learn  to  swim  in  case  of  wreck,  etc." 

Without  question  of  any  sort  from  us,  he  utters  many  absurdi- 
ties; for  instance,  on  being  asked  to  make  a  sentence  containing 
the  three  words  Paris,  fortune,  river,  he  does  not  hesitate  to  write 
the  following  sentence,  which  has  no  meaning:  "This  fortune  of 
the  river  of  the  prairie  of  the  portion  of  the  god-father." 

Asked  to  recall  the  pictures  shown  to  him,  he  cites  two  from 
memory  correctly  and  seven  others  which  he  has  not  seen  and 
which  he  invents.  Asked  to  name  samples  of  colors,  he  does  so 
in  the  main,  correctly;  but  when  he  comes  to  a  gray  tint,  he  says 
"tricolor."  When  asked  to  recount  something  which  he  has 
just  read,  he  does  so  without  sparing  the  absurdities.  Thus  he 
explains  that  a  man  has  been  killed  in  an  accident  on  the  street, 
and  that  he  has  been  carried  to  the  hospital  in  a  serious  condition; 
or  again,  reversing  the  facts,  he  recounts  that  robbers  had  arrested 
a  commissioner  of  the  police,  and  conducted  him  to  the  guard 
house,  while  of  course  the  paper  stated  the  exact  opposite. 

It  is  clear  that  in  condensing  all  these  examples  of  absurdities 
we  have  made  them  seem  exaggerated.  Griffon,  in  an  ordinary 
conversation,  commits  fewer  errors  of  judgment  than  would  appear 
from  the  above;  one  can  even  talk  with  him  during  a  minute  or 
two,  without  his  making  any  break.     It  is  when  he  is  asked  some- 


l'esprit  faux  127 

what  complicated  questions  that  he  is  particularly  apt  to  make 
these  blunders. 

This  moron  has  received,  as  we  have  said,  some  instruction; 
he  can  read  and  can  write  a  passable  letter;  we  had  him  write 
one  to  his  parents;  it  was  legible,  comprehensible,  correct,  and 
without  nonsense.  He  counts  money  well.  His  memory  for 
immediate  repetition  of  sentences  is  normal,  and  rises  as  high  as 
26  syllables.  His  attention  is  good,  and  his  reaction  times  al- 
though long,  are  not  out  of  reason. 

At  first  sight  one  is  tempted  to  attribute  all  his  errors  of  judg- 
ment to  his  instruction.  He  seems  to  have  received  an  amount 
of  instruction  out  of  proportion  to  his  degree  of  intelligence. 
It  would  be  a  curious  example  of  the  results  which  are  obtained 
in  applying  the  ordinary  methods  of  instruction  to  an  subnormal 
subject.  Evidently  MoUere  was  right  when  he  said  that  "an 
educated  fool  is  more  a  fool  than  an  ignorant  fool."  But  it 
would  be  unjust  to  accuse  solely  the  school  that  Griffon 
attended  until  he  was  thirteen.  There  is  in  him  a  natural,  con-  ^ 
genital  defect,  a  weakness  of  judgment;  this  weakness  has  been 
put  in  clear  light  by  the  instruction  he  has  received,  but  the  in- 
struction is  not  the  direct  cause  of  the  weakness. 

How  are  we  to  represent  the  state  of  his  judgment?  The  errors 
of  judgment  which  may  be  committed  are  of  many  different 
kinds.  There  are  some  that  are  plainly  apparent,  which  come 
from  the  inexact  use  of  words;  persons  suffering  from  senile  de- 
mentia, and  from  aphasia  often  commit  them;  they  take  one 
word  for  another,  or  else  forget  the  beginning  of  their  sentence 
before  they  finish  it,  and  hence  they  make  utterly  false  asser- 
tions, of  which  they  are  not  conscious.  Other  errors  of  judg- 
ment have  a  kind  of  system  like  those  of  persons  suffering  from 
melancholia  or  delusions  of  persecution,  who  persist  in  their 
false  ideas,  and  sometimes  even  seek  to  demonstrate  them  by 
all  kinds  of  reasons. 

The  mistakes  of  Griffon  do  not  belong  to  either  of  these  cate- 
gories; they  are  errors  of  judgment  very  much  more  nearly  akin 
to  those  which  we  normals  commit.  The  mechanism  of  these 
errors  seems  to  consist  in  a  lack,  a  faihirc  of  evocation  of  the  ' 
reasons  which  would  show  the  falsity  of  the;  affirmation.  It  is 
what  is  called  n' entendre  qu'iine  cloche.  How  often,  in  fact,  we 
accept  the  first  idea  that  presents  itself.     How  easily  we  allow 


128  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

ourselves  to  be  prejudiced  against  people  because  we  accept 
what  others  say  against  them,  and  we  do  not  even  think  of  what 
might  be  said  for  them.  One  could  also  attribute  this  error  of 
judgment  to  negligence  or  to  distraction.  In  any  case,  it  is 
like  a  judgment  by  default,  because  the  opposing  party  is  not 
represented  at  the  hearing.  In  each  instance  one  might  rebuke 
Griffon  because  he  had  not  paid  sufficient  attention.  Thus  he 
does  not  notice  the  blunder  he  made  when  he  counted  himself 
among  his  own  brothers;  he  does  not  notice  that  he  absurdly 
calls  a  gray  tint  "tricolor;"  he  does  not  see  that  in  putting  three 
words  into  a  sentence  he  has  written  something  without  sense, 
nor  that  he  replies  to  a  question  which  is  incomprehensible  for 
him,  nor  yet  that  he  contradicts  himself  when  he  says  that  Casimir- 
Perier  is  actually  president  of  the  Republic,  and  that  this  same 
Casimir-Perier  has  resigned,  etc. 

What  proves  that  he  fails  through  lack  of  attention,  lack  of 
reflection,  let  us  say  through  lack  of  control,  is  that  he  knows 
enough  to  correct  himself,  if  he  applies  himself.  Thus,  search- 
ing for  the  name  of  the  tint  gray  he  says  "tricolor."  If  some 
demented  person  having  a  fixed  delusion,  had  made  this  error, 
he  would  have  explained  it  in  a  logical  manner;  for  instance,  by 
insisting  that  every  color  is  truly  tricolor,  because  it  is  made  up 
of  three  fundamental  colors,  and  other  absurdities.  Griffon  said 
it  without  even  noticing  it;  the  proof  of  which  is,  that  a  month 
afterwards  when  we  ask  him  the  meaning  of  the  word  tricolor, 
he  replies  "The  French  flag  is  tricolor."  We  ask  him  again,  "If 
we  say  that  a  table  is  tricolor  what  does  that  mean?"  "That 
means,"  says  Griffon,  "that  it  is  variegated."  Evidently,  the 
first  time  he  had  used  incorrectty,  without  noticing  it,  a  word 
whose  meaning  he  understood.  Another  example:  he  said  to 
us  that  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  the  laboring  class  fired  on 
the  people.  This  is  not  a  positive  error  of  judgment,  it  is  again 
a  lapse,  because  on  another  occasion,  when  we  asked  him  of 
what  the  people  is  made  up  he  replied  that  the  people  is  made 
up  of  the  laboring  class. 

But  however  innocent  these  lapses  may  be,  they  are  neverthe- 
less marks  of  a  peculiar  mentality,  when  they  are  so  abundant 
as  with  Griffon;  and  we  have  now  to  put  the  question  which 
we  raised  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter;  is  it  characteristic  of 
a  weak  intelligence  to  commit  so  many  errors  of  judgment? 


L  ESPRIT   FAUX  129 

We  do  not  think  so.  We  have  indeed  seen  some  imbeciles  and 
some  morons,  whose  intellectual  level  was  equal  to  or  even  in- 
ferior to  that  of  Griffon.  None  of  them,  if  we  except  Cabussel, 
excelled  as  he  does,  in  absurdities.  Albert,  for  instance,  protects 
himself  from  insidious  questions  by  a  simple  "I  do  not  know," 
and  others  are  silent.  This  allows  us  to  suppose  that  the  falsi- 
ties of  judgment  are  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  weakness 
of  intellectual  level;  they  express  rather  a  discord.  This  is  the 
way  it  appears  to  us.  Albert,  Victor  and  many  others  are  short 
in  all  their  faculties,  but  their  faculties  are  well  coordinated. 
Without  doubt  their  judgment  is  weak  enough,  but  so  i&  their 
imagination  and  their  memory,  all  is  weak,  and  consequently 
the  intelligence  is  proportionately  low.  If  it  is  true  that  the 
judgment  acts  as  a  check,  it  matters  little  that  it  is  weak,  since 
the  motor  which  it  must  watch  over  and  regulate  has  little  power. 
On  the  contrary  Griffon  shows,  like  Cabussel,  a  certain  intellec- 
tual activity,  and  even  something  more,  a  certain  fertility  and 
ingenuity  of  imagination.  Question  him  and  he  never  remains 
without  a  repl3\  He  finds  an  answer  for  all,  even  for  those  things 
of  which  he  is  ignorant  or  which  he  does  not  understand.  He 
tells  you  the  origin  of  ink,  he  defines  in  the  most  fantastic  manner 
the  word  which  he  does  not  know.  In  his  inventions  he  shows 
some  imagination;  and"  there  is  some  merit  in  his  finding  that 
M.  de  Trevise  represents  a  landed  proprietor  and  a  reactionary, 
while  M.  Durand  is  the  name  of  a  commercial  traveler;  it  is  a 
work  of  invention  which  resembles  that  of  a  dramatic  author, 
in  due  proportion  of  course.  And  it  is  in  this  slight  intellectual 
activity,  in  this  little  gift  of  imagination  that  the  secret  of  his 
absurd  judgments  may  be  found;  he  has  too  much  imagination 
for  his  power  of  control,  or  too  little  control  for  his  power  of 
imagination.  Truly  it  is  not  well  for  a  defective  to  have  too 
much  imagination. 

Our  general  conclusion  will  be  that  the  particular  state  to  which 
we  give  the  name  of  "esprit  faux,"  a  state  wiiich  is  sometimes 
to  be  found  among  imbeciles,  docs  not  correspond  to  a  regular 
period  of  psychological  evolution;  it  is  a  somewhat  exceptional 
state,  which  results  from  a  lack  of  harmony  between  the  iuvcn- 
tiyp  faculties  and  the  corrective  faculties,  like  an  ('ciuii)age  where 
the  mmfber  of  reins  is  not  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  honses. 


s^ 


XIII.    A  SCHEME  OF  THOUGHT 
I.     Preliminaries 

The  general  impression  which  is  obtained  when  one  passes 
some  time  with  imbeciles  or  idiots  is  that  they  are  literally  "les 
pauvres  d'esprit,"  poor  in  mind.  They  do  not  diffet  from  nor- 
mals as  certain  types  of  dements  do,  by  unexpected  and  some- 
times original  and  fantastical  phenomena  which  are  like  extra 
attachments  to  a  well-known  mechanism;  the  difference  is  not 
one  of  more  but  of  less.  The  defective  is  a  normal  who  lacks 
something. 

But  in  what  does  this  lack  consist?  If  ever  the  notion  of  higher 
processes  and  of  inferior  processes  had  any  chance  of  application 
in  psychology,  it  is  truly  applicable  to  this  type  of  individuals. 
One  feels  that  it  is  especially  the  higher  part  of  the  intelligence, 
the  most  delicate,  the  finest  that  is  not  developed  in  them;  they 
are  reduced  to  what  is  coarsest  and,  consequently,  to  what  is 
the  most  simple,  the  most  elementary  and  the  most  general  in  man. 

But  this  is  only  a  very  vague  conclusion,  and  we  must  try 
to  make  it  exact.  It  is  curious  to  see  how  prone  we  are  to  hide 
behind  words  what  we  do  not  thoroughly  understand.  The 
above  difference,  when  it  has  been  employed  to  express  the 
distinction  between  man  and  the  animal,  has  received  different 
names;  in  man,  reason,  in  the  animal,  instinct.  We  have  also 
used  and  abused  the  term  degree.  It  has  been  said  that  the 
intelligence  of  a  child  differs  from  that  of  an  adult  in  degree  only. 
But  in  exactly  what  does  this  degree  consist?  And  what  distinc- 
tion can  be  made  between  the  difference  of  degree  and  the  dif- 
ference of  nature?  Authors  do  not  agree  upon  the  meaning 
of  these  expressions  when  they  attempt  to  fathom  them,  which, 
by  the  way,  they  prudently  avoid.  In  short,  it  is  singular  that 
the  principle  of  psychic  development  should  be  so  poorly  defined 
that  no  one  at  the  present  moment  can  tell  the  essential  dif- 
ference which  separates  the  intelligence  of  a  child  from  that 
of  an  adult. 

130 


A    SCHEME    OF   THOUGHT  131 

Alienists  and  psycho-pathologists  have  at  least  had  the  merit 
of  introducing  one  clear  idea  into  this  domain  when  they  have 
admitted  that  with  many  dementia  and  hysteria  cases  the  va- 
rious symptoms,  delirium,  convulsions,  strokes,  etc.,  can  be  ex- 
plained by  two  combined  causes;  the  unchaining  of  automatism 
and  the  suppression,  the  paralysis,  the  inhibition — in  a  word 
the  putting  out  of  service,  of  the  higher  processes.  This  interest- 
ing conception,  taken  literally,  leads  us  to  admit  that  there 
exist  in  us  two  activities  of  a  different  nature,  the  one  inferior,' 
called  the  inferior  psychism  or  automatism,  the  other  superior, ' 
called  reflection,  will,  the  synthesis  (la  synthese).  While  those, 
who  have  pushed  this  conception  farthest  and  have  put  the 
most  ingenuity  into  developing  it,  have  maintained  that  there 
are  all  the  transitions  possible  between  these  two  forms  of  men- 
tal activity,  and  that  we  pass  gradually  from  the  one  to  the  other, 
other  authors  have  not  taken  these  reservations  into  account; 
they  have  seen  here  faculties  so  different  that  they  have  wished 
to  attribute  to  them  a  different  localization  in  the  nerve  centers; 
there  are,  according  to  them,  certain  parts  of  the  brain  devoted 
to  the  automatic  life,  while  other  centers  have  the  higher  func- 
tions of  attention  and  reflection,  coordination  and  perception. 
It  has  long  been  admitted  that  the  frontal  region  of  the  brain 
is  the  seat  of  these  higher  processes.  Recently,  a  neurologist, 
pushing  this  theory  to  the  limit,  has  proposed  to  call  the  center 
of  this  higher  life  Center  O,  and  he  has  introduced  into  the  ex- 
planation of  the  psychological  mechanism  of  various  symptoms, 
like  aphasia,  hysteria,  spiritism,  and  many  other  cases,  the 
use  of  this  center  "0,"  which  sometimes  excites,  sometimes  in- 
hibits the  lower  centers,  sometimes  is  itself  paralyzed,  which 
thus  permits  the  lower  centers  to  develop  a  hyper-activity  with- 
out restraint. 

Without  doubt  this  hypothesis  of  two  wholly  different  activities, 
the  one  superior,  creative,  synthetic,  the  other  inferior,  con- 
servative, analytic,  has  already  rendered  great  service  to  certain 
phases  of  mental  pathology.  Notably  it  appears  to  apply  to 
hysteria,  to  mental  dissolution,  to  oV)sessions,  and  to  spiritisni. 
But  perhaps  an  exclusive  consideration  of  these  types  of  phe- 
nomena has  tended  towards  a  certain  exaggeration,  when  one 
has  attempted  to  form  a  general  concept  of  the  human  mind, 
using  this  one  sided  hypothesis  as  a  key. 


132  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Without  wishing  to  combat  this  hypothesis  directly,  we  shall 
here  try  to  limit  it.  It  does  not  apply  indiscriminately  to  all 
types  of  subjects.  It  has  been  extended  somewhat  artificially 
to  normals.  We  shall  show  by  an  extended  study  of  defectives 
that  it  does  not  apply  in  any  way  to  them;  it  does  not  explain 
in  any  way  the  character  of  their  defects.  It  would  not  apply 
any  better  to  children.  In  a  word,  it  may  be  that  we  have  a 
conception,  which  is  valuable  perhaps  for  certain  modes  of  func- 
tioning of  the  mind;  but  which  is  not,  however,  a  general  principle 
of  the  development  or  of  the  genesis  of  mind. 

There  exist  among  certain  imbeciles  and  among  the  unstable, 
fantastic  ideas,  impulses,  sudden  paroxysms  of  rage,  wild  pranks. 
Possibly  one  might  admit  that  these  episodical  phenomena  are 
explained  by  a  bursting  forth  of  this  automatic  life,  that  is  to 
say  in  the  modern  phrase,  a  lack  of  synthesis;  let  us  put  it  better: 
a  simultaneous  lack  of  coordination  and  of  hierarchy.  One 
may  understand  from  this  that  these  impulses  take  on  so  much 
importance  because  they  have  escaped  the  control  of  the  higher 
faculties.  So  be  it.  But  all  defectives  do  not  by  any  means 
present  phenomena  of  this  kind.  Besides  it  is  not  because  they 
present  them  that  they  are  defectives.  Outside  of  these  accidental 
troubles  they  have  a  peculiar  mental  state,  characteristic  of 
defectives,  which  is  imbecility,  idiocy,  or  moronity  as  the  case 
may  be;  and  what  we  insist  upon  is,  that  in  order  to  explain  this 
chronic  mental  state,  one  has  no  right  to  speak  of  lack  of  synthesis, 
as  is  habitually  done;  here  the  expression  has  no  sense  whatever, 
and  those  who  employ  it  are  parrots. 

2.     Distinction  Between  the  Faculties  and  the 
Acquisitions 

In  the  analysis  of  the  mental  states  of  defectives,  which  we 
now  begin,  we  shall  make  a  fundamental  distinction  by  which 
many  subsequent  misunderstandings  may  be  avoided.  We  must 
not  confound  our  mental  faculties  with  the  practical  results, 
knowledge,  acquisitions  and  powers  of  all  sorts,  which,  thanks 
to  these  faculties,  we  acquire. 

The  practical  acquisitions  are  of  the  following  order;  reading, 
writing,  arithmetic,  professional  skill,  the  manner  of  gaining 
one's  living,  etc.     This  is  a  matter  of  instruction.     The  mental 


FACULTIES   AND    ACQUISITIONS  133 

faculties  are  what  are  commonly  called  attention,  memory, 
judgment,  reasoning,  abstraction,  etc.     This  is  intelligence. 

The  practical  results  obtained  by  a  defective  evidently  depend 
upon  his  intellectual  faculties,  and  also  upon  his  character,  as 
well  as  upon  the  environment  in  which  he  is  placed;  and,  like- 
wise, the  dependence  upon  the  intellectual  level  is  so  close  that 
we  believe  it  to  be  possible,  when  we  observe  a  subject  of  a  cer- 
tain level,  to  foresee  for  all  time,  whether  he  will  be  incapable 
of  learning  to  read.  There  is,  therefore,  an  important  relation 
between  the  intellectual  faculties  of  an  individual  and  the  prac- 
tical results  which  he  may  obtain  from  them.  It  is  the  same 
relation  which  exists  between  a  science  and  its  applications. 
But,  if  one  wishes  to  compare  any  individual  with  the  normal 
type,  from  the  point  of  view  of  his  intelligence  and  to  discover 
thus  how  far  inferior  to  the  normal  he  is,  one  perceives  that  the 
comparison  is  put  in  very  different  terms,  according  as  one's  point 
of  view  is  the  practical  result  or  the  intellectual  faculties. 

Taking  account  only  of  the  practical  acquisitions,  that  is  of 
instruction,  we  find  an  absolutely  clear  difference  between  the 
two  subjects.  The  normal  child  of  seven  years  can  read  hesi- 
tatingly; an  imbecile  even  of  twenty  years  cannot  read,  and 
can  never  learn  to  read.  This  is  an  excellent  criterion  for  dis- 
tinguishing one  from  the  other.  Reading  is  a  barrier  which 
will  separate  them  for  all  eternity;  it  is  moreover  a  limit  which 
suffers  no  distinction  of  more  or  less,  it  is  absolute.  One  can 
come  to  an  understanding  on  this  point  because  it  is  a  question 
of  fact,  and  our  understanding  will  be  clearer  if  we  take  the  pains 
to  define  what  we  mean  by  reading;  if  we  distinguish  the  pro- 
nouncing of  syllables  from  hesitating  reading,  and  this  from 
fluent  reading.  We  could  cite  also  as  an  example  of  a  practical 
result,  the  use  of  speech.  We  have  said  that  speech  does  not 
result  from  a  faculty,  and  that  we  do  not  possess  a  faculty  of 
speech,  as  we  do  the  faculty  of  paying  attention,  or  of  memory, ^ 

Speech  is  an  application,  a  practical  result  of  our  faculties  com- 
parable, for  example,  to  the  art  of  playing  chess;  and  indeed  if 
we  take  the  word  art  in  its  technical  sense,  we  might  say  with 
perfect  truth  that  speech  is  an  art.  Let  us  repeat  that  speech 
belongs  to  instruction.     Besides,  speech  serves  as  an  excellent 

'  See  Language  and  Thouglit,  Part  TI,  tins  volumo. 


134  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

criterion  for  distinguishing  a  whole  group  of  defectives;  idiots 
are  mute,  whereas  imbeciles  speak. 

Let  us  turn  now  to  the  intellectual  faculties  and  see  if  they 
can  furnish  us  with  an  analogous,  distinctive  criterion.  In  other 
words  is  it  possible  to  cite  known  mental  faculties  which  belong 
to  normals  and  are  not  to  be  found  among  defectives?  Formerly 
this  was  believed,  and  certain  authors  believe  it  still;  but  this 
is  because  they  have  submitted  their  subjects  to  incomplete 
observations.  Let  us  make  an  enumeration.  Is  the  defective 
radically  incapable  of  attention?  Evidently  not.  We  have 
proved,  even  with  idiots,  that  they  give  undeniable  evidences 
of  attention.  Recall  the  idiot  Vouzin,  who  looks  at  us  a  little 
especially  when  we  call  him  loudly,  and  who  for  a  moment  even 
showed  spontaneous  attention,  when  he  took  the  music  box 
from  our  hands.  Is  it  memory  that  is  lacking?  Not  that  either. 
We  have  noted  many  instances  of  prolonged  memory  among  them. 
Denise,  the  poor  girl,  remembered  for  several  days  the  object 
that  we  had  called  "Papa."^ 

Are  they  strangers  to  the  notion  of  number?  This  has  been 
believed,  because  they  employ  at  random  the  names  of  numbers 
which  they  do  not  understand ;  but  some  precise  tests  have  shown 
us  that  they  have  a  distinct  consciousness  of  plurality  even  when 
they  cannot  name  it.  Is  it  then  critical  sense,  judgment  that 
they  lack?  Certainly  judgment  often  fails  them;  or  rather  they 
can  be  placed  in  certain  conditions  where  it  would  require  a 
particular  degree  of  judgment  for  them  to  be  equal  to  the  situa- 
tion, and  they  cannot  attain  it.  But  in  other  cases  they  cer- 
tainly show  some  judgment,  for  instance  when  Albert  refuses 
to  be  the  dupe  of  a  suggestion.  We  may  thus  pass  in  review  all 
our  faculties,  and  determine  that  not  one  is  entirely  lacking  in 
them.  They  always  have  them  in  some  degree.  The  arsenal 
of  their  intellect  is  equipped  with  all  the  weapons. 

Another  means  of  arriving  at  the  same  conclusion  consists 
in  repeating  an  experiment  that  had  been  attempted  by  them 
but  in  which  they  had  failed;  let  that  experiment  be  simplified 
by  replacing  it  with  another  of  the  same  nature  but  easier,  and 
the  defective  immediately  takes  his  revenge.  A  certain  move- 
ment cannot  be  accomplished  in  ten  seconds;  he  does  it  in  twenty 

^  See  Language  and  Thought,  Part  II,  this  volume. 


THE    DIRECTION   OF   THOUGHT  135 

seconds.  He  cannot  repeat  four  figures;  but  he  can  repeat  two. 
He  does  not  understand  a  certain  sentence;  but  he  comprehends 
another  that  is  shorter  and  less  complicated.  He  fails  in  a  "game 
of  patience"  formed  of  ten  pieces;  he  succeeds  if  the  number  of 
pieces  is  only  three.  Sometimes  it  is  not  easy  to  simplify  a 
test;  but  every  time  that  it  is  reduced  sufficiently,  one  can  be 
certain  that  the  defective  will  be  able  to  succeed. 

This  truth,  verified  repeatedly,  frees  us  from  the  necessity 
of  undertaking  an  investigation  whose  result  can  be  foreseen, 
or  of  putting  any  questions  which  seem  on  reflection  to  be  use- 
less or  without  sense.  Thus  there  is  no  need  of  asking  whether 
or  not  an  imbecile  has  any  esthetic  sense.  He  will  always  have 
at  least  a  trace.  Show  him  two  figures,  one  pretty,  the  other 
ugly,  and  he  will  be  able  to  make  a  distinction  between  them 
if  you  carry  the  degree  of  deformity  far  enough. 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  difference  between 
the  defective  and  the  normal  is  not  produced  by  the  absence  of  ' 
a  particular  faculty,  and  alienists  who  in  their  definitions  have 
seemed  to  insinuate  the  contrary,  have  deceived  themselves. 
But  these  are  all  very  negative  conclusions;  and  now,  after  having 
said  what  is  not,  it  is  time  to  say  what  is. 

III.     The  Direction  of  Thought 

In  order  to  group  all  the  facts  collected  we  are  going  to  present 
an  hypothesis;  this  hypothesis  cannot  explain  everything  nor 
cover  everything;  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  considering  a  single 
side  of  the  question,  the  intellectual  side,  leaving  for  another 
time  the  study  of  the  instincts  and  the  emotions.  In  a  word, 
we  are  going  to  present  a  scheme  of  thought  and  show  how  this 
scheme  can  explain  the  differences  which  we  have  encountered  in 
the  intelligence  and  bearing  of  a  defective,  and  also  to  explain 
exactly  in  what  the  evolution  of  the  intelHgencc  consists.  Our 
scheme  should  represent  not  only  the  mechanism  of  the  thought, 
but  its  evohition.  Here  we  arrive  at  the  culminating  point  of 
our  study,  at  the  important  general  idea,  which  gives  th(  evalua- 
tion and  the  summary  of  all  the  little  observations  in  detail. 

Whenever  one  has  tried  to  define  thought  (we  take  the  word 
here  in  its  broadest  sense),  there  has  l^een  a  general  tendency 
to  give  too  great  importance  to  mental  images,  thought  being 


136  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

thereb}^  reduced  to  an  act  of  contemplation,  the  contemplation 
of  an  image.  But  many  observations,  experiments,  and  reason- 
ings have  shown  us  that  thought  is  not  a  passive  state,  but  rather 
a  system  of  actions.  James  has  repeatedly  insisted,  as  we  our- 
selves have  done,  upon  the  possible  existence  of  conscious  thought 
which  is  produced  without  the  aid  of  images;^  and  on  the  other 
hand  it  has  been  shown  that  to  think  does  not  consist  solely 
and  passively  in  taking  cognizance,  but  in  trying,  in  feeling 
one's  way,  in  choosing.  All  these  preliminary  views  can  take 
a  more  exact  form,  thanks  to  the  following  scheme. 

Thought,  as  we  believe,  is  composed  of  three  distinct  elements; 
a  direction,  an  adaptation,  and  a  criticism.  These  three  elements 
characterize  a  complete  thought,  but  they  may  be  lacking  in 
an  incomplete  thought.  In  order  to  make  our  description  better, 
let  us  suppose  a  thought  to  be  as  rich  as  possible,  very  much 
richer  than  it  is  in  reality;  we  shall  do  as  an  author  does  who, 
wishing  to  describe  a  regiment,  describes  without  exception 
all  the  possible  auxiliary  exercises,  even  those  which  never  coexist 
in  the  same  regiment. 

First  the  direction.  To  accomplish  with  consciousness  and 
surety  an  act  of  thought,  we  must  first  know  ''what  it  is  about." 
We  take,  for  instance,  a  problem  in  addition;  we  know  that  we 
must  add,  we  have  constantly  this  idea  of  addition  in  our  minds, 
and  it  is  necessary,  because  this  idea  produces  an  effect  upon 
every  figure  with  which  we  operate;  we  encounter  for  instance, 
a  figure  3  and  a  figure  7,  written  one  over  the  other;  one  might 
multiply  them,  subtract  them  or  add  them.  If  we  add  them 
it  is  because  of  the  directing  idea  that  we  must  make  an  addition. 
In  every  experiment  with  an  individual,  one  commences  by  giv- 
ing him  some  instruction;  this  instruction,  once  it  is  understood, 
serves  as  the  starting  point  of  the  directing  idea.  It  is  the  direct- 
ing idea  under  the  most  conscious  form  in  which  it  can  be  clothed, 
the  verbal  form. 

Thus  we  ask  one  of  our  defectives.  Griffon,  to  name  for  us 
all  the  red  objects  that  he  knows.  He  complies,  and  for  two 
minutes  busies  himself  in  citing  seventeen  red  objects.  There 
are  here  two  phenomena:  the  evocation  of  the  names  of  red  ob- 
jects, and  on  the  other  hand,  the  order  which  we  have  given  him, 

'  See  Experimental  Study  of  the  Intelligence,  p.  81. 


THE   DIRECTION    OF   THOUGHT  137 

which  he  remembers,  and  to  which  he  conforms.  It  is  this  order » 
which  serves  as  a  directing  state  of  consciousness.  These  states  , 
of  consciousness  function  continually  in  us  normals.  They 
are  veritable  orders  which  we  give  ourselves.  But  they  are  not 
always  conscious  orders.  In  the  beginning,  when  we  com- 
mence an  art  not  yet  learned,  we  have  the  full  consciousness  of 
the  directions  we  are  to  follow;  the  beginner  in  painting  distinctly 
remembers  and  can  even  formulate  the  numerous  rules  which 
he  learned  from  his  professor,  and  which  are  necessary  for  him 
to  remember  in  order  to  cover  every  centimeter  of  his  canvas 
with  color.  But  little  by  little,  the  influence  of  the  directing 
state  becomes  weaker  on  the  movement  of  the  thought  and  of 
the  hand.  One  no  longer  needs  to  make  an  express  appeal 
to  the  verbal  formula  of  the  instructions;  it  falls  into  the  vague 
state  of  an  intellectual  feeling,  or  even  completely  disappears. 
Some  authors  have  recently  made  a  curious  experiment  which 
demonstrates  what  we  have  just  said;  this  is  accomplished  by 
means  of  controlled  association  of  ideas.  A  word  is  given  to  the 
subject,  and  he  must  find  a  second,  which  stands  in  an  exact 
relation  to  the  first,  for  instance  of  subordination  or  of  superordi- 
nation.  At  first  the  subject  is  obliged  to  recall  the  order;  he  re- 
peats it  to  himself,  he  is  even  obliged  to  have  it  so  vividly  in 
his  consciousness  that  he  sometimes  visualizes  it  in  a  way  to 
be  his  guide;  then  httle  by  little  he  thinks  of  it  less;  in  the  end 
he  does  not  think  of  it  at  all;  and  yet  only  such  words  as  conform 
to  the  instruction  present  themselves.  The  directing  state, 
from  being  conscious  has  become  unconscious:  but  it  is  like  the 
manager  who  from  behind  the  scenes  watches  and  directs  the 
actors  on  the  stage. 

These  few  facts  borrowed  from  the  history  of  our  normal 
life,  permit  us  to  know  in  what  the  direction  consists.  We  also 
know  by  personal  experience  that  cases  present  themselves 
where  the  directing  idea  fails  us.  We  do  an  erraud,  we  go  into 
another  room  to  look  for  an  object,  then,  surprised  we  stop, 
not  knowing  what  we  came  to  look  for.  We  accuse  our  memory 
or  perhaps  our  attention;  in  reality  it  is  the  direction  which  lias 
suddenly  failed  us.  In  dreams,  in  reveries,  we  see  images  suc- 
ceeding one  another,  but  there  is  no  plan,  we  do  not  know  where 
we  are  tending,  there  is  no  purpose,  we  drift  wifliout  cHrection. 

Among  our  defectives,  wc  often  encounicr  :ui  absence  or  weak-, 
ness  of  direction  which  manifests  itself  under  two  different  forms; 


138  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

either  the  direction,  once  commenced,  does  not  continue,  or  it 
has  not  even  been  commenced  because  it  has  not  been  understood. 

The  direction  often  grows  very  weak  among  imbeciles.  We 
see  it  when  we  talk  with  them.  In  conversation,  intelligent  per- 
sons are  attentive  to  what  we  say,  they  look  at  and  listen  to  us; 
what  would  distract  them  is  repulsed,  annihilated,  remains  in- 
effective. In  a  conversation  of  this  kind  there  is  no  order  given 
to  listen,  it  is  a  sentiment  of  curiosity  or  of  deference  which  pro- 
duces the  direction.  We  have  seen  how  this  direction  may  be  lack- 
ing under  certain  circumstances  with  imbeciles  and  idiots ;  we  have 
described  all  these  failures  in  the  chapter  on  attention.  Some- 
times the  direction  fails  entirely  of  being  established.  Vouzin 
instead  of  listening  to  us  looks  all  about  him;  nothing  is  coordi- 
nated in  his  case;  these  psychological  elements  remain  scattered. 
With  others,  like  Denise,  the  direction  can  form  itself,  but  it 
is  very  precarious;  the  current  is  established,  but  it  is  easily  di- 
verted; with  others  the  distractions  are  transitory,  and  the 
current  may  of  itself  again  take  up  the  first  direction.  We 
are  studying  here  the  formation  of  a  tendency  altogether  ele- 
mentary, the  tendency  to  coordination  and  systematization ;  it 
is  necessary  not  only  for  carrying  out  an  exact  psychological 
experiment,  but  also,  which  is  much  more  important,  for  the 
adaptation  of  a  human  being  to  his  environment. 

We  have  said  there  are  other  circumstances  where  the  direc- 
tion fails  through  lack  of  comprehension;  speaking  in  common 
terms,  our  imbecile  receives  an  order  but  does  not  execute  it 
because  he  has  not  understood.  This  is  what  happens  with  a 
good  many  of  our  tests.  We  tell  an  imbecile,  for  instance,  to 
compare  two  boxes  and  to  indicate  the  heavier,  and  he  does  not 
succeed.  If  he  does  not  succeed  it  is  not  because  it  is  impossible 
for  him  to  perceive  the  difference  of  the  two  weights.  As  we 
have  often  proved  he  can  very  well  perceive  this  difference; 
but  he  is  embarrassed  by  the  necessity  of  making  a  comparison; 
he  does  not  understand  the  meaning  of  the  experiment;  he  does 
not  see  that  he  must  take  a  box,  weigh  it  in  his  hand,  remember 
its  weight,  then  weigh  another,  compare  it  with  the  first,  decide 
which  of  the  two  is  the  heavier,  and  point  it  out.  In  regard 
to  this,  children  show  the  same  embarrassment  as  imbeciles, 
they  do  not  understand  the  directing  idea.  Here  is  another 
example.     One   may   understand,    may   even    begin   an   action. 


THE   ADAPTATION   OF   THOUGHT  139 

then  suddenly  cease  to  understand.  We  have  had  particular 
occasion  to  observe  this  among  general  paralytics.  An  operation 
is  given  them  to  perform,  for  instance  a  subtraction;  in  the  mid- 
dle of  it  they  no  longer  remember  where  they  are,  and  begin  to 
add  instead  of  continuing  their  subtraction.  Or  again,  they 
have  commenced  the  study  of  a  problem.  They  have  seen  that 
27  must  be  multiphed  by  36;  they  do  the  fii'st  part  of  the  multi- 
plication correctly,  then  they  stop,  they  are  lost.  It  is  as  though 
in  their  heads  they  had  been  playing  chess  and  some  one  came 
along  and  hit  the  chess-board,  jumbling  the  men  together.  They 
are  obliged  to  abandon  the  problem. 

Thus  one  of  the  first  characteristics  which  distinguishes  a* 
superior  from  an  inferior  intelligence,  is  the  power  of  directing  • 
the  thought;  and  this  power  of  du-ection  manifests  itself  in  two' 
ways:  by  its  complexity  and  by  its  persistence.  Let  us  further 
remark  how  the  position  which  we  have  taken  differs  from  a 
theory  wide-spead  in  psychology,  which  gives  all  the  efficacy 
to  the  idea,  to  the  sensation,  to  the  movement,  to  isolated  phe- 
nomena, while  we  believe  that  the  first  fact,  the  most  important 
of  the  psychic  life,  is  a  coordination  which  gives  to  the  current 
of  ideas  a  definite  direction.  According  to  the  adherents  of 
the  first  theory,  which  we  may  call  the  theory  of  psychic  atomism, 
the  attention  is  only  of  the  one  idea,  it  is  a  state  which  results 
from  the  isolation  of  one  idea  reigning  alone  in  an  empty  con- 
sciousness; a  singular  theory  which  would  hardly  apply  to  an 
idiot,  because,  since  it  is  very  probable  that  the  idiot  has  fewer 
ideas  than  the  normal,  the  idiot  must  approach  nearer  to  that 
desideratum  of  an  empty  consciousness  and  consequently  must 
be  more  attentive  than  the  normal.  Observation  shows  us  that 
the  contrary  is  true,  and  we  can  very  well  understand  it;  the 
idiot  does  not  coordinate,  and  without  coordination  there  is 
no  attention. 

IV.    The  Adaptation  of  Thought 

Continuing  the  exposition  of  our  scheme,  we  shall  speak  of 
adaptation.     There  is  not  only  a  direction  in  the  movement  of  i 
thought,  there  is  also  a  progress;  this  progress  manifests  itself 
in  the  nature  of  the  successive  states  through  which  one  passes; 
they  are  not  equivalent,  the  first  is  not  of  the  same  value  as  the 


140  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

last.  One  arrives  at  the  last  state  only  because  he  has  already 
passed  the  first  state.  This  progress,  seen  as  a  whole  and  as 
Mt  were  from  without,  has  often  received  the  name  of  choice; 
thought,  in  order  to  evolve,  makes  a  selection;  it  consists  in  con- 
stantly^ choosing  between  many  states,  many  ideas,  many  means, 
which  present  themselves  before  it  like  routes  which  diverge 
from  a  crossroad.     The  figure  seems  to  us  sufficiently  accurate. 

•  To  think  is  constantly  to  choose  in  view  of  the  end  to  be  pursued ; 
the  formula  is  so  true  that  it  might  be  given  a  thousand  different 
applications.  But  it  has  one  fault,  it  is  too  brief;  it  states  a 
result,  the  choice,  that  is  to  say,  not  a  selection  made  with  volun- 
tary discernment,  but  the  mere  fact  that  the  thought,  placed 
before  a  host  of  possibilities,  realizes  but  on-e.  This  is  too  brief, 
because  we  do  not  say  in  what  the  progress  consists  nor  by  what 
mechanism  it  manifests  itself. 

The  explanation  becomes  at  once  better  if  we  observe  that  the 
quality  of  the  states  of  consciousness  as  they  evolve  is  different 
and  varies  according  to  law.  In  fact  the  first  states  through 
which  one  passes  are  indefinite,  the  last  states  are  definite;  the 
first  are  undetermined,  the  last  are  more  determined.  Thought, 
^one  may  say,  tends  to  a  determination;  it  even  consists  in  a  deter- 
mination; it  starts  from  chaos  where  everything  is  indefinite, 
to  end  in  a  realization  which  by  its  definite  contours  resembles 

•  the  reality.  This  explanation  is  certainly  better  than  that  of 
choice. 

It  has  sometimes  been  believed  that  this  stage  of  beginning 
resembles  a  general  idea,  and  that  the  progress  of  thought  would 
be  from  the  general  to  the  particular.  The  truth  is,  that  in  all 
the  observations  where  one  has  been  able  to  see  closely  the  true 
I  progress  of  thought,  in  reading  for  instance,  or  in  the  conception 
I  of  a  sentence,  the  idea  at  the  beginning  lacks  individualization, 
and  becomes  individual  only  by  further  work.  Thus  for  instance, 
say  a  word  to  a  person,  and  try  to  grasp  what  that  word  suggests 
to  him.  There  is  in  this  case,  a  very  vague  first  stage,  then  comes 
one  more  precise,  with  a  better  determined  thought.  At  the 
beginning  the  idea  is  embryonic.  To  call  it  general  seems  to  us 
to  start  from  an  altogether  false  conception.  The  general  idea 
is  an  exact  idea  and  not  a  vague  one;  it  is  an  idea  that  includes 
numerous  possibilities  of  individual  application,  and  consequently 
it  seems  to  us  to  be  rather  a  multiplication  of  exactness,  and  a 


THE  ADAPTATION   OF   THOUGHT  141 

sum  of  individualizations  rather  than  any  indetermination  what- 
ever.^ 

Let  us  go  farther;  thought  is  not  only  an  exact  determination.  ^ 
Its  object  is  not  a  disinterested  existence,  and  without  bearing 
upon  the  necessities  of  life.  Like  nutrition  and  respiration,  it 
is  a  vital  function;  it  exists  only  because  it  is  of  use.  It  serves 
to  adapt  us  better  to  the  physical  environment  of  nature,  and 
to  the  moral  environment  of  our  fellows.  Every  idea,  as  has 
often  been  said,  leads  to  action  or  contains  a  potential  act.  But 
the  idea  would  be  of  no  use  if  its  determination  were  not  exact; 
it  must  be  exact  in  order  that  the  means  may  adapt  itself  to 
the  end,  in  order  that  the  thought  may  adapt  itself  to  the  goal 
to  be  pursued.  Every  thought  is  like  a  key  which  must  fit  exactly  . 
in  the  hole  of  some  lock. 

These  adaptations  presuppose  many  realized  conditions;  first 
that  the  end  to  which  one  adapts  oneself  be  posited,  then  that 
it  be  chosen,  finally  that  it  be  attained. 

Posited;  we  wish  to  say  that  it  must  be  definitely  stated  so  , 
that  one  knows  where  one  is  going.  Many  cases  are  possible, 
because  nothing  is  more  varied  in  shade  than  the  psychic  life. 
Sometimes  the  end  is  as  definite  as  a  formula  in  algebra,  and 
in  fact,  to  solve  a  problem  in  algebra  is  to  make  an  effort  toward 
an  end  which  is  expressed  by  the  very  terms  of  the  problem; 
the  end  is  put  in  an  equation.  Sometimes  the  end  remains  . 
vague;  it  is  a  general  idea,  an  ideal  of  beauty,  of  goodness,  of 
truth,  of  justice,  that  each  one  interprets  in  his  own  way  and  which 
sometimes  is  felt,  rather  than  expressed.  As  often  happens, 
feeling,  that  sort  of  confused  thought,  takes  the  place  of  the 
clear  idea. 

The  choice  of  the  end  is  not  less  important  nor  less  difficult. 
In  every  day  life  many  different  ends  present  themselves  to  us, 
and  we  are  obliged  to  make  a  choice.  The  thought  is  higher . 
in  proportion  as  the  choice  is  better.  We  have  said  in  relation 
to  attention — and  it  might  be  remarked  in  relation  to  will,  reason, 
and  even  to  feeling — there  exists  a  hierarchy  among  possible 
acts  of  adaptation;  there  are  insignificant  acts,  and  others  that 
are  important;  tlujre  arc  those  whose  advantage  is  small  and 
immediate,  others  whose  advantage;  is  very  great  but  remote. 

*  See  in  Experimental  Slndy  of  the  Intelligence,  p.  135,  a  pasHugc  where 
this  point  is  studied. 


142  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

To  know  how  to  choose  is  to  subordinate  the  lower  nature,  to 
dominate  the  instincts,  to  elevate  life.  The  mentality  of  the 
child,  of  the  imbecile  (and  unfortunately  also  of  many  adults 
who  for  this  reason  can  never  improve  themselves),  consists  in 
preferring  the  immediate  pleasure  of  the  moment,  to  the  more 
lasting  pleasure  of  the  morrow,  and  consequently  in  developing 
an  activity  which  does  not  calculate,  does  not  reflect,  and  above 
all  does  not  economize,  and  which  therefore  cannot  accumulate 
capital. 

But  we  shall  not  linger  over  these  questions  of  choice  of  ends 
for  they  do  not  come  within  the  domain  of  the  present  study. 
The  choice  of  ends  depends  less  upon  the  intelligence  than  upon 
the  emotional,  the  affective,  the  instinctive  life.  To  make  a 
broad  distinction,  one  might  say,  the  end  is  chosen  by  our  ten- 
dencies; but  the  means  for  attaining  this  end  are  combined  by 
our  intelligence;  our  study  must  confine  itself  to  the  adjustment 
of  means  to  an  end,  which  is  the  proper  work  of  the  intelligence, 
and  which  constitutes  adaptation. 

Wlien  it  is  a  question  of  a  new  action,  the  adaptation  does  not 
take  place  immediately  at  the  first  attempt  but  by  gropings, 
that  is  to  say  by  successive  trials;  one  is  like  a  locksmith  called 
to  open  a  locked  door;  he  searches  in  his  bunch  of  keys  and  tries 
many  but  he  does  not  try  them  all  indiscriminately,  for  he  sees 
at  a  glance  those  that  will  not  fit;  his  attempts  are  not  blind, 
they  are  directed,  selected,  according  to  a  complex  mechanism, 
which  we  have  not  the  time  to  describe  here. 

All  that  is  abstract  in  our  description,  disappears  immediately 
when  we  recall  in  detail  the  observations  which  we  made  upon 
imbeciles.  This  appeal  to  experience  will  not  only  help  to  render 
our  scheme  more  clear,  but  will  enable  us  to  understand  why  the 
defective  remains  stationary  and  does  not  continue  his  normal 
development. 

Thus,  first  of  all,  we  shall  explain  how  it  is  that  for  certain 
operations  an  imbecile  is  equal  to  a  normal  person.  We  have 
seen  that  defectives  perceive  slight  differences  of  sensations  for 
weights  or  lengths  almost  as  exactly  as  we  do.  This  is  because 
there  is  no  necessity  for  reflection,  and  the  thought  does  not 
need  to  evolve;  it  suffices  to  have  consciousness  of  an  elementary 
sensation  of  difference — the  act  of  thought  is,  in  itself,  elementary, 
and  if  the  state  of  consciousness  has  an  extreme  definiteness,  it 


THE   ADAPTATION    OF   THOUGHT  143 

owes  that  definiteness  solely  to  the  sensation  sensed,  not  to  the 
psychological  operation  of  sensing.  Moreover,  we  have  already 
noted  that  a  normal  subject  who  should  continue  to  examine  and 
reflect  would  end  by  losing  the  fine  sensation  of  a  slight  differ- 
ence. This  is  indeed  a  proof  that  all  development  of  thought,* 
without  going  out  to  meet  the  result  sought  after,  can  be  assured 
only  by  producing  a  good  state  of  attention. 

Another  case.  We  have  shown,  that  in  forming  associations 
with  a  word  an  imbecile  succeeds  as  well  as  a  normal.  We  ask 
him  to  say  any  word,  associated  with  the  word  pronounced  to 
him.  This  is  an  arbitrary  procedure,  a  thought  scarcely  deter- 
mined and  really  the  operation  required  is  suited  to  the  mentality 
of  a  defective,  and  we  can  understand  that  he  willingly  submits. 
On  the  contrary  the  normal  is  uncomfortable,  asks  if  he  is  to 
say  just  anything,  and  is  surprised  at  the  small  significance  of 
such  an  experiment;  his  discomfort  is  easily  understood;  habi- 
tuated to  adapting  himself  to  an  end  in  determining  his  thought, 
he  finds  himself  lost  when  he  has  no  means  of  knowing  to  what 
he  must  adapt  himself,  especially  so  when  we  allow  him  to  sup- 
pose there  is  no  end  to  which  he  must  adapt  himself.  Put  aside 
this  particular  mental  state,  and  retain  only  the  words  said  in 
association,  and  we  see  that  those  of  defectives  are  very  nearly 
of  the  same  nature  as  those  of  normals  and,  moreover,  paradoxical 
as  it  seems  to  anyone  who  attaches  an  absolute  value  to  the  quick- 
ness of  thought,  the  defectives  are  more  rapid,  simply  because 
they  do  not  choose,  do  not  direct  their  thought,  but  give  the  first 
word  that  comes  to  mind. 

This  is  permissible  in  an  experiment  upon  the  association  of 
ideas;  but  they  comport  themselves  in  the  same  way  in  other 
cases,  where  they  should  adapt  themselves  to  a  definite  end. 
Let  us  cite  some  examples.  In  order  to  make  an  inventory 
of  their  knowledge  we  show  them  a  piece  of  money  or  a  playing 
card,  and  ask  them  what  it  is.  We  are  surprised  at  the  difficulty 
we  meet  with  in  determining  exactly  what  they  know,  because  a 
one-franc  piece  will  be  called  first  2  francs,  then  in  another  minute 
1  or  3  francs  or  2  sous  by  the  same  subject;  in  the  same  way, 
when  they  are  presented  with  a  card,  a  nine  of  spades,  they  say 
spades,  or  clubs,  or  diamonds;  and  if  one  insists  upon  being  told 
the  number  of  points,  they  will  say  that  it  is  8  of  spatles,  then 
say  that  it  is  7,  or  10,  or  9,  or  4.     In  the  iiico.  of  theso  errors  and 


144  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

contradictions,  the  inexperienced  experimenter  has  a  tendency 
to  become  impatient;  he  is  incHned  to  reprove  the  imbecile, 
to  chide  him  for  his  lack  of  attention,  for  it  seems  truly,  that  if 
he  took  a  little  pains  he  could  reply  correctly.  This  would  be 
a  grave  error  of  method.  The  important  thing  is  not  to  obtain 
from  the  imbecile  a  correct  reply;  this  would  be  the  act  of  the 
pedagogue  and  is  here  altogether  out  of  place;  the  important 
thing  is  to  determine  with  precision  that  peculiar  mental  state, 
thanks  to  which  our  defective  is  contented  with  the  first  reply 
which  comes  to  mind. 

It  is  not  quite  the  first  response  that  occurs  to  him,  it  is  rather 
a  lack  of  elaboration.  The  imbecile,  of  whom  one  asks  the  name 
of  pieces  of  money  spread  before  him  on  the  table,  does  not  re- 
ply with  any  random  word;  he  does  not  say  "It  is  a  dog."  He 
gives  the  name  of  a  piece  of  money.  In  the  same  way,  if  we  show 
him  a  square  of  red  paper  he  does  not  name  a  piece  of  furniture, 
he  names  a  color;  he  says — incorrectly — that  it  is  white  or  blue. 
In  other  words  he  gives  the  genus  for  the  species.  It  is  there- 
fore a  first  determination,  very  insufficient,  but  it  satisfies  him. 
He  goes  no  farther;  he  does  not  go  far  enough  to  name  the  right 
color. 

In  the  same  way  when  he  is  shown  a  picture  containing  a 

great  number  of  objects,  and  we  say  to  him :  Where  is  the 

suspending  the  voice  at  the  moment  of  naming  the  object,  it 
sometimes  happens  that  the  imbecile,  too  eager  to  satisfy  us, 
puts  his  finger  upon  any  object  whatever.  This  is  a  form  of 
suggestibility  caused  in  part,  as  we  have  shown  before,  by  an 
excess  of  deference  and  which  results  also  from  a  facility  for 
saying  no  matter  what  without  reflection.  Nearly  all  the  cases 
of  suggestibility  which  we  have  described  among  imbeciles  reveal 
just  this  particular  mental  state. 

To  fix  the  ideas,  we  have  designated  this  state  by  an  arbitrary 
and  truly  clinical  name:  n'importequisme  (no-matter- whatism) . 
A  thorough  analysis  would  show  that  this  n'importequisme  is 
very  complex;  we  suppose  that  it  has  for  its  essential  condition, 
an  absence  of  critical  sense;  the  imbecile  does  not  realize  the 
insufficiency  of  his  reply,  and  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  not 
realize  it,  otherwise  he  would  not  be  satisfied  with  such  a  gross 
approximation.  We  shall  return  to  this  point  in  a  moment, 
when  we  study  that  special  element  of  thought — control.     But 


r 


THE   ADAPTATION   OF   THOUGHT  145 

in  our  opinion  the  n'importequism  has  need  of  two  other  con- 
ditions, a  thought  that  does  not  evolve,  and  a  thought  that 
does  not  pullulate. 

According  to  circumstances,  one  of  these  defects  in  the  thought 
of  the  imbecile  will  manifest  itself  more  than  the  other.  The 
insufficiency  of  its  pullulation  shows  especially  in  the  "game  of 
patience,"  which  consists  in  joining  the  pieces  of  the  cards  in 
such  a  fashion  as  to  reconstruct  a  whole.  With  this  problem, 
a  normal  person  who  really  wishes  to  take  the  pains  to  succeed, 
shows  a  remarkable  abundance  of  ideas.  One  combination  fail- 
ing he  tries  a  second,  then  a  third  and  so  on,  either  in  maintaining 
a  part  of  the  previous  combination  which  seems  to  him  good, 
or  in  imagining  an  entirely  new  construction;  there  is  a  continual 
struggle  between  his  memory  and  his  imagination,  and  from 
this  struggle,  fertile  combinations  are  born.  His  intelligence, 
encountering  an  obstacle,  is  like  the  water  in  a  stream  which, 
arrested  by  a  stone,  turns  back  and  struggles  against  the  obstacle. 
With  the  imbecile,  the  slowness  of  the  production  of  ideas  is 
very  striking  especially  when  one  has  watched  the  work  of  a 
normal.  It  is  no  longer  living  water  that  flows,  but  a  streamlet 
of  wax  that  congeals.  Not  only  does  the  imbecile  content  him- 
self with  something  nearly  true,  owing  to  the  absence  of  critical 
sense,  but  moreover  the  number  of  attempts  which  he  makes 
is  extremely  small,  two  or  three  for  example,  where  a  normal 
would  make  ten.  Herein  lies  the  explanation  of  the  poverty 
of  ideas  which  makes  any  conversation  with  an  imbecile  so  in- 
sipid. Let  us  recall  our  friend  Albert,  who  when  warmly  greeted 
after  a  week's  absence,  "Well,  well  my  dear  boy!  It's  been  a 
long  while  since  we've  met!  What  have  you  done  all  this  time? 
Tell  us  all  about  it,"  replies  simply— "I  have  swept." 

Under  other  circumstances  one  sees  in  the  imbecile  less  the 
lack  of  pullulation  than  the  lack  of  differentiation  of  the  thought. 
We  might  cite  very  many  examples  to  support  this;  we  shall  give 
only  two  sorts,  which  we  have  observed  in  the  perception  of 
pictures  and  in  the  definition  of  terms. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  many  imbeciles  can  say  only  a  single 
thing  of  the  picture  shown  them,  "There  is  a  man,  there  is  a 
woman."  We  have  made  the  summary  remark  that  it  was 
through  lack  of  penetration.  The  expression  was  superficial, 
the  analysis  was  summary;  seen  more;  closely  the  phenomenon 


146  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

reveals  to  us  especially  an  arrest  of  intellectual  development 
through  lack  of  differentiation.  In  what  does  the  interpretation 
of  a  picture  really  consist?  It  consists  in  completing  the  image 
by  the  appropriate  evocation  of  an  idea  which  adjusts  itself 
exactly  to  the  picture,  so  that  this  interpretation  is  fitting  to 
this  picture  and  fitting  to  it  only.  The  operation  consists  in 
adjusting  oneself  to  an  end,  and  this  end  is  furnished  by  the  pic- 
ture. We  see  in  the  replies  of  our  imbeciles,  that  the  adjustment 
is  far  from  being  definite,  and  that  their  commentary  on  the 
picture  has  nothing  characteristic  or  individual.  They  say  to 
us,  for  example,  of  a  picture  which  represents  a  combat  of  horses, 
"There  ....  there  are  men,"  and  they  repeat  apropos 
of  another  picture  representing  men  drinking  at  a  table,  "There 

.  .  .  .  there  are  men."  Identical  replies  for  very  dif- 
ferent pictures.  In  other  words  their  thought,  instead  of  dif- 
ferentiating itself  in  a  particular  manner  to  adjust  itself  to  each 
picture,  remains  vague,  one  might  even  say  general,  taking  the 
qualification  "general"  in  the  sense  of  embryonic;  in  a  word 
it  does  not  evolve.  It  would  fit  any  of  the  pictures  shown  them, 
and  consequently  it  properly  fits  none.  It  is  this  absence  of 
evolution  which  we  have  remarked  about  them,  when  they  said, 
in  naming  1  franc,  that  it  was  1  sou  or  10  francs;  only  with  this 
difference;  when  our  imbeciles  name  pieces  of  money  or  colors 
or  playing  cards  they  make  an  effort  at  precision;  they  do  not 
say,  "It  is  money,  it  is  a  color,  it  is  a  card,"  but  rather,  "It 
is  1  franc,  it  is  blue,  it  is  spades,"  and  by  the  very  fact  that  they 
are  precise  they  fail.  On  the  contrary  their  remarks  upon  pic- 
tures remain  true  because  they  are  vague  and  insufficient. 

The  same  remark  holds  with  regard  to  the  explanation  which 
they  furnish  us  or  with  the  definitions  which  one  can  draw  from 
them.  To  the  question  "what  is  a  horse,"  "a  table,"  "a  chair," 
etc?  they  usually  reply  like  a  child  of  seven  years,  in  terms  of 
use.  "A  table  is  to  eat;  a  horse  is  to  eat;  bread  is  to  eat;  a  spoon 
is  to  eat."  There  is  in  this  case,  exactly  as  for  the  comments 
upon  the  picture,  an  insufficiency  of  determination,  because  all 
these  formulas  of  use  apply  to  all  this  group  of  objects  only 
because  they  do  not  exactly  adapt  themselves  to  any  one;  such 
a  definition  is  passable  only  because  it  is  vague.  It  is  the  same 
phenomenon,  which  is  produced  through  lack  of  differentiation 
in  the  thought.     On  occasion  one  can  also  distinguish  in  the 


THE   ADAPTATION   OF   THOUGHT  147 

replies  another  interesting  character,  the  utihtarian  predilec- 
tion, but  this  belongs  to  the  domain  of  the  feelings,  instincts, 
and  needs,  and  for  the  moment  we  are  speaking  only  of  the 
mechanism  of  thought. 

To  sum  up :  the  effort  of  adaptation  of  which  the  imbecile  men- 
tality is  capable  is  arrested  in  two  different  ways;  first,  through 
lack  of  successive  attempts,  which  we  have  called  lack  of  pullula- 
tion  of  the  thought,  which  is  equivalent  to  a  weakness  of  intellec- 
tual activity;  second,  through  lack  of  the  work  of  differentiation 
which  is  necessary  in  order  that  the  exact  adaptation  of  the 
thought  to  the  end  be  assured.  Let  us  recall  the  comparison 
of  the  key.  The  imbecile  can  try  only  one  or  two  keys  to  open 
the  lock,  and  the  keys  are  badly  adjusted;  the  key  grinds,  and 
the  lock  often  does  not  open. 

A  word  in  regard  to  this.  One  will  think,  perhaps,  that  the 
lack  of  intellectual  activity  and  the  lack  of  differentiation  of  the 
thought  go  together,  and  are  the  same  fact  seen  under  two  differ- 
ent aspects.  It  will  be  supposed  that  every  active  thought  must 
evolve,  adapt  itself,  differentiate  itself,  and  that  consequently 
it  is  the  weakness  of  the  activity,  which  prevents  the  mental 
evolution  of  the  imbecile.  In  our  mind  this  is  an  error  of  inter- 
pretation. We  do  not  believe  that  the  causes  of  an  intellectual 
arrest  can  be  reduced  to  a  unit3^  These  causes  are  many  and 
when  one  of  them  is  suppressed  the  arrest  may  still  continue 
to  be  produced.  We  have  made  one  observation  which  seems 
instructive  in  this  regard.  It  has  impressed  us  very  much.  It 
is  the  ca.se  of  an  imbecile  named  Cabusscl,  of  whom  we  have  al- 
ready spoken.  Cabusscl  does  not  resemble  his  fellow  imbeciles 
in  all  respects;  he  represents  a  type  that  is  not  common.  Ordi- 
narily an  imbecile  is  slow  and  has  but  few  ideas.  It  is  difficult 
to  talk  with  him,  his  replies  are  short,  and  he  scarcely  ever  makes 
abundant  remarks  spontaneously.  This  is  a  particular  mark 
of  his  weak  intellectual  activity;  if  he  is  made  to  find  and  to  pro- 
nounce the  greatest  number  of  words  possible  in  a  give  time, 
he  finds  very  few;  certain  of  oui-  imbeciles  cannot  find  20  words 
in  three  minutes. 

Cabusscl,  as  wc.  have  seen,  has  a  great  deal  of  intellectual 
activity;  his  activity  is  shown  by  the  vivacity  and  abundance  of 
his  conversation,  which  is  such  that  wc  feel  the  need  of  a  stenog- 
rapher  to   take   it   down  entirely;  and  yet  his  attention  is  not 


148  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

better,  nor  his  intellectual  level  higher  than  those  imbeciles  who, 
like  Albert,  have  very  much  less  activity.  In  particular,  let  us 
recall  that  Cabussel,  notwithstanding  all  his  vivacity  of  speech 
describes,  in  exactly  the  same  terms  as  Albert,  the  pictures  which 
are  shown  him.  He  limits  himself  to  saying,  "There,  that  is  a 
man;  there,  that  is  a  woman."  This  is  certainly  a  proof  that 
thought  can  pullulate  without  evolving  and  that  the  level  of 
the  intelligence  is  distinct  from  the  activity  of  the  intelligence. 

V.     The  Correction 

The  last  piece  of  mental  mechanism  which  we  shall  attempt 
to  describe  is  the  apparatus  of  control.  This  has  been  desig- 
nated under  different  names;  critical  sense  is  the  most  commonly 
known;  judgment  is  the  technical  expression  of  psychologists; 
auto-censure  is  a  happy  word,  recently  proposed  by  certain  alienists 
to  name  this  faculty  of  control  when  it  exercises  itself  upon  it- 
self. Perhaps  this  last  point  of  view  is  the  most  interesting. 
In  effect  it  is  a  question  here,  before  everything  else,  of  a  faculty 
of  control,  which  has  for  its  object  its  own  operations.  When 
we  judge,  we  take  one  after  the  other,  two  attitudes;  one  is  turned 
towards  the  exterior  world,  which  we  perceive  and  evaluate; 
the  other,  the  fact  of  reflection,  is  turned  back  upon  ourselves, 
and  it  is  ourselves  that  we  evaluate. 

It  is  evident  that  we  all  know  this  sort  of  auto-criticism  and 
that  aU  of  us  have  exercised  it  upon  ourselves.  It  is  familiarly 
expressed  in  the  dialogue  of  a  naive  person  talking  with  him- 
self, when  he  counsels  himself  before  acting,  and  scolds  himself 
afterwards.  It  translates  itself  nobly  in  the  monologues  of  the 
classic  theater,  where  the  personage  finds  himself  divided  be- 
tween the  demands  of  duty  and  the  impulse  of  his  instinct.  In 
ordinary  life,  we  pass  continually  from  the  role  of  actor  to  that 
of  judge;  we  are  never  sufficiently  seized  with  the  fire  of  action 
or  of  feeling  to  lose  the  faculty  of  judging  ourselves,  or  rather 
the  two  attitudes  are  not  successive  but  they  mingle  in  a  com- 
posite whole;  one  is  moved  and  at  the  same  time  is  a  conscious 
witness  of  one's  emotion ;  and  even  the  cold  and  sensible  reflec- 
tions made  upon  oneself  do  not  detract  from  the  sincerity  of 
the  feelings  experienced. 

The  anecdotal  side  of  this  question  presented  itself  to  psycholo- 
gists when  they  sought  to  learn  what  was  true  in  the  Paradoxes 


THE    CORRECTION  149 

of  Diderot.  Diderot  claimed  that  an  actor  can  play  properly- 
only  when  he  feels  nothing  of  what  he  expresses;  because  how 
could  he  be  moved  and  at  the  same  time  regulate  his  steps  upon 
the  stage,  and  watch  the  effect  of  his  play  upon  the  audience? 
The  reply  has  been  made  to  this  that  although  the  emotional 
capacity  of  actors  varies  according  to  the  temperament  of  each 
one  of  them,  there  is  nothing  paradoxical  in  admitting  that  they 
are  at  the  same  time  moved  and  master  of  themselves;  the  essen- 
tial of  artistic  emotion  is  that  it  be  under  the  direction  of  the 
will  and  the  surveillance  of  taste.* 

In  the  preceding  description  of  the  scheme  of  thought,  we 
have  constantly  taken  for  granted  that  the  control  is  at  work. 
Let  us  recall  that  thought  consists  in  an  adaptation.  It  is  neces- 
sary that  the  means  not  only  be  found,  but  be  judged  capable 
of  attaining  this  end.  Before  pulling  the  trigger  the  marks- 
man sees  that  his  weapon  is  properly  aimed.  In  the  same  way 
the  control  intervenes  to  make  sure  that  the  means  are  efficacious; 
those  that  are  judged  good  are  adopted;  the  others  are  rejected. 
Without  this  attentive  selection  no  adaptation  can  succeed. 

What  is  most  curious  is  that  the  effect  of  the  control  makes 
itself  felt,  while  for  the  most  part  the  control  itself  is  unconscious. 
When  we  undertake  a  commercial  affair  we  know  what  is  possible 
for  us  to  attempt,  what  is  possible  to  demand,  and  this  feeling 
is  sufficient  to  stifle  a  host  of  unreasonable  ideas,  even  before 
they  appear.  We  do  not  have  to  disperse  them  and  sort  out  the 
good  grain,  for  usually  the  greater  part  of  the  bad  grain  does  not 
present  itself.  There  is  here  a  silent  work  of  systematization 
which  is  extremely  useful. 

Let  us  pass  on  to  our  defectives.  At  every  step  of  our  obser- 
vations we  have  discovered  their  lack  of  this  power  of  control. 
A  certain  one,  in  our  presence,  yawns,  or  scratches  himself  in 
the  most  comical  manner;  this  is  a  lack  of  control  through  lack 
of  good  manners.  Another  told  to  copy  an  "a"  scribl)los  a  form- 
less mass  at  which  he  smiles  in  a  satisfied  manner;  this  is  lack 
of  control  through  lack  of  attention,  because  these  same  imbe- 
ciles, if  one  insists,  can  be  made  to  see  that  their  scribbling  does 
not  resemblo  the  model,  liul  it  is  especially  when  we  ask  their 
opinion  upon  some  question  which  they  <1')  not  know,  tiiat  we 

"See  A.  Binet,  Le  Paracloxe  de  Diderot,  Annie  Paychologiqnc,  vol. 
iii,  p.  279. 


150  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

discover  their  lack  of  control.  This  state  of  n'importequism 
already  pointed  out  is  composed  in  the  first  place  of  a  lack  of 
evolution  and  of  differentiation  in  the  thought,  and  in  the  next 
place  by  an  absence  of  criticism.  We  have  already  remarked 
that  to  reply,  "It  is  exactly  eleven  o'clock,"  when  one  cannot 
tell  time,  to  give  the  first  color  that  comes  into  one's  head  when 
asked  to  name  a  particular  color,  must  mean  that  the  sense  of 
demonstration  is  lacking,  the  sense  of  the  absurd,  the  fear  of 
being  wrong,  in  a  word  all  of  those  states  which  tend  to  correct 
and  reduce  and  which  constitute  control. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  remark,  that  in  order  to  bring  out  this 
n'importequism  clearly,  it  is  necessary  to  exercise  force  upon 
the  intelligence  of  imbeciles.  Left  to  themselves,  they  do  not 
say  and  they  do  not  perform  all  the  absurdities  that  we  draw 
from  them;  if  they  have  committed  very  many  blunders  in  their 
conversations  with  us  we  are  somewhat  responsible,  because 
we  obliged  them  to  reply  to  questions  beyond  their  reach.  In 
short  if  they  are  lacking  in  judgment  they  are  equally  lacking 
in  direction,  in  adaptation  and  the  rest;  if  their  functionings 
are  in  a  rudimentary  state,  there  is  at  least  some  harmony  in 
all  these  rudiments.  It  would  therefore  be  wrong  to  think  of 
comparing  them  with  those  degenerates,  among  whom  impulsive 
acts  betray  a  lack  of  harmony,  a  loss  of  equilibrium.  These 
are  mental  conditions  of  a  very  different  nature. 

VI.  Origin  of  the  Scheme  of  Thought 

The  scheme  of  thought  which  we  have  just  set  forth  has  been 
made  definite  by  our  study  of  defectives  and  by  our  need  to 
explain  wherein  their  deficiency  consists;  but  its  origin  dates 
farther  back.  One  of  us  had  already  this  idea  in  mind  when 
he  wrote  some  ten  years  ago,  his  '' Experimental  Study  of  the 
Intelligence,"^  which  we  have  often  been  obliged  to  cite;  the 
observations  contained  in  that  book  have  stimulated  experimen- 
tation in  Germany  upon  the  psychology  of  thought,  which  is 
at  the  present  moment  being  carried  on  with  much  activity, 
and  which  passes  by  the  general  name  of  the  Method  of  WurtzhurgJ 

*  Schleicher  Brothers,  Paris,  1900. 

'  This  name  is  used  because  the  psychologists  of  the  University  of 
Wurtzburg  have  been  the  second  to  employ  this  method.  This  is  a  curious 
usage  with  which  we  are   unacquainted.     Or   rather,    it   is   the   second 


ORIGIN    OF   THE    SCHEME    OF   THOUGHT  151 

It  will  also  be  noted  that  the  expressions  of  direction  of  thought, 
of  correction,  and  other  equivalents  are  currently  employed  to- 
day by  many  authors,  and  our  scheme  itself,  although  it  is  per- 
haps more  definite  and  more  complete  than  anything  which  has 
been  proposed,  will  seem  to  many  to  lack  originality. 

It  is  important  to  point  out  in  conclusion  exactly  in  what 
respects  our  scheme  seems  to  us  to  be  in  advance  of  the  former 
theories  of  the  mechanism  of  thought,  and  what  characteristic 
points  it  presents. 

In  the  first  place  one  might  believe  a  double  use  was  made  of 
the  primordial  faculties  of  mind,  which  have  been  described  from 
all  eternity  under  the  familiar  names  of  memory,  attention, 
imagination,  judgment.  We  have  sometimes  employed  these 
expressions  in  our  descriptions,  but  we  have  not  abused  them, 
and  it  would  have  been  easy  for  us  not  to  have  used  them  at 
all.  Would  it  have  been  possible  to  reduce  the  scheme  of  thought 
to  a  play  of  these  faculties?  At  first  thought  this  reduction 
merits  a  trial,  because  it  seems  very  seductive. 

One  might  remark  that  all  that  we  have  described  under  the 
term  direction  is  only  attention;  our  auto-correction  is  only 
judgment;  and  as  to  the  act  of  adaptation,  which  is  the  center 
of  the  system,  one  could  just  as  well  reduce  it  to  memory,  which 
conserves  the  states  of  consciousness,  and  to  the  imagination, 
which  raises  them  up  at  the  proper  moment. 

But  on  reflection  it  seems  to  us  that  to  reduce  the  scheme  of 
thought  to  these  known  faculties  would  be  to  take  from  the 
scheme  all  its  originality.     On  the  one  hand  the  essential  point 
of  the  new  theory  is  considering  thought  as  an  action,  the  ac-  " 
tion  consisting  in  adapting  itself;  it  is  around  this  conception  * 
that  everything  gravitates;  furthermore,  the  principle  of  adapta- 
tion is  not  contained  in  any  one  of  our  intellectual  faculties; 
there  is  in  it  an  idea  which  surpasses  them.     On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  principal  parts  of  the  system,  direction,  correction,  adjuM- 
ment,  can  be  explained  by  aplay  of  the  attention,  memory,  imagiiia-   • 
tion,  judgment,  it  must  be  noted  tiiat  any  one  of  those  faculties 
taken  alone  would  be  ineffectual  for  the  work  that  one  would 

example  of  wliich  wo  h.-ivc  :iiiy  nconi.  Tlic  first  is  (lie  followiii^x:  tlic 
study  of  erroPH  in  tcHtiiiioiiy  wliicli  \vn  iiwiuKuratod  \n  currently  (leHiKuated 
today  by  the  name  of  the  author  wlio  »ool<  it  up  iifler  us,  and  bears  the 
name  of  the  method  of  Stern. 


152  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

wish  to  assign  to  it.  Take  for  instance  auto-correction.  Is 
that  judgment?  Yes,  without  doubt;  one  must  judge  in  order 
to  correct  oneself,  but  correction  supposes  more  than  an  intel- 
lectual appreciation.  It  supposes  in  addition,  an  arrest,  a  sus- 
pension of  a  defective  motor  tendency;  to  judgment  one  must 
add  will.  Sometimes  correction  is  made  in  full  consciousness 
after  an  effort  of  reflection;  in  this  case  attention  must  be  added 
to  judgment  and  will.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  arrest  may  be  made 
without  making  an  intellectual  judgment,  by  the  conflict  of 
an  emotional  state  which  serves  as  antagonist;  one  must  then 
add  to  the  list  of  acting  faculties,  a  new  faculty,  that  of  emotivity. 
The  list  is  already  long,  and  we  have  taken  into  account  neither 
memory,  which  is  necessary  in  order  for  us  to  possess  the  motives 
for  rendering  a  judgment,  nor  imagination  which  serves  to  pre- 
sent them  forcibly  to  the  mind. 

Let  us  take  another  example,  the  direction.  Is  that  atten- 
tion? Without  doubt,  and  we  do  not  deny  it ;  but  it  will  be  easy 
in  analyzing  this  second  case,  to  show  all  that  this  faculty  implies; 
an  observation  taken  from  life  will  prove  it  to  us.  An  imbecile 
Denise  who  is  listening  to  us  suddenly  changes  her  directions- 
while  we  talk  she  is  attracted  by  a  bird  flying  in  the  garden, 
and  she  begins  watching  the  bird  and  forgets  us.  We  say  that 
the  first  direction  has  been  abandoned,  and  that  is  sufficient 
for  our  scheme.  But  what  is  the  mechanism  of  this  derailment? 
Is  it  lack  of  attention?  Is  it  lack  of  memory?  It  is  extremely 
difficult  to  know,  because  direction  supposes,  among  other  things, 
memory  and  attention,  and  the  difference  between  derailment 
through  lack  of  attention,  and  derailment  through  lack  of  memory 
is  extremely  subtle.  We  would  say  lack  of  memory  when  the 
directing  idea  has  completely  disappeared;  lack  of  attention 
when  the  idea,  without  completely  disappearing,  has  lost  its 
interest  and  is  disregarded.  All  these  distinctions  are  of  but  little 
importance.  Here  then  is  a  case  which  shows  admirably  not 
only  that  the  greater  part  of  our  primordial  faculties  is  involved 
in  each  part  of  the  scheme  of  thought,  but  moreover  that  it  may 
be  a  very  delicate  matter  to  establish  the  role  of  each  one  of 
these  faculties.  9 

In  short  then,  we  may  conclude  that  the  theory  of  the  intellec- 
tual faculties  and  the  theory  of  the  scheme  of  thought  belong 
to  two  different  planes. 


ORIGIN    OF   THE   SCHEME    OF  THOUGHT  153 

To  make  this  distinction  more  clear,  we  borrow  from  biology 
the  following  comparison;  the  primordial  biological  element  is 
the  cell;  in  grouping  themselves,  cells  form  the  tissues;  tissues 
in  their  turn  form  the  organs.  In  the  same  way  one  might 
say  that  the  intellectual  functions  of  memory,  attention,  judg- 
ment, etc.,  correspond  to  the  cells;  combining  themselves,  they 
form  something  analogous  to  a  tissue.  What  corresponds  toj 
the  organ  is  our  scheme  of  thought,  because,  like  the  organ, 
this  scheme  has  a  function. 

It  is  perhaps  in  this  last  word,  function,  that  the  chief  originality 
of  our  new  scheme  of  thought  resides;  and  if  this  word  is  under- 
stood in  its  fullest  sense,  one  sees  new  perspectives  opening  out. 
One  will  understand  that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  the  obso- 
lete in  contemporaneous  psychology,  and  that  one  must  encourage 
a  different  psychology,  the  one  which  is  already  called  in  America 
functional  psychology. 

In  our  opinion  it  will  henceforth  seem  superannuated  to  make 
psychology  a  science  of  introspection,  or  to  express  it  better, 
of  contemplation,  which  has  for  its  object  of  study  the  sta,tes 
of  consciousness,  and  which  has  no  other  end  but  to  describe  all 
the  qualities  of  these  states.  In  fact,  up  to  this  point,  we  have 
seen  in  the  faculties  of  memory,  attention,  judgment,  imagina- 
tion, only  those  faculties  which  spend  themselves  entirely  in 
states  of  consciousness  and  which  serve  either  to  conserve  these 
states  or  to  reproduce  them,  or  to  amplify  them,  or  to  compare 
them,  or  to  decompose  them.  One  never  gets  beyond  them; 
they  are  considered  not  as  means  but  as  ends.  Consequently 
it  has  been  believed  that  in  every  act  of  thought,  the  emphasis 
must  be  placed  upon  the  states  of  consciousness,  even  upon  the 
imaginative  representation,  so  that  it  has  caused  great  surprise 
to  learn  that  there  can  be  thoughts  without  images,  without  words, 
and  reduced  to  a  feeling.  Consequently  again,  it  has  been  be- 
lieved that  the  explanation  of  the  mental  operations  could  be 
seen  in  the  properties  of  images;  the  Eiiglisli  School  has  wished 
to  explain  the  reason  of  all  mental  pheiioniena  without  exception 
by  the  mechanism  of  the  association  of  ideas,  and  recently  a 
well-known  author  sought  to  explain  attention  by  a  state  of 
mono-ideisni. 

To  this  conception  of  a  structural  psychology  we  opi)osc  its 
counterpart,  that  which  gives  action  as  the  ciid  of  Ihoiight  and 


154  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

which  seeks  the  very  essence  of  thought  in  a  system  of  actions. 
All  the  consequences  of  this  new  orientation,  at  least  if  it  succeeds 
in  making  itself  accepted,  will  develop  with  time.  There  are 
intimate  consequences  that  will  make  themselves  felt  in  the  man- 
ner of  positing  the  most  serious  psychological  problems,  in  par- 
ticular the  manner  of  understanding  the  attention,  generaliza- 
tion, and  also  the  relation  of  the  conscious  to  the  unconscious, 
and  the  reciprocal  influence  of  the  emotions  and  the  thoughts, 
and  finally  the  relation  of  delirium  to  emotivity.  We  already 
have  here  the  principal  points  upon  which  it  seems  tons  great 
changes  will  take  place.  We  note,  as  a  logical  example  of  the 
revolution  which  we  predict,  a  new  method  for  measuring  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness;  instead  of  measuring  the  intensity 
of  these  phenomena,  which  has  been  the  vain  and  foolish  ambition 
of  the  psycho-physicists,  we  shall  measure  the  useful  effects  of 
the  acts  of  adaptation,  and  the  value  of  the  difficulties  conquered 
by  them;  there  is  here  a  measure  which  is  not  arithmetical,  but 
which  permits  a  lineal  seriation,  a  hierarchy  of  the  acts  and  of 
different  individuals  judged  according  to  their  powers. 

Questions  of  detail  aside,  if  we  seek  to  take  into  account  the 
evolution  of  the  whole,  which  we  approve,  we  can  assert  that 
psychology,  having  become  a  science  of  action,  takes  on  an  al- 
together different  attitude  for  pedagogy,  for  morals,  and  for 
scientific  philosophy. 

For  pedagogy  it  ceases  to  be  the  lonely  exercise  of  hermits, 
a  delight  of  the  sophists,  an  application  of  "Know  thyself"  which 
has  caused  it  to  be  said  up  to  the  present  that  this  analytical 
science  has  no  educative  value.  In  obliging  us  to  come  out  of 
our  own  inner  consciousness,  in  order  to  understand  our  fellow- 
man  in  the  life  of  action,  it  takes  on  an  aspect  of  social  science. 
In  morals  the  consideration  of  ends  permits  it  to  receive  inspira- 
tion from  whatever  there  is  that  is  useful  and  solid  in  the  doc- 
trines of  pragmatism  in  vogue.  There  again  we  encounter  an 
interesting  point  of  contact  with  the  contemporaneous  tendencies 
which  are  still  vague,  but  very  powerful.  But  it  is  especially 
by  the  manner  of  positing  the  great  philosophical  problem  that 
the  revolution  will  make  itself  felt,  for  while  the  psychologist 
of  contemplation  tends  to  detach  himself  from  the  exterior  world 
and  to  seek  only  the  differences  between  his  states  of  conscious- 
ness and  his  own  body,  which  produces  a  gulf  between  the  physi- 


ORIGIN   OF   THE    SCHEME    OF   THOUGHT  155 

cal  and  the  moral  world;  the  psychologist  of  action,  who  sees 
that  the  phj'sical  and  the  moral  concm*  in  every  act  of  adaptation, 
will  apply  himself  rather  to  demonstrate  their  union,  and  instead 
of  an  antithesis,  will  tend  to  make  a  synthesis. 

Alfred  Binet  and  Th.  Simon. 


PART  II 

The  Language  of  the  Feeble- Minded 


I.  A  NEW  PSYCHOGENETIC  METHOD 

We  desire  to  draw  the  attention  of  our  readers  to  a  study  which, 
in  our  opinion,  constitutes  a  new  psychological  method;  this  method 
consists  in  analysing  the  manifestations  of  intellectual  phenomena 
among  cert  am  individuals  designated  by  the  names  idiot,  imbe- 
cile, and  moron.  Imbeciles  perhaps  form  the  most  instructive 
group  of  all  these  defectives  and  it  is  of  these  only  that  we  shall 
speak  in  our  short  article.  We  believe  the  method  which  we 
present  is  new  and  we  hope  that  we  shall  be  able  to  demonstrate 
its  novelty.  Our  affirmation  may  be  doubted  by  those  who  know 
of  the  enormous  literature  which  exists  upon  all  defectives;  but 
the  clinicians  who  have  devoted  themselves  to  these  patients  and 
who  have  even  made  for  them  a  vague  pedagogy  adorned  with 
the  pompous  title  of  the  medico-pedagogical  method  have  never, 
so  to  speak,  examined  them  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  prob- 
lems which  their  mental  state  raises  in  regard  to  modern  psy- 
chology. In  fact  the  chapter  upon  "Backwards"  is  the  most 
backward  of  all  psychiatry.^ 

The  method  which  we  are  going  to  describe  is  a  psychogenctic 
method;  let  us  characterize  it  first  by  indicating  what  branches  of 
study  it  resembles  and  from  what  other  branches  it  is  differen- 
tiated. 

For  the  past  thirty  years  the  field  of  psychology  has  been  so 
furrowed  in  every  direction  that  it  has  become  extremely  difficult 
to  present  a  general  view  of  the  investigations  which  is  coherent. 
There  exists  at  the  present  time  an  objective  psychology  which  is 
often  opposed  to  a  subjective  psychology,  terms  vague  and  almost 
indefinable.  In  the  same  way  expemnental  psycliology  has  been 
opposed  to  pathological  psychology,  the  authors  failing  to  recog- 
nize by  this  distinction  that  the  observation  of  these  patients  is 

'  VVc  hope  that  tliis  appreciation  will  not  be  considered  an  unjuat  criti- 
cism upon  certain  good  works  that  have  appeared  upon  the  psychology 
of  imbeciles.  The  work  of  Dr.  SoUier  is  well  known,  and  for  the  epoch  in 
which  he  wrote,  is  excellent.  But  iwyclujIoKical  analysis  has  proRressed 
greatly  since  that  time  and  we  are  under  the  neee.s.sity  of  studying  very 
many  questions  of  which  no  one  had  then  dreamed. 

159 


160  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

compatible  with  experimentations  quite  as  complicated  as  for 
normal  subjects  and  laboratory  students.  In  this  pathological 
branch  are  grouped  together  psychiatry  and  hypnotism  although, 
both  in  regard  to  their  value  and  their  processes,  they  are  entirely 
different.  As  for  experimental  psychology  it  is  almost  universally 
confounded  with  psycho-physics  of  which  it  is  nevertheless  only 
a  very  insignificant  part;  and  this  confusion  is  all  the  more  regret- 
table because  it  permits  those  who  condemn  the  barrenness  of  the 
psycho-physical  to  anathematize  at  the  same  time  the  whole  psy- 
chology of  experimentation  which  is  supremely  unjust.  And 
moreover  there  is  again  physiological  psychology  whose  domain 
is  so  badly  defined  that  it  is  confused  with  normal  psychology, 
with  psycho-physics,  and  even  with  pathological  psychology. 
This  is  chaos;  and  if  the  experts  cannot  always  find  themselves 
how  can  we  suppose  that  the  uninitiated  can  arrive  at  a  clear  idea 
of  the  whole? 

We  are  not  attempting  here  to  put  an  end  to  this  chaos;  that 
would  take  too  long.  In  order  to  indicate  the  ground  we  intend 
to  cover,  it  will  suffice  to  divide  all  psychology  into  three  fields 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  phenomena  involved,  and  not  ac- 
cording to  the  processes  of  investigation  which  are  common  to  the 
three  fields.  The  first  group  represents  the  phenomena  which 
have  attained  their  full  development,  a  static  condition;  this  is 
the  study  of  the  adult  normal.  The  second  group  represents  the 
phenomena  which  are  in  a  stage  of  total  or  partial  dissolution,  or 
of  derangement,  in  a  word,  which  correspond  in  the  main  to  the 
somewhat  vague  concept  of  pathological  phenomena.  The  third 
group,  the  only  one  with  which  this  article  is  concerned,  repre- 
sents the  phenomena  in  a  stage  of  evolution;  into  this  group 
enters  first  of  all  and  above  all  the  study  of  the  child  who  repre- 
sents the  most  typical  form  of  evolution;  then,  with  various 
differences,  we  can  compare  the  child  with  the  individual  belong- 
ing to  a  lower  civilization  who  has  long  been  called  by  the  naiive 
word  savage;  then  we  can  compare  him  with  the  animal,  and  lastly 
with  the  defective. 

To  be  brief,  we  shall  retain  of  this  enumeration  only  the  two 
extreme  terms,  the  child  and  the  defective.  It  has  long  been  said 
that  the  defective  is  comparable  to  a  child  arrested  in  his  develop- 
ment. We  have  in  our  asylums  imbeciles  of  forty  who  are  at  the 
intellectual  level  of  a  normal  child  of  five  years.     But  it  must  be 


NEW   PSYCHOGENETIC   METHOD  161 

well  understood  that  this  resemblance  is  only  roughly  true.  An 
imbecile  of  forty  does  not  exactly  resemble  a  normal  child  of  five 
years;  following  the  happy  comparison  of  Kraepelin,  he  resembles 
him  somewhat  as  would  a  caricature ;  he  resembles  him  as  much 
as  an  invalid  can  resemble  a  healthy  person,  as  much  as  an  awk- 
ward and  imcouth  being  can  resemble  one  who  is  all  charm  and 
grace.  For  the  moment  we  shall  not  insist  upon  all  the  differ- 
ences which  obviously  are  numerous  and  which  are  moreover 
imperfectl}^  known;  of  these  differences  the  following  interests  us 
more  than  the  others  because  it  justifies  the  psychogenetic  method 
for  defectives.  The  normal  child  of  five  years  is  continually 
developing;  he  does  not  remain,  so  to  speak,  a  single  instant  at 
the  same  intellectual  level;  he  is  following  an  ascending  curve. 
On  the  contrary,  the  adult  imbecile  of  forty  has  terminated  his 
development;  he  will  be  tomorrow  or  two  years  hence  the  same 
that  he  is  today,  that  he  was  yesterday,  that  he  was  two  years 
ago,  or  perhaps  even  that  he  was  ten  years  ago.  He  does  not 
follow  an  ascending  curve;  he  treads  a  level  platform,  and  conse- 
quently one  can  discern  the  qualities  and  resources  of  his  intellec- 
tual level,  better  than  as  though  it  were  the  question  of  a  child; 
one  can  learn,  for  instance,  all  the  acquisitions  which  his  intel- 
lectual level  can  command;  one  can  learn  if  his  degree  of  intelli- 
gence renders  him  capable  of  learning  to  read,  to  count,  to  acquire 
this  or  that  practical  knowledge;  on  the  contrary,  one  remains 
ignorant  of  these  things  for  a  child  of  five,  because  such  child  has 
not  yet  had  time  to  learn  them,  and  by  the  time  he  has  learned 
them  he  is  no  longer  five  years  old  but  has  mounted  to  a  higher 
intellectual  level.  Here  then,  as  we  take  it,  is  the  great  advantage 
of  the  psychogenetic  method  applied  to  imbeciles;  it  permits  us  to 
know  by  an  experiment  as  prolonged  as  we  desire  to  make  it ,  all  tlie 
resources  of  an  intelligence,  all  its  capacities,  all  its  potentialities. 


II.  APHASIA  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  LANGUAGE 

Let  us  leave  generalities,  and  demonstrate  by  a  precise  example 
what  we  have  just  advanced.  Psychology  in  its  entirety  could  be 
viewed  by  this  method  but  we  cite  only  one  particular  phase, 
that  of  the  development  of  language. 

The  study  of  language  will  be  very  useful  for  our  demonstra- 
tion because  it  will  furnish  us  with  the  opportunity  of  comparing 
the  results  obtained  by  three  different  methods,  first,  the  patho- 
logical method,  brilliant  and  well  known,  which  has  given  us  the 
aphasias;  second,  the  psychogenetic  method,  known  but  little 
used,  which  consists  in  studying  the  child;  and,  finally,  third, 
another  psychogenetic  method  almost  unknown  and  never  prac- 
ticed which  consists  in  studying  the  imbecile.  We  shall  also  by 
a  precise  comparison  observe  the  advantages  of  these  different 
methods  as  well  as  their  disadvantages.  It  must  be  well  under- 
stood that  we  do  not  in  any  way  attempt  to  establish  a  preemi- 
nence of  one  of  these  methods  over  the  others.  This  would  be 
neither  correct  nor  kind.  All  the  methods  are  useful;  we  are  not 
in  favor  of  exclusion  but  of  synthesis;  it  is  what  we  have  always 
desired  and  always  counseled. 

Let  us  first  ask,  what  have  we  learned  from  the  imposing  array 
of  the  manifold  works  on  aphasia  that  is  of  general  application  to 
the  problem  of  the  mechanism  of  language?  Let  us  pass  over  the 
infinite  number  of  details,  certain  ones  of  which  have  been  very 
suggestive,  and  let  us  restrict  ourselves  to  a  general  view. 

The  study  of  aphasia  has  shown  us  in  particular  that  what  wej 
call  language  does  not  represent  a  faculty  unique,  indivisible, 
moulded  in  a  single  piece,  but  is  composed  of  a  certain  number^ 
operations  which  are  independent  of  each  other,  and  tfcat  each 
may  be  destroyed  or  conserved  to  the  exclusion  of  the  others. 
This  is  the  most  important  information  that  comes  out  clearly 
from  all  the  observations  which  have  been  made  upon  aphasic 
cases  as  well  as  from  all  the  diverse  and  often  artificial  theories 
which  have  been  devised  to  express  the  difficulties  of  language. 
We  recall  merely  that  according  to  the  simplest  and  most  schematic 

162 


\ 


PSYCHOLOGY   OF   LANGUAGE  163 

of  these  theories,  language  results  from  the  four  following  opera- 
tions: first,  understanding;  second,  speaking;  third,  reading; fourth, 
writing,  and  that  each  of  these  operations  may  be  suppressed 
separately  by  a  cerebral  accident.  It  has  been  disputed  that  this 
independence  is  equally  complete  for  all  but  this  matter  of  degree 
is  of  little  import;  what  has  been  definitely  proved  is  that  there 
is  some  independence.  Let  us  remark  however  that  this  func- 
tional independence  can  be  realized  only  by  an  individual  who  is 
already  in  possession  of  the  different  mechanisms  of  language. 
It  is  the  perfected  mechanism  which  can  act  alone  without  the 
aid  of  the  whole;  it  is  necessary,  for  instance,  that  an  individual 
should  have  previously  heard  language  in  order  to  continue  speak- 
ing even  when  he  has  ceased  to  understand  what  he  hears  (word 
deafness)  .2  The  study  of  aphasia  therefore,  with  many  reserva- 
tions which  we  pass  over,  shows  the  absence  of  relation  between 
the  established  functions.  It  does  not  show  what  relations  are 
produced  between  the  functions  which  are  on  the  way  to  being 
established.  There  is  here  a  place  for  another  entirely  different 
study.  Ever j^  one  knows  or  supposes  that  if  the  faculty  of  speech 
becomes  independent  of  the  faculty  of  understanding  it  is  not  so 
in  the  beginning  at  the  time  of  its  formation,  and  that  the  child 
born  deaf  remains  necessarily  a  mute.  How  could  he  pronounce 
words  that  he  had  never  heard  or  had  not  been  taught  by  another 
means?  Therefore  at  the  moment  of  this  elaboration  of  the  func- 
tions, numerous  relations  exist  between  the  budding  functions  and 
the  study  of  this  part  of  the  phenomena  may  be  termed  the  psycho- 
genesis  of  language.  Aphasia  does  not  comprise  a  psychogenesis, 
this  must  not  be  forgotten. 

The  psychogenesis  of  language  can  be  investigated  by  dilTcrent 
methods,  by  means  of  studies  on  children,  or  on  primitive  peoples. 
We  are  going  to  show  how  the  study  of  imbeciles,  who  up  to  a 
certain  point  constitute  permanent  children,  can  be  turned  to 
account. 

*  We  omit  in  the  text  an  affinnaf  ion  whi(;h  iniglit  l)c  criticised  because, 
according  to  Dejerine  and  other  authors,  spontaneous  speech  is  profoundly 
altered  in  word  deafness;  the  patient  having  lost  verbal  aiiditory  percep- 
tion no  longfT  UMflorstandH  his  own  spoccli  and  rontinualiy  uhch  one  word 
for  another  and  niisforms  words.  Oilier  aiilhorw,  as  Marie  and  liis  school, 
do  not,  however,  accept  this  as  an  explanation  of  the  confusion  observed. 


III.  AN  OBSERVATION  OF  AN  IMBECILE.    SCIENTIFIC 
DETERMINATION  OF  HER  LEVEL 

As  this  article  is  only  a  short  demonstration  we  shall  limit  our- 
selves to  observing  one  subject  in  particular;  this  subject  which 
we  take  from  among  many  others  is  an  imbecile  of  the  lowest 
grade.  According  to  the  definition  which  we  have  proposed,  we 
must  place  in  the  category  of  idiots  all  defectives  who  are  incap- 
able of  communicating  with  their  fellows  by  speech.  Our  patient 
is  not  properly  speaking  an  idiot;  she  is  located  upon  the  threshold 
between  idiocy  and  imbecility  because  she  is  able  to  make  herself 
understood  by  speech  although  to  a  very  limited  degree.  By 
choosing  this  patient  we  are  permitted  to  study  the  psychogenesis 
of  language,  the  formation  of  the  first  word,  the  psychological 
conditions  which  are  essential  for  the  beginning  of  speech,  and  this 
is  precisely  the  end  that  we  have  in  view. 

Our  patient  Denise  is  a  woman  of  twenty-five  years,  who  belongs 
to  a  family  of  petits  ouvriers.  We  suppress  all  purely  medical 
details  which  would  have  no  interest  for  our  psychological  analysis. 
Listen  first  to  what  the  mother  of  Denise  tells  us  regarding  her 
poor  child.  There  was  no  possibility  of  having  illusions  upon 
the  mental  state  of  the  young  girl.  She  was  subjected  to  a 
medico-pedagogical  treatment  for  eight  years.  What  has  she 
learned?  Absolutely  nothing  her  mother  says;  and  of  late  she 
has  even  been  deteriorating.  (We  give  this  opinion  without 
taking  any  responsibility  to  ourselves.)  The  parents  kept  her 
for  a  long  time  at  home.  They  considered  her  a  child  without 
intelligence  but  harmless.  During  her  first  years  she  took  the 
breast  normally  and  presented  nothing  exceptional.  But  she  did 
not  play  or  jump  the  rope  as  ordinary  children  do,  although  it 
amused  her  very  much  to  watch  the  others  play.  The  mother 
says  with  an  excessive  optimism  that  she  understands  every- 
thing; in  reality  she  continually  needs  the  help  of  those  about  her 
to  perform  the  simplest  acts.  Awkward  to  the  point  of  being 
unable  to  make  a  bow,  she  can  nearly  dress  herself  but  must  be 
watched  to  see  that  she  does  not  put  her  clothes  on  wrong  side 

164 


OBSERVATION    OF    AN    IMBECILE  165 

out.  She  does  not  know  how  to  comb  her  hair  or  wash  her  face; 
to  do  up  her  hair  she  turns  it  to  one  side  and  puts  pins  in  it; 
she  washes  her  hands  mechanically  without  noticing  the  result. 
She  eats  alone  decently  enough,  and  can  help  herself  to  drink; 
her  meat  and  bread  must  be  cut;  she  is  rather  difficult  to  please 
in  regard  to  her  food,  and  would  like  to  drink  wine  or  cognac. 
It  is  only  recently  that  she  learned  to  open  a  door.  She  even 
learned  to  thread  a  No.  8  needle.  She  cannot  be  taught  to  do 
anything  useful;  in  sewing  she  remains  hours  making  the  same 
stitch  and  the  stitch  once  made  she  pulls  it  out.  Or  else  she  busies 
herself  cutting  rags  or  paper.  If  she  sweeps  she  stops  because 
she  is  withouL-sequenee  in  her  ideas  and  leaves  the  dirt  in  the 
middle  of  the  room.  She  cannot  be  made  useful  in  preparing 
vegetables.  She  shells  peas  by  biting  them.  She  cannot,  un- 
aided, do  any  useful  work;  someone  must  always  be  near  to  watch 
her.  One  cannot  even  tell  her  to  gather  the  flowers;  she  will 
pluck  anji:hing.  At  such  a  level  the  imbecile  is  therefore  practi- 
cally useless. 

Her  disposition  is  sweet  although  a  little  restless;  she  is  not 
contented  anywhere;  if  she  is  in  the  house  she  always  wishes  to 
go  outside.  What  pleases  her  most  is  music,  singing,  and  espe- 
cially moving  pictures.  We  are  assured  that  she  has  a  true  voice 
in  singing.  She  is  affectionate,  she  loves  everyone,  but  is  spiteful, 
remembers  an  affront  and  does  not  wish  to  see  the  person  again 
who  offered  it.  She  is  timid,  is  afraid  of  fire  and  carriages. 
She  is  at  times  subject  to  violent  fits  of  temper  during  which  she 
beats  her  head  with  her  fist  or  strikes  it  against  the  wall.  She 
has  even  a  little  jealousy.  Against  whom?  Against  her  mother's 
cat!    This  last  trait  completes  the  portrait  of  the  poor  innocent. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  for  what  reason  she  was  placed  in  the 
asylum.  The  parents  noticed  that  of  late  she  had  had  convul- 
sions with  blood  in  her  mouth,  jerking  of  the  liml)s  and  eyes  turned 
back.  Following  these  attacks  she  slept  and  snored  loudly.  At 
other  times  she  simply  lost  consciousness  after  which  she  asked 
to  urinate;  in  coming  to  herself  her  eyes  were  fixed  and  saliva  was 
on  her  lips;  a  bonbon  was  put  into  her  mouth.  Tlu;  j)arents 
were  alarmed  at  these  attacks  which  certainly  h.iil  the  charac- 
teristics of  coma;  thoy  reproached  themselves,  the  poor  souls,  for 
having  kept  their  rhild  at  home.  "You  see,"  the  mother  said 
to  the  father,  "it's  all  your  fault;  she  ought  to  have  been  cared 


166  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

for  at  the  hospital."  As  a  result  of  all  these  fears  they  decided 
to  place  their  child  in  the  asylum.  Let  us  add  that  these  attacks 
are  very  infrequent  with  her.  During  the  several  months  that 
we  have  been  studying  her  they  have  only  manifested  them- 
selves once. 

Let  us  examine  the  patient.  Short  in  stature  (4  ft.  8  in.) 
somewhat  stoat,  heavy,  the  waist  thick;  there  is  nothing  abnormal 
about  her  physical  appearance.  The  head  is  well  formed  but  small 
like  that  of  a  child  of  ten  years.  The  features  are  regular  and 
well  cut;  there  are  no  wrinkles;  the  face  is  fat,  the  cheeks  pendant ; 
there  is  in  the  whole  body  a  general  tendency  to  overweight. 
The  subject  is  twenty-five  but  appears  thirty.  The  countenance 
is  wide  awake  and  mobile;  small  black  eyes,  brilliant  and  lively, 
expression  almost  mischievous.  The  moment  she  enters  our  office 
we  hold  out  our  hand;  she  shakes  it  and  begins  to  laugh  showing 
her  white  teeth.  It  is  not  simply  a  laugh  but  a  foolish  uncon- 
trolled laugh.  We  studied  her  during  many  sittings,  because  she 
was  at  our  disposition  whenever  we  wished,  without  interruption. 
At  the  least  noise,  the  slightest  gesture,  at  anything  or  nothing 
she  bursts  into  loud  laughter.  She  is  a  real  child.  During  our 
many  interviews,  at  every  outside  noise  such  as  the  ringing  of  a 
bell,  the  opening  of  a  door,  etc.,  she  suddenly  placed  both  hands 
on  her  abdomen.     This  was  a  play  rather  than  a  tic. 

This  is  not  the  only  proof  of  her  childishness ;  she  is  affected  with 
echolalia  and  mimicry  accompanied  by  all  kinds  of  comical  actions. 
If  one  coughs  she  coughs;  if  one  blows  his  nose,  she  blows  hers;  if 
one  laughs,  she  laughs.  She  repeats  the  last  word  of  a  sentence 
which  is  said  or  else  says  yes  in  acquiescence,  even  when  one  is 
paying  no  attention  to  her.  At  the  same  time  she  imitates  what- 
ever one  does.  If  one  writes,  she  takes  on  a  mischievous  air  and 
pretends  to  write  with  her  finger  on  the  table;  if  one  scratches 
himself  she  scratches  herself;  if  one  crosses  his  arms  she  does  the 
same;  if  one  twirls  his  moustache  she  imitates  the  action.  The 
imitation  by  gesture  or  voice  is  done  quickly,  accompanied  with  a 
laugh  and  mocking  air  but  the  imitation  does  not  continue  long. 
Very  quickly  her  attention  fails;  Denise  thinks  of  other  things, 
looks  about  her,  then  after  a  time  comes  back  to  us  and  if  we 
continue  to  write  she  resumes  her  imitative  gestures.  When  she 
is  not  thinking  of  us  her  face  suddenly  becomes  serious  and 
nothing  is  more  comical  than  the  rapidity  with  which  this  poor 


OBSERVATION    OF   AN   IMBECILE  167 

creature  passes  from  seriousness  to  laughter.  This  tendensy,  to 
laughtcryto  ooholalia -and  mimicry  manifests  itself  most  strikingly 
when  she  is  in  a  familiar  environment.  It  is  all  done  with  the 
mischievous  air  of  a  school  boy  who  makes  fun  of  his  master. 

Before  a  witness  whom  she  does  not  know  Denise  is  intimidated, 
remains  shy,  and  shows  no  evidence  of  echolalia  or  mimicry.  It 
is  therefore  something  different  from  reflex  echolalia,  since  it  is 
under  the  influence  of  psychic  causes  and  is  exercised  only  under 
certain  easily  determined  conditions.  Neither  is  it  a  voluntary 
echolalia,  the  art  of  imitation  as  practised  by  a  comedian  who 
gives  himself  to  this  effort  as  others  give  themselves  to  any 
sort  of  work.  It  is  an  intermediate  form  which  is  at  the  same 
time  partly  reflex  and  partly  voluntary  and  which  very  clearly 
expresses  the  childish  character  of  Denise. 

Furthermore  all  her  gestures  reveal  her  mental  level.  Sitting 
by  our  side  she  picks  her  nose  or  scratches  her  head  without 
suflacient  reserve;  from  time  to  time  she  yawns  noisily  or  sighs; 
at  times  she  says  "Mama"  in  a  plaintive  tone  or  carries  her 
hand  to  her  face;  she  has  at  such  times  a  flushing  of  the  face  and 
she  breathes  heavily  like  someone  who  is  very  warm.  Let  us 
also  add  that  she  is  very  gentle,  not  at  all  stubborn  and  one  can 
do  with  her  whatever  he  will.  This  group  of  facts  constitutes  an 
attitudeJJiatis-very  pecuUar,  childish,  gay,  mocking  and  altogether 
feeble-minded. 

The  facts  here  recorded  show  us  that  Denise  has  the  charactf.r 
oLa-^hild ;  but  she  is  not  only  backward  as  to  chai'acter  but  also 
backward  in  intelligence;  one  can  very  well  suspect  this  from  all 
that  we  have  said  of  her.  Thus  socially  she  is  useless  since  she 
has  neither  enough  application  nor  enough  discernment  to  i)er- 
form  the  most  humble  task.  One  could  not  even  employ  her  to 
sweep  because  even  for  that  she  would  need  watching.  liut  all 
these  little  facts  give  only  one  impression.  One  must  go  farther 
and  fix  the  position  of  this  imbecile  in  the  scale  of  intelligence. 

Without  wishing  to  treat  fundamentally  a  question  which  here 
presents  itself  only  incidentally,  let  us  recall  the  grades  bet  w(vn 
which  one  might  hesitate  in  cla.ssifying  our  imbecile;  those  grades 
arc  first,  idiocy  of  the  highest  degree;  second,  imbecility  of  the 
lowest  degree;  third,  imbecihty  of  the  intermediate  degree. 

The  table  which  we  here  give  indicates  briefly  the  incntal 
capacities  of  these  three  degrees. 


168 


THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 


High  Grade  Idiot. 


Lowest  Grade  Imbecile. 


Middle  Grade  Imbecile. 


High  Grade  Imbecile. 


Capable  of  understanding  a  gesture  and  of 
executing  simple  orders  given  by  gesture, 
like  coming,  seating  themselves,  getting 
up;  capable  of  imitating  a  gesture  or  an 
attitude  when  ordered,  for  instance,  clap- 
ping the  hands,  dancing,  crj'-ing,  etc. 

Capable  of  understanding  and  executing  sim- 
ple orders  given  verbally  without  gesture, 
for  instance,  "Get  up!  Where  is  your  eye? 
Go  bring  me  the  bouquet  which  is  on  the 
table!  Where  is  the  ink-well?  Show  me 
a  pencil!  Where  is  the  little  girl  in  this 
picture?" 

Capable  of  naming  common  objects  when 
pointed  out,  of  comparing  two  lines  or  two 
weights;  and  of  copying  a  square. 

Capable  of  repeating  three  figures;  of  per- 
forming the  three  errands;  of  naming  ex- 
actly certain  pieces  of  money;  naming  the 
colors;  counting  10  pins;  knowing  the 
names  of  the  days  of  the  week  and  the 
months  of  the  year,  and  the  number  of 
fingers. 

Denise  can  pass  all  the  tests  of  the  high  grade  idiot;  they  are 
of  course  very  easy  and  with  the  exception  of  the  last  do  not  sur- 
pass the  intelligence  of  a  dog.^ 

She  passes  the  tests  of  low  grade  imbecility  very  well.  Upon 
verbal  command  she  rises,  seats  herself,  dances,  cries  out.  She 
points  out  objects  named  to  her.  She  also  designates  in  a  pic- 
ture the  object  she  is  asked  to  find,  a  child,  a  window,  a  little  cat, 
etc.  by  immediately  putting  her  finger  on  it  saying,  "Aya!"  with 
a  childish  expression  of  satisfaction.  Moreover  she  is  so  sug- 
gestible that  if  one  tells  her  to  find  an  object  which  does  not  exist 
in  the  picture  she  points  to  anyl-hing.  One  might  even  believe 
that  she  always  went  at  random,  but  an  attentive  study  of  her 
gestures  shows  that  she  understands  very  well  what  is  named  to 
her. 

*  We  must  use  a  certain  reserve  in  comparisons  which  one  is  tempted 
to  draw  between  a  himaan  being  and  an  animal  in  respect  to  their  intelli- 
gence. The  difference  of  the  organs,  larynx  and  anterior  members,  pre- 
vent an  animal  from  performing  acts  of  speech  and  of  imitation  without 
the  level  of  his  intelligence  being  necessarily  the  cause. 


OBSERVATION    OF   AN    IMBECILE  169 

Denise  fails  in  the  tests  for  middle  grade  imbecility.  She  can 
scarcely  name  one  of  the  objects  presented  to  her.  To  the  ques- 
tion, "What  is  this?"  she  replies,  "Yes"  and  bursts  into  laughter. 
She  cannot  copy  a  square,  or  compare  two  lines  or  two  weights. 
When  one  gives  her  the  two  weights  to  compare  and  asks  her  which 
is  the  heavier  she  puts  a  finger  upon  each  and  replies,  "That," 
with  great  satisfaction.  She  designates  a  line  at  random  with 
complete  inattention  and  from  time  to  time  she  gives  a  great  sigh 
as  though  complaining  of  the  over  strain  demanded  of  her  intelli- 
gence. She  is  therefore  an  imbecile  of  the  lowest  grade;  her 
intellectual  inferiority  manifests  itself  in  the  tests  that  do  not 
require  speech,  an  important  point. 

Another  example  of  her  intellectual  inferiority,  she  cannot 
execute  three  orders  at  a  time.  She  does  one ;  if  we  ask  her  to 
get  a  flower  which  is  on  the  table  near  at  hand  she  quickly  exe- 
cutes this  simple  order ;  but  if  we  add  two  other  orders,  for  instance, 
to  strike  three  times  on  the  door  and  change  the  position  of  a 
chair,  she  cannot  execute  successively  these  three  orders;  she  can 
recall  but  one  of  them,  most  often  the  last,  and  after  having  exe- 
cuted that  she  returns  completely  satisfied  and  takes  her  seat. 

All  this  permits  us  to  conclude  that  Denise  is  a  low  grade 
imbecile.  It  can  be  seen  that  this  conclusion  is  not  simply  a 
formula,  it  implies  and  sums  up  a  series  of  numerous  tests  and 
of  verifications. 


IV.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  STATE  OF  LANGUAGE  OF  THIS 

IMBECILE 

The  intellectual  level  of  Denise  is  so  low  as  to  have  some  influ- 
ence upon  the  development  of  her  language.  When  one  en- 
counters a  subject  so  lacking  in  intelligence,  one  expects  that  he 
will  speak  very  imperfectly.  We  shall  study  successively  in  Denise 
the  three  following  points: 

1.  The  vocabulary  in  spontaneous  speech. 

2.  Articulation. 

3.  Comprehension  of  spoken  words. 

1.  Vocabulary.  To  say  that  Denise  does  not  speak  would  be 
an  exaggeration;  it  is  not  complete  mutism;  she  pronounces  merely 
a  few  short,  simple  words  which  are  almost  all  substantives,  such 
as  yes,  no,  papa,  mama,  pipi,  aya,  (for  voild)  good-day,  and  good- 
bye. The  mother,  indulgent  and  blind  like  all  mothers,  assures 
us  that  the  vocabulary  of  Denise  is  composed  of  some  forty  words 
although  she  admits  that  she  could  never  recognize  nor  pronounce 
the  names  of  her  brother  or  her  sister.  This  evaluation  of  forty 
words  seems  to  us  exaggerated.  There  is  still  another  word  which 
Denise  loves  and  which  she  often  pronounces,  it  is  zut.  Several 
of  these  words  really  serve  her  the  purpose  of  language;  we  mean 
by  that  she  never  uses  them  at  random  to  amuse  herself  by  the 
sound  or  as  an  exercise  of  the  larynx,  as  children  often  do,  or  by 
false  application  to  objects.  Every  time  she  uses  them  she  gives 
them  their  exact  meaning.  Thus  it  has  often  happened  that 
feeling  a  need  she  turned  to  us,  no  longer  laughing,  took  on  a 
most  serious  air  and  said,  "Pipi."  At  another  time  seeing  her 
completely  occupied  during  our  questioning  in  turning  and  look- 
ing at  a  cheap  ring  which  she  had  on  her  finger  we  asked  her, 
"Who  gave  you  that  ring?"  She  replied  immediately  and  with- 
out the  slightest  hesitation,  "Mama."  This  is  indeed  language. 
It  has  been  seen  that  it  is  reduced  to  a  very  small  number  of 
common  and  proper  nouns.  Let  us  add  that  she  rarely  uses  even 
the  words  that,  she  knows,  so  that  she  seems  mute.  She  might 
therefore  be  compared  to  a  child  of  one  or  two  years  who  has 

170 


LANGUAGE   OF   AN    IMBECILE  171 

conamenced-feo-speak  but  whose  vocabulary  is  still  very  restricted. 
But  there  is  a  difference.  The  normal  child  is  constantly  making 
an  effort  to  increase  his  little  vocabulary;  while  still  very  young 
he  subjects  his  larynx  to  exercises  to  produce  suppleness  and 
emits  all  sorts  of  varied  sounds.  This  babble  is  foreign  to  Denise. 
She  does  not  try  to  increase  her  verbal  acquisition,  an  important 
difference  such  as  is  always  found  when  one  attempts  to  compare 
the  defective  with  a  normal  child. 

In  order  not  to  forget  it  one  might  express  this  difference  in 
the  following  terms.  In.  the  psychology  of  an  individual  there 
are  two  orders  of  phenomena,  those  which  are  acquired,  repre- 
senting the  results  of  a  former  development,  and  those  which 
require  the  realization  of  an  effort,  an  expenditure  which  must 
be  made  at  the  very  moment;  we  refer  the  first  phenomena  to  the 
psychology  of  conservation  because  they  represent  a  structure 
already  formed ;  the  second  group  of  phenomena  should  be  referred 
rather  to  the  psj-chology  of  acquisition.  Thus  to  name  an  object 
whose  name  is  already  known  is  the  psychology  of  conservation; 
to  learn  and  retain  the  name  of  a  known  object  belongs  to  the 
psychology  of  acquisition.  One  can  already  see  that  these  two 
psychological  processes  are  subject  to  different  laws;  amon^^de- 
ments  the  conservation  is  always  superior  to  the  acquisition;  the 
dement  knows  things  which  at  that  actual  hour  he  would  be 
unable  to  learn  if  he  did  not  already  know  them;  he  constantly 
shows  a  contrast  between  his  previous  acquisitions  and  his  actual 
capacities.  We  recall  a  general  paralytic  very  much  reduced  who 
allowed  himself  to  fall  several  times  from  the  chair  where  he  sat, 
by  inadvertently  leaning  too  much  to  one  side  while  ravelling 
off  the  edge  of  a  bandage  which  he  had  about  his  hand.  Yet  this 
same  paralytic  was  still  capable  of  reading.  Among  defectives 
the  psychology  of  acquisition  and  the  psychology  of  conservation 
are  equal;  the  defectives  have  neither  gone  back  nor  progressed; 
they  are  today  what  they  were  j'cstcrday;  and  they  can  acquire 
knowledge  on  a  par  with  that  which  they  already  possess.  Lastly, 
among  normal  children  the  formula  changes  once  more.  The 
function  is  superior  to  the  organ;  the  power  of  acquisition  sur- 
passes that  of  conservation  because  children  progress  unceasingly, 
they  become  constantly  better,  they  are  superior  today  to  what 
thc}'  were  yesterday;  the  future  belongs  to  them. 

2.  Articulation.     Another  point  of  resemblance  between  Denise 


172 


THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


and  a  young  child  is  that  she  has  difficulties  of  speech  which  very 
much  resemble  the  natural  dyslalia  of  a  little  child.  Little  chil- 
dren pass  normally  through  a  period  of  imitation  when  they  do  their 
best  to  reproduce  the  sounds  they  have  heard  or  that  they  them- 
selves have  invented  in  pronouncing  at  random.  Their  efforts  at 
reproduction  are  complicated  by  awkwardness  or  errors;  often  a 
child  is  incapable  of  pronouncing  certain  consonants  for  months 
and  even  for  years;  he  either  suppresses  them  or  replaces  them 
by  others;  some  authors  call  this  difficulty  of  articulation  lisping 
while  others  prefer  to  designate  it  by  the  name  of  natural  dyslalia. 
It  is  essential  to  come  to  an  understanding  about  the  nature  of 
these  difficulties  of  speech.  They  must  not  be  confounded  with 
mechanical  dyslalia  which  results  from  a  malformation  of  the 
organs  of  articulation,  nor  with  the  dyslalia  accompanying  a 
nervous  temperament;  to  distinguish  these  latter  is  important 
and  the  error  which  one  would  commit  in  confounding  them 
would  be  as  great  as  if  one  confounded  the  awkwardness  of  a 
gesture  with  paralysis,  the  contraction  or  the  convulsion  of  a 
member. 

We  ask  Denise  to  repeat  the  short  words  or  letters  or  figures 
which  we  pronounce  before  her;  she  understands  what  we  wish 
and  lends  herself  as  best  she  can  to  the  attempt;  one  can  almost 
recognize  the  word  she  pronounces  but  it  is  much  distorted. 

Here  are  some  examples. 


WORDS    PRONOUNCED 

WORDS  REPEATED 

WORDS  PRONOUNCED 

WORDS  REPEATED 

BY  US 

BY  DENISE 

BY  US 

BY  DENISE 

pa 

ba 

gateau 

toto 

papa 

papa 

monsieur 

tesui  (?) 

bobo 

bopo 

madame 

dada 

pif 

pitui 

caca 

pipi 

ga 

ba 

beb6 

b6b6 

These  imitations  are  rendered  difficult  by  the  bursts  of  laughter 
and  also  by  that  very  particular  mental  state  which  we  call 
n'importequisme  (no-matter-what-ism)  which  consists  in  being 
satisfied  with  the  first  approximation  that  comes  to  mind.  We 
cannot  guarantee  that  the  words  which  we  attribute  to  Denise 
have  been  articulated  by  her  in  exactly  the  manner  that  we  have 
written  them;  the  pronunciation  is  so  defective  that  sometimes 


LANGUAGE    OF   AN    IMBECILE 


173 


one  does  not  know  exactly  what  one  hears, 
same  for  the  letters  of  the  alphabet: 


We  have  done  the 


WHAT  WE 
SAID 

WHAT  WAS 
REPEATED 

SAID 

repeated' 

SAID 

REPEATED' 

SAID 

REPEATED 

a 

a 

d 

d 

1 

6        1 

S 

6 

e 

e 

f 

e 

m 

e 

t 

d 

1 

1,  u,  Ul 

g 

de      j 

n 

e 

u 

vu 

o 

o? 

h 

a 

o 

veu 

V 

J6 

u 

u 

i 

rrr 

P 

d 

w 

d6dew6 

b 

ge 

J 

J 

q 

vu 

y 

iducce 

c 

ge 

k 

a.e 

r 

r         1 

z 

6d 

Conformable  to  what  we  have  observed  with  children  the  vowels 
are-better-pronounced  than  the  consonants.  Nearly  all  the  vowels 
are  well  pronounced  as  are  also  several  consonants,  especially  the 
d  and  the  g.  But  we  have  not  thought  it  worth  while  to  make  a 
careful  study  of  this  difficulty  of  speech  in  order  to  find  what 
part  belongs  to  the  organs  of  speech,  to  defective  audition,  or 
especially  to  the  mental  state  of  the  subject.  This  extremely 
difficult  study,  very  much  more  difficult  than  instructive,  would 
take  us  too  far  from  our  program.  The  essential  point  is  that 
tb»-dyolftlia  of  Doftke-TK-rroT  Ifie  direct  and  ofiry  cause  which 
■pie vents  her  from  speaking.  She  might  be  able  to  talk  even 
while  articulating  badly;  she  does  not  seem  to  realize  that  she 
misforms  the  sounds  which  she  is  asked  to  repeat  and  moreover, 
we  are  persuaded  that  she  has  not  the  mental  state  of  those 
stammerers  who  remain  silent  because  they  are  afraid  to  show 
their  difficulties  of  speech. 

M.  Marius  Dupont,  professor  at  the  National  Institute  for 
deaf-mutes  at  Paris,  communicated  to  us  recently  the  very 
curious  observation''  of  a  little  blind  child  of  five  years,  who  pro- 
nounces only  vowels;  when  he  wishes  to  say,  "Merci,  maman 
ch^rie,"  which  is  his  favorite  sentence,  he  pronounces  the  follow- 
ing .series  of  sounds:  e,  i,  a,  a,  e,  i,  which  his  nurse  understands 
very  well.  Here  is  indeed  a  typical  case  of  alalia.  It  seems  to 
us  important  to  remark  that  Denisc  has  by  no  moans  so  deep- 
seated  a  trouble  of  pronunciation  and,  consequently,  if  she  limits 
her  language  to  pronouncing  only  eight  or  ten  words  the  cause  of 


*  This  observation  appeared  in  the  liuUelin  de  la   Soci6(4  de  Vcnjanl, 
1907. 


174  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

her  lack  of  development  of  speech  must  belong  to  another  order 
than  that  of  difficulty  of  articulation. 

Verbal  'perception.  As  an  interesting  contrast  this  subject  under- 
stands speech.  She  is  almost  a  mute  but  she  does  not  have  word 
deafness  and  her  comprehension  of  speech  is  sufficient  to  lend 
itself  to  different  complicated  tests.  Here  in  fact  are  orders 
given  her  which  she  executed  without  the  accompaniment  of  any 
gesture  which  would  enlighten  her  upon  the  sense  of  the  words: 

Clap  your  hands!    She  claps  her  hands. 

Dance!    She  makes  contortions  with  her  arms. 

Run!    She  runs  a  little  in  the  room. 

Sing!  She  does  not  sing,  probably  does  not  dare  before  us,  but  after 
hesitation  yawns  noisily.  We  suppose  that  for  her  this  amounts  to  the 
same  thing. 

Go  and  open  the  door!    She  goes  to  the  door  and  taps  it  with  her  hand. 

Go  and  get  me  a  book  from  the  table!    She  executes  the  order. 

Read!    She  makes  the  gesture  of  holding  a  book  under  her  eyes. 

Where  is  your  eye,  your  nose,  your  ear,  your  hand?  Designates  exactly 
each  time. 

Where  is  my  watch?    Indicates  my  watch  which  is  on  the  table. 

Where  is  the  floor?    Raises  her  arm  and  indicates  the  ceiling. 

The  key  of  the  lock?    Says  "There"  and  points  to  the  hole  in  the  lock. 

The  pins?    Points  to  the  pins  that  are  on  the  table. 

The  basin?    Points  to  a  basin  that  is  on  a  nearby  table. 

The  placard?    Points  at  random  to  the  wall. 

The  table  cover?    Points  to  the  cloth  on  the  table. 

The  penholder?  First  points  in  the  air  then  designates  the  cloth  on  the 
table. 

The  eye  glass?    Points  in  the  air  and  raises  herself  comically  on  her  feet. 

The  gas  jet?    Points  to  the  gas  jet  in  the  room. 

Where  is  your  left  hand?    Points  to  her  abdomen. 

All  these  indicative  gestures  are  executed  with  greatest  earnest- 
ness, her  joy  is  excessive,  her  laugh  bursts  out  amid  the  most 
comical  movements.  Denise  often  pronounces  the  word  "aya!" 
in  pointing  to  an  object,  which  doubtless  signifies  voild  (here). 

Other  quite  complicated  sentences  show  the  extent  of  her  power 
of  comprehension. 

Q.  Come  here. 

A.   (She  comes  with  her  chair). 

Q.  Do  you  see  the  music  box  which  is  on  the  table? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  You  will  be  good  enough  to  take  it  to  the  table  at  the  side. 

A.  lA (She  does  the  action). 

Q.  Will  you  go  and  get  it  and  put  it  in  the  pocket  of  M.  S.  ? 


LANGUAGE    OF    AX    IMBECILE  175 

(She  brings  it  from  the  table.) 

Q.  Will  you  be  so  obliging  as  to  sit  down? 

She  obeys. 

Q.  Will  you  put  that  object  in  the  pocket  of  M.  S. ? 

She  places  it  on  the  table. 

Q.  Will  you  give  us  a  little  air  by  opening  the  door  behind  me? 

She  takes  the  music  box. 

Q.  The  order  is  repeated. 

She  goes  towards  the  door. 

Several  repetitions  of  the  order.     She  wanders  about  the  room. 

Q.  Will  3'ou  take  a  pin  and  put  it  on  a  chair? 

She  wanders  about  the  room. 

Repetition  of  the  order. 

A.  Pipi. 

Q.  Pull  your  ear. 

She  does  it. 

Q.  Give  yourself  a  box  on  the  cheek. 

Her  two  fists  held  tight  she  strikes  her  extended  cheeks. 

Q.  Pinch  your  nose. 

A.  There!     (She  puts  her  index  finger  on  her  nose.) 

Q.  Scratch  your  hand. 

She  claps  her  hands  together. 

Q.  Throw  your  handkerchief  in  the  air. 

She  obeys. 

To  other  questions  she  can  answer  yes  or  no  always  nodding 
her  head;  her  replies  are  often  given  with  a  discernment  which 
proves  she  has  understood.  Thus  she  will  say,  "yes,"  if  one  asks, 
"Are  you  a  good  girl?"  "Do  you  wish  a  bonbon?"  On  the 
contrary  she  will  not  fail  to  reply,  "No,"  if  asked  "Do  you  wish 
to  go  to  bed?" 

All  these  examples  show  that  her  verbal  comprehension  is  real 
although  limited  and  changeable.  We  have  been  able  to  give  a 
quite  complicated  sentence,  "Throw  your  handkerchief  in  the  air," 
which  was  understood.  Others  were  not.  Like  a  child  Denise 
catches  one  word  and  guesses  at  the  rest;  but  at  times  she  catches 
nothing,  so  that  one  cannot  foresee  even  when  one  knows  her  well 
whether  or  not  she  will  understand  a  given  sentence  because  her 
comprehension  is  very  uncertain. 

Animal  sensitivity  to  verbal  perception.  It  seems  to  us  that  in 
a  certain  measure  Denise  understands  like  an  animal  and,  more- 
over, that  the  acuteness  of  her  verl)al  perception  is  very  great, 
much  greater  than  one  would  have  supposed.  In  the  first  jihice 
she  is  extremely  sensitive  to  the  intonation  of  tke.  sentences  pro- 
nounced.    When  asking  her  if  she  is  good  we  can  by  the  inflec- 


176  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 

tion  of  our  tones  obtain  from  her  at  will  either  the  answer  yes  or 
the  answer  no.  We  do  not  know  exactly  in  what  the  difference 
consists  of  the  two  intonations  which  we  employ  with  this  definite 
end  in  view;  we  can  only  say  that  one  of  them  which  terminates 
in  a  high  note  tends  to  suggest  an  affirmation,  while  the  other, 
which  ends  in  a  lower  note  and  which  is  like  a  disapprobation, 
tends  to  suggest  a  negation.  Is  it  not  singular  that  this  defective 
grasps  so  slight  a  shade  of  meaning  when  she  has  so  little  intelli- 
gence that  she  cannot  even  shell  peas  but  tears  them  open  with 
her  teeth?  It  is  because  we  have  here  to  deal  with  that  part  of 
the  comprehension  of  language  which  is  not  only  human  but  ani- 
mal. Bear  in  mind  that  a  dog  is  also  very  sensitive  to  the  varied 
intonations  of  the  voice  of  his  master;  he  knows  very  well  if  he  is 
flattered,  if  one  is  satisfied  with  him,  if  one  is  sad,  if  one  repri- 
mands him,  if  one  is  angry,  and  since  he  does  not  understand 
grammatical  construction,  it  is  clearly  the  intonation  which  guides 
him.  Lubbock  has  shown  that  because  the  dog  is  an  excellent 
observer  it  is  possible  to  present  him  before  the  public  as  being 
able  to  read  and  to  execute  orders  written  in  advance  upon  a 
placard.  Very  curious  experiments  have  been  made  recently  in 
Germany  upon  a  learned  horse  that  was  exhibited  in  public;  this 
horse  divined  from  the  slightest  movement  of  the  head  and  eyes 
of  his  master  what  he  was  to  do,  how  many  blows  of  his  hoof  he 
was  to  give,  or  rather,  knocking  with  his  hoof  a  series  of  blows,  he 
knew  when  he  must  stop,  etc.  Curious  the  master  did  not  know 
how  his  own  thought  could  be  divined  by  this  beast!  One  can 
easily  collect  among  animals  a  great  number  of  examples  of 
feats  of  intelligence  which  require  a  very  fine  perception  and  a 
great  talent  of  observation.  It  is  really  curious  that  this  fineness 
of  perception,  altogether  animal,  should  be  found  among  defectives. 
Let  us  hasten  to  add  that  the  normal  individual  possesses  it  also ; 
but  he  possesses  it  from  birth  like  the  animals;  it  is  a  gift  which 
he  has  not  developed. 

Denise  is  also  very  skillful  in  distinguishing  in  a  sentence  the 
affirmation  or  the  negation,  even  though  she  is  incapable  of  under- 
standing the  sentence.  Thus,  the  sentence,  "Isn't  it  true  that  there 
are  artillerymen  in  the  artillery f"  provokes  an  acquiescence;  while 
the  sentence,  "Isn't  it  true  that  there  are  no  artillerymen  in  the 
artillery"?  provokes  a  lively  negation  with  her  head.  Denise  has 
therefore  perceived  in  the  midst  of  all  these  incomprehensible 
words  the  difference  between  "there  are,"  and  "there  are  no." 


V.  DISCUSSION  OF  THREE  HYPOTHESES  UPON  THE 
ABSENCE  OF  SPEECH  IN  OUR  SUBJECT 

Let  us  now  analyze  the  symptoms  which  we  have  just  described 
and  attempt  to  interpret  them. 

It  is  evident  at  the  outset  that  Denise  presents  an  excellent 
case  of  dissociation  between  the  faculty  of  speech  and  the  faculty 
of  comprehending  speech,  and  this  dissociation  must  be  brought 
more  clearly  to  light  and  then  explained  if  this  is  possible. 

Denise  understands  very  well  the  words  of  certain  sentences, 
therefore  she  must  have  a  certain  memory  for  words;  she  must 
have  such  memory  in  order  to  recognize  the  words  pronounced, 
because,  if  she  did  not  recognize  them,  she  would  not  comprehend 
them ;  she  must  also  have  this  memory  in  order  to  execute  a  com- 
mand which  is  not  immediate  but  which  requires  a  little  time. 
She  is  told  to  go  and  get  a  bouquet  that  is  on  the  table;  while  she 
is  on  the  way  she  must  remember  for  a  certain  time  what  is  said 
to  her  otherwise  she  could  not  execute  the  command  and  would 
come  back  empty  handed. 

How  then  does  it  happen  that  being  capable  of  recalling  a  word 
she  should  be  incapable  of  pronouncing  it?  This  observation 
proves  above  every  thing  else  the  independence  of  these  two 
faculties.  Certain  authors  have  insisted  that  the  muscular  sense 
is  such  an  important  thing  that  even  to  understand  a  word  we 
partly  articulate  it.  Denise  takes  it  upon  herself  to  refute  this 
exaggerated  opinion;  this  may  be  true  of  certain  individuals  of 
an  accentuated  motor  type  but  it  has  no  general  value.  Denise 
in  fact  understands  a  sentence  of  five  or  six  words  but  is  incap- 
able of  repeating  a  single  one  of  those  words.  But  this  indepen- 
dence of  the  two  functions  once  verified,  it  remains  to  be  explained 
how  it  happens  that  this  subject  has  not  obeyed  the  very  natural 
phenomenon  of  psycho-motor  induction,  and  that,  having  posses- 
sion of  these  words  through  memory,  she  has  not  become  apt  in 
pronouncing  them.     Where  is  the  obstacle? 

Let  us  first  note  what  happens  with  children  and  with  animals. 

At  eight  or  ten  months  a  normal  child  already  understands 

177 


178  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

many  words.  He  docs  not  commence  to  speak  until  much  later, 
at  fifteen  or  eighteen  months.  With  the  adult  also  the  faculty  of 
comprehension  surpasses  constantly  that  of  execution.  How 
many  unknown  words  there  are  whose  sense  one  can  divine,  sen- 
tences complex  and  delicately  shaded  that  one  understands,  and 
that  one  could  not  invent  or  even  repeat !  Let  us  take  an  extreme 
example:  the  dog  recognizes  his  name  and  a  dozen  other  words, 
as  cheese,  soup,  go  out,  get  away,  etc. ;  and  yet  he  could  certainly 
never  bark  out  a  single  word.  All  these  facts  lead  to  the  con- 
clusion that  it  is  normal  for  one  to  understand  language  long 
before  one  can  speak. 

Is  it  the  same  with  our  patient?  This  can  be  disputed.  Three 
fundamental  explanations  can  be  suggested ;  they  are  fundamental 
as  it  seems  to  us  because  any  others  that  could  be  imagined  are 
but  the  variations  of  these  three. 

The  first  consists  in  assuming  an  acquired  aphasia.  Then  one 
would  have  to  admit  that  Denise  had  been  striken  with  a  circum- 
scribed lesion  in  the  nervous  centers  of  articulated  language ;  one 
would  have  to  admit,  for  example,  if  one  is  a  localizer  of  the  old 
school,  that  Denise  is  reduced  to  the  pronunciation  of  so  few 
words  because  she  has  been  the  victim  of  an  accident,  a  softening 
for  instance,  in  the  third  left  frontal  convolution.  In  the  hospi- 
tals for  deaf-mutes,  children  have  been  observed  who  present 
the  unusual  association  of  the  two  following  sjnnptoms;  they  hear 
but  they  do  not  speak;  according  to  the  usual  expression  under 
such  circumstances  they  are  hearing-mutes.  It  has  been  admitted 
that  they  suffer  from  a  cerebral  lesion  which  has  produced  in 
their  cases  a  motor  aphasia  of  articulation.  Has  our  imbecile 
Denise  also  aphasia  produced  by  a  cerebral  lesion?  We  do  not 
think  so.  Upon  this  point,  be  it  well  understood,  we  can  only 
conjecture;  only  we  remark  that  by  her  clinical  aspect  she  does  not 
at  all  resemble  an  aphasic  patient.  When  an  adult  who  has  once 
spoken  is  deprived  of  articulate  language  by  a  circumscribed 
cerebral  lesion,  one  always  observes  in  him  an  evident  contrast 
between  his  desire,  his  need  of  speech  on  the  one  hand,  and  his 
absence  of  speech  on  the  other.  With  Denise  nothing  of  this 
kind  is  observed;  she  makes  no  effort  to  speak.  Besides,  and  this 
second  argument  is  still  more  decisive  than  the  first,  she  has 
never  spoken  better  than  she  now  speaks;  she  has  not  therefore 
been  deprived  of  a  function  that  she  had  exercised  previously. 


ABSENCE    OF   SPEECH — DISCUSSION  179 

A  second  hypothesis,  very  distinct  from  the  preceding,  would 
consist  in  admitting  that  Denise  and  subjects  who  resemble  her 
are  stricken  with  congenital  motor  aphasia.  There  would  also  be 
among  idiots,  those  defectives  who  do  not  even  understand  articu- 
late language,  a  congenital  word  deafness.  These  expressions  have 
already  been  proposed  by  different  authors;  but  in  proposing  them, 
one  has  not  seemed  to  realize  their  bearing;  it  has  even  sometimes 
been  believed  that  the  expression  was  the  equivalent  of  saying 
simply  has  never  spoken,  has  never  understood  speech!  We  do  not 
in  the  least  agree  with  this  manner  of  look^jig  at  the  matter;  and 
to  show  the  error  it  is  sufl&cient  to  remark  that  it  would  be  an 
incongruity  equal  to  that  of  saying  of  a  normal  child  of  two  months, 
who  as  yet  understands  nothing  of  what  is  said  to  him,  this  child 
is  stricken  with  congenital  word  deafness;  obviously,  this  would 
be  absurd.  Congential  aphasia  impHes  a  lack  of  development  of 
the  organs  necessary  to  language,  an  atrophy  sufficiently  accentu- 
ated to  have  a  really  pathological  character  and  to  constitute  a 
contrast  between  the  arrested  development  of  the  centers  of  lan- 
guage and  the  much  greater  development  of  the  other  centers  of 
the  same  brain.  This  is  truly  the  only  reasonable  meaning  that 
one  can  give  to  these  expressions. 

But,  in  place  of  the  hypothesis  of  the  failure  of  language  through 
local  accidents  we  prefer  another  hypothesis  which  brings  in  the 
level  of  intelligence.  It  seems  to  us  that,  exactly  Uke  a  child 
of  ten  months,  Denise  does  not  speak  because  she  is  not 
intelligent  enough  to  speak.  This  last  explanation,  to  which  we 
give  our  preference,  is  not  of  an  essentially  psychological  nature, 
and  we  ask  that  it  be  not  opposed  to  the  preceding,  as  a  psycho- 
logical hypothesis  which  would  be  opposed  to  an  anatomical  or 
physiological  hypothesis.  It  is  for  convenience  of  language,  and 
in  order  to  be  more  quickly  understood,  that  we  say  that  the 
lack  of  language  of  our  patient  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  inferiority 
of  her  intellectual  level;  this  same  thought  could  easily  be  trans- 
lated into  anatomical  terms,  and  one  could  say  equally  well  that 
if  there  is  in  Denise  an  atrophy  of  the  centers  of  language,  this 
atrophy  is  neither  greater  nor  less  than  for  that  of  the  rest  of 
her  brain.  What  has  been  learned  up  to  this  time  from  autopsies 
made  upon  the  brains  of  imbeciles  points  in  this  direction.  We 
do  not  know  that  a  special  localized  reduction  of  volume  in  the 
cerebral  centers  that  control  language  has  been  observed  among 
imbeciles. 


180  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

What  are  the  reasons  which  make  us  admit  that  it  is  the  intel- 
lectual level  of  Denise  that  is  responsible  for  her  pseudo-aphasia? 
Let  us  recall  first  what  is  beyond  all  discussion.  Denise  is  a  low 
grade  imbecile. 

A  very  stnng  argument  in  favor  of  our  explanation  results 
from  the  comparison  of  Denise  with  other  imbeciles.  We  have 
often  said  we  muot  not  make  a  study  of  only  one  of  these  sub- 
jects, they  must  be  brought  together  and  a  synthesis  made  of 
all  the  observations*  Moreover  we  can  demonstrate  that  imbe- 
ciles in  general  speak'little;  and  middle-grade  imbeciles  especially 
speak  a  very  limited  language;  they  make  very  short  sentences 
with  rudimentary  syntax.  The  case  of  Denise,  when  closely  com- 
pared to  theirs,  becomes  clear;  it  no  longer  has  an  isolated  char- 
acter, as  would  be  the  case  if  Denise  had  been  the  victim  of  some 
cerebral  accident;  one  has  the  feeling  that  with  low  grade  imbe- 
ciles a  lack  of  the  development  of  language  reigns  supreme,  and 
that  Denise  has  carried  this  common  trait  to  its  maximum. 


VI.   THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CONDITION  OF  SPEECH; 
EXPERIMENTS  AND  THEORY 

A  skeptic  who  had  followed  our  discussion  might  say,  "You 
take  a  great  deal  of  pains  for  nothing.  By  a  great  reinforcement 
of  arguments,  you  have  demonstrated  that  if  youi-  patient  does 
not  speak,  or  speaks  very  little,  it  is  because  she  is  in  the  same 
mental  state  as  a  little  child  of  from  eight  to  twelve  months  who 
also  understands  many  words  but  does  not  yet  speak.  For  the 
general  study  of  imbecility  no  doubt  it  is  an  advantage  to  demon- 
strate that  the  lack  of  language  among  these  patients  depends 
upon  the  weakness  of  their  intelligence.  But  you  do  not  wish 
here  to  pose  as  a  clinician,  you  are  using  only  psychology;  you  are 
seeking  to  discover  the  psychological  conditions  of  the  formation 
of  language.  Therefore  why  should  you  take  an  imbecile  for 
study  when  all  your  effort  will  consist  in  concluding  that  these 
things  take  place  in  her  as  though  she  were  a  little  normal  child. 
Would  it  not  be  more  simple,  more  clear,  more  decisive  to  leave 
your  imbecile,  and  confine  yourself  to  the  study  of  the  normal 
child?" 

It  is  very  evident  that  we  have  made  these  objections  to  our 
own  method  because  we  know  how  to  reply  to  them. 

It  is  very  true  that  children  understand  the  language  of  those 
about  them  long  before  they  can  speak;  and  it  has  always  appeared 
logical  that  the  phase  of  comprehension  always  precedes  the  phase 
of  speech  although  the  two  phases  overlap  each  other.  This 
chronological  order  is  reasonable;  before  giving  one  must  receive; 
before  pronouncing  a  word  one  must  know  it.  But  one  has  never 
gone  farther  than  to  affirm  the  logic  of  this  chronology,  and  the 
very  pretty  prol;lem  which  is  there  posed  has  not  been  seen, 
because  one  thought  only  of  normal  children.  Here  is  the  prob- 
lem stated  in  explicit  terms.  A  child  of  twelve  months,  for  in- 
stance, understands  the  sense  of  some  sixty  words  which  he  hears 
almost  constantly.  Why  does  he  not  spontaneously  pronounce 
them  on  his  own  account  when  h(>  has  the  idea  to  do  it?  It  .seems 
to  us  that  this  prol)lem  is  fundamental,  because  it  puts  directly 

181 


182       THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

before  us  the  psychogenetic  conditions  of  speech;  but  those  who 
study  only  the  normal  child  never  dream  of  putting  it ;  they  simply 
say,  "Give  the  normal  child  time  to  familiarize  himself  with  the 
60  words  which  he  understands  but  cannot  yet  pronounce."  Or 
one  will  reply,  "If  he  does  not  yet  pronounce  the  words  it  is  because 
he  does  not  yet  feel  the  need,  that  he  has  not  the  idea,  etc." 

These  replies  only  evade  the  problem.  One  sees  this  very  well 
when  one  deals  with  an  imbecile  such  as  our  subject  Denise.  Here 
is  a  young  girl  of  twenty-five  years,  who  certainly  understands 
more  than  two  hundred  words  even  in  complicated  sentences  and 
who  employs  scarcely  one,  and  who  will  probably  remain  all  her 
life  at  the  stage  of  comprehension  without  being  able  to  arrive 
at  that  of  spontaneous  speech.  Evidently  one  can  not  in  a  similar 
case  reply  that  the  subject  has  not  yet  had  time  to  perfect  herself 
or  that  she  does  not  pronounce  these  words  because  she  has  not 
yet  felt  the  need.  Neither  can  one  be  content  with  remarking 
that  her  intelligence  is  the  cause,  and  that  the  poverty  of  her 
vocabulary  is  explained  by  a  falling  away  of  her  intelligence;  the 
intelligence  is  a  unit  and  the  explanation  lacks  precision.  Let  us 
strive  to  find,  therefore,  what  is  essential  to  spontaneous  speech 
and  let  us  see  whether  or  not  this  essential  mechanism  is  lacking 
in  our  patient. 

We  are  obliged  to  resort  somewhat  to  theory,  for  which  we 
apologize,  but  it  cannot  be  dispensed  with.  In  order  to  institute 
an  experiment  as  is  our  intention  one  must  have  a  little  guiding 
thread. 

It  is  a  question  of  pronouncing  a  word  oneself,  a  word  known  to 
everyone,  but  in  which  one  takes  the  initiative.  Let  us  say, 
in  order  to  fix  our  ideas,  that  it  is  the  question  of  a  word  desig- 
nating an  object  before  us,  a  chair  or  a  table;  let  us  say  that  our 
subject  is  not  alone  but  is  with  another  person  who  shows  him 
the  table,  and  who  asks,  "What  is  that?"  Let  us  further  say  that 
our  subject  understands  the  sense  of  the  request  made  of  him, 
and  let  us  pass  by  all  that  is  implied  in  that  comprehension,  and 
limit  ourselves  to  the  pronunciation  of  that  simple  reply  which 
should  be  given,  "a  table." 

For  the  subject  to  be  capable  of  pronouncing  this  simple  word 
properly  under  the  given  conditions  so  that  it  will  be  easily  under- 
stood, many  conditions  must  be  realized.  Let  us  enumerate  all 
those  which  we  can  imagine. 


PSYCHOLOGY    OF   SPEECH  183 

1.  It  is  necessary  to  know  and  to  understand  in  a  general  manner 
that  words  serve  to  designate  objects,  and  that  their  function  is 
to  name  objects.  This  knowledge,  expressed  in  abstract  form, 
appears  subtle;  but  it  is  only  subtle  in  our  manner  of  expressing 
it  and  of  taking  it  into  account.  In  reality,  it  is  accessible  to 
very  rudimentary  intelligence,  since  domestic  animals  understand 
the  language  of  gesture  and  even  of  words.  Recently  a  dog  has 
been  reported  who  obeyed  the  command,  "Go  and  bring  my 
slippers." 

2.  The  second  condition  is  more  precise;  it  is  necessary  to 
possess  an  association  of  a  certain  nature  uniting  definite  words 
to  definite  things.  It  is  necessary  that  the  word  chair  be  united 
in  memory  to  the  chair,  to  its  visual  aspect,  to  its  use,  in  such  a 
manner  that  when  one  pronounces  the  word  before  the  subject, 
this  person  has  the  idea  of  its  signification.  We  have  however 
seen  that  comprehension  always  precedes  spontaneous  speech. 

3.  Another  association  must  also  exist,  which  acts  in  an  inverse 
sense,  that  is  from  the  idea  to  the  word ;  it  is  necessary  that  when 
the  object  is  perceived,  or  conceived,  this  perception  or  this  idea 
should  be  able  to  awaken  the  memory  of  the  word  and  produce 
the  mental  evocation. 

4.  One  must  have  the  power  of  pronouncing  the  word,  that  is 
to  say  of  executing  the  phonetic  movements  necessary  for  its 
articulation. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  this  brief  analysis,  reduced  to  the  maxi- 
mum of  simplicity,  we  have  not  had  recourse  to  the  hypothesis 
of  motor  images  of  articulation.  Do  such  images  exist?  It  may 
be  doubted.  In  any  case  it  is  of  no  interest  here  to  raise  a  diffi- 
cult question  which  we  can  easily  afford  to  pass. 

Let  us  now  return  to  our  imbecile,  and  let  us  see  what  it  is 
that  prevents  her  from  speaking  spontaneously.  Is  it  the  evoca- 
tion of  the  word?     Is  it  the  pronunciation? 

Her  pronunciation  is  defective,  certainly,  and  there  is  here  per- 
haps a  slight  obstacle  to  the  development  of  her  language.  But 
we  can  eliminate  this  obstacle  in  certain  precise  experiments  and 
see  what  is  produced  in  consequence.  In  this  manner  we  could 
convince  ourselves  that  her  difficulty  in  articulation  in  nowise 
prevents  her  from  speaking.  Let  us  take  advantage  of  the  fact 
that  she  pronounces  correctly  and  easily  the  word,  "papa"  in 
echolalia,  that  is  to  say  when  it  is  pronounced  before  her.     There 


184  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

is  no  difficulty  of  articulation  with  this  word;  let  us  use  it  then 
for  oar  experiments. 

We  take  a  music  box  which  we  find  by  chance  upon  the  table 
of  our  office  where  we  are  with  our  imbecile;  we  show  the  object 
to  her  while  saying  and  repeating  over  and  over,  "You  see  what 
I  have  here?  You  see  this  object?  You  see  it?  See  what  it 
is!  Look  well  at  it!  I  am  going  to  tell  you  what  it  is.  You 
don't  know  what  it  is?  I  am  going  to  tell  you.  Well  it  is  papa. 
Do  you  hear?  It  is  papa!  Papa!  Papa!  It  is  papa!"  We  con- 
tinue thus  with  ardor  to  repeat  the  same  words,  all  the  time  mov- 
ing the  object,  looking  at  it,  pointing  to  it,  and  making  every 
effort  to  fix  the  attention  of  the  patient  upon  the  object. 

Denise,  who  is  amused  by  the  play,  repeats  after  us  "papa," 
and  we  even  make  her  touch  the  music  box,  while  repeating  after 
us  the  same  word.  We  thus  succeed  in  quite  rapidly  forming  an 
association  between  the  object  and  word.  If  in  fact  we  ask  her 
some  time  afterwards,  when  we  have  replaced  the  object  on  the 
table,  "Where  is  papa?  Give  me  papa,"  she  points  to  the  music 
box  on  the  table  without  hesitating,  although  there  are  a  dozen 
other  articles  upon  the  table,  and  although  we  do  not  facilitate 
the  designation  by  a  gesture  or  a  glance  towards  the  object.  But 
this  association  which  is  formed  is  unilateral.  If  we  take  the  music 
box  and  say,  "What  is  this?  What  is  this  called?"  She  never 
says  "papa,"  she  says  nothing,  she  stands  with  her  mouth  open. 

Let  us  first  examine  this  unilateral  association.  It  has  under- 
gone many  fluctuations.  Three  minutes  after  the  experiment  it 
seems  to  have  disappeared.  If  we  again  ask  her  where  is  papa, 
she  points  to  one  of  us.  In  response  to  a  sign  of  disapprobation, 
she  points  to  the  table  and  puts  her  finger  insistently  upon  the 
table;  all  the  time  that  we  repeat  the  question,  "Where  is  papa?" 
she  replies  "aya"  while  designating  either  the  table  or  the  cloth 
on  the  table;  she  even  identifies  the  table,  it  would  seem,  with 
the  memory  of  her  real  father,  and  leans  over  and  embraces  the 
table  with  comical  expressions  of  affection.  Our  lesson  is  there- 
fore forgotten.  We  begin  over  again  presenting  the  music  box, 
which  is  there  all  the  while,  and  we  affirm  over  again  that  it  is 
papa.  Denise  immediately  accepts  the  correction,  begins  again 
to  show  the  music  box  when  one  asks  for  papa,  and  even  embraces 
the  object  devotedly  as  she  did  the  table. 

From  this  moment  the  association  is  established.     Five  minutes 


PSYCHOLOGY    OF   SPEECH  185 

afterwards  when  one  asks  for  papa,  she  shows  the  music  box  with- 
out hesitation  and  embraces  it.  Even  better,  two  days  later  we 
see  Denise  again  in  the  same  surroundings;  and  immediately 
before  saying  another  word  we  ask,  "Where  is  papa?"  Without 
hesitation,  she  turns  to  the  table,  takes  the  music  box  and  gives 
it  to  us.  Note  carefully  that  every  time  we  make  the  demand 
we  are  very  careful  not  to  cast  a  glance  toward  the  object  which 
might  guide  the  patient.  There  is  therefore  established  in  her, 
thanks  to  the  experiment  which  we  have  made,  an  association  of 
ideas  which  goes  from  the  word  heard  to  the  object. 

But  never,  when  we  present  the  music  box,  has  she  said  "papa;" 
no  more  at  the  second  than  at  the  first  sitting.  She  contented 
herself  by  replying  to  the  question  many  times  repeated,  "What  is 
this?"  by  "yes,"  or  else  she  taps  the  object  laughing,  and  pro- 
nounces nothing.  Perhaps  one  might  have  secured  better  results 
after  many  weeks  of  training.  But  as  it  now  stands  our  experi- 
ment seems  to  us  to  be  complete;  it  demonstrates  that  to  pass 
from  the  object  to  the  name,  our  subject  experiences  a  very  much 
greater  difficulty  than  to  pass  from  the  name  to  the  object,  which 
is  the  important  fact  we  wished  to  demonstrate. 

Nevertheless  it  is  not  the  pronunciation  of  the  word  that  em- 
barrasses her;  she  has  no  difficulty  of  articulation,  because  she 
repeats  the  word  papa,  after  having  heard  it;  moreover  one  can 
obtain  its  repetition  from  her  in  all  sorts  of  intonations;  still  more, 
one  can  lead  her  to  repeat  it  when  it  is  pronounced  before  her  in 
a  whisper;  and  it  has  even  happened  that  when  we  pronounced 
before  her  the  word  "mama"  in  a  very  low  voice,  she  had  never- 
theless said  papa.  She  can  then  pronounce  the  word  from  repe- 
tition, or  more  rarely  from  suggestion  by  a  movement  of  the  lips; 
it  is  inductive  evocation  excited  by  audition  or  by  seeing  the  move- 
ment of  the  lips. 

What  is  lacking  in  her,  is  the  evocatiofi  of  the  word  by  presenta- 
tion of  the  object,  that  is  to  say,  through  lack  of  the  idea  of  sense. 

Here  then  is  the  conclusion  at  which  we  arrive;  it  is  a  conclu- 
sion which,  from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  note  this  well, 
docs  not  bring  into  play  any  special  memory,  nor  any  of  1he 
images  which  have  been  so  much  used  and  abused  in  the  different 
theories  of  aphasia  and  which  have  for  this  reason  taken  on  such 
an  artificial  characler.  From  our  })oint  of  view  there  arc  ihrce 
nece.ssary  stages  in  the  acquisilion  of  langii.'igo. 


186  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

1.  The  comprehension  of  words,  of  which  we  shall  say  very 
little  here,  and  which,  roughly  speaking,  consists  in  associating 
the  spoken  word  with  the  idea. 

2.  The  articulation  of  words  consisting  in  the  habits  acquired 
by  the  organs  of  articulation  under  the  supervision  of  the  ear  and 
the  auditory  memor}^ 

These  two  phases  succeed  each  other  but  the  second  is  not 
implied  in  the  first  nor  is  it  the  logical  development  of  it.  The 
word  that  one  hears  and  that  one  understands  is  not  the  same  that 
one  pronounces.  In  the  one  case  it  is  a  question  of  an  auditory 
sensation  or  of  an  auditory  memory,  and  in  the  second  case  it 
is  a  motor  act.  It  is  therefore  quite  possible  that  one  may  have 
heard  and  may  be  capable  of  representing  or  of  recognizing  what 
one  has  heard,  without  for  that  reason  being  clever  enough  to 
coordinate  the  movements  necessary  for  pronouncing.  Exactly 
as  it  is  possible  that  one  might  have  seen  an  artist  paint  a  pic- 
ture and  yet  be  incapable  of  painting.  There  is  therefore  a  whole 
apprenticeship  to  be  made,  and  we  see  or  rather  we  infer  that  for 
many  reasons  this  apprenticeship  is  long  and  consequently  the 
advent  of  spoken  language  is  retarded;  the  phonetic  movements 
are  very  much  more  delicate  and  probably  very  much  more 
difficult  to  execute  than  the  gestures  of  the  limbs;  and  the  proof 
is,  that  the  idiot  and  the  low  grade  imbecile,  who  have  become 
capable  of  executing  movements  of  the  body  under  our  order, 
such  as  to  get  up,  sit  down,  raiee  the  arms,  etc.,  do  not  succeed 
in  controlling  their  larynx  and  in  drawing  from  that  instrument 
articulate  sounds.  That  which  further  proves  the  difficulty  of 
articulation  as  compared  with  other  movements,  is  all  the  awk- 
wardness of  pronunciation  which  we  observe  in  subnormals  and 
which  are  much  more  frequent  among  them  than  among  normals. 

3.  The  third  phase  is  the  evocation  of  coordinated  movements 
of  the  larynx.  This  evocation  is  difficult  and  continues  so  even 
when  the  movements  have  been  acquired  with  their  coordination 
and  one  is  already  able  to  pronounce  a  word.  The  most  simple 
and  direct  means  of  evocation  is  the  audition  of  the  corresponding 
articulated  sound;  another  means  is  the  sight  of  the  movement 
of  the  lips.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  very  much  less  easy  to  pass 
from  the  idea  of  a  thing  to  the  execution  of  the  phonetic  move- 
ment necessary  for  naming  that  thing.  We  ourselves  can  realize 
this  difficulty  when,  thinking  of  a  known  person,  we  have  trouble 


PSYCHOLOGY    OF    SPEECH  187 

in  recalling  his  name;  it  must  be  that  this  difficulty  is  really  great 
since  it  is  sufficient  to  block  the  way  for  Denise  and  prevent  her 
from  ever  employing  articulate  speech. 

It  is  this  third  phase,  up  to  the  present  misunderstood  or  at 
least  little  known,  which  has  been  clearly  brought  out  by  the 
observation  of  our  imbecile.  It  is  a  phase  having  a  character  of 
utilization,  a  djmamic  character.  If  we  attempt  to  represent 
what  is  passing  in  the  mind  of  Denise  at  the  moment  when  we 
are  vainly  attempting  to  make  her  give  the  name  with  which 
we  have  baptized  the  music  box,  we  find  that  not  a  single  one  of 
the  elements  necessary  for  finding  the  name  is  lacking.  She 
knows  the  word  papa,  since  she  has  already  heard  it  and  recog- 
nized it;  this  proves  that  she  has  retained  the  auditory  memory 
of  it;  she  is  capable  of  pronouncing  the  word,  since  she  pronounced 
it  in  echolalia;  she  has  retained  the  sense  of  the  word,  since  she 
goes  and  gets  the  music  box  when  she  is  told  to  show  us  papa. 
It  can  be  seen  that  an  author,  partisan  to  the  importance  of 
images  in  aphasia,  would  recognize  that  all  the  images  are  here 
present.  What  is  lacking  is  the  realization  of  the  existing  asso- 
ciations, the  functioning  of  established  habits,  the  particular  mode 
of  functioning  which  enables  us  to  pass  from  the  idea  to  the 
phonetic  act. 


VII.  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  APHASIA  PROPERLY  SO- 
CALLED  AND  THE  POVERTY  OF  LANGUAGE 
OF  THE  LOW-GRADE  IMBECILE 

It  has  often  been  said  that  certain  idiots  and  imbeciles  deprived 
of  speech  are  aphasics;  we  ourselves  in  studying  certain  of  our 
subjects,  Denise  for  instance,  the  young  woman  whose  speech  is 
reduced  to  four  or  five  words,  have  discussed  the  idea  that  she 
might  be  stricken  with  some  cerebral  lesion  which  has  produced 
in  her  the  symptoms  of  motor  aphasia.  Our  conclusion  has  been 
negative.  Abandoning  our  patient  we  are  now  going  to  examine 
a  true  aphasic  from  cerebral  lesion  and  make  on  this  occasion  a 
parallel  between  the  aphasia  symptoms  produced  by  lesions  and 
the  symptoms  of  the  lack  of  language  observed  with  idiots  and 
imbeciles. 

M.  X. a  man  of  thirty  nine  years  exercising  the  profession 

of  clock  maker  was  stricken  about  a  year  ago  with  aphasia.  W^e 
have  only  this  single  bit  of  information  in  regard  to  him.  He 
presents  himself  to  us  with  all  the  outward  signs  of  a  man  of 
intelligence.  His  manner  of  salutation,  of  taking  the  proffered 
chair,  of  listening  to  us  is  quite  different  from  that  of  an  imbecile. 
If  we  speak  to  him  he  leans  forward  and  makes  a  visible  effort  to 
understand  us  and  if  he  does  not  understand  he  lets  us  know  by 
an  expressive  gesture  that  he  desires  us  to  repeat.  From  time 
to  time  he  himself  starts  to  speak;  he  makes  many  gestures  with 
great  earnestness,  even  rises  to  give  more  force  to  his  exposition, 
touches  the  table,  indicates  certain  points  of  the  table,  then  of 
his  body,  but  since  his  vocabulary  is  reduced  to  six  or  eight  words 
we  are  not  able  to  grasp  his  thought.  From  time  to  time  he  per- 
ceives that  he  has  not  made  himself  understood,  or  rather  he 
perceives  that  the  word  sought  for  fails  him,  because  in  the 
middle  of  his  efforts,  he  stops  and  says  in  a  grave  discouraged 
voice,  "No,  not  that,"  then  he  falls  into  an  immovable  and  re- 
signed silence.  We  note  also  that  when  he  speaks  in  his  own 
way,  he  continues  to  do  so  only  because  we  appear  to  be  listening 
to  him.     If  we  turn  away  our  eyes  or  speak  to  another  person  he 

188 


APHASIA   VS.    POVERTY   OF   LANGUAGE  189 

immediately  perceives  it  and  is  silent,  possibh'  from  a  feeling  of 
propriety.  All  these  signs  prove  that  he  retains  an  intelligence 
very  superior  to  that  of  an  imbecile.  The  only  point  where  the 
subject  seems  to  lack  comprehension  is  this;  the  explanations 
which  he  gives  us  by  gesture  are  practically  incomprehensible  to 
us,  and  yet  he  does  not  always  seem  to  perceive  this;  he  seems  to 
imagine  that  we  can  understand  him. 

A  word  upon  his  intelligence  in  general.  We  possess  two  tests 
of  intelligence  not  dependent  upon  speech,  which  indicate  an 
intelhgence  superior  to  imbecility;  these  are  the  arranging  of  five 
weights  and  a  quite  complicated  game  of  patience.  No  one  lower 
in  intelligence  than  a  moron  can  place  the  5  weights  in  order;  and 
the  game  of  patience  is  only  possible  to  a  high  grade  moron.  Our 
aphasic  came  out  well  in  both  tests  although  he  was  slow  in  the 
execution.  He  found  it  difficult  to  weigh  the  weights  two  by 
two  so  as  to  find  the  heaviest  but  once  well  begun  he  succeeded  in 
arranging  them  exactly.  The  game  of  patience  also  embarrassed 
him  but  he  studied  it  with  intelligence  and  after  many  fruitless 
and  prolonged  attempts  he  at  last  arrived  at  the  exact  solution. 
All  this  proves  that  his  intelligence  is  notably  superior  to  that  of 
an  imbecile;  it  is  at  least  equal  to  that  of  a  moron. 

Let  us  now  make  the  analysis  of  the  aphasic  phenomery^  which 
this  patient  presents.  He  is  especially  stricken  with  motor  aphasia 
or  aphemia;  he  is  moreover  incapable  of  reading,  or  of  writing  from 
dictation,  and  is  in  the  third  degree  of  word  deafness.  Let  us 
remark  at  once  that  this  combination  of  aphasia  symptoms  recalls 
in  a  striking  manner  what  we  noticed  in  the  observations  of  our 
imbecile  Denise. 

Articulate  speech.     Spontaneously  our  invalid  employs  a  very 

limited  number  of  words:  "yes,  no that,  yes that,  no 

no that,  yes that,  no 1 wait "  are  the  current 

expressions  with  which  he  accompanies  his  gestures  when  he 
wishes  to  give  an  explanation.  From  time  to  time  he  utters  a 
word  more  complicated  as  comrade,  clock.  Of  course  we  do  not 
pretend  to  give  a  complete  list  of  the  vocabulary  which  he  still 
retains;  the  important  thing  is  to  notice  how  much  it  is  reduced 
in  the  spontaneous  speech  of  ideation  which  consists  in  expressing 

a  personal  thought.     X retains  a  few  more  words  in  the 

speech  of  automatic  recitation,  which  consists  in  repeating  words 
learned  in  a  scries,  than  in  spontaneous  speech  of  ideation.     It  is 


190  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

thus  that  he  manages  to  count  aloud  to  twenty;  this  recitation  is 
performed  with  a  great  deal  of  effort  and  with  much  time,  but 
very  correctly.  There  is  here  an  interesting  contrast  with  the 
spontaneous  speed  of  ideation.  We  will  say  the  same  of  the  speech 
of  denomination.  If  one  presents  to  him  a  familiar  object,  pencil, 
pen  holder,  book,  watch,  paper,  or  asks  him  the  color  of  an  object, 

X sometimes  is  ignorant  of  the  name  of  the  object,  or  gives 

up  trying  to  find  it,  or  gives  a  name,  sometimes  correctly,  some- 
times a  name  closely  allied  (clock  for  watch,  pencil  for  pen  holder). 
The  speech  of  denomination  is  therefore  a  little  better  conserved 
than  that  of  the  spontaneous  speech  of  ideation. 

There  remains  a  last  form  of  speech,  the  speech  of  repetition. 

X cannot  repeat  a  sentence  and  if  one  is  proposed  to  him, 

he  does  not  repeat  it  at  all;  but  he  repeats  exactly  a  simple  sound, 
as  for  instance  simple  vowels;  the  sound  he  emits,  without  being 
always  pure  (u  resembles  eu)  is  nevertheless  recognizable.  He  can 
also  repeat  a  single  syllable  pa  and  ba.  But  he  cannot  repeat  a 
polysyllable  word  like  papa;  moreover  he  can  repeat  a  single 
figure,  but  repeats  two  with  difficulty  and  never  three;  and  it  is 
all  the  more  surprising  since,  as  we  have  just  seen,  thanks  to  the 
speech  of  automatic  recitation,  he  can  articulate  in  a  series  all 
the  figures  from  one  to  twenty.  It  is  not  therefore  properly  speak- 
ing the  articulation  of  the  different  figures  that  presents  this  diffi- 
culty to  him,  but  rather  the  representation,  the  memory  of  the 
three  figures  to  be  repeated. 

One  might  say  that  X repeated  like  an  imbecile.     There  is 

here  certainly  a  most  important  point  to  notice.     X resembles 

really  very  many  of  our  imbeciles  who  speak  a  little,  can  repeat 
a  figure  or  two,  but  never  three. 

Word  comprehension.  There  are,  it  seems,  two  forms  to  dis- 
tinguish in  verbal  audition.  The  first  could  be  called  the  verbal 
comprehension  of  ideation.  One  speaks  to  a  person  and  this  per- 
son, thanks  to  the  words  which  he  hears,  understands  the  thought. 

With  X this  form  is  conserved,  but  it  is  deeply  affected.     He 

understands  certain  sentences;  as  for  others  he  slightly  misunder- 
stands them.  Thus  we  say,  "Carry  an  object  to  the  nearby 
table,"  and  he  understands,  "next  room;"  he  opens  the  door, 
crosses  a  corridor  and  with  much  seriousness  carries  the  object 
into  another  room.  He  executes  very  well  certain  orders  as  "Open 
the  door."     But  at  our  command  he  cannot  point  to  his  nose, 


APHASIA   VS.    POVERTY    OF   LANGUAGE 


191 


mouth  or  ears.  He  seems  to  understand  that  it  is  a  question  of 
his  face.  But  his  hand  wanders  over  his  features  with  indecision. 
On  the  other  hand  he  has  better  verbal  comprehension  of  objects. 
We  have  just  seen  that  he  cannot  find  his  ear  when  it  is  asked  of 
him;  but  if  we  touch  his  ear,  and  ask  him,  "Is  it  a  pen  holder? 
a  horse?  a  dog?"  he  replies  everytime  with  great  deliberation  and 
as  if  after  long  reflection,  "No,  not  chat."  And  when  one  pro- 
nounces the  word  ear,  his  eyes  brighten,  and  he  is  overjoyed  to 
say  to  us  with  many  gestures,  "That's  it."  Under  certain  cir- 
cumstances in  order  to  find  the  name  of  an  object,  we  have  seen 
him  resort  to  a  union  of  two  processes,  which  we  have  called  the 
speech  of  automatic  recitation  and  the  verbal  comprehension  of 
objects.  One  writes  before  him  the  number  12  and  asks  him  what 
it  is.  He  counts  1,  2,  3,  etc.,  until  he  reaches  the  number  12 
(automatic  recitation)  and  there  he  stops,  compares  the  word  12 
to  the  symbol  he  has  under  his  eyes,  (verbal  comprehension  of 
objects) ;  he  finds  an  agreement  between  the  word  and  the  figure, 
and  afiirms  energetically  "12,"  putting  his  finger  on  the  number. 

As  to  writing,  he  possesses  only  the  writing  of  automatic  repeti- 
tion, he  writes  his  name;  he  has  not  spontaneous  writing  of  ideation, 
copying,  or  dictation.     Reading  does  not  exist;  it  is  lost. 

Let  us  carefully  note  that  in  the  preceding  descriptions  we  have 
paid  no  attention  to  the  inner  language  of  our  subject  nor  to  the 
state  of  his  images.  We  have  voluntarily  set  aside  these  difllicult 
and  perhaps  artificial  questions  subject  to  innumerable  interpre- 
tations. Let  as  limit  ourselves  to  making  the  most  of  the  objec- 
tive sjTnptoms  which  we  have  noted.  We  can  arrange  them  in 
a  particular  order  which  corresponds  to  the  degree  of  their  de- 
creasing conservation,  the  first  of  the  list  being  the  best  preserved. 


Speech     of     automatic 

Writing    of 

automatic 

recitation 

repetition, 
ture) 

(Signa- 

Speech  of  the  denomi- 

Comprehension of  de- 

nation of  objects 

nomination 

Speech  of  ideation 

Comprehension        of 
ideation 

Speech  of  repetition 

There  exists  then  a  very  clear  order  in  the  appearing  of  these 
symptoms,  and  this  order  seems  to  be  the  same  for  speech,  com- 


192  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

prehension,  and  writing.  Thus  the  speech  of  ideation  is  more 
difficult,  more  unstable  than  the  speech  of  recitation;  and  the 
speech  of  repetition  is  the  most  unstable  of  all.  This  instability- 
seems  to  be  a  fact  of  observation  which  we  must  accept  without 
trying  to  explain  it  by  any  theories.  If  further  investigations 
confirm  our  classification  this  then  is  the  hypothesis  which  can 
be  put  forth. 

The  production  of  aphasia  would  then  be  dependent  upon  two 
principal  factors;  the  seat  of  the  lesion,  and  the  greater  or  less 
degree  of  integrity  of  the  nervous  organ  affected.  It  is  the  seat 
of  the  lesion  which  determines  the  form  of  the  aphasia,  rendering 
it  motor  or  sensorial,  or  explains  the  complexity  of  the  form  of 
the  aphasia,  which  may  be  partial  or  total.  This  form  once 
determined,  it  remains  to  determine  the  degree  of  the  aphasia; 
and  it  is  here  that  the  distinction  of  degrees  which  we  have  just 
indicated  comes  in;  there  is,  for  the  three  species  of  language,  a 
hierarchy  of  different  degrees;  the  more  complex  are  lost  first; 
the  spontaneous  speech  of  ideation  for  example  would  be  lost 
very  much  before  the  speech  of  automatic  recitation.  The  speech 
of  suspended  repetition  also  long  before  the  speech  of  automatic 
recitation. 

But  if  observation  confirms  this  hypothesis,  it  is  probable  that 
curious  analogies  will  be  found  between  the  state  of  aphasia  and 
the  state  of  speech  among  imbeciles.  Without  doubt  certain 
forms  of  aphasia  present  themselves  which  have  nothing  analogous 
to  what  is  found  in  imbeciles,  thus  sensorial  aphasia  appears  in 
diverse  phenomena,  notably  in  word  deafness,  in  subjects  who 
continue  to  have  the  power  of  speech.  The  malady  has  produced 
a  lesion,  which  operates  in  a  sense  the  reverse  of  psychogenesis, 
because  one  begins  to  understand  before  one  begins  to  speak, 
and  no  imbecile  can  exist  who,  by  his  own  lack  of  intelligence, 
could  present  anything  analogous  to  sensorial  aphasia;  that  is  to 
say,  who  would  speak  without  understanding  the  spoken  words. 
It  is  not  by  the  form,  that  is  to  say  by  the  nature  of  the  function 
attacked,  that  the  imbecile  resembles  the  aphasic,  but  by  the 
degree.  One  function  being  affected,  let  us  say  for  instance 
speech,  the  series  of  the  degrees  of  alteration  which  the  aphasic 
would  present  will  be  a  psychogenetic  series,  whose  general  grada- 
tion will  be  found  exactly  repeated  in  the  imbecile.  This  at 
least  is  the  hypothesis  which  we  formulate. 


VIII.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  LANGUAGE  AS   A  SIGN  OF 
HUMAN  INTELLIGENCE 

Among  the  physiological  definitions  of  man,  one  of  those  most 
often  cited  consists  in  considering  the  use  of  articulate  speech  as 
the  most  characteristic  mark  of  the  human.  The  philosophers 
have  started  from  this  point  to  exalt  the  beauty  of  the  function 
of  language;  and  it  has  even  seemed  that  it  required  nothing  less 
than  the  whole  human  intelligence  to  render  speech  possible. 
Abstract  studies  that  have  been  written  upon  language  have  sus- 
tained this  illusion.  In  reasoning  upon  this  function,  they  have 
sought  to  present  it  as  a  wonder  of  reflexion  and  elaboration. 
Currently  the  psychologists  have  maintained  that  language  results 
from  an  implicit  convention,  consisting  in  the  use  of  words  as 
signs,  substitutes,  symbols  of  objects  and  of  thoughts.  In  other 
words,  language  would  suppose  an  intelligence  capable  of  per- 
ceiving a  general  relation  between  things  and  their  verbal  signs.^ 
Presented  under  this  form,  the  idea  which  is  held  to  have  presided 
at  the  formation  of  language  seems  so  complex  that  one  is  not 
astonished  that  animals  are  incapable  of  it  and  consequently  are 
deprived  of  language. 

Other  conclusions,  obtained  by  investigations  in  the  clinical 
domain,  have  lately  added  their  weight  to  the  preceding.  We 
allude  to  the  work  and  theories  of  Marie  and  his  pupils." 

Marie  sought,  by  a  series  of  observations  and  of  autopsies,  to 
renew  the  conception  of  aphasia.  We  do  not  speak  of  his  ideas 
upon  the  seat  of  this  lesion,  but  only  of  his  physiological  observa- 
tions. He  asserts  that,  "with  all  aphasics  there  exists  a  very 
marked  diminution  of  the  intellectual  capacity  in  general,"  and 
that  neurologists  have  committed  a  grave  error,  in  declaring  in 

'  To  our  minds  this  is  establishing  a  confusion  between  the  perception 
of  a  relation  and  its  realization.  It  suffices  that  the  relation  is  realized 
in  order  that  language  exist. 

'  See  L'Ann6e  pnychoL,  vol.  XIII,  p.  344,  an  account  rendered  by  Hcrn- 
heim  of  recent  theories  of  aphasia.  The  short  original  articles  of  Marie, 
appeared  in  the  Semnine  mMicale,  May  2.3,  1000  and  October  17.  HH)6. 
Cf.  Thi^se  do  Moutier,  Aphasie  de  Broca,  Paris,  1908. 

193 


194  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

their  definition  of  aphasia,  that  "the  intelHgence  is  intact."  He 
even  declares  that,  for  his  part,  if  he  had  to  give  a  definition  of 
aphasia,  the  fact  which  above  all  else  he  would  endeavor  to  bring 
out  would  be  the  diminution  of  intelligence.  He  warns  us  against 
the  apparent  intelligence,  which  aphasics  may  present  in  conse- 
quence of  the  fact  that  they  retain  the  power  of  mimicry,  the 
emotional  faculty,  and  the  sentiment  of  propriety;  with  great 
reason,  he  affirms  that  the  intellectual  deficiency  of  aphasics  may 
escape  a  superficial  view,  and  he  demands  a  methodical  examina- 
tion of  his  patients. 

We  shall  speak  in  a  moment  of  this  examination,  and  we  shall 
discuss  the  procedure  and  the  results.  But  first  of  all  what  role 
does  Marie  assign  to  the  intellectual  deficiency  of  aphasics?  Upon 
this  important  point  we  regret  to  assert  that  his  thought  remains 
vague.  Or,  to  speak  more  clearly,  we  believe  that  in  these  two 
articles  he  has  changed  his  point  of  view.  He  reproaches  the 
clinicians,  who  have  recognized  this  deficiency,  with  considering 
it  as  an  accessory  phenomenon,  and  with  being  very  wrong  in 
not  taking  it  into  account  when  constructing  a  theory  about 
aphasia.  This  criticism  would  seem  to  suppose  that  for  Marie 
the  deficiency  is  not  a  coincidence,  but  an  integral  part  of  the 
aphasia. 

In  the  first  article  he  writes  expressly  in  regard  to  sensorial 
aphasia,  or  aphasia  of  Wernicke,  that  if  these  patients  speak 
badly,  have  jargon  aphasia  or  paraphasia,  it  is  "in  consequence  of 
intellectual  decay;"  this  decay  would  account  for  their  so-called 
word  deafness  and  their  incapacity  to  read  and  write.  Note 
carefully  that  the  theory  thus  sketched  is  very  significant,  for  it 
applies  not  only  to  the  aphasia  of  Wernicke  but  also  to  the  aphasia 
of  Broca,  which  would  only  be,  according  to  the  same  author,  a 
sensorial  aphasia  complicated  by  anarthria. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  thp  second  of  the  articles  cited;  there  Marie 
seems  to  have  moderated  his  first  thesis,  or  rather  to  have  com- 
pletely changed  it,  because  replying  to  Dejerine  who  called  his 
attention  to  the  fact  that  dements  and  general  paralytics,  in  spite 
of  their  intellectual  deficiency,  do  not  become  aphasics,  he  does 
not  hesitate  to  object  that  there  may  be  some  dissociation  in  the 
intelligence,  and  he  admits  that  the  "intellectual  deficiencj'^  of  the 
aphasic  is  specialized."  He  says  again,  that  the  "gamut  of  intel- 
lectual decay  is  singularly  varied,  as  much  from  the  point  of  view 


LANGUAGE   AS   A    SIGN    OF   INTELLIGENCE  195 

of  the  quantity  as  of  the  quality,"  and  he  adds,  what  everybody 
will  regret,  that  he  has  not  the  possibility  of  expatiating  further 
upon  this  order  of  ideas. 

In  fact  this  last  concession,  that  the  deficiency  of  aphasia  is 
specialized,  seems  to  destroy  what  there  is  of  psychological  origi- 
nality in  the  theory  of  Marie;  because  if  one  admits  that  only  that 
part  of  the  intelligence  of  the  aphasic  which  relates  to  language  is 
affected,  one  returns  more  or  less  implicitly  to  the  ancient  theory 
which  makes  aphasia  a  disturbance  of  the  function  of  language. 
Without  wishing  to  insist  farther  upon  this  particular  point,  we 
shall  speak  upon  the  question  of  how  it  is  that  Marie  seems  to 
have  afl&rmed  in  the  beginning,  as  his  contradictors  have  believed 
that  he  affirmed,  that  the  loss  of  language  is  due  to  a  diminution 
of  the  intelligence.^ 

The  least  criticism  that  can  be  made  of  these  hypotheses  is  to 
accuse  them  of  vagueness  in  not  determining  the  amount  of  intelli- 
gence necessary  for  speech.  Not  only  are  the  conclusions  vague 
but  still  more  one  finds  numerous  suppositions  that  are  not  demon- 
strated. Marie,  for  instance,  affirms  that  an  aphasic,  a  cook  by 
trade,  cannot  cook  an  egg  as  well  as  before  the  appearance  of  his 
aphasia;  in  concluding  that  it  is  his  intellectual  weakening  which 
explains,  in  part  at  least,  the  loss  of  speech,  one  might  make 
this  unverifiable  supposition  that  the  intellectual  weakening  is 
sufficiently  profound  to  render  language  impossible.  We  borrow 
another  example  still  more  disputable  from  the  same  author;  he 
affirms  in  some  experiments,  which  are  by  the  way  of  a  very 
interesting  originality,  that  one  of  these  aphasics  is  incapable  of 
performing  three  commissions  which  are  given  to  him  simul- 
taneously, either  verbally  or  by  gesture;  this  aphasic  always  for- 
gets one  or  two  of  the  three.  We  admit  that  this  proves  that  he 
is  weakened  from  the  intellectual  point  of  view,  but  is  such  a 
weakening  sufficient  to  explain  the  loss  of  language?  This  is  the 
whole  question. 

'  The  doctrine  of  P.  Marie  upon  aphasia,  says  Dcjcrine,  may  be  summed 
up  in  the  following  terms;  sensorial  aphasia  is  not  a  consequence  of  the 
destruction  of  the  sensorial  images  of  lunKuaRe,  because  the  author  does 
not  regard  the  existence  of  these  images  as  proven,  and  all  the  sijmplotns 
that  one  encounters  among  patients  are  according  to  him  due  to  a  single  and 
only  cause,  the  diminution  of  the  intelligence.  (Dejerine,  Medical  Press, 
VII,  1906.) 


196  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

In  order  to  answer  this  question  we  think  it  necessary  to  make 
a  distinction  between  the  quantity  of  intelHgence  necessary  for 
the  formation  of  language,  and  the  quantity  necessary  for  the 
conservation  of  language  already  acquired.  This  last  case  could 
be  studied  in  senile  dementia  and  general  paralysis;  we  limit  our- 
selves to  that  which  concerns  the  formation  of  language. 

If  we  have  recourse  to  our  measuring  scale  of  intelligence,  we 
shall  readily  see  that  a  normal  child  of  six  years  easily  performs 
three  commissions;  but  even  at  two  years  he  speaks  and  under- 
stands; one  sees  therefore  that  the  intellectual  level  of  the  test 
for  three  commissions  is  very  much  higher  than  the  intellectual 
level  which  suffices  for  the  formation  of  language;  the  superiority 
amounts  to  four  years.  It  is  in  this  manner  that  we  must  study 
dements,  whether  or  not  the  facts  are  favorable  to  the  thesis 
which  rightly  or  wrongly  has  been  attributed  to  Marie. 

One  great  interest  in  the  study  of  children  and  also  of  imbeciles 
is  that  we  can  bring  precision  into  these  questions  of  intellectual 
level,  which  have  always  been  treated  with  a  vagueness  altogether 
amusing.  By  the  examination  of  a  series  of  idiots  and  unbeciles 
it  is  possible  to  establish,  with  all  the  approximation  desired, 
what  amount  of  intelligence  is  necessary  for  speaking  and  for 
understanding,  or  at  least,  we  establish  by  this  method  the  condi- 
tion of  the  intellectual  faculties  among  defectives  who  can  not 
talk,  and  those  who  use  only  a  few  words.  These  belong  to  very 
different  levels.  In  this  way  one  can  establish  upon  an  experi- 
mental basis  a  hierarchy  of  psychical  functions  which  until  now 
has  never  been  done. 

The  impression  which  one  receives  from  these  new  affirmations 
is  that  the  quantity  of  intelligence  necessary  for  the  use  of  speech 
has  been  very  much  exaggerated.  Denise,  who  is  at  the  dawn  of 
language,  is  a  low  grade  imbecile.  Below  her  there  are  only 
idiots,  those  who  do  not  speak;  they  are  sensitive  only  to  the 
language  of  gestures.  But  what  is  their  intellectual  level?  We 
doubt  if  it  is  greatly  superior  to  that  of  an  intelligent  dog;  superior 
perhaps  from  certain  points  of  view,  inferior  from  others.  The 
idiot  of  the  highest  degree  is  capable  of  obeying  a  gesture,  and 
even  of  imitating  a  little;  if  one  claps  the  hands  before  him  or 
dances  or  cries,  he  is  capable  of  understanding  that  we  wish  him 
to  imitate  these  movements,  and  he  is  capable  also  of  making  a 
crude  imitation.     This  is  the  highest  test  of  intelligence  that  we 


LANGUAGE   A3  A    SIGN    OF    INTELLIGENCE  197 

have  been  able  to  give  them.  Let  us  now  pass  to  low  grade  imbe- 
ciles of  the  type  of  Denise  who  have  the  beginnings  of  articulate 
language;  women  of  this  type  cannot  do  their  hair,  nor  prepare 
vegetables;  but  they  can  dress  themselves,  sometimes  however, 
putting  on  their  clothes  wrong  side  out.  They  are  capable  of 
mechanical  work  which  requires  no  discernment.  We  have  seen 
an  imbecile  man  of  this  level  who  earned  20  sous  a  day  blowing  the 
bellows  of  a  forge.  Put  a  pen  in  their  hand  they  cannot  even 
copy  a  square;  they  do  not  understand  the  request,  they  cannot 
conceive  of  copying,  or  in  any  case  all  their  attempts  at  copying 
are  absolutely  formless.  It  seems  useless  to  give  more  details  in 
order  to  bring  out  the  veritable  intellectual  level  necessary  for  the 
formation  of  language.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  moment  that  we 
have  summarily  fixed  this  level,  and  that  we  have  demonstrated 
that  with  other  experiments  it  can  be  determined  with  a  very 
great  exactness.  The  essential  was,  however,  to  have  demon- 
strated that  it  is  determinable.  We  also  wished  to  show  that 
it  is  a  very  low  intellectual  level  corresponding  to  low  grade 
imbecility. 


IX.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE 

The  possibility  of  placing  Tn"aTi  ascending  series  the  intelligence 
of  different  imbeciles,  thanks  to  the  method  which  we  have  set 
forth,  has  had  the  happy  result  of  facilitating  the  study  of  the 
development  of  language  among  defectives.  This  is  a  question 
altogether  new  which  we  are  simply  going  to  outline. 

Let  us  note  first  of  all  that  the  lowest  grade  imbeciles  rejiresent 
the  beginning  of  language;  at  this  level  there  are  no  sentences 
but  only  words,.  The  imbecile  that  we  have  studied  at  length, 
Denise,  speaks  only  words.  We  have  encountered  two  other  low 
grade  imbeciles  in  the  same  condition.  Furthermore,  it  is  very 
possible  that  this  is  not  an  absolute  rule,  and  that  the  function 
of  language  develops  sometimes  a  little  earlier,  sometimes  a  little 
later.  In  order  to  know  this,  it  would  be  necessary  to  examine 
a  great  number  of  subjects.^ 

Let  us  remark  that  the  words  pronounced  separately  by  these 
imbeciles  are  mostly  nouns,  at  times  adjectives,  and  even  verbs. 
Are  these  grammatical  distinctions  very  important?  Or  rather 
is  not  the  most  important  matter  to  note  that  these  distinctions 
are  without  interest?  The  grammatical  function  of  words  should, 
we  believe,  be  taken  into  consideration  only  when  it  has  a  definite 
meaning  to  those  who  employ  them.  But  it  is  very  evident  that 
when  one  of  our  imbeciles  employs  a  single  word,  that  word  does 
not  perform  the  function  of  verb,  or  of  noun  but  of  a  whole 
proposition.  The  adjective  bad  (mal)  used  by  one  of  them  signi- 
fies "I  feel  bad"  (J'ai  mal),  and  the  substantive  mama,  means 
"Mama  gave  me  this  or  that." 

Let  us  come  to  a  higher  level  and  consider  imbecilesjffiho-  are 
capable  of  making  sentences.  Our  observations  are  on  an  imbe- 
cile of  fifty,  named  Victor. 

Victor  is  a  man  of  robust  aspect,  tall,  square  shouldered,  bronzed 

*  An  attempt  has  been  made  by  M.  Maupate  {Annates  midicopsycholo- 
giques),  but  the  absence  of  all  seriation  among  his  subjects  has  very  much 
reduced  the  interest  of  the  notes  upon  his  experiments  upon  which  his 
work  is  based. 

198 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  199 

skin  full  of  wrinkles,  and  the  manners  of  a  working  man;  one 
would  say  an  old  sailor;  his  head  is  well  formed,  the  features  are 
regular,  and  the  expression  of  his  countenance  seems  to  show 
more  intelligence  than  the  poor  fellow  really  has.  But  he  is 
awkward  in  his  movements;  and  even  when  he  remains  quiet, 
whether  standing  or  sitting,  one  recognizes  in  his  attitude  some- 
thing— I  don't  know  what — that  is  peculiar.  Since  this  subject 
has  the  use  of  language  let  us  make  him  talk  a  little. 

Q.  What  is  your  name,  my  friend? 

A.  Victor. 

Q.  From  what  place  do  you  come? 

A.  Chdtenay. 

Q.  Where  is  Chdtenay? 

A.  Near  Sceaux. 

Q.  Is  there  a  large  city  near  Ch&tenay  and  Sceaux? 

A.  Versailles. 

Q.  And  Paris?    You  know  Paris. 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  What  is  Paris? 

A.  To  go  to  a  sale.     (He  seems  satisfied  with  his  reply.) 

Q.  But  besides  that  what  is  Paris? 

A.  To  buy  there  merchandise. 

Q.  And  where  is  it? 

A.  There.     (He  indicates  any  direction.) 

Q.  What  is  your  trade? 

A.  Tiler. 

Q.  You  go  on  the  roofs? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  You  have  fallen? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur There  (He  points  to  his  head  with  earnestness, 

and  an  air  of  self-pity,  to  show  where  he  received  a  hurt  in  falling.) 
Q.  How  much  do  you  make  as  tiler? 
A.  Si.xty  francs. 
Q.  Every  day? 
A.  Every  day! 

Q.   (With  a  tone  of  correction)  Every  month? 
A.   (Eagerly)  Every  month! 
Q.  What  was  the  profession  of  your  father? 
A.  Tiler. 

Q.  And  your  mother,  what  did  she  do? 
A.  Worked  among  people. 
Q.  Ah? 

A.  Washed  the  dishes— sewed. 
Q.  Are  your  parents  living? 
A.   (With  a  shade  of  sadness)  They  are  both  dead long  ago. 


200  THE    INTELLIGfcNCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  How  long  ago? 

A.  A  month  ago. 

Q.  Why  did  you  not  continue  to  be  a  tiler? 

A.  Not  much  work all  the  iron  merchants tilers. 

Q.  You  have  a  sister? 
A.  Yes,  sir. 

Q.  Your  sister  is  older  than  you? 
A.  Older. 
Q.  Or  younger? 
A.  Younger. 
Q.  What  does  she  do? 
A.  Seamstress. 

Q.  What  does  her  husband  do? 
A.  Watch  merchant  at  Enghien. 
Q.  Have  they  children? 
A.  (Shade  of  sadness)  They  are  dead. 

Q.  Come  now,  tell  me  about  your  sister.    Give  me  details.     What  does 
she  do? 

A.  Sews all  the  time with  the  sewing  machine. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  Goes  to  the  city  to  carry  the  linen. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  She  fixes  my  shirt socks. 

Q.  Tell  me  something  more. 

A  Don't  know  any  more. 

Q.  Oh!  yes,  think. 

A.  I  don't  remember  anything. 

Q.  What  did  you  do  this  morning? 

A.  Brought  the  soup. 

Q.  And  after  that? 

A.  Brought  the  bread  and  the  soup. 

Q.  And  after  that? 

A.  Eat. 

Q.  What  else  have  you  done? 

A.  Brought  the  drink. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  Eat. 

Q.  What  do  you  know  how  to  do? 

A.  (With  pride)  I  can  put  wine  in  bottles. 

Q.  All  alone? 

A.  All  alone. 

Q.  Really. 

A.  Never  broken  a  bottle. 

Q.  Are  there  others  who  can  do  that? 

A.  No,  only  I  can. 

Q.  M.  Simon  (who  is  present),  could  he  fill  bottles? 

A.  I  can  show  him. 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  201 

All  this  dialogue  goes  on  without  irony,  at  least  on  the  part  of 
Victor;  he  is  attentive,  remains  several  hours  sitting  beside  us, 
and  concerns  himself  only  with  us;  he  is  very  much  less  distracted 
than  Denise  who  often  gets  up  during  the  conversation  to  go  to 
the  window  to  see  what  is  passing  outside.  He  has  a  serious, 
conscientious,  convinced  and  deferential  attitude,  especially  during 
our  first  sittings.  Little  by  little  he  familiarizes  himself  with 
us  to  the  point  of  forgetting  the  feeling  of  conventionality,  as 
would  a  school  boy  with  whom  one  had  the  imprudence  to  joke 
too  much.     But  this  manifested  itself  only  in  subsequent  sittings. 

Determination  of  level.  It  is  evident  from  that  which  precedes 
that  it  is  here  a  question  of  a  quite  low  mental  level.  But  this 
is  only  an  impression  and  we  cannot  content  ourselves  with  this 
sort  of  medical  subjectivity.  These  general  questions  by  which 
one  very  prooerly  commences  an  examination  in  order  to  find  out 
a  patient's  general  condition,  have  no  other  purpose  than  to  enable 
one  to  judge  of  the  whole;  this  is  excellent,  necessary,  and  even 
indispensable.  If  one  begins  the  examination  of  a  subject  by  a 
precise  test,  he  will  not  arrive  at  an  idea  of  the  whole;  he  would 
perform  a  task  as  ridiculous  as  though  he  studied  geography 
with  a  microscope.  No  method  is  good  except  when  one  employs 
it  at  the  opportune  moment  and  to  the  end  for  which  it  is  designed. 
Our  general  interrogations  have  given  us  the  suspicion  that,  in 
Victor's  case,  there  is  a  reduction  of  all  the  faculties,  a  global 
reduction.  An  analysis  of  detail  which  would  have  been  out  of 
place  in  the  beginning  must  now  intervene  in  order  to  bring  pre- 
-\cision  into  particular  points. 

Imbeciles  like  Victor,  of  the  middle  grade,  can  compare  two 
lines  and  two  weights.  Victor  is  clearly  of  this  grade.  If  the 
two  lines  are  presented  to  him  he  understands,  after  explanation, 
what  is  asked  of  him  and  indicates  exactly  the  longer  Une.  He 
shows  the  same  exactitude  for  the  weights.  He  does  not  make 
a  mistake,  even  sounds  the  box  by  shaking  it  near  his  ear,  and 
easily  finds  the  heavier  (comparison  between  two  boxes  of  3  and 
15  grams).  He  is  consequently  in  the  middle  grade  of  imbecility. 
Can  he  raise  himself  to  the  highest  grade  of  imbecility? 

For  this  level  one  must  be  able  to  repeat  at  least  three  figures, 
execute  three  commis-sions  at  one  time,  know  fairly  well  the  names 
of  the  pieces  of  money,  the  colors,  the  cards,  know  his  ago,  the 
number  of  his  fingers,  and  other  analogous  things.     This  is  about 


202  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 

the  stock  of  ordinary  knowledge  which  a  high  grade  imbecile  is 
able  to  acquire.  In  spite  of  his  fifty  years  of  existence  Victor  has 
not  yet  been  able  to  assimilate  these. 

The  repetition  of  figures  is  never  correct;  he  can  never  repeat 
three  exactly;  he  is  mostly  satisfied  to  repeat  one,  the  last  of  the 
series.  At  times  he  gives  two,  but  transposes  them;  but  three 
figures  are  above  his  capacity.  It  is  not  willingness  however 
that  is  lacking.  He  is  very  attentive  during  the  test,  and  listens 
to  us  with  his  eyes  fixed  upon  us. 

For  the  three  commissions  he  nearly  executes  them ;  but  he  does 
not  entirely  succeed.  He  is  told  to  give  the  bouquet  to  M.  Simon, 
to  carry  the  umbrella  to  M.  Binet,  then  to  carry  his  chair  near 
the  window.  He  does  the  first  two  and  seats  himself  satisfied. 
"Is  that  all?"  we  ask  him;  he  thinks  again,  gets  up  and  takes  the 
chair  where  he  was  told.  In  another  experiment  he  forgot  the 
first  two  commissions  and  remembered  only  the  last.  His  exacti- 
tude varies  then  from  time  to  time ;  but  it  is  evident  that  one  could 
not  place  confidence  in  him  to  execute  punctually  three  commis- 
sions; in  this  regard  he  would  not  be  utilizable. 

Let  us  continue  the  examination  of  certain  useful  acquisitions 
of  the  high  grade  imbecile  and  we  shall  see  which  are  lacking  in 
Victor. 

He  does  not  know  the  number  of  his  fingers.  To  the  question, 
"How  many  fingers  have  you,"  he  replies, 

A.  Five  (another  time  he  replies  three). 
Q.  And  on  the  other  hand? 
A.  Seven. 

This  would  be  simply  absurd  if  he  understood  the  meaning  of 
the  words ;  but  he  has  not  the  slightest  notion,  nor  does  he  care  in 
the  least.  As  to  his  age,  he  has  the  same  indifference  in  the  use 
of  words  whose  sense  he  does  not  realize. 

Q.  What  is  your  age? 

A.  Don't  know,  monsieur. 

Q.  Are  you  two  years  old? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  Or,  rather,  perhaps  you  are  a  thousand  years  old? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

He  can  recite,  without  too  many  mistakes,  the  figures  from  1 
to  10  sometimes  skipping  a  figure;  above  10  he  makes  many  omis- 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  203 

sions  and  many  transpositions.  Here  for  example  is  a  series  he 
once  gave,  with  a  perfectly  serene  gravity;  6,  7,  9,  10,  11,  14, 
17,  9,  7,  11,  14,  17,  32,  35,  9,  17,  11,  14,  11,  17,  11,14,  20,  32,  33, 

44,  20,  32,  20,  32,  35,  20,  24,  20,  24,  25,  12 What  repetition, 

what  perpetual  beginning  over  again  done  with  complete  imcon- 
sciousness!  Notice  also  that  certain  numbers  are  repeated  very 
much  oftener  than  others. 

He  cannot  make  the  simplest  additions. 

Q.  2  and  1,  how  many  does  that  make? 
A.  2. 

Q.  5  sous  and  1  sou,  how  many  does  that  make? 
A.  1  sou. 

Not  only  are  the  errors  so  great  as  to  be  absurd  but  when  one 
is  that  ignorant  it  is  absurd  to  make  anj'-  reply.  This  is  what  we 
have  called  ''no-matter-what-ism"  (n'importequisme). 

This  tendency  shows  itself  also  when  pieces  of  money  are  given 
to  him  to  name;  there  is  only  one  with  which  he  is  entirely  familiar 
and  in  naming  which  he  never  makes  a  mistake;  it  is  the  ten  sous 
piece.  ' '  That' '  he  says  with  energy, ' '  to  buy  a  package  of  tobacco, 
ten  sous."  When  his  sister  comes  to  see  him  on  Sundays  she 
brings  him  regularly  a  ten-sou  piece  to  buy  his  tobacco.  These 
are  things  that  stamp  themselves  indelibly  upon  his  memory. 
The  other  pieces  receive  the  most  diverse  names,  and  the  names 
vary  from  one  moment  to  another;  a  1-franc  piece  is  generally 
called  20  sous;  a  2-franc  piece  is  also  called  20  sous;  a  5-franc 
piece  is  called  1  franc,  or  2  francs  or  3  francs.  A  20-franc  piece 
is  called  1  franc  or  3  francs;  and  even  the  modest  sou  is  called 
sometimes  1  sou,  sometimes  2  sous.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to 
determine  the  exact  knowledge  of  Victor,  because  he  by  no  means 
has  an  exact  knowledge.  He  has  a  vague  knowledge  which  is 
rendered  fantastical  by  his  tendency  to  say  the  first  word  that 
comes  to  his  mind;  it  is  not  absolutely  the  first  word  for  it  is  the 
name  of  some  piece  of  money;  but  wiiether  that  name  is  correct 
or  not  truly  makes  very  little  difference  to  him. 

To  count  is  for  him  equally  impo.ssiblc.  He  seems  not  to  have 
the  least  notion  of  numbers  although  he  can  recite  their  names 
fairly  well;  but  to  recite  them  while  applj'ing  them  to  objects  is 
a  very  much  more  difficult  operation.  We  beg  him  to  count  his 
fingers;  he  touches  only  four  and  recites  2,  3,  5,  7.     He  therefore 


204  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

believes  he  has  7  fingers.  We  ask  hhn,  "How  many  ears  have 
you?"  he  rcphes  "two,  there  and  there"  (at  the  same  time  touch- 
ing them) .  We  rise  to  make  a  ridiculous  demonstration  and  we 
say,  "No,  you  have  three!"  But  the  suggestibility  is  so  great 
that  we  have  no  need  of  demonstration,  and  he  replies  at  once, 
"Three." 

We  ask  h'm  for  12  pins.  He  takes  a  handful  out  of  the  box  and 
gives  them  to  us.  Another  request,  "Give  me  3  pins."  He  again 
picks  up  what  he  can  hold  between  his  thumb  and  forefinger,  and 
believes  he  has  fully  satisfied  our  request.  It  is  evident  that  the 
numbers  3  and  12  do  not  in  the  least  disquiet  him.  We  spread  5 
pins  before  him  and  ask: 

Q.  How  many  pins  are  there? 

A.  4. 

Q.  But  no,  count  them. 

A.  2. 

Q.  Begin  again,  count  them. 

A.  3. 

In  fact  he  puts  his  finger  at  random  upon  the  pins  and  does  not 
count  them.  We  now  have  3  single  sous  and  2  double,  spread 
out  on  the  table. 

Q.  Do  you  know  how  to  count? 

A.  A  little,  not  much. 

Q.  How  many  sous  are  there  on  the  table? 

A.   (without  counting)  3  sous. 

Q.  No,  count  them. 

He  does  so,  counting  the  double  sous  as  single  sous;  further- 
more in  one  case,  he  puts  his  finger  between  two  pieces  and 
counts  only  one  sou. 

A.  Four  sous. 

We  must  add  that  no  matter  what  problem  we  give  him  he 
always  has  a  reply. 

Q.  From  19  apples  we  take  away  6  apples;  how  many  are  left? 
A.  7. 

At  another  time  he  would  say  9  or  any  other  number.  It  is  a 
very  curious  mental  state.  On  being  analyzed,  it  reveals  itself  as 
something  very  complex.     In  the  first  place  Victor  has  learned  a 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  205 

certain  number  of  things.  He  knows  a  series  of  figures  and  can 
recite  them,  though  there  are  of  course  many  errors  in  the  series. 
What  pains  have  been  taken  to  teach  them  to  him!  What  an 
amount  of  lost  time!  The  reader  can  judge  for  himself.  Oh,  the 
beauty  of  teaching  done  at  random ! 

The  names  of  colors  are  as  badly  learned  as  those  of  pieces  of 
money;  hght  green  is  called  white;  dark  red,  blue  or  yellow;  dark 
blue,  black;  green,  red  or  chocolate;  pink,  white;  brown,  white; 
yellow,  j^ellow.  Scarcely  any  denomination  is  correct.  We  are 
certain  that  if  we  had  tried  again  we  should  have  received  an 
entirely  different  series  of  names. 

Here  is  how  he  names  some  of  the  cards.  He  says  that  he  has 
played  cards  with  his  sister;  it  is  difficult  to  believe. 


a  club 


Cards  shown 

Replies 

King  of  Spades 

Spades Hearts 1 

Ace  of  Spades 

The  diamond 

Queen  of  hearts 

Queen 

Ten  of  diamonds 

A  heart 

Seven  of  Spades 

Spades 

Queen  of  Clubs 

A  Queen 

Invited  to  sort  the  cards  according  to  design  and  color,  he  slowly 
succeeds  in  grouping  together  the  cards  of  the  same  color;  it  is 
even  necessary  to  encourage  him,  because  left  to  himself  he  loses 
all  idea  of  direction.  It  takes  him  2  minutes,  whereas  a  normal 
person  does  the  same  work,  the  sorting  of  32  cards,  with  fewer 
errors  in  35  seconds. 

After  all  these  failures  it  is  very  probable  that  Victor  knows 
neither  how  to  read  nor  to  write.  Since  he  does  not  even  attain 
to  the  intelligence  of  a  high  grade  imbecile,  it  cannot  be  expected 
that  he  could  do  what  pertains  to  the  level  of  a  moron.  We 
should  not  persist,  for  this  would  be  very  useless,  if  this  question 
of  reading  and  writing  were  not  the  occasion  of  some  instructive 
remarks.     We  ask  him, 

Q.  Do  you  know  how  to  read? 
A.  Not  much. 

We  hand  him  a  newspaper  l)egging  him  to  read  something.  He 
accepts  it,  takes  on  a  serious  expression,  and  following  the  text 
with  his  finger,  recites  letters  which  have  no  connection  with  th(! 
printed   characters.     It   is   not  even   spelling.     He   only   recites 


206  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

what  he  remembers  of  the  alphabet,  a,  b,  d,  v,  r,  p,  c,  q,  r,  etc. 
So  he  does  not  know  how  to  read.  This  is  enough  to  estabUsh 
the  diagnosis  of  Victor. 

Let  us  make  a  resume  of  our  tests.  Victor  is  defective  in  intelh- 
gence;  this  is  the  incontestable  result  of  our  examination.  Let  us 
now  be  more  precise.  He  is  not  an  idiot,  since  he  understands 
verbal  orders.  He  is  not  a  moron,  since  he  can  neither  read  nor 
write.  He  is  an  imbecile.  Since  he  is  capable  of  naming  certain 
objects,  of  comparing  two  lines  and  two  weights,  he  is  an  imbecile 
of  the  middle  grade;  on  the  other  hand,  not  being  able  to  name 
the  colors,  nor  the  pieces  of  money,  nor  to  execute  three  com- 
missions given  him  simultaneoulsy  he  cannot  belong  to  the  highest 
grade  of  imbecility;  he  stops  at  the  middle  grade. 

It  remains  now,  after  these  preliminaries,  to  study  his  language. 

The  verbal  data  upon  which  we  are  going  to  work  are  notes 
taken  at  the  very  moment  that  he  spoke;  in  these  notes  we  have 
expressed  verbatim  what  we  believed  he  said,  without  changing 
anything;  in  the  rare  cases  when  we  did  not  understand  one  of  the 
sentences  we  have  passed  it  by  in  silence. 

The  process  by  which  one  gathers  the  words  of  an  individual 
should  be  noted  in  a  linguistic  study,  because  it  exercises  a  certain 
influence  upon  the  language  of  the  person  studied.  The  best 
process  would  be  without  doubt  to  remain  listener,  and  to  write 
the  words  as  they  are  spontaneously  spoken.  But  the  imbecile 
is  one  of  those  who  have  no  story  to  tell,  and  who  willingly 
remain  silent.  Generally  Victor  asks  no  questions,  nor  does  he 
take  the  initiative  in  a  conversation.  To  induce  him  to  talk  one 
must  question  him;  this  is  what  we  did.  We  have  therefore 
studied  only  the  language  of  his  replies;  and  this  language  is 
always  more  or  less  influenced  by  our  questions;  the  idea  always 
and  very  often  the  words,  even  the  grammatical  forms,  were  the 
result  of  our  suggestion.  These  conditions  understood,  we  pre- 
sent our  observations  upon  Victor. 

According  to  a  plan  which  was  suggested  to  us  by  M.  Meillet, 
professor  at  the  College  de  France,  an  individual  linguistic  study 
should  contain  vocabulary,  phonetics,  and  grammar.  We  set 
aside  phonetics  because  Victor  presents  nothing  peculiar  in  the 
articulation  of  his  words;  his  articulation  is  normal,  as  is  also 
the  rapidity  of  his  speech.  It  remains  therefore  simply  to  study 
his  vocabulary  and  grammar. 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  207 

As  to  vocabulary,  we  shall  not  dwell  at  length  upon  this  as  it 
presents  nothing  that  is  especially  interesting.  Victor  employs 
current  concrete  words,  and  practically  no  abstract  words.  He 
does  not  misform  them  hke  a  child  or  an  aphasic;  he  does  not  say 
"dada"  for  a  horse,  nor  repeat  a  syllable  to  form  words  of  an 
infantile  language.  He  does  not  use  to  excess  words  like  "thing" 
(machin),  he  uses  no  circumlocution,  and  does  not  make  him- 
self conspicuous  by  the  impropriety  of  terms,  that  is  to  say  by 
a  development  of  language  that  is  out  of  keeping  with  his  intel- 
lectual level.  We  have  rather  the  impression  that  his  vocabulary 
is  extensive ;  in  a  catalog  of  hardware  he  names  correctly  a  host  of 
household  utensils.  We  are  of  the  opinion — though  this  is  only 
a  hypothesis — that  his  vocabulary  is  superior  to  his  grammar. 
We  understand  by  this,  that  if  his  vocabulary  represents  the 
linguistic  development  of  a  child  of  a  certain  number  of  years, 
his  grammar  would  correspond  to  that  of  a  younger  child.  Note 
also  that  he  invents  no  neologisms. 

His  grammar  is  more  interesting  because  it  bears  more  strongly 
the  mark  of  his  intellectual  deficiency.  In  the  first  place  let  us 
note  that  he  speaks  little;  his  sentences  are  short,  he  willingly 
abridges  or  suppresses  many  words,  as  though  the  spoken  lan- 
guage were  repugnant  to  him.  More  often  to  very  many  ques- 
tions he  contents  himself  by  replying,  "Yes,  sir,"  "No,  sir;"  his 
favorite  reply  is  the  very  prudent  expression,  "Not  much"  (pas 
beaucoup).  It  has  even  seemed  to  us  that  Victor  has  less  relish 
for  speech  than  he  has  verbal  capacity,  and  that  often  he  could 
speak  at  greater  length  than  he  does;  because,  called  upon  to 
express  the  same  idea  under  different  circumstances,  he  expresses 
it  sometimes  in  two  words,  sometimes  in  a  more  extended  sen- 
tence where  the  same  two  words  appear  with  other  words. 

We  shall  study  this  more  in  detail. 

Length  and  nature  of  the  sentences.  His  sentences~~are  always 
short,  as  we  have  said.  They  have  3^  ^words,  or  5-or-at  times  7. 
The  maximum  that  we  have  observed  is  9  words  in  the  following 
sentence,  "  The  school  master  keeps  you  in"  (Le  maitre  d'<5cole  il 
vous  font  en  retenue).  The  proposition  is  simple,  there  are  no 
subordinate  clauses.  In  order  to  explain  a  complicated  action 
which  he  has  seen  performed  before  him,  Victor  proceeds  by  little 
sentences;  he  will  say,  for  example,  "He  took  some  pins —and 
then  he  has "     Even  when  he  reproduces  something  told  him, 


208  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

he  returns  to  his  system  of  little  propositions,  detached  one  from 
the  other,  or  simply  attached  by  "and  then."  One  day  we  told 
him  the  story  of  a  little  girl  who,  during  the  absence  of  her  mother, 
let  her  racquet  fall  in  the  well  and  was  drowned  in  attempting 
to  regain  her  plaything.  He  reproduced  the  story  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner,  "The  woman  is  away to  do  errands the 

girl  played  with  her  racquet the  racquet  fell  in  the  well the 

little  girl  also goes  to  get  it." 

Persons.  He  employs  all  the  persons  of  the  verb,  and  also  all 
the  personal  pronouns.  Speaking  of  himself  he  says,  /.  For 
example,  one  is  interesting  him  in  drawing  and  asks  him  to  draw 
a  dog;  he  replies,  "I  don't  know  how  to  draw  dogs."  He  says 
thou.  Speaking  to  one  of  us,  who  had  just  been  tormenting  him 
by  all  sorts  of  tests,  he  assumed  this  familiar  manner  in  addressing 
us,  "  Toi,  tu  es  ficelle."  He  says  he  or  she;  speaking  of  his  sister,  he 
says,  "She  washes,  she  darns,"  but  more  willingly,  "a  darns  the 
socks;"  sometimes  even  there  is  entire  suppression  of  the  pronoun, 
"does  errands,  sews  on  the  machine,"  for  "she  does  errands"  etc. 
You  figures  in  this  sentence.  "You  want  to  make  me  angry" 
(Vous  voulez  me  monter  le  cou).  Often  he  uses  the  pronoun  one, 
which  belongs  to  the  Parisian  idiom,  for  example,  "One  is  bored" 
(on  s'ennuie).  Lastly  he  has  a  tendency  to  leave  the  pronoun 
/  understood  and  even  the  auxiliary;  notice  the  following  sen- 
tence. We  ask  him,  "What  have  you  done  this  morning?"  A. 
Brought  the  soup.  Q.  And  then  afterwards  what  else  have  you 
done?  A.  Been  to  get  bread.  He  suppresses  in  these  cases,  I 
have  brought,  I  have  been,  etc.  Also  here,  boasting  of  his  skill  in 
bottling  wine,  he  says,  "Never  broken  any  bottles,  I,  monsieur;" 
instead  of  "7  have  never,"  etc. 

Tenses.  The  verb  is  used  in  either  the  present  or  the  past;  we 
find  some  examples  of  the  perfect.  Thus  having  perceived  one 
of  us  pretending  to  take  pins  out  of  the  bowl  on  the  sly,  Victor 
denounces  him  by  saying,  "He  has  taken  some  pins."  Another 
time,  reproducing  a  story  he  said,  "The  coachman  has  crushed  a 
man,"  We  could  even  cite  some  examples  of  the  imperfect  of 
the  indicative,  but  only  in  cases  where  it  had  been  suggested  by 
a  question  in  the  imperfect.  Q.  What  did  your  sister  do?  A. 
She  worked.  We  have  never  encountered  the  future.  The  only 
way  in  which  he  ever  speaks  of  an  event  in  the  future  is  by  putting 
it  in  the  present,  "My  sister  comes  tomorrow,  Sunday." 


EVOLUTION  OF  LANGUAGE  209 

Articles.  Definite  and  indefinite  articles  are  employed  cor- 
rectly; only  he  often  leaves  them  understood,  "Policeman  has 
arrested  a  man,"  for  "the  policeman,  etc." 

Agreement.  The  agreement  of  a  noun  with  its  adjective  is 
made  correctly.     "He  is  nice,  my  chief"  {II  est  gentil,  mon  chef). 

To  be  definite,  we  do  not  find  it  necessary  in  Victor's  case  to 
make  any  special  remark  upon  vocabulary  or  phonetics.  The  only 
pecuHarity  worthy  of  note  concerns  the  assemblage  of  words. 
There  is  nothing  incorrect  in  that  assemblage,  but  it  tends  toward 
coBcis^fiess-HTid^simplicity^by-  thtr^  redaction  of  the  words  in  a 
sentenc©-  and  by  the  freqtient  suppression  of  words,  usually  those 
that  commence  the  ocntonctv-anxLiastly  by  never  _employing 
subefdiaate  propositions,  which  is  a  characteristic  to  be  noted; 
and  this  seems  to  prove  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  form  these 
propositions  mentally,  than  to  conjugate  the  verbs  or  to  correctly 
employ  the  articles  and  pronouns  or  to  make  the  adjectives  agree 
with  the  substantives. 

Briefly,  the  characteristic  feature  of  this  syntax  seems  to  us 
to  be  atrophy.  It  is  in  harmony  with  the  mental  state  of  this 
imbecile,  which  is  especially  a  state  of  poverty.^ 

'  There  is  a  point  which  we  have  not  treated  in  the  text,  from  lack 
of  sufficient  data;  it  is  in  relation  to  a  very  interesting  question  about 
which  we  have  only  our  suspicions.  It  has  been  seen  that  we  can  give  to 
each  defective  the  age  of  a  normal  child,  for  example  we  can  say  of  a  cer- 
tain imbecile  of  thirty  that  he  has  the  development  of  a  child  of  five.  This 
comparison  is  never  altogether  correct  in  that  which  concerns  language. 
The  defective  appears  to  us  to  have  a  language  development  superior  to 
the  normal.  Here  is  a  curious  proof.  One  of  us  charged  one  of  our  pupils, 
Mile.  Hoffman,  to  study  the  association  of  ideas  with  school  children. 
It  turned  out  that  children  of  seven  years  scarcely  found  as  words  to 
associate  any  but  those  of  the  same  sound,  of  the  type  of  these ;  the  word 
given  is  chapeau  (hat)  the  child  repeats  chapeau  or  says  peau  (skin)  or  chat 

(cat),  etc On  the  contrary,  middle  grade  imbeciles  of  the 

type  of  Victor,  who  is  certainly  not  at  the  level  of  seven  years,  can  find 
associations  of  other  words,  by  relation  of  significance;  to  chapeau  they 
reply  for  instance  by  the  word  tSte  (head).  It  is  evident  that  from  the 
point  of  view  of  verbal  ideation,  this  is  a  higher  level.  We  note  this  fact 
in  passing,  counting  upon  returning  to  it  later  after  having  studied  it  more 
deeply. 


X.  THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  THOUGHT  AND 

LANGUAGE 

There  is  no  problem  more  discussed  than  this.  It  is  only 
candidates  for  the  bachelor's  degree  who  are  able  to  discuss  the 
matter  with  ease.  Those  who  have  reflected  a  little  are  not  slow 
in  finding  that  the  problem  is  very  complex.  But  there  is  some 
chance  of  solving  it,  if,  instead  of  taking  it  in  its  entirety,  we 
divide  it  into  parts. 

Experiments  upon  the  mechanism  of  thought,  undertaken  and 
published  by  one  of  us  five  or  six  years  ago^  ^  which  have  been  taken 
up  and  developed  of  late  years  in  Germany,  especially  by  Kulpe 
and  his  pupils,"  have  shown,  as  a  first  point,  the  necessity  of  mak- 
ing a  distinction  between  the  thought  and  the  image;  to  think  can 
not  be  reduced  simply  to  recalling  an  image,  because  one  must  also 
comprehend  the  image,  that  is  to  say  one  must  realize  what  it 
is  meant  to  represent  as  though  it  were  a  picture.  The  proof 
of  this  is  to  be  found  in  experimental  facts  which  are  particularly 
striking.  When  with  minute  care  one  questions  a  person  upon 
what  he  has  just  thought  and  upon  what  he  has  just  imaged, 
one  notices  that  from  his  description  there  is  a  disagreement, 
almost  a  contradiction,  between  the  thought  and  the  image;' it 
happens,  in  fact,  that  one  thinks  one  thing  and  represents  to  one- 
self another.  More  often,  and  one  might  even  say  always,  thfi, 
ihoughtn:gTTdre!'"ttnm' 'the  images ;  one  pictures  to  oneself  a  part 
while  tmB  thinks  the  whole.  Example:  one  has  the  idea  of  an 
excursion  planned  for  the  morrow,  but  one  does  not  represent  to 
oneself  either  the  excursion  or  "tomorrow;"  one  visualizes  only 
the  surroundings,  for  instance  the  mountainous  district  that  one 
is  going  to  visit.  William  James  held  these  ideas;  but  he  held 
them  theoretically;  the  best  deduced  of  these  reasonings,  and 
even  his  too  theoretic  examples,  have  not  the  eloquence  of  the 

'"  See  Vtllude  experimentale  de  I' intelligence,  by  Binet,  Paris,  Schleicher 
Bros. 

11  See  Revue  ginerale  sur  Vintelligence,  by  Larguier  des  Bancels,  I'Annee 
psychologique,  XIII,  p.  476. 

210 


THOUGHT  AND  LANGUAGE  211 

introspections  gathered  from  persons  who  have  no  theory  and 
who  do  not  reason.     It  results  from  all  this,  that  the  thought  and 
tli.e_  image  are  two  and  that  there  can  exist  a  thought  without  an 
_imag£. 

In  what  then  does  thought  consist?     If  it  is  something  other 
than  the  total  of  our  representations,  of  what  elements  is  it  com- 
posed?    Certain  critics  of  our  earlier  work  have  objected  to  the 
idea  that  a  thought  can  exist  without  sensorial  elements;  they 
have  suggested  that  what  is  lacking  in  the  image,  which  is  always 
individual,  narrow  and  paltry,  to  enable  it  to  keep  pace  with  the 
unfolding  of  the  thought,  can  be  supplied  by  the  word.     The 
thought  would  thus  be  at  the  same  time  image  and  inner  language, 
a  combination  of  both,  and  what  is  not  image  would  be  speech,  and 
what  is  not  speech  would  be  image.     Let  us  remark  before  going 
farther  that  this  explanation  is  not  entirely  satisfactory  because 
one  can  object  at  once  that  language  is  but  a  substitute  and  has 
only  the  value  of  a  symbol,  a  factitious  value.     A  word  in  reality 
signifies  nothing  in  itself,  it  is  less  expressive  than  an  image,  it  is 
only  an  inert  brute  element,  like  the  noise  of  the  wind  or  the 
sound  of  a  hammer,  and  consequently  has  more  need  than  the 
image  of  being  completed  by  some  other  thing  which  represents 
its  signification.     On  the  whole  the  debate  comes  back  to  this; 
to  make  it  clear  let  us  represent  a  thought  by  pieces  of  money; 
the  thought  corresponds,  let  us  say,  to  100  francs.     But  the  image 
is  not  worth  100  francs,  it  is  worth  only  20  or  30  sous;  but  the 
wo'rd  is  not  money  at  all,  it  is  only  a  substitute  for  money;  the 
word  is  like  commercial  paper,  a  bank  note,  which  is  the  sign  of  a 
gold  reserve.     But  where  is  this  reserve?     In  what  does  it  consist? 
If  we  attack  this  problem  by  the  way  of  experimentation,  this 
is  exactly  the  question  to  which  it  is  necessary  to  reply;  iik+^thc 
image  the  yvord  corresponds  only  to  a  fragmeftt-ef- the  thought; 
to  translate  the  thought  in  its  entirety  into  words  would  require 
a  long  discourse.     Thus  one  asks  a  person  if  she  has  read  a  cer- 
tain book,  and  she  replies,  "No."     This  negation,  to  which  she 
limits  herself,  does  not  correspond  to  her  complex  thought,  because 
that  no  is  a  general  negation,  consequently  very  vague;  while  the 
person  makes  a  negation  of  an  extraordinary  precision,  speciali/(.'d 
to  a  certain  question  and  regarding  a  certain  l)()f)k.     Tlius,  evi- 
dently, thtL_lhoiightiaH-|>u»u^t:^t.lK'-  word.     Let  us  suppose  if  the 
thought  surpasses  the  word  spoken,  it  is  possible  that  it  does  not 


212  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

surpass  the  word  thought ;  it  is  possible  that  our  interlocutor  limits 
herself  to  pronouncing  this  little  word  no,  but  has  an  inner  lan- 
guage very  much  richer.  One  can  imagine  that  she  pronounced 
mentally  or  heard  mentally  the  entire  sentence,  "No,  I  have  not 
read  the  book  about  which  you  speak;"  and  if  this  supposition 
seems  too  opposed  to  the  personal  feeling  which  we  have  of  not 
making  such  a  use  of  the  inner  language  when  the  thing  is  not 
worth  the  trouble,  one  would  still  say  that  the  above  sentence 
was  repeated  in  a  shortened  form,  murmured,  whispered,  or  in  a 
word  that  it  might  have  been  in  our  consciousness  like  a  large 
panorama  which  one  takes  in  with  a  glance  of  the  eye  rapid  as 
the  lightning.     Is  this  supposition  correct? 

This  is  a  difficult  question  to  answer  when  we  take  for  subjects 
those  whose  inner  language  is  already  well  developed.  These 
persons  may  protest  as  much  as  they  like,  affirm  that  they  do  not 
represent  to  themselves  in  any  possible  manner  entire  sentences 
which  would  be  necessary  for  an  adequate  expression  of  their 
thought,  but  the  fact  still  remains  doubtful;  because  being  capable 
of  this  verbal  development  one  may  suppose  that  they  are  not 
conscious  of  it,  that  they  have  performed  the  operation  uncon- 
sciously. All  this  doubt  is  cleared  away  by  the  examination  of 
imbeciles  and  also  of  aphasics. 

We  have  already  recounted  that  Denise  one  day  had  a  ring  on 
her  finger,  which  she  turned  and  re-turned  with  satisfaction. 
We  asked  her,  "Who  gave  you  that  pretty  ring?"  Without 
hesitation  she  replied,  "Mama."  Let  us  weigh  this  word.  Let 
us  note  that  in  order  for  the  thought  contained  in  this  reply  to 
be  completely  developed  in  language,  it  would  be  necessary  that 
Denise  had  replied  to  us  or  had  simply  thought  to  herself  the  fol- 
lowing sentence,  "It  was  mama  who  gave  me  this  ring."  But 
she  cannot  articulate  even  mentally  this  sentence,  which  is  very 
evident,  since  her  vocabulary  is  reduced  to  five  or  six  words  and 
her  mental  level  does  not  permit  her  to  make  sentences.  We 
are  therefore  very  certain  that,  in  this  case,  her  thought  has  no 
corresponding  series  of  necessary  words;,  it  is  indeed  a  thought 
without  sufficient  words  and  consequently  there  is  in  her  a,  thought 
without  words. 

We  find  analogous  examples  furnished  by  aphasics.  The  watch- 
maker, observations  of  whom  we  have  previously  reported,  when 
we  suggest  to  him  a  complicated  act  like  counting  aloud  20  sous 


\ 


THOUGHT  AND  LANGUAGE  213 

in  1-sou  pieces,  remains  a  moment  reflecting  upon  the  money- 
spread  out  before  him  upon  the  table  and  then  says  to  us  with 
profound  conviction,  emphasizing  each  word,  "Ta,  7ion\"  ("That, 
no")  which  signifies:  ''I  feel  myself  incapable  of  doing  what  you 
ask."  This  last  sentence  our  aphasic  evidently  could  not  pro- 
nounce, since  his  language  also  is  reduced  to  a  few  words,  and 
since  he  can  no  longer  construct  sentences.  But  the  argument 
furnished  by  this  observation  is  perhaps  less  convincing  than  that 
which  is  furnished  by  our  imbecile ;  one  can  always  suppose  than  an 
aphasic  who  has  previously  spoken  has  retained  a  better  inner  lan- 
guage than  his  actual  articulated  language,  and  that  what  he  does 
not  say  with  his  phonetic  organs  he  can  say  to  himself  mentally. 

Let  us-tberef ore- return  to  our  imbecile;  with  her  we  are  at  least 
certain  that  there  exists  no  interior  language  sufficiently  compli- 
cated^jtP-give  place  to  sentences.  Let  us  cite  a  second  observa- 
tion of  her.  She  is  very  modest,  almost  laughably  so,  and  we 
apologize  for  presuming  upon  it;  but  a  psychologist  has  the  right 
to  take  his  material  wherever  he  finds  it.  Often  during  our 
conference  she  has  interrupted  her  bursts  of  laughter  by  taking 
on  a  serious  air  and  coming  close  to  us  to  say  under  her  breath, 
"pipi!"  which  signified  in  a  sentence,  "I  wish  to  pipi;  conduct 
me  to  the  toilet  or  else  let  me  go  alone.*'  But  here  we  hold 
the  irrefutable  proof,  as  we  believe,  that  language  is  not  coex- 
tensive with  thought.  It  is  absolutely  certain  that  Denise  is  not 
able  to  conceive  mentally  of  this  sentence  nor  of  any  other 
sentence  as  slightly  complex  as  one  can  imagine  but  capable  of 
expressing  the  same  thought.  The  proof  which  comes  from  this 
observation  is  excellent,  very  much  superior  to  that  furnished  by 
the  word  "Mama."  In  replying  this  word  Denise  has  heard 
and  understood  the  sentence  by  which  we  asked  the  question, 
and  if  she  is  incapable  of  forming  a  sentence  herself,  one  might 
suppose  as  a  last  resource  that  she  had  retained  our  sentence 
which  she  heard,  and  that  it  was  the  memory  of  this  sentence 
which  constituted  the  verbal  part  of  her  thouglit.  Here  the  objec- 
tion can  find  no  place,  because  Denise  heard  no  sentence;  she  is 
not  replying,  she  said  the  word  pipi  spontaneously,  wiiidi  thus 
finds  itself  in  a  place  to  solve  one  of  the  highest  problems  of  the 
psychology  of  thought. 

Very  many  other  analogous  observations  might  be  cited.  Among 
our  low  grade  imbeciles  there  is  a  young  man  of  Iwenty-fivc,  with 


214  THE    INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

regular  features,  who  also  understands  complex  sentences  but  has 
a  vocabulary  reduced  to  some  ten  words.  One  day  when  we 
wished  him  to  write,  he  refused  to  take  the  pen,  and  touching  his 
right  hand  with  his  left  hand,  repeated  several  times  in  a  voice 
expressive  of  pain  the  word,  "Bad!  Bad!  Bad!"  Evidently  he 
wished  to  say,  as  all  his  gestures  of  refusal  and  of  suffering  clearly 
indicated,  that  his  right  hand  hurt  him  and  that  it  was  this  which 
prevented  him  from  taking  the  pen.  This  makes  still  another 
case  where  one  could  not  make  a  hypothesis  of  the  existence  of 
inner  language  which  would  be  richer  than  the  word  effectively 
pronounced. 

Still  another  objection.  It  will  be  said  to  us,  "Your  reasoning 
contains  an  error;  it  consists  in  regarding  turn  by  turn  the  image 
and  the  word,  apropos  of  different  examples.  You  commence  by 
remarking,  apropos  of  the  image,  it  does  not  represent  all  the 
thought.  But  it  will  be  further  said  it  remains  possible  that,  if 
words  and  image  are  insufficient  taken  separately,  they  suffice 
when  they  are  taken  together,  and  the  lack  in  the  image  is  sup- 
plied by  the  word  and  vice  versa.  It  remains  possible  to  continue 
the  objection  that  if  Denise  does  not  find  in  her  inner  language, 
evidently  very  rudimentary,  anything  to  think  with,  she  manages 
to  think  by  images  and  nothing  prevents  us  from  supposing  that 
an  imbecile  visualizes  very  much  more  than  a  normal  person. 

Evidently  this  is  possible;  it  is  probable  that  we  shall  never 
know  to  what  point  this  is  true  because  of  the  impossibility  there 
will  always  be  of  demanding  introspection  of  an  imbecile  of  the 
grade  of  Denise.  But  our  opinion  is  that  images  scarcely  serve 
to  do  more  than  to  represent  material  objects,  the  things  per- 
ceptible to  the  senses;  acts  picture  themselves  imperfectly  to  the 
eye  of  the  mind ;  still  more  is  this  true  for  the  conditions,  the  pro- 
jects, the  relations  of  time  and  space,  in  a  word,  for  all  kinds  of 
associations.  The  "I  wish  to  pipi"  or  the  "I  cannot  write  because 
my  finger  is  bad,"  cannot  be  expressed  in  images;  they  are  thoughts 
of  relations  which  can  only  express  themselves  in  words;  and  if 
the  words  do  not  suffice,  as  in  the  present  case,  it  is  not  the  image 
which  supplements  their  absence. ^^ 

'2  Since  we  are  here  treating  a  question  of  general  psychology,  we  seize 
the  opportunity  to  add  that  one  of  us  (Binet),  in  experiments  still  unpub- 
lished, has  succeeded  in  creating  among  adults  a  state  where  the  inner 
language  is  suspended,  and  where  the  subject  can  still  think,  but  rudi- 
mentarily.     This  artificial  state,  difficult  enough  to  obtain  and  especially 


THOUGHT  AND  LANGUAGE  215 

All  this  comes  back  then  to  the  conclusion  that  the  thought  is 
distinct  both  fpom  the  image  and  from  the  word,  that  it  is  quite 
anotherthingj  that  it  constitutes  a  different  element.  But  in  what 
does  this  element  consist'.'  We  suppose  tiiat  it  has  the  nature  of 
feeling.  This  would  be  an  intellectual  feeling,  consequently  very 
vague  in  its  nature  but  one  whose  presence  and  especially  whose 
effects  we  perceive;  and  it  is  indeed  by  its  effects  that  it  is  revealed 
to  us,  because  the  thought  is  not  at  all  a  state;  it  is  an  action,  not 
a  gesture;  one  sees  the  consequence  of  the  gesture  very  much 
more  than  the  gesture  itself.  American  psychologists  have  under- 
stood this  when  they  established  their  antithesis  between  the 
psychology  of  structure  and  the  psychology  of  function;  the  first 
is  especially  descriptive,  it  recounts  the  state  of  that  which  is; 
the  second  has  especially  the  point  of  view  of  the  action ;  it  places 
the  accent  upon  that  which  serves,  upon  that  which  is  useful, 
upon  that  which  is  accomplished.  It  is  the  confused  and  often 
enaotional-percg^tion  of  that  which  prepares  and  accomplishes 
itsellinjis,  which  constitutes  the  thought.  This-vague  sentiment 
becomes  more  precise  when  it  produces  images,  words  and  acts; 
the  representations,  the  inner  language,  and  the  acts,  are  the  con- 
scious forms  of  the  thought;  they  are  like  the  light,  they  render 
the  thought  visible  to  us;  they  reveal  to  us  the  detail  as  the 
touches  of  color  placed  upon  the  canvas  reveal  to  us  the  gestures 
of  an  artist  whom  we  watch  at  work  while  standing  behind  him. 
But-they  come  only  after  the  thought,  they  are  its  result;  before 
imagining  the  thought,  before  speaking  it,  it  is  comprehended, 
it  is  performed.  It  is-this  feeling  that  dictates  the  words,  and 
suggests  the  images;  and  in  their  turn,  images  and  words  react 
upon  the  feeling,  amplify  it,  render  it  precise  or  modify  it  by  a 
reciprocal  work  where  the  cause  becomes  the  effect,  and  the  eifect 
becomes  cause. 

to  prolong,  is  produced  by  a  constant  exercise  of  whistlinp;  or  sustaining  a 
sound,  or  of  continually  repeating  the  same  word.  If,  to  a  person  who 
conscientiously  applies  himself  to  this  work  of  plionafion,  one  puts  a 
question  in  abstract  terms,  which  rofjuires  of  him  some  reflection,  judg- 
ment, an  act  of  approbation  or  of  disapprobation,  the  person  may  arrive  at 
judging  with  exactitude  and  of  having  the  sentiment  of  approval  or  dis- 
approval, although  no  single  word  of  the  inner  laiigiuigc  is  at  his  service. 
Unfortunat(;ly  these  experiments  cannot  often  be  n-jx-ated,  because  after 
several  attempts  the  subject  succeeds  in  adapting  himself,  and  he  returns 
to  his  inner  language,  even  while  his  mouth  whistles  or  pronotinces  words; 
it  is  especially  in  the  initial  i)eriod  thut   the  exiM-riment   is  profitable. 


216  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 

We  think  it  very  probable  that  this  initial  intellectual  feeling, 
which  precedes  images  and  words  and  from  which  the  images  and 
words  seem  to  come  like  a  natural  emanation,  plays  an  important 
role  in  the  realization  which  we  have  of  our  thought.  In  a  word 
it  gives  us  a  foretaste  of  our  thought,  it  permits  us  to  perceive  it 
before  it  is  defined. 

It  is  probably  for  this  reason  that  our  thought  seems  to  belong 
to  us,  and  that  our  images  and  our  words  are  attributed  to  our 
personahty  and  not  judged  as  elements  that  have  come  from 
without,  which  would  be  strangers  to  us.  There  are  very  many 
mental  states  in  which  our  sensorial  and  verbal  representations 
are  despoiled  of  this  particular  virtue  of  incorporating  themselves 
with  our  person;  indeed  in  some  idees  fixes,  some  obsessions,  the 
subject  feels  himself  taken  possession  of  by  something  which  is 
other  than  himself;  and  it  is  probable  that  a  good  part  of  the 
externalization  of  the  hallucinations  depend  upon  this  character. 
There  is  room  here  to  investigate  whether  certain  psychic  states 
in  alienation  could  not  be  explained  by  a  loss  of  this  intellectual 
feeling  which  prepares  the  representative  phase  of  the  thought.^' 

In  any  case,  we  believe  we  have  proved  beyond  doubt  by  our 
precise  observations  that-±hera-is  a  thought  without  images,  that 
there  is  a  thought  without  words,  and  that  the  thought  is  formed 
by  means  of  an  intellectual  feeling.  These  are  facts  altogether 
simple,  elementary,  demonstrable,  which  will  serve  later  as  founda- 
tions for  new  experiments  and  theories  upon  thought. 

Alfred  Binet  and  Th.  Simon. 

"  It  goes  without  saying  that  our  thesis  is  contradictory  to  that  of  M. 
Janet  who  has  supposed  that  the  attributing  of  one  of  our  states  to  our  per- 
sonality is  made  by  means  of  what  he  calls  " a  personal  perception;"  that  is 
to  say,  if  we  understand  him  rightly,  a  judgment  of  attribution  which  is 
essentially  intellectual  in  nature.  Already  a  penetrating  critic,  M.  Maigre, 
had  remarked  that  this  personal  perception  is  an  operation  of  which  we 
have  absolutely  no  consciousness;  it  is  therefore  an  hypothesis  which  one 
must  present  with  a  certain  discretion  and  not  as  a  fact  of  observation. 
If  not  M.  Janet,  at  least  his  pupils  have  too  often  spoken  of  the  personal 
perception  as  though  it  were  a  fact.  We  prefer  to  confide  the  same  r61e  to 
another  process,  the  intellectual  feeling,  whose  existence  at  least  is  not 
contestable  after  all  the  observations  and  experiments  which  we  have 
reported,  and  it  seems  to  us  more  natural  to  suppose  that  this  fundamental 
r61e  of  incorporation  of  a  state  into  the  personality  is  held  by  a  sentiment, 
than  to  cause  the  intervention  of  an  act  of  judgment.  At  least  the 
opinion  of  M.  Janet  will  be  interesting  to  have. 


PART  III 

Feeble-Mindedness  and  Dementia 


I.  THE  INTELLECTUAL  WEAKENING  IN  GENERAL 

PARALYSIS 

1.  Criticism  of  current  definitions  of  dementia.  Does 
there  exist  a  clear  and  precise  conception  of  dementia?  Certainly 
not.  The  best  definition  given  until  very  recently  is  the  following : 
dementia  consists  in  a  definite,  progressive  weakening  of  the  intel- 
lectual faculties  following  a  state  of  normal  intelligence.  Let  us  note 
that  this  definition  contains  two  distinct  elements,  the  one  evolu- 
tional, the  other  static.  Let  us  take  the  evolutional  character; 
this  is  doubtless  very  important  for  diagnosis,  since  from  the  time 
of  Esquirol  it  has  distinguished  dementia  from  idiocy  and  similar 
states;  but  this  is  only  a  historical  character,  from  which  one  could 
not  draw  any  idea  of  the  real  import  of  the  dementia  at  the 
moment  of  observation.  The  second  element  of  the  definition, 
the  intellectual  weakening,  is  still  more  unsatisfactory  because  it 
offers  nothing  that  is  really  characteristic  if  we  adhere  to  so 
vague  a  formula.  What  is  this  intellectual  weakening  of  which 
we  speak?  In  what  does  it  consist?  In  what  particular  does  it 
differ  from  the  state  of  the  intellectual  faculties  found  among  so 
many  of  the  insane  who  are  not  dements?  Intellectual  weaken- 
ing is  almost  the  rule  among  the  insane.  Let  us  take  melan- 
cholies; it  is  a  very  commonplace  observation  that  these  pationis 
are  less  intelligent  and,  as  it  were,  weakened  in  intelligence  dur- 
ing their  affliction,  as  compared  with  their  state  when  cured. 
As  to  alcoholics,  Kraepelin  speaks  repeatedly  of  their  weakening 
intellectually.  Chronic  delirium  cases,  according  to  some  alienists, 
present  an  attendant  state  of  mental  debility  though  this  is  per- 
haps quastionable.  Let  us  set  these  cases  aside  along  with  cer- 
tain degenerates;  it  seems  that  all  other  insane  cases  without  ex- 
ception have  a  weakened  intelligence.  Certain  ones  arc  perhaps 
80  only  temporarily,  and  constitute  what  was  once  called  acute 
curable  dementia;  but  in  any  case,  during  the  period  of  the 
existence  of  the  disease,  this  weakened  condition  is  evident,  often 
demonstrable  and  even   measurable.     The  distinctive   erit(>rion 

219 


220  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

which  one  seeks  in  this  succession  of  ideas  has  therefore  not  yet 
been  found. 

If  no  clear  conception  of  dementia  exists  in  the  writings  of  the 
older  alienists,  may  we  not  at  least  find  it  among  moderns,  who 
for  several  years  past  have  prided  themselves  on  employing  in 
psychiatry  the  language  of  psychology?  Not  among  them  either. 
For  to  say  as  some  do,  that  paralytic  dementia  is  a  lack  of  mental 
synthesis  is  to  be  satisfied  with  words  in  order  to  follow  the  fashion, 
for  this  term  mental  synthesis  is  used  to-day,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
apropos  of  everything,  and  consequently  does  not  apply  any  more 
exactly  to  dements  than  to  other  insane  patients.  To  see  in  para- 
lytic dementia  an  incoherence  of  the  association  of  ideas,  as  Mas- 
selon  has  lately  proposed  (see  Intellectual  Weakening,  I'Annee 
Psychologique,  XIII,  p.  260)  is  to  attempt  a  psychological  expla- 
nation which,  though  more  precise  than  the  preceding,  is  only 
the  more  criticisable,  because  the  ideational  phenomenon  of  in- 
coherence is  to  be  found  among  many  other  mental  patients. 
Since  it  is  very  much  less  accentuated  among  general  paralytics 
than  among  many  maniacal,  hallucinational,  and  confusional  states, 
it  cannot  therefore  characterize  dementia.  The  great,  the  serious 
fault  of  these  so  called  psychological  definitions  is  that  they  are  so 
commonplace;  far  from  being  applicable  to  dementia  alone  they 
would  answer  equally  well  for  nearly  all  forms  of  insanity. 

Whence  does  it  come  then  that,  notwithstanding  the  inade- 
quacy of  this  theory,  practitioners  have  the  merited  reputation  of 
making  an  early  diagnosis  of  general  paralysis  with  the  greatest 
accuracy?  It  is,  first,  because  they  make  use  of  signs,  especially 
of  certain  physical  signs  which  ordinarily  accompany  dementia. 
For  instance,  if  an  individual  has  a  pupillary  inequality,  especially 
if  he  has  difficulty  of  speech,  and  if  to  this  difficulty  be  added  the 
poorly  defined  symptom,  intellectual  weakening,  then  the  diagnos- 
tician hesitates  no  longer;  it  is  paralytic  dementia;  the  practitioner 
leaves  to  the  psychologist  the  delicate  and  unnecessary  work  of 
analyzing  the  intellectual  weakening  of  the  dement.  In  addition  to 
the  physical  signs,  and  even  when  these  are  lacking,  the  practitioner 
makes  use  of  certain  information  furnished  by  the  family  concern- 
ing the  conduct  of  the  patient;  this  information  is  characteristic; 
it  bears  upon  facts  which  are  stamped  in  advance  as  symptoms  of 
dementia.     The  neglect  of  his  affairs,  the  lack  of  care  and  neatness. 


CRITICISM    OF    DEFINITIONS   OF   DEMENTIA  221 

forgetting  his  address,  the  impossibilit}-  of  performing  a  com- 
plicated errand,  errors  in  making  change,  heedless  extravagance, 
are  the  facts  which  the  practitioner  recalls  under  the  form  of 
striking  incidents;  if  he  finds  these  or  other  similar  incidents  in  the 
life  of  his  patient  he  hesitates  no  longer,  nor  does  he  further  scru- 
tinize the  mentality  of  the  patient.  IMore  than  this,  persons  of  the 
highest  authority  who  have  written  upon  the  intellectual  symp- 
toms of  paralytic  dementia  have  done  no  more  than  recall  such  a 
series  of  incidents  while  summarily  classifying  them  under  the 
heads  of  disorders  of  memory,  of  attention,  of  will;  they  believe 
they  are  writing  psychology  and  characterizing  a  mental  state. 

It  is  true  that  this  empiricism  usually  suffices  for  the  needs  of 
medical  practice.  But  it  does  not  always  suffice.  We  recall  that 
once  we  were  asked  to  diagnose  the  case  of  a  woman  some  fifty 
years  of  age  who  had  the  small  head  of  an  imbecile.  Her  clothing 
was  dirty  and  in  disorder,  she  balanced  herself  on  her  chair  and 
had  spasmodic  mumbling.  She  gave  slow,  monosyllabic  answers 
to  our  questions  and  did  not  seem  to  understand  the  greater  part 
of  them  especially  the  difficult  ones;  she  gave  indeed  the  impres- 
sion of  a  diminished  intelligence,  but  was  she  an  imbecile  or  a 
paralytic?  She  had  no  pupillary  inequality  and  spoke  too  little 
to  show  derangement  of  speech.  The  first  physician  saw  in  her  an 
imbecile;  as  for  us,  allowing  ourselves  to  be  guided  by  one  of  those 
almost  indefinable  impressions  which  are  so  frequent  in  mental 
pathology,  we  inclined  toward  general  paralysis.  At  this  moment 
we  are  well  convinced  that  only  by  the  study  of  the  mentality 
would  it  be  possible  to  decide,  and  to  recognize  dementia  one 
must  know  what  it  is  from  the  psychological  point  of  view. 

But  the  most  serious  objection  that  one  can  make  against  the 
empiricism  of  practitioners  is  that  if  empiricism  does  suffice  to 
make  with  surety  the  greater  part  of  the  daily  diagnosis  it  does 
not  go  beyond  diagnosis;  this  is  practice  but  not  science,  that  is 
to  say  particular  not  general;  and,  moreover,  practice  being  thus 
separated  from  theory  remains  local,  partial,  commonplace  and 
does  not  benefit  by  more  extensive  studies;  this  is  very  nuicli  to 
be  regretted  because  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the  difTen^nt 
forms  of  insanity  show  relations  and  resem1)lanccs  among  them- 
selves and  the  analysis  of  one  would  greatly  illuniinate  the  others. 

It  is  urujcr  the  influcnff  f)f  these  irleas  llinf  we  have  imdertakcii 


222  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

our  investigations.  Wo  have  studied  the  two-prmdipai  forms'  uf 
dementia,  senile  and  paralj^tic,  especially  the  latter,  endeavoring  to 
find  the  psychological  formula  which  applies  to  it  and  to  it  alone, 
because  this  is  the  necessary  condition  of  every  demonstration. 
How  we  went  about  it  will  be  seen  from  what  follows.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  explain  our  method;  the  best  way  is  to  see  it  in  ac- 
tion. We  have  seen,  examined  and  submitted  to  every  sort  of 
experimentation  some  forty  patients.  It  is  man}^,  even  too  many; 
we  have  accumulated  so  much  material  only  because  the  idea  which 
was  to  come  out  of  it  and  permit  us  to  interpret  it  all  was  long  in 
making  itself  known  and  we  have  been  able  to  see  clearly  only 
after  long  groping  in  the  dark. 

We  begin  by  the  study  of  general  paralysis,  or  paralytic 
dementia.^ 

2.  The  lowering  of  the  intellectual  LiEVEL  in  paralytic 
DEMENTIA.  We  are  going  to  show  that  evety-demeH^4ia8-an  in-, 
tellectual  level  below  normal.  This  statement  needs  explanation 
because  it  would  seem  that  we  are,  as  it  were,  breaking  down  a 
door  which  is  not  locked,  and  it  will  be  thought  useless  to  demon- 
strate what  everybody  knows;  namely,  that  dementia  carries 
with  it  an  intellectual  weakening.  But  we  lay  aside  this  expres- 
sion intellectual  weakening,  which  is  vague  and  equivocal  and 
which  we  shall  reserve  for  criticism  farther  on.  We  wish  to  show 
especially  that  if-eur  measuring  scale  of  intelligence  were  used, 
which  is  composed  of  a  graded  series  of  slight  difficulties  to  be 
overcome,  of  little  problems  to  be  solved,  it  would  be  ^asy  to  de- 
termine the  point  in  this  series  where  the  dement  fails;  and  as 
each  point  of  the  scale  corresponds  to  a  level  of  normal  age  es- 
tablished as  a  result  of  experiments  upon  normal  children7'this 
procedure  permits  the  determination  of  the  mental  age  of  a  gen- 
eral paralytic,  by  saying  for  instance  that  he  is  at  the  level  of 
eight  years  or  of  five  years.     We  have  here  a  measure  whose  pre- 

1  The  present  study  is,  in  a  certain  measure,  complete  in  itself;  but,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  directing  idea  and  of  the  method,  it  is  closely  con- 
nected with  our  four  preceding  studies  upon  alienation  the  conclusions 
of  which  it  continues.  See  in  U Annee  Psychologique,  XIII,  p.  163, 
and  following,  our  three  articles  on  sub-normals;  XIV,  p.  1,  our  article 
already  cited  upon  the  Development  of  the  Intelligence  among  Children; 
XIV,  p.  284,  the  article  upon  Language  and  Thought;  and  finally  in  the 
present  volume,  the  article  upon  The  Intelligence  of  Imbeciles. 


LOWERING   OF   THE    INTELLECTUAL   LEVEL  223 

cision  is  interesting,  and  quite  preferable  to  that  commonplace 
assertion  that  a  certain  patient  is  very  weak  mentallj^  and  that 
another  is  not  so  weak.  We  have  taken  the  level  of  intelligence 
of  a  great  number  of  dements  and  here  is  what  we  have  noted. 

Althought  the  method  was  organized  for  children  and  imbeciles 
only,  the  great  majority  of  dements  lend  themselves  admirably  to 
it  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place  this  is  because  of  their  oon- 
fi4iHg,  happy,  optimistic  character.  They  seat  themselves  quietly 
and  reply  to  our  questions  without  asking  the  why  or  wherefore 
of  the  examination  even  when  we  abruptly  ask  them  such  childish 
questions,  as,  "How  many  fingers  have  you?"  At  timies  a  slight 
excitement  or  a  touch  of  delirium  troubles  our  examination,  but 
it  amounts  to  very  little.  Only  once  one  of  our  patients,  a  bach- 
elor of  some  forty  years,  on  hearing  our  first  question  replied 
dryly,  "Pardon,  sir,  I  should  like  very  much  to  know  why  you  ask 
me  that."  Let  us  recognize  this  as  the  reply  of  one  who  is  annoyed 
rather  than  of  a  paralytic.  If  our  paralytic  was  capable  of  it,  it 
was  only  because  he  was  at  the  beginning  of  his  affliction  and  his 
mental  level  was  twelve  years  and  consequently  nearly  normal. 
This  is  truly  a  case  where  the  exception  proves  the  rule. 

The  mental  dispositions  which  render  the  general  paralytic 
suited  to  an  examination  of  intelligence  are  not  the  same  as  those 
which  act  upon  imbeciles  and  morons.  In  a  previous  study  we 
have  described  the-attrtude  of  docility  and  deference  which  verj- 
many  defectives  show  us ;  their  deference  is  such  that  they  seem  to 
obey  the  most  absurd  suggestions.  General  paralytics  have  a 
different  character;  if  they  yield  to  an  examination  it  is  not  through 
deference.  This  social  sentiment  is  no  part  of  their  psychology. 
They  are  particularly  satisfied  with  themselves,  without  se- 
quence in  their  ideas,  and  with  a  foundation  of  indifference,  and 
this  mental  state  renders  then  equally  as  manageable  as  iinl)ecile8; 
let  us  add  that  irritability  is  encountered  similarly  in  both. 

Another  reason  why  our  general  paralytics  are  excellent  subjects 
for  experimentation  is  because  their  partieular  form  of  mental 
traui>l€  can  readily  he  caught  by  the  tests.  What  we  here  affirm 
needs  explanation.  Let  us  attempt  to  give  the  tests  to  a  patient 
suffering  from  delusions  of  pcnsecution.  First  he  may  resist, 
grow  angry,  or  refuse  to  speak.  Let  us  suppose  him  to  be  tract- 
able.    In  spite  of  this  his  mental  state  will  not  be  discovered  by 


224  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

our  tests  because,  while  his  delusions  prove  an  absence  of  judg- 
ment, it  is  rare  that  our  special  tests  upon  judgment  show  that 
faculty  to  be  lacking  in  him.  It  would  seem  that  his  intelligence 
is  divided  into  two  parts,  the  one  sane  and  the  other  delirious; 
it  is  only  the  sane  part  that  the  experimenter  can  put  into  action 
by  the  tests.  On  the  contrary,  with  the  paralytic  everything  is 
affected,  the  weakening  is  universal,  and  he  shows  himself  as 
much  at  fault  for  any  question  of  our  examination  as  for  the 
circumstances  of  his  life. 

Another  remark.  Our  method  permits  of  measuring  the  in- 
tellectual  level  without  taking  account  of  accompanying  cir- 
cumstances which  sometimes  produce  an  illusion  in  regard- to  the 
intelligence  of  a  person.  Thus,  we  have  examined  a  patient  whose 
difficulties  of  articulation  were  so  accentuated  that  we  had,  much 
trouble  to  understand  him.  To  listen  to  him  one  would  have 
thought  him  of  very  low  grade;  on  measuring  his  intelligence  we 
found  that  he  had  a  level  of  nine  years.  Psychic  and  physical 
troubles  do  not  always  go  together  although  one  is  certainly  in- 
clined to  that  impression;  do  we  not  find  emphasized  in  treatises 
a  form  of  paralysis  in  which  physical  troubles  are  particularly 
marked?  That  which  was  evident  only  in  very  marked  cases  no 
longer  appears  as  an  exception. 

It  might  be  objected  that  an  extremely  precise  measurement  of 
the  mental  level  of  general  paralytics  is  of  little  value  except  for 
the  moment  it  is  made,  since  they  are  constantly  on  the  road  to 
dissolution.  Consequently  this  measurement  has  not  the  same 
interest  as  in  the  case  of  an  imbecile  whose  level  is  very  much 
nlore  static.  But  there  are  a  number  of  problems  which  remain 
since  the  discovery  of  paralysis,  which  we  have  not  been  able  to 
solve  through  lack  of  method  by  which  we  can  appreciate  the 
degree  of  dementia;  for  instance,  is  paralytic  dementia  progres- 
sive or  does  it  proceed  by  sudden  drops?  Would  not  the  progno- 
sis of  its  evolution  be  different  if  six  months  of  the  afffiction 
sufficed  to  reduce  an  average  intelligence  to  a  level  of  five  years 
while  in  another  case  two  years  of  illness  have  not  resulted  in  a 
similar  decay?  Since  Baillarger  there  has  been  much  discussion 
upon  the  degree  of  retrogression,  upon  its  reality,  whether  it  ex- 
tends only  to  physical  troubles  and  the  phenomena  of  delirium, 
leaving  the  other  functions  definitely  injured,  or  if  paralytic  de- 


MEASURIXG    THE   MENTALITY    OF   A    DEMENT  225 

mentia,  properly  so-called,  although  attributed  by  the  anatomo- 
pathologists  to  the  destruction  of  the  fibers  of  Tuczek,  is  never- 
theless itself  subject  to  retrogression.  The  intellectual  level  of  the 
same  patient  carefully  taken  at  different  dates  would  quickly 
enlighten  us  upon  these  points. 

In  conclusion  we  shall  cite  as  an  example  the  measurement  of 
the  level  of  a  woman  reduced  by  dementia  to  the  intelligence  of  a 
child  of  five  years. 

'  Beauchamp  is  a  woman  of  thirty,  with  delicate  features  and  an 
amiable,  smiling  expression.  She  was  formerly  a  teacher.  Her 
fiusband  who  esteemed  and  admired  her  tells  us  that  she  had  a 
very  cultivated  mind  and  a  taste  for  art  and  literature.  Now  at 
the  end  of  only  six  months  of  illness  she  shows  a  lamentable  de- 
gree of  decay  as  we  shall  demonstrate.  She  talks  willingly  al- 
though chiefly  in  monologue.  Certain  days  she  continually  re- 
peats the  same  story  but  her  recital  is  so  obscure,  so  incoherent,  so 
weak  that  we  cannot  understand  it  even  after  many  repetitions. 
She  talks  about  a  little  child,  very  small,  and  we  conjecture  that 
the  mother  of  Beauchamp  says  to  the  child,  "Oh,  how  dirty  you 
are!"  Then  the  child  seems  to  have  thrown  something  violently 
to  the  floor,  "That  went  poum!"  The  patient  mimics  the  scene 
with  energy.  Soon  after  she  looks  at  us  and  shows  us  the  palm 
of  her  right  hand  where  there  is  a  little  scar  which  moves  her  to 
pity.  She  ends  by  explaining  that  the  apothecary  had  been  con- 
sulted. And  that  is  all.  As  soon  as  the  story  is  ended  the  patient 
begins  again.  We  have  not  been  able  to  discover  whether  that 
little  child  was  Beauchamp  herself  or  not. 

She  lent  herself  willingly  to  the  experiment  as  far  as  her  intelli- 
gence and  power  of  attention  permitted.  In  reality  she  could  not 
comprehend  the  simplest  tests  and  the  explanation  which  we  gave 
her  served  practically  no  purpose  at  all.  Below  we  give  our  con- 
versation with  a  table  showing  the  tests  passed.  We  call  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  the  sign  -|-  indicates  that  the  test  has  been 
passably  well  executed  while  —  is  the  sign  of  failure. 


226 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 


Measuring  Scale  of  Intelligence.     Results  Obtained  with  Beauchamp, 

General  Paralytic 


TESTS 

RE- 
PLIES 

TESTS 

RB- 
PLIKS 

3  years 

Show  nose,  eyes,  mouth 

Enumerate  a  picture 

Repeat  2  figures 

+ 

+ 

+ 
+ 

+ 
+ 

+ 
+ 

6  years 

Show  right  hand,  left  ear 

Repeat  sentence  of  16  sylla- 
bles  

+ 

Repeat  a  sentence  of  6  sylla- 
bles  

Make  aesthetic  comparison.. 
Define  by  use 

— 

Give  family  name 

Do  3  errands 

Tell  age 

_ 

4  years 

Distinguish     morning     and 
evening 

Give  sex 

7  years 
Distinguish  lack  in  figures... 

Give  number  of  fingers 

Copy  a  written  sentence 

Copy  a  diamond 

Name  kev,  knife,  sou 

Reneat  3  figures 

Compare  2  lines 

4- 

5  years 

Compare  2  weights 

Reneat  five  fierures 

Copy  a  square 

Repeat  a  sentence  of  10  sylla- 
bles  

Describe  a  picture 

Count  13  single  sous 

Name  4  pieces  of  money 

8  years 
Reading  with  2  memories . . 
Count  3  single  and  3  double 
sous 

— 

Count  4  sinele  sous 

"Game  of  patience"  with  two 
nieces  

+ 

Name  4  colors 

-f 

Count  from  20  to  0 

Compare  two  objects  from 
memory 

Write  from  dictation 

— 

Q.  Point  to  your  nose. 

A.  It  is  in  the  water!  (Incomprehensible  sentence  but  she  points 
to  her  nose  as  she  says  it.) 

Q.  Point  to  your  eyes. 

A.  Here  they  are!  (She  leaves  her  chair  and  comes  close  to  us  with 
the  intention  of  showing  her  eyes.) 

Q.  Where  is  your  mouth? 

A.  There  it  is!     (She  opens  her  mouth  and  places  her  finger  there.) 


We  see  that  the  first  test  is  passed  and  proceed  to  the  second 


MEASURING    THE   MENTALITi'    OF   A   DEMENT  227 

We  place  before  the  patient  a  picture  representing  an  old  man 
and  a  child  drawing  a  cart. 

Q.  Look  at  this.     Do  you  see?     Tell  me  what  we  have  here? 

A.  Oh!     I  do  not  know. 

Q.  Look  at  it  closely! — 

A.  Oh!     I  don't  know 1  do  not  know.     (She  seemB  ready  to  pout.) 

Q.  Oh  yes?    Tell  us  what  you  see? 

A.  I  see  nothing. 

Q.  Isn't  there  a  picture? 

A.  No, Oh!  it  is  a  little  old  man and  then  the  other (turning 

herself  towards  us)  and  then  you  see 

Q.  And  besides? 

A.  (Putting  the  picture  aside  and  handing  it  back  to  us)  I  do  not  know 
who  it  is.     I  do  not  know  who  it  is. 

Q.  Well,  this  one?  What  do  you  see  in  this?  (Showing  her  a  picture 
of  two  unfortunates  upon  a  bench.) 

4.  Oh!     It  is  an  old  man  asleep. 

Q.  And  besides? 

A.  That  is  all— and  his  wife  is  beside  him.  (She  pushes  the  picture 
away  as  though  she  did  not  wish  to  be  bothered. )     Oh !     I  do  not  know  her. 

Q.  And  this  one?  (We  show  her  a  picture  that  represents  a  prisoner 
looking  out  of  the  window  of  his  cell.) 

^.  Oh!     I  don't  know 

Q.  But  tell  me!    Look!    What  do  you  see? 

A.  Who  is  it?    Oh!  I  don't  know  who  it  is. 

Q.  But  what  is  he  doing,  this  poor  man? 

A.  Oh!     I  don't  know.     I  don't  know  him. 

As  we  insist  she  seems  to  be  irritated,  pushes  the  picture  away  and 
pouts  while  replying  "I  don't  know." 

Q.  Let's  laugh  a  little. 

She  smiles.     Her  calm  has  returned  and  we  can  continue. 

We  consider  that  she  has  passed  this  second  test  because  for 
two  of  the  pictures  she  has  enumerated,  "It  is  a  little  old  man 
and  then  the  other."  Once  even  she  gave  a  bit  of  description, 
"It  is  an  old  man  asleep."  But  it  must  be  remarked  that  it  re- 
quired great  effort  for  her  to  adapt  herself  to  the  experiment;  it 
was  necessary  to  insist  before  she  could  be  induced  to  look  at  the 
pictures;  she  even  thought  that  we  were  asking  her  to  recognize 
the  persons  in  the  pictures,  a  very  curious  absunhly  wliicli  a 
normal  child  would  never  commit. 

The  third  test  is  a  repetition  of  figures. 

Q.  Listen  now  carefully.  I  am  going  <o  explain  wli.it  we  an-  going  to 
do.     I  am  going  to  say  some  figures  and  then  you  will  repeat  them.     Under- 


228  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

stand!  I  am  going  to  say  a  figure  then  you  say  it  after  me.  Listen  (we 
raise  our  voice)  4! 

A.  4. 

Q.  2,9. 

A.  2.     Why  should  I  do  it? 

Q.  6,  8. 

A.  2,  4,  6,  8. 

Q.  6,  1,  3. 

A.  No,  I  am  not  that  old 1  am  thirty  years  old.     (She  adds  some 

words  which  we  could  not  catch.     It  is  a  confused  murmuring.) 

Q.  3,  2,  9. 

A.  (She  repeats  nothing.) 

Q.  0,  2,  8. 

^.  8,  2,  0.    See? 

Q.  1,  3,  9. 

A.  9,  8. 

It  is  evident  that  when  we  give  her  a  single  figure  she  under- 
stands that  she  must  repeat  it,  but  when  we  give  her  two  or  three 
she  ceases  to  understand  or  loses  the  directing  idea  of  the  experi- 
ment after  having  had  it  for  a  moment.  We  note  that  once  she 
was  able  to  repeat  two  figures  but  never  three. 

The  following  test  consists  in  giving  words  and  sentences  to  be 
repeated.     Our  patient  is  going  to  act  in  this  as  in  the  other  tests. 

After  a  preliminary  explanation  we  pronounce  in  a  louder  voice 
the  words  to  be  repeated. 

Q.  Papa. 

A.  Yes,  my  papa. 

Q.  Shoe,  hat. 

A.  Yes,  my  hat.     And  then 1  have  a  veil. 

Q.  (In  a  natural  voice)     But  no,  that  is  not  it You  must  repeat 

just  what  I  say  without  adding  any  more.  Now  repeat  what  I  say.  (With 
raised  voice)     Hat!  Shoe! 

A.  Yes,  my  hat j^es,  it  is  blue it  is  blue  with  some etc. 

The  patient  has  not  understood.  To  put  her  right  we  had  re- 
course to  a  proceeding  which  has  often  proved  successful  with 
normal  children ;  instead  of  explaining  in  abstract  terms  that  one 
must  repeat  we  have  her  repeat  some  very  simple  words,  then  we 
complicate  them  progressively;  it  is  a  sort  of  bait. 

Q.  Pampam! 
A.  Pampam! 
Q.  Papa! 
A.  Papa! 


MEASURING   THE    MENTALITY    OF   A    DEMENT  229 

Q.  Mama! 

A.  Mama! 

Q.  Dodo! 

A.  Dodo! 

Q.  Shoes,  hat. 

A.  Yes,  my  shoes  with  mama. 

Q.  It  is  cold!     I  am  hungry! 

A.  Yes,  from  that  moment (Prattle). 

As  it  is  a  question  here  simply  of  recording  a  result  we  are 
obliged  to  admit  that  our  patient  did  not  satisfy  the  requirements 
of  test  four  and  that  she  does  not  repeat  the  sentence  of  six 
syllables.  Perhaps  she  might  do  so  after  training  but  this  would 
no  longer  be  within  the  limits  of  the  test. 


Q.  What  is  your  name? 
A.  Margaret. 
Q.  And  your  other  name? 
A.  Beauchamp. 


This  reply  is  completely  satisfactory;  it  is  true  that  this  test 
has  a  social  character  and  that  in  life  one  has  occasion  to  say  his 
name  much  oftener  than  to  repeat  one  or  two  figures.  Our  scale 
is  adapted  to  little  children  and  they  are  often  puzzled  to  re- 
member their  family  name;  they  find  it  easier  to  repeat  two  figures. 

To  sum  up,  our  dement  passes  all  the  tests  at  three  years  except 
one;  she  attains  therefore  the  level  of  three  years,  following  the 
rule  which  we  have  established;-  but  there  is  in  her  manner  of 
answering  the  tests  something  which  differentiates  her  from  a 
child. 

Let  us  pass  to  the  tests  of  four  years. 

Q.  Are  you  a  gentleman  or  a  lady? 
A.  Indeed,  I  am  a  lady. 

The  question  is  unusual,  almost  impertinent,  but  it  did  not  in  the  least 
shock  her. 

Q.  What  is  this?     (Showing  a  key.) 

A.  It  is  my  key. 

Q.  And  this?     What  is  this?     (Showing  a  pen-knife.) 

A.  Very  well,  my  little It  is  a  little  thing  for  me 

Q.  What  do  you  cull  this  little  thing? 
A.  A  little  knife. 

*  See  The  Development  of  the  Intelligence  of  Children,  L' Annie  Pay- 
chologiqvc,  XIV,  1908.     (Our  Vol.  1,  p.  182.) 


230  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  And  this?     (Showing  a  sou.) 

A.  Ah!    that  is  two  sous  for  me.     (Smile.) 

We  admit  that  this  test  has  given  satisfactory  results.  The  at- 
titude of  the  patient  is  nevertheless  very  peculiar;  in  the  first 
place  she  had  difficulty  in  evoking  the  name  of  knife;  then  she  con- 
stantly took  an  attitude  of  proprietor  or  rather  of  monopolist. 
"It  is  my  key,  it  is  two  sous  for  me,"  "We  have  never  encoun- 
tered anything  analogous  among  normal  children. 

Q.  Here  are  two  lines.     Which  is  the  longer? 

A.  Well — there!     (She  shows  the  longer  without  hesitation.) 

All  the  tests  of  four  years  are  passed  except  the  repetition  of 
three  figures.     Let  us  see  those  of  five  years. 

Q.  Do  you  see  these  two  boxes?     (The  boxes  are  placed  before  her  on 
the  table.)     Give  me  the  heavier. 
A.  I  do  not  know  which  is  heavier. 
Q.  No,  but  find  out  and  give  it  to  me. 
A.   (Showing  a  box.)     Well,  that  one? 
Q.  Give  me  the  heavier? 

A.  Well,  there  is  none also  inside Well,  both  of  them. 

Q.   (Both  boxes  are  placed  in  her  hands.)     Give  me  the  heavier  one. 
A.  Here  it  is  (she  gives  a  box),  and  then  this  is  the  other  (she  gives  the 
other  box). 
The  test  is  not  passed;  our  dement  did  not  understand  the  question. 

Copying  a  square  gives  rise  to  many  difficulties.  A  large  square 
was  drawn  before  her  on  a  sheet  of  paper  and  she  was  asked  to 
make  one  just  like  it.  A  pen  was  placed  in  her  hands.  She 
seemed  very  willing  and  said,  "Very  well,  yes,  there!"  but  she  had 
not  understood  because  under  the  square  she  slowly  wrote  her  full 
name.  We  were  obliged  to  intervene  with  a  new  explanation; 
then  she  began  scribbling  in  the  model ;  we  stopped  her  and  finally 
obtained  a  reproduction  of  the  square  but  quite  lacking  in  pro- 
portion. Nevertheless,  the  lack  of  skill  in  her  hand  which  the 
design  betrays  is  far  less  than  her  lack  of  skill  in  comprehending. 
If  we  compare  her  with  a  normal  child  of  three  or  four  years  we 
see  at  once  the  difference.  The  normal  child  may  be  far  more 
awkward  in  directing  his  hand  and  in  drawing  the  figure,  but  on 
-the  contrary  he  is  far  more  intelligent  in  comprehending  that 
what  is  required  of  him  is  to  copy  it.  Furthermore  we  find  two 
other  curious  examples  of  this  difference.     We  attempt  to  make 


MEASURING    THE   MENTALITY    OF   A    DEMENT  231 

our  patient  copy  a  diamond  and  a  written  sentence.  For  the 
diamond  she  writes  below  it  a  little  line  in  zigzag,  which  shows 
once  more  how  Httle  she  understands  what  is  desired  of  her. 
We  make  her  a  second  model  and  urge  her  to  copy  it ;  instead  of 
copying  it  she  embelHshes  the  model  with  little  scribblings  in- 
side or  with  little  strokes  about  the  outhne.  There  is  the  same 
failure  in  copying  a  written  sentence.  We  had  written  "The 
Little"  and  we  asked  Beauchamp  to  copy  these  two  words,  which 
should  have  been  all  the  easier  for  her  in  that  she  can  still  write 
a  little;  but  here  again  she  did  not  understand.  Instead  of  copy- 
ing she  read  the  two  words  and  understood  their  meaning;  im- 
mediately her  mind  was  turned  in  a  direction  quite  other  than 
we  had  wished.  She  said,  "That  is  it,  the  little  baby;  there,  see 
the  little  dear." 

Q.  Write  what  you  see  there. 

A.  Well,  it  is  very  little,  because  it  is  four  years  old It  is  sweet,  it 

is  darling. 

Conformable  to  her  ideation,  the  patient  writes  after  the  model, 
"baby  of  four  years;"  the  writing  is  tremulous  but  nevertheless 
legible.  This  continuation  of  a  commenced  sentence  seems  to  be 
dictated  by  the  obsessing  memory  to  which  we  have  already  al- 
luded of  the  little  child  who  went  poum!  The  analysis  of  these 
three  failures  in  the  act  of  copying  is  interesting.  A  normal  child 
may  fail  in  the  operation  of  copying,  but  he  understands  that  it  is 
a  question  of  copying;  this  comprehension  is  so  simple  that  gener- 
ally when  one  explains  the  tests,  it  is  understood;  on  the  con- 
trary our  patient  can  copy  very  well  since  she  still  knows  how 
to  write  a  little,  but  she  cannot  comprehend  what  is  asked  of  her.  ^ 

Four  single  sous  are  spread  before  her  on  the  table.  When  we 
ask  her  to  count  them,  she  does  so  rapidly  and  declares  that  there 
are  four  sous.  How  did  she  understand  that  so  easily?  We  think 
it  is  because  counting  sous  is  a  social  usage  like  giving  one's 
name,  while  repeating  and  copying  are  operations  which  have  no 
social  usage  and  which  one  does  not  frequently  perform  in  lif(^; 
thus  our  patient  understands  very  well  when  asked  to  count, 
while  she  does  not  understand  when  asked  to  copy.  Apropos  of 
the  act  of  counting  we  shall  give;  two  other  examples  wliich  are 
very  interesting.  We  wish  to  discover  whether  our  dement  can 
count  13  single  sous;  she  counts  rapidly,  but  arrives  at  the  nunibiT 


232  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

12;  this  is  not  a  bad  error.  The  following  is  better.  We  give  her 
3  double  sous  and  3  single  sous  and  without  difficulty  she  an- 
nounces that  that  makes  9  sous.  Note  carefully  that  this  test 
belongs  to  eight  years.  If  our  dement  succeeds  in  this  it  is, 
first,  because  counting  is  a  usual  act;  and,  second,  it  is  because 
she  profits  by  previous  instruction. 

To  finish  these  tests  of  five  years  let  us  say  that  our  patient  does 
not  reconstruct  the  figure  in  the  "game  of  patience;"  she  ends  by 
uniting  the  pieces  at  random. 

She  was  able  to  accomplish  some  of  the  tests  of  six  years;  she 
showed  the  first  time  her  right  hand  and  left  ear  and  she  gave  her 
age.  But  she  failed  almost  constantly  in  the  other  tests;  most 
of  the  time  it  was  because  she  failed  to  comprehend  what  was 
desired  of  her.  The  ordinary  explanation  did  not  penetrate  her 
intelligence.  In  support  of  this  we  cite  a  beautiful  example.  It 
is  a  question  of  definitions.  Nothing  seems  more  simple  than  to 
reply  to  the  following  questions,  "What  is  a  fork,  a  table,  a  chair, 
etc.,"  when  one  knows  these  objects.  But  Beauchamp  was  never 
able  to  grasp  the  idea  of  a  definition.     Let  the  reader  judge. 

Q.  What  is  a  fork? 

A.  Oh!     I  had  one.     I  had  beautiful  ones. 

Q.  Yes,  without  doubt,  but  what  is  a  fork? 

A.  I  had  beautiful  ones. 

Q.  But  what  is  a  fork? 

A.  Well,  it  is  like  that.     They  are  very  beautiful. 

Q.  But  explain  to  me.     What  is  a  fork? 

A.  I  had  one  that  was  beautiful 1  have  two  of  them. 

Q.  And  a  table?    What  is  a  table? 

A.  Oh!    I  have  a  beautiful  table. 

Q.  A  table,  what  is  that? 

A.  I  have  a  beautiful  table. 

Q.  And  a  chair,  what  is  a  chair? 

-4.  Oh!    I  have  a  beautiful  chair. 

Q.  But  what  is  it? 

A.  Oh !    they  are  pretty 1  have  large  chairs yes,  they  are  pretty, 

very  large. 

Q.  And  a  horse?    What  is  that? 

A.  (Quickly)     Oh 1  have  none oh!  I  have  none,  certainly  not  a 

horse. 

Q.  But  what  is  it? 

A.  Ah!    there  are  plenty,  everywhere. 

Q.  But  what  is  a  horse? 

A.  A  horse?    Ah!  I  do  not  know  where  it  is. 


MEASURING   THE   MENTALITY   OF   A   DEMENT  233 

Q.  And  a  mama? 

A.  My  mama 

Q.  What  is  a  mama? 

A.  Well,  I  do  not  know. 

Q.  Yes,  but  what  is  it,  what  is  a  mama? 

A.  Oh  well,  I  have  one  at  home,  she  is  sixty-two  years  old,  mama. 

Q.  And  in  two  years,  how  old  will  she  be? 

A.  Well,  the  poor  mother,  she  will  go  away. 

Thus  in  spite  of  persistent  effort,  we  cannot  make  ourselves 
understood,  notwithstanding  that  this  patient  knows  very  well  a 
fork,  a  table,  etc.,  and  we  believe  could  define  them  if  she  only 
understood  that  we  are  asking  for  a  definition. 

By  appl5dng  the  rules  which  we  have  adopted  we  fix  the  intellec- 
tual level  of  Beauchanp  at  five  years;  we  mean  by  this  not  that 
she  has  exactly  the  mental  state  of  a  child  of  five  years,  because 
we  have  seen  how  much  of  a  difference  separates  her  from  a  nor- 
mal child  of  five ;  but  rather  that  she  fails  for  one  reason  or  another 
before  the  same  difficulties  as  a  normal  child  of  five  years.  In 
establishing  this  level  we  do  not  take  into  account  the  ways  and 
means  but  simply  the  results.  .    ~ 


II.  THE  MINOR  PSYCHOLOGICAL  SIGNS  OF  GENERAL 

PARALYSIS 

1.  A  DIRECTING  HYPOTHESIS.  One  who  relied  solely  upon  the 
results  of  our  measuring  scale  would  not  be  able  to  grasp  the 
mental  differences  which  differentiate  an  imbecile  from  a  general 
paralytic.  Shall  we  conclude  that  these  subjects  have  the  same 
mentality?  Evidently  not.  We  must  put  our  readers  on  their 
guard  against  this  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  bearing  of  our 
measurements.  The  scale  which  we  use  is  made  up  of  a  series  of 
small,  intellectual  problems,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  two  in- 
dividuals may  fail  in  the  same  problems  without  for  that  reason 
having  similar  mentalities;  the  practical  consequence  is  that  the 
efficacy  of  their  mentality  is  the  same ;  but  the  mentalities  may  be 
different. 

Our  scale  resembles  very  much  a  measuring  rod  which,  instead 
of  measuring  the  height,  measures  the  intelligence;  but  just  as  an 
ordinary  measuring  rod  gives  no  information  regarding  the  nor- 
mality of  the  physical  development  and  may  indicate  the  same 
number  of  centimeters  for  a  normal  child  and  for  an  adult  hunch- 
back, so  our  scale  of  intelHgence  gives  the  actual  level  of  intelli- 
gence without  analyzing  it  and  without  informing  us  as  to  the 
type  of  mentality. 

The  problem  which  we  set  for  ourselves  is  therefore  still  un- 
touched. Thus  far  we  have  not  succeeded  in  discovering  how  the 
state  of  dementia  differs  psychologically  from  the  state  of  im- 
becility.    Let  us  try  to  go  farther. 

A   commonplace   idea   shall   serve   us   as   an  entering  wedge. 

"The  dement,"  it  has  often  been  said,  "is  a  rich  person  who  has 

wasted  his  fortune,  while  an  imbecile  is  one  born  poor  and  who 

remains  poor  all  his  life."     If  we  examine  this  idea  closely  we  see 

at  once  by  a  simple  statement  of  the  facts  that  these  two  types  of 

individuals  are  in  an  entirely  different  psychological  condition. 

That  which  is  lacking  in  the  imbecile  is  a  certain  development  of 

the  thought;  his-4houghti4ias-^iot- evolved;  and  all  that  we  know, 

234 


TWO    HYPOTHESES  235 

all  that  we  have  previously  learned  of  the  precise  nature  of  the 
evolution  of  the  thought,  serves  to  make  us  understand  the  con- 
dition in  which  it  is  found.  Let  us  add  that  within  the  limits 
where  his  thought  has  evolved  he  acts  regularly  if  not  normally. 
On  the  contrary  the  general  paraljiiic  presents  to  us  a  thought 
which  has  previously  evolved  and  which  had  even  reached  the  ex- 
tcemfi^limits  of  its  evolution.  This  thought  had  then  up  to  a 
certain  moment  been  complete,  but  now  it  is  attacked  by  a 
particulajjuadification  which  has  made  it  decrease. 

In  exactly  what  does  this  decrease  consist?  It  is  at  this  point 
that  our  hypotheses  commence.  We  believe  that  we  have  the 
choice  between  at  least  tsKO-ejtplanations.  Accordi«g  to  tlie  first, 
there  would  be  produced  in  the  paralytic  a  phenomenon  the  in- 
ver9»-of  evolution.  His  intelligence  would  be  like  a  train  that 
reversed  its  engine  and  ran  back  over  the  same  line  in  the  oppo- 
site direction  from  the  preceding  trip.  The  general  paralytic 
would  thus  find  himself  realizing  successively  by  a  sort  of  tumbling 
down  the  mental  state  corresponding  to  ten  years,  then  nine 
years,  eight  years,  seven  years  and  so  forth.  This  hypothesis  of 
retrfegcession  has  for  its  one  great  merit  that  of  clarity;  but  this  is 
probably  all  that  can  be  said  for  it,  because  when  one  looks  closely 
at  a  general  paralytic  one  sees  clearly  that  his  mental  state  does 
not  resemble  that  of  an  imbecile,  still  less  that  of  a  child.  Thus 
Beauchamp,  whom  we  have  already  somewhat  analysed  and  whom 
we  placed  at  the  level  of  a  child  of  five  years,  knows  better  how  to 
read,  to  write  and  to  count  money  than  a  child  of  five  years;  and 
on  the  other  hand  she  has  some  more  serious  lacks  of  compre- 
hension than  is  encountered  even  among  such  young  children. 
There  are  here  a  host  of  slight  signs  which  make  us  decide  to 
abandon  the  hypothesis  of  retrogression;  and  we  boldly  ch  ose 
another  which  we  are  going  to  explain. 

We  admit  provisionally  that  our  patients  remain  virtually  in 
possession  of  all  their  intolligencc  but  that  they  have  dillicuUy  in 
making  use  of  it;  the  injury  would  affect  the  functioning;  there 
would  be  embarrassment,  difficulty,  slowness  and  often  even  im- 
possibility of  exercising  the  existing  functions,  of  ap{)lyiiig  ac- 
quired knowledge,  in  a  word  of  making  the  machine  work.  Even 
leaving  our  hypothesis  in  this  very  vague  form  we  can  already 
predict  what  its  character  will  be;  this  difficulty  of  functioning  pre- 
sents  in   reality   an   essentially   patliologicMJ   stamp,   and   con.se- 


\ 


236  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

quently  it  would  only  be  by  chance,  by  a  wholly  exterior  resem- 
blance, that  the  paralytic  could  be  compared  to  an  imbecile  and 
especially  to  a  child.  Therefore,  while  the  hypothesis  of  retro- 
gression would  lead  to  the  conclusion,  certainly  unacceptable  to 
any  one  who  has  associated  with  general  paralytics,  that  these 
subjects  have  the  mentality  of  children,  the  hypothesis  of  the 
failui'e  iif  functioning  prevents  any  comparison  of  this  nature;  it 
allows  ^s-indeed  to- foresee  that  children,  imbeciles  and  paxaly tics 
are  alike  in  their  inability  to  solve  the  same  problems;  tiiery  are 
stopped  by  the  same  obstacles  so  that  we  can  attribute  to  them 
the  same  mental  level;  but  the  identity  of  the  results  in  no  way 
implies  the  identity  of  mechanisms;  the  mentalities  remain 
distinct. 

Let  us  try  to  give  a  precise  meaning  to  the  words  difficulty  of 
functioning.  They  are  still  vague,  general,  and  we  prefer  to  con- 
sider a  single  one  of  the  phenomena  in  which  this  difficulty  mani- 
fests itself.  This  phenomenon  is  of  paramount  importance  and 
seems  to  give  us  the  key  to  the  problem.  It  is  the  evocation 
of  the  states  of  consciousness.  We  suppose,  to  state  it  briefly, 
that  paralytics  have , especially  a  weakness  of  evocation. 

2.  Analysis  of  some  observed  results.  We  are  now  about 
to  study  successively  the  following  phenomena,  in  which  the 
aforesaid  weakness  of  evocation  manifests  itself,  and  which  there- 
fore constitute  from  the  practical  point  of  view  what  we  shall  call 
the- minor  psychological-signs  of  general ^waly sis. 
i  Failure  and  slowness  in  the  recall  of  certain  memories. 

Errors  in  naming  colors. 
'    Difficulty  in  the  flow  of  words. 

Lapsus  calami. 

Arithmetical  errors. 

Disorder. 

Incomplete  perceptions.  l  Vak.  AJkX.k.VU) 

Illusions.  •  . 

Inertia  of  comprehension.  - 

Incongruous  replies. 

Greffage.^ 

These  are  only  brief  and  precise  laboratory  notes.     But  they 
represent  the  results  of  tests  and  observations  which  we  have 

*  For  definition  of  this  term  see  p.  254. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  237 

ourselves  made  and  which  others  will  be  able  to  repeat,  verify  and 
complete.  We  must  of  necessity  commence  by  an  understanding 
of  the  precise  facts.     Let  us  analyse  each  one  a  little. 

Failures  and  slowness  in  the  recall  of  certain  mem- 
ories. It  is  known  that  many  of  these  patients  cannot  give  their 
address,  the  number  of  their  street,  or  the  names  of  their  friends. 
In  such  an  instance  authors  readily  attribute  the  trouble  to  a 
lack  of  memory  in  the  patients;  in  fact  proper  names  and  figures 
are  among  the  elements  that  are  the  most  difficult  to  evoke; 
when  one  is  fatigued  one  has  difficulty  in  remembering  proper 
names  or  in  speaking  a  foreign  language  that  he  knows  only 
slightly ;  this  difficulty  of  evocation  becomes  very  evident  with  the 
aged.  It  is  the  first  break  in  the  memory.  Often  one  retains  the 
faculty-of  voluntarily  evoking  all  memories  except  that  of  proper 
ngmes.  Those  who  grow  old  at  the  head  of  a  numerous  staff 
know  something  of  this. 

We  cite  as  an  example  a  patient  named  Samse,  a  woman  of 
forty-two  years,  who  follows  the  occupation  of  stocking  darner. 
She  has  a  level  of  seven  years;  she  is  lively  and  pleasant  and  can 
give  much  exact  information  about  herself  and  her  family,  her 
past  life  and  her  maladies;  but  whenever  she  is  asked  to  give  a 
precise  figure  she  shows  herself  incapable.  As  to  the  time  of  her 
marriage : 

Q.  At  what  age  were  you  married? 

A.  Oh!  quite  a  while  ago. 

As  to  her  belongings. 

Q.  Were  you  rich?  ' 

A.  Oh  well,  I  had  a  little  money  of  course;  it  would  be  unfortunate  to 
work  and  not  have  a  sou.  Do  you  think  I  would  spend  everything?  No 
indeed,  my  money  is  invested. 

Q.  How  much  have  you?  j 

A.  Oh!  a  good  deal. 

Q.  But  how  much? 

A.  Oh!  well,"  I  don't  remember,  but  it  was  quite  a  little. 

We  could  cite  many  other  examples. 

Naming  of  colors.  If  often  happens  that  a  general  paralytic 
cannot  name  the  colors  exactly.  He  recognizes  the  colors  very 
well  and  also  knows  their  names,  but  he  (aiinot  recall  a  name  at 
will  and  he  gives  another  in  its  place.  We  have  found  cases  some- 
what similar  among  imbeciles,  but  the  difTcrence  is  that  the  hh- 
becile  pit.hnr^flnfs  nnt  knf)vv  or  partially  lyjOia^^T-^^^*^  ^^^  P-'ra- 


238  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

lytic— kHtrvey  but  caliliOt  rermember  when  it  is  necessary.  For 
example  Colon,  a  house  painter  who  has  the  level  of  ten  years, 
should  because  of  his  profession  know  the  colors  very  well;  he  is 
of  an  intellectual  level  that  should  be  able  to  name  them  since  a 
normal  child  of  eight  years  names  them. 

Colon  has  nevertheless  much  difficulty.     He  says, 

For  red,  "That  is  bright  red." 

For  yellow,  "That  is pale  yellow." 

For  blue,  "That  is  dark  green it  is  dark  blue." 

For  green,  "That  is  light  dark light  yellow." 

He  therefore  failed  on  the  blue  and  for  the  green  gave  a  curious 
reply;  perhaps  by  light  he  meant  green.  In  any  case  we  ask  him 
to  repeat  and  he  says,  "red,  light  yellow,  bue  (instead  of  blue), 
pale  green"  which  is  nearly  correct.  Thus  he  knows  but  cannot 
at  once  show  his  knowledge.  This  inability  is  truly  the  most 
annoying  thing  that  could  happen  to  a  candidate  during  an 
examination. 

Difficulty  in  pronouncing  words  rapidly.  It  is  the  same 
experiment  but  with  a  variation  which  adds  to  the  difficulty;  one 
must  not  be  satisfied  with  simply  naming  the  colors ;  they  must  be 
named  quickly,  very  quickly,  as  quickly  as  possible.  Thus  the 
varied  functional  insufficiencies  manifest  themselves. 

Bernard  is  a  woman  forty-five  years  old,  who  has  the  level  of 
seven  years.  We  show  her  a  sheet  of  white  paper  upon  which  are 
pasted  four  papers,  red,  yellow,  blue,  green.  At  our  invitation 
she  names  them  correctly.     Then: 

Q.  Couldn't  you  go  a  little  faster? 

A.  (Trying  to  go  fast.)     Red,  green  (correcting  herself)  no,  yellow 

green,  yellow,  green. 

That  took  seven  seconds,  a  very  long  time,  because  for  a  normal 
adult  one  and  a  half  seconds  suffice. 

Q.  Try  again. 

A.  Red,  yellow,  blue,  yellow no,  blue. 

Thus  when  she  repeats  the  operation  with  the  idea  of  going 
quickly  she  fails.     She  has  forgotten  the  name  of  green. 

(Showing  her  the  green  paper.)     What  is  that  color? 

A.  (After  having  put  her  finger  upon  the  paper  and  having  thought 

a  long  time)     Like  chicken  eggs no  duck  eggs (Correct,   because 

duck  eggs  are  a  tint  of  green). 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  239 

Q.  Yes,  but  what  do  you  call  it? 

A.  (After  a  long  meditation  which  lasts  five  seconds)  It  is  green. 

Q.  Name  them  now  as  quickly  as  possible. 

A.  Red,  yellow,  blue,  green. 

Q.  Still  quicker. 

A.  No. 

Q.  Oh  yes. 

A.  Red,  yellow,  blue  (slight  bewilderment)  green.     (Time,  five  seconds.) 

Q.  As  quickly  as  possible. 

A.  Red,  yellow,  blue and  that,  green. 

Q.  Quicker  still. 
A,  No,  it  isn't  fair. 

Note  that  the  considerable  time  of  five  seconds  to  name  four 
colors  does  not  contain  the  time  of  reaction  to  a  given  signal;  we 
measure  the  duration  of  the  pronunciation  of  the  four  words, 
starting  with  the  first  word  pronounced.  With  others  we  give  a 
signal  and  as  soon  as  the  signal  is  heard  they  must  name  the  four 
colors ;  we  count  the  total  time  from  the  giving  of  the  signal  until 
the  word  green,  the  last  of  the  series,  is  pronounced  using  our 
watch  that  marks  the  seconds;  this  rudimentary  chronoscope  is 
quite  sufficient  because  the  time  required  is  not  less  than  four  or 
five  seconds.  It  is  curious  to  see  patients,  who  like  Samse  have  a 
level  of  seven  years  and  even  others  who  like  Philipon  have  a 
level  of  nine  years,  give  such  very  poor  reactions.  One  of  them 
made  an  anticipated  reaction  and  said  the  word  before  the  sig- 
nal was  given;  this  was  pointed  out  to  her;  she  replied:  "It  was 
said  all  the  same."  Others  remained  some  time  without  reaction 
to  the  signal.  We  said  to  one,  "Come  now,  start!"  Insteatl  of 
commencing  to  pronounce  the  names  of  the  colors  she  laughs  and 
looks  at  us.     Has  she  forgotten  the  order?    We  ask  her: 

Q.  What  must  you  do  now? 
A.  Why,  I  must  begin. 

But  she  does  not  start,  she  does  not  pronounce  a  single  word. 

We  might  have  employed  a  chronoscope  for  registering  the 
times  of  reaction  of  our  subjects  but  that  would  have  taught  us 
nothing.  When  the  delay  and  the  irregularities  are  so  great, 
hundredths  of  a  second  become  insignificant.  This  is  because  in 
reality  something  more  than  a  slowness  or  a  difficulty  in  the  motor 
evocation  of  a  word  takes  place  here;  the  patient  has  lost  Die 
sense  of  the  experiment  and  cannot  recall  what  has  been  explained 


240  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

to  him  about  the  way  to  proceed.  This  is  not  a  slight,  Hmited, 
local  trouble,  such  as  every  normal  person  has  experienced  when 
fatigued;  it  is  a  general  confusion  in  the  sense  of  direction,  which 
makes  one  forget,  to  speak  familiarly,  ''where  one  is."  We  shall 
speak  a  little  later  of  this  general  confusion. 

Slowness  of  words  and  gestures.  Another  form  of  the 
difficulty  of  evocation ;  certain  patients  show  an  extreme  slowness 
in  replying  to  questions  as  simple  as  these,  "Point  to  your  nose! 
your  eyes!  your  mouth!"  An  old  woman  named  Gauze  who  has  a 
level  of  seven  years  was  so  slow  that  we  had  the  curiosity  to  take 
the  time  of  her  gestures.  To  point  to  her  nose  she  took  three  sec- 
onds and  her  eye  four  seconds.  Here  is  a  bit  of  dialogue  in  which 
we  noted  the  time  which  elapsed  between  the  end  of  our  questions 
and  the  beginning  of  her  replies. 

Q.  How  long  since  you  came  here? 

A.   (After  5  seconds)     It  has  been two  weeks. 

Q.  What  is  your  profession? 
A.   (After  3.5  seconds)     I  was  cook. 
Q.  How  much  did  you  earn  a  month? 

A.  (After  4  seconds)  Oh!  that's  nothing.  When  I  was  through  I  went 
away;  they  paid  me. 

Q.  Is  this  morning  or  afternoon? 

A.  (After  2.5  seconds)     It  is  afternoon. 

If  the  reader  wishes  to  realize  the  slowness  of  the  reply  let  him 
take  his  watch  and  allow  the  indicated  time  to  pass;  he  will  thus 
see  the  extraordinary  pace  of  our  dialogue  with  Gauze.  Other 
tests  show  this  same  trouble  of  evocation  in  more  complex  phe- 
nomena. 

Lapsus  calami.  These  are  errorstawhich-nermal  persons  are 
subject  in  writing.  When  one  writes  quickly,  or  when  one  is  pre- 
occupied by  another  thought  than  the  one  he  is  writing,  or  when 
one's  head  is  fatigued,  or  finally,  when  one  is  writing  amidst 
noise  or  distractions,  it  often  happens  that  he-skipB-»-w0r4ortwo. 
Such  lapses  are  extremely  -  fr^jquent  in  .-ihe.,ffin.ti»g- -^.general 
p^aralytics;  usually  dictating  a  few  lines  to  them  will  suffice  to 
bring  this  out;  one  would  certainly  not  so  easily  obtain  such 
lapses  from  a  normal  person  who  was  either  fatigued  or  absent- 
minded.  Thus  we  dictate,  "In  the  morning  I  walk  in  the  coun- 
try." The  patient  wrote,  "The  morning  walk  in  the  country;" 
or  else  they  wrote  prone  for  promene  omitting  the  syllable  me  in 


PSYCHOLOGY    OF    GENERAL   PARALYSIS  241 

the  middle  of  the  word.  Another,  to  whom  had  been  dictated  the 
sentence,  "The  pretty  httle  girls  study  the  flowers  which  they 
gathered  yesterday,"  wrote  ,"The  pretty  girls  studied  the  flowers 
gathered  yesterday."  To  appreciate  the  gravity  of  these  omis- 
sions one  must  take  great  pains  in  dictating.  If  one  imprudently 
dictates  words  before  the  patient  has  finished  writing  those  pre- 
ceding, one  will  infallibly  lead  him  to  skip  what  has  gone  before. 
But  we  have  a  better  example.  Even  in  spontaneous  writing  the 
paralytic  dement  skips  words;  or  rather,  what  is  more  serious, 
leaves  a  word  unfinished  and  passes  to  the  next.  We  have  before 
us  a  letter  written  by  a  patient  which  eulogizes  his  talents  as  a 
painter.  In  this  writing  are  to  be  foimd  lapses  like  the  following, 
"  I  took  extraordinary  models  from  Africa.  I  made  resplen  views. 
The  sky  was  red."  He  has  written  resplen  for  resplendent,  the 
second  part  of  the  word  did  not  form  itself  under  his  pen.  It  is 
simply  to  comply  with  usage  that  we  call  this  phenomenon  for- 
getfulness;  in  reality  it  is  produced  by  lack  of  evocation.  We 
do  not  encounter  these  lapses  so  frequently  among  the  morons; 
when  a  moron  writes  he  does  not  usually  omit  many  words. 

Errors  of  arithmetic.  For  a  long  while  alienists  have  found 
empirically  clinical  procedures  which  admirably  bring  to  light  the 
intellectual  defects  of  these  dements.  Here  the  instinct  of  the 
investigator  has  gone  ahead  of  his  theory.  It  has  been  felt  that 
the  paralytic  must  betray  himself  in  arithmetical  operations  be- 
cause these  operations  require  a  mental  application  of  which  he  is 
incapable. 

Let  us  first  see  them  counting  sous;  it  is  rare  that  a  paralytic 
succeeds  quickly  in  an  exact  calculation  with  sous.  Thus  Colon, 
who  has  a  level  of  ten  years  and  represents  one  of  our  most  in- 
telligent patients,  counts  17  sous  when  there  are  only  10.  Most 
of  them  arc  so;  they  neglect  a  sou  or  two  or  they  forget  them.  It 
is  the  same  thing  when  dressing  themselves  or  buttoning  their 
clothes.  Forgetting  some  of  the  sous  is  the  same  thing  as  having 
a  dirty  beard;  it  reveals  the  same  mental  state.  We  say  negli- 
gence, because  if  we  call  their  attention  to  it  and  tell  them  to  be 
more  careful  they  are  able  to  count  without  error. 

When  we  give  them  written  additions  where  Wwrc.  are  luiiiibcrs 
to  be  carried  the  operation  is  always  diflicull  for  them.  One 
sees  many  of  the  paralytics  act  as  though  there  were  no  number 
to  be  carried.     Example,  36  -|-  29,  he  calculates  thus;  G  plus  9 


242  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OP   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

equals  16,  he  writes  16;  then  he  continues;  he  says  3  plus  2  equals 
5,  he  writes  5,  and  obtains  a  sum  of  516.  This  is  not  the  only 
error  that  he  commits  but  it  is  the  most  characteristic  since  he 
recalls  the  process  of  the  operation.  In  what  does  this  error  con- 
sist? The  subject  has  not,  properly  speaking,  forgotten  the  rules 
of  addition ;  but  he  does  not  evoke  them  at  the  necessary  moment ; 
he  does  not  remember  that  the  1  of  the  first  sum  should  be  added 
to  the  number  in  the  next  column. 

Let  us  cite  the  example  of  Philippon  who  has  a  level  of  nine 
years  and  who  nevertheless  cannot  do  correctly  a  sum  in  addition, 
where  there  is  a  number  to  be  carried.  Here  is  a  specimen  of 
her  work,  four  additions  in  which  she  has  committed  two  types 
of  errors,  first,  a  frequent  error  of  addition,  and,  second,  a  con- 
stant error  of  carrying  consisting  in  writing  the  number  to  be 
carried  as  a  separate  figure. 

Furthermore,  in  the  simplest  operations  an  unbelievable 
number  of  errors  is  possible.     We  shall  cite  a  few  examples. 

54  38  84  29 

66  56  78  43 


11  11  8  16  13  12  6  17 

Addition  executed  by  Philippon,  general  paralytic,  who  has  a  level  of 
nine  years. 

In  the  first  place  errors  in  the  arrangement  of  the  figures;  as, 
when  4  is  to  be  subtracted  from  11,  they  write  11  below  4  and  try 
to  take  11  from  4;  or  they  completely  forget  the  number  to  be 
carried;  or  again,  whenever  there  is  a  number  to  be  carried  espe- 
cially if  the  question  is  complicated  they  abandon  the  operation 
in  the  very  midst. 

The  following  addition  was  given  to  Samse,  4  +  12.  She 
counts,  4  and  2  are  6,  and  1  are  7  and  writes  only  the  last  figure. 

Disorder.  Anothei^— eon-fusion  a4)pears  in-  4heiiL_calculat,ion 
which-is-A^-ery-ciirious.  Let  us  suppose  them  to  be  doing  a  prob- 
lem which  requires  a  multiplication  and  afterwards  a  division. 
The  beginning  of  the  operation  is  easy  enough;  then  in  the  midst 
of  it  they  stop,  are  lost,  and  can  no  longer  call  up  the  conditions 
of  the  problems;  no  matter  what  effort  they  make  they  cannot 
gather  up  the  thread.  This  state  of  disorder  may  be  explained, 
it  seems  to  us,  in  the  following  manner;  when  one  performs  a 


PSYCHOLOGY   OF   GENERAL   PARALYSIS  243 

problem  there  is  a  train  of  reasoning  that  he  follows  out;  he  passes 
from  argument  a  to  argument  h  then  to  c  then  to  d,  and  when  he 
arrives  at  d  he  has  still  present  in  his  mind  c  and  b  and  a;  he  has  the 
perception  of  the  order  followed  up  to  the  point  where  he  stands; 
and  he  sees  briefly  the  whole  route  that  he  traversed;  if  he  does 
not  see  this  clearly,  he  has  at  least  the  feeling  for  it.  Tliis  per- 
mits him  to  continue  in  a  direction  which  is  in  harmony  with 
the  commencement.  In  the  paralytic  this  subconscious  evocation 
undergoes  an  eclipse;  the  idea  flies,  it  disappears.  It  is  like  a 
signal  light  that  vanishes;  one  cannot  relight  it  so  remains  in 
darkness.  Another  comparison  perhaps  better  and  already  used 
by  us  is  that  of  the  chess  board.  While  one  is  studying  the  dis- 
posal of  the  pieces  some  one  passes,  hits  the  board  and  all  the 
pieces  are  jumbled  together.  It  is  this  chaos  that  is  produced 
from  time  to  time  in  the  mind  of  the  dement.  He  is  conscious 
of  this  and  says  himself  that  he  no  longer  knows  what  he  is  about. 
A  very  simple  example  is  furnished  us  by  a  young  man,  Alex- 
ander, whose  level  is  that  of  nine  years.  We  say  to  him  after 
putting  money  before  him,  "You  are  a  merchant;  here  is  money 
for  you  to  make  change  from;  and  here  is  merchandise  to  sell. 
I  will  buy  this  box  which  costs  four  sous.  I  pay  you  with  the 
twenty-sou  piece.  How  much  change  will  you  give  me?"  This 
explanation  is  repeated  a  great  number  of  times.  Then  we  say 
to  Alexander, 

Q.  How  much  will  you  give  me  back? 
A.  Well,  4  sous.     I  give  you  back  4  sous.    Here  they  are. 
And  he  gives  us  the  4  sous. 
Q.  Let  us  see,  how  much  was  the  box? 
A.  4  sous. 

Q.  And  I  gave  you  how  much? 
A.  50  centimes. 

Q.  (Showing  him  the  1-fr.  piece.)     I  gave  you  how  much? 
A.  1  franc. 

He  had  inadvertently  made  an  error,  having  mistaken  a  l-fr.  piece  for 
50  centimes.     Hut  this  was  not  his  only  error. 
Q.  So  you  .should  give  me  back  how  much? 
A.  16;  IG  and  '),  that  makes  21.     21  and  3  that  makes  24. 
Q.  You  will  give  me  then? 
A.  23. 
Q.  23  80U8. 
A.  You  need  still  more 7,  3  and  7,  30,  and  G,  36. 


244  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

This  would  be  pure  gibberish,  if  we  had  not  followed  step  by 
step  the  ideas  of  Alexander  and  if  we  had  not  taken  into  account 
the  manner  in  which  he  reasoned.  Let  us  analyse.  We  obtained 
a  first  point;  he  is  conscious  that  he  should  give  us  back  16  sous. 
But  immediately  afterwards  he  loses  his  direction;  seeing  some 
sous  before  him  on  the  table,  he  thinks  he  must  add  them  to  that 
sum  of  16;  so  he  adds  the  piece  of  5  sous  which  is  on  the  table 
then  3  sous  which  makes  24,  and  he  thinks  that  he  should  give 
back  24  sous.  Here  is  a  slight  lapse  for,  having  announced  24, 
he  forgets  and  believes  that  it  is  23.  Then  seeing  that  we  still 
wait  he  has  the  idea  of  continuing  his  addition.  To  the  23  sous 
he  adds  all  that  he  finds  upon  the  table,  first  7  sous,  which  makes 
30  sous,  then  6  sous,  which  makes  36  sous.  In  reality  he  is  com- 
pletely lost  because  he  has  abandoned  his  first  idea  and  seems  no 
longer  to  think  of  it.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  operation 
does  not  by  any  means  surpass  his  knowledge,  his  intellectual 
level;  the  proof  of  this  is  given  in  what  follows. 

Q.  Well  then,  let  us  begin  again;  the  box  costs? 

A.  4  sous. 

Q.  I  gave  you? 

A.  1  fr. 

Q.  Well  then,  you  should  give  me  back? 

A.   (In  a  clear  tone  without  hesitation)  16  sous. 

It  is  characteristic  in  these  losses  of  functioning  that  the  sub- 
ject knows  how  to  do  the  problem  submitted  to  him;  he  has  the 
knowledge  but  from  time  to  time  the  power  fails  him.  To  Colon, 
the  house  painter  who  has  a  level  of  ten  years,  we  gave  a  simple 
written  subtraction  to  do,  25  —  9.  He  wrote  25  and  put  the 
9  below  the  5. 

Q.  Calculate. 

A.  9  and  5,  14;  I  carry  1;  1  and  2,  3,  34. 

He  has  forgotten  that  he  was  to  subtract  and  he  makes  an 
addition.     The  operation  takes  30  seconds. 

Q.  So  25  less  9,  that  makes  34? 

A.  Yes  sir  (thinking  it  over),  Oh,  no;  (he  calculates  again)  5  and  9, 
14,  I  carry  1;  1  and  2,  3. 

He  repeats  the  same  error.  He  is  shown  that  he  was  wrong 
in  making  the  addition.     He  starts  again  the  same  way. 


1 


PSYCHOLOGY   OF   GENERAL    PARALYSIS  245 

Q.  But  I  said  25-9.     So  25-9  that  makes  34? 

A.  Oh!  no.     That  makes ,  25-9  that  makes  21. 

Q.  Calculate  out  loud. 

A.  25,  34,  less  9,  34  less  9  that  makes  20.  25  less  9,  15,  16,  that 
makes  only  16.     Yes,  25  less  9,  that  makes  16. 

This  second  operation  has  taken  one  mmute  and  fifty  seconds 
which  is  an  enormous  time  if  one  takes  the  pains  to  reahze  it 
watch  in  hand.  Notice  that  he  has  reached  the  true  solution, 
which  is  to  be  expected  since  he  has  the  level  of  ten  3^ears,  but  he 
has  not  attained  the  end  without  losing  himself  three  times  on 
the  way;  it  was  necessary  each  time  to  expressly  demand,  "Is 
the  result  correct?"  to  make  him  perceive  that  he  had  made  an 
addition  instead  of  a  subtraction.     This  loss  of  direction  indeed 

siLpimnPH    JTH    iiiMifTiririnnn    ai    py^^pgtinp        To    folloW    a    direction, 

the  directing  idea  must  be  prolonged  either  unconsciously  or  by 
short  successive  recurrences.  Here  we  have  seen  with  what 
facihty  it  disappears. 

We  now  come  to  the  phenomena  of  reception;  perception,  com- 
prehension of  that  which  goes  on  about  the  individual.  In  these 
phenomena  of  reception  the  absence  of  evocation  also  makes  itself 
felt.  Here  the  sense  of  the  word  is  a  little  diverted  from  its 
usage,  because  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  memory  properly  so 
called  but  of  perception.  We  must  admit  however  that  in  the 
formation  of  a  perception  there  is  implied  a  recalling;  we  perceive 
an  object  only  because  the  stimulus  of  the  sensation  evokes 
some  former  knowledge,  some  acquired  images.  It  is  these  im- 
plied evocations  in  every  exterior  perception  which  are  badly 
formed  in  the  general  paralytic.  Some  unusual  phenomena 
result  from  this;  we  are  going  to  study  some  of  these  phenomena, 
notaI)ly  the  incomplete  perceptions. 

Incomplete  perceptions.  In  incomplete  perceptions  the 
.sensations  which  ought  to  be  the  point  of  departure  of  the  evo- 
cation are  indeed  felt,  but  only  certain  ones  of  these  sensations 
make  the  evocations;  the  others  rest  inert;  therefore,  an  incom- 
plete fragmentary  perception  results  which  one  can  very  simply 
illustrate  by  the  use  of  playing  cards. 

Madame  Gauze  knows  the  cards.  When  asked  to  name  those 
presented  to  her  she  indicates  the  suit  correctly;  for  (lie  value 
she  is  often  obliged  to  count  with  her  fingers.  I  f  a  card  is  presented 
to  her  and  she  is  asked  simply  to  name  it  she  usually  indicates 
either  the  suit  or  the  vahic,  rarely  bftth.     Example, 


246  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Cards  Shown  Replies  of  Subject 

Ace  of  clubs  Ace 

Queen  of  clubs  A  Queen 

Jack  of  clubs  A  Jack 

Jack  of  hearts  A  Jack 

Eight  of  spades  Eight  of  hearts 

King  of  clubs  King  of  hearts 

Queen  of  hearts  (correct) 

Ten  of  spades  Spades 

Ten  of  clubs  Clubs 

Eight  of  clubs  Eight  of  spades 

Queen  of  diamonds  A  Queen 

King  of  hearts  The  King 

King  of  spades  Well,  that's  the  King. 

Q.  But  what  is  he  called?  The  King  of  spades. 

King  of  diamonds  The  King 

Jack  of  diamonds  The  Jack 

Is  there  here  a  defect  of  perception  or  a  defect  of  evocation 
of  the  name?  It  matters  little,  the  essential  thing  is  to  record 
that  there  is  a  defect.  Another  example  shows  the  same  defect, 
the  same  negligence  being  produced  also  by  cards  but  under 
rather  different  conditions.  We  show  the  woman  Philippon  the 
nine  of  clubs. 

A.  That  is  clubs. 

Q.  How  many  of  clubs? 

A.  The  seven. 

Q.  (With  surprise)     Ah! 

A.  On  no!     the  nine,  I  am  mistaken. 

Q.  You  must  remember  that  it  is  the  nine. 

A.  Certainly. 

We  place  the  card  in  a  pack  which  is  presented  to  her. 

Q.  Find  it  now. 

A.  (Gaily)     Sure,  I  must  find  it,  my  card. 

She  looks  at  the  cards  one  by  one,  and  makes  two  piles,  one  of 
red  the  other  black,  with  errors  from  time  to  time  in  this  useless 
assortment.  During  this  operation  the  nine  of  clubs  passes 
under  her  eyes. 

A.  (Saluting  the  card)     Here  it  is,  my  beauty.     Come  my  old  friend. 
But  instead  of  taking  out  the  card  she  puts  others  on  top  of  it.     We  say 
to  her. 

Q.  You  have  not  found  the  card.     Give  it  to  me. 
A.  Oh!  yes,  I  found  it,  it  is  the  nine,  and  here  it  is. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  247 

She  hands  us  the  seven  of  clubs  which  she  has  just  found;  but 
then  she  shows  a  slight  hesitation  and  perceiving  the  eight  of 
clubs  which  came  next  she  hands  that  instead  of  the  seven. 

Q.  Is  that  really  the  card  that  you  were  to  give  me? 
A.  (Without  looking  at  the  card.)     I  am  not  mistaken. 
Q.  Is  it  really  the  one? 
A.  1  tell  you  I  am  not  mistaken. 

Q.  Come  now,  look  at  the  card  (showing  the  eight  of  clubs).     What  is 
this  card  that  you  gave  me? 
A.  It  is  the  eight. 
Q.  And  you  should  give  me? 
A.  The  nine. 

Q.  You  have  not  given  it  to  me? 
A.  (In  a  familiar  tone.)     Rascal! 

She  hunts  in  the  pile  and  finds  the  ten  of  clubs  and  says: 
A.  Here  is  the  ten  of  clubs,  the  nine  is  not  far  away. 

This  illustration  shows  several  things,  a  defect  of  evocation 
of  the  right  name,  negligence,  power  of  action  inferior  to  knowl- 
edge. 

Illusions  in  exterior  perceptions.  We  shall  group  with 
partial  perceptions  certain  psychological  phenomena  which  have 
an  entirely  different  aspect  but  which  depend  upon  the  same 
fragmentary  character  of  the  perception.  When  our  patient,  to 
whom  we  show  the  six  of  hearts,  tells  us  simply  that  it  is  six  he 
forms  an  incomplete  perception;  but  incomplete  as  it  is  the  name 
remains  correct,  because  the  suit  and  the  value  in  a  playing  card 
are  distinct  facts  to  be  noted.  It  is  no  longer  the  same  when 
the  perception  bears  upon  a  collection  of  objects,  a  picture  or  an 
engraving;  each  of  the  elements  in  such  a  group  has  a  significance 
which  depends  at  the  same  time  upon  itself  and  upon  the  rest; 
if  one  perceives  it  separately  one  may  be  deceived  as  to  its  nature. 
Therefore  the  number  of  errors  which  these  patients  make  upon 
pictures  is  very  great.  Philippon  (nine  j^ear  level),  to  whom  wo 
show  a  picture  representing  a  prisoner  standing  on  his  l)cd  to 
look  out  of  a  narrow  window,  imagines  that  the  man  is  perched 
on  a  rock;  Bern  sees  in  the  cart  of  the  ragman  a  horse  which 
does  not  exist;  Gauze,  allowing  her  indolent  glance  lo  wander 
over  a  picture  representing  a  poor  old  man  and  a  woman  seated 
on  a  bench,  gives  the  following  information. 


248  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  What  is  there,  here? 

A.  A  man  who  is  all  white,  and  then  his  wife  who  is  all  black  (if  the 
man  appears  to  her  all  white  it  is  doubtless  because  of  his  white  beard). 

Q.  And  what  else? 

A.  That!     (she  shows  the  trunk  of  a  tree).     And  there  a  bench. 

A.  And  what  besides? 

A.  A  spoon. 

Q.  A  spoon?    Where  is  it? 

A.  There,  I  think  that  is  a  spoon. 

Astonishing  illusion;  the  scene  clearly  takes  place  on  a  boulevard. 
Where  does  she  see  a  spoon? 

Q.  Show  me  where  the  spoon  is? 

She  follows  with  her  finger  the  picture  of  a  street  lamp.  Thus  she  mis- 
takes for  a  spoon  the  street  lamp,  which  in  this  case,  would  be  very  large 
and  planted  in  the  ground.     We  persist. 

Q.  But  where  is  all  this  which  is  happening? 

A.  Well  it  is  the  man  who  is  white  and  his  wife  who  is  black. 

Q.  But  are  they  in  the  house?    Where  are  they? 

A.  They  are  on  a  bench. 

Q.  Are  they  in  the  country,  by  the  road? 

A.  Well,  there  wouldn't  be  things  along  a  road. 

Q.  What  kind  of  things? 

A.  Well,  there  is  no  housekeeping  on  a  road (not  clear). 

Q.  But  listen.     Here  are  trees. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Then  it  is  in  a  garden. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  How  could  there  be  a  spoon  like  that  in  a  garden? 

A.  I  don't  know.     I  said  a  spoon  as  I  would  say  anything  else. 

This  illustrates  the  illusion  of  the  senses  among  these  patients, 
an  isolated  perception  which  is  false,  which  is  not  correlated 
with  the  rest,  and  which  is  not  corrected. 

Illusions  in  verbal  perceptions.  Here  it  is  a  question  of 
perceiving  and  understanding  a  sentence  pronounced  by  another 
person.  Every  sentence  is  a  composition  of  words,  each  of  which 
has  not  only  its  own  sense  but  a  sense  determined  by  the  rest  of 
the  sentence.  If  one  perceives  but  one  word  of  the  sentence,  or 
but  a  single  syllable  he  may  build  upon  it  a  perception  which 
will  be  not  only  incomplete  but  above  all  erroneous.  These 
verbal  illusions  though  not  very  frequent  often  occur  among 
general  paralytics.  We  have  noted  a  certain  number  of  them. 
Gauze,  before  whom  we  talk  and  exchange  the  remark, "  A/^oms 
avons  oublie  ga,"  (We  have  forgotten  that)  says  to  us  spontane- 
ously, "Je  suis  nee  a  Epernay;"  (I  was  born  in  Epernay);  it  is 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  249 

probable  that  she  perceived  the  isolated  sound  oublie  and  inter- 
preted it  to  l:>e  ou  est  nee.  Another,  Bern,  hearing  one  of  us  say 
to  the  other,  "N'est-ce  pas?"  (Is  that  not  so?)  was  impressed 
simply  by  the  sound  and  understood  Espagne  (Spain)  and  said 
to  us,  "In  Spain  you  know  they  are  very  false;  in  Portugal  they 

work.     I  lived  with  a  French  woman "  after  this  came  a 

description  of  her  life  as  a  house  maid. 

Thus,  partial  perceptions  may  give  place  to  verbal  illusions. 
But  we  repeat  this  phenomenon  is  quite  rare. 

IxERTL\  OF  COMPREHENSION.  The  studv  of  Verbal  illusions 
as  well  as  that  of  incomplete  perceptions  puts  us  upon  the  track 
of  a  more  general  phenomenon,  that  of  the  inability  to  CQllIpi'c- 
hen4-tbe-4lwTrghf  of  others.  We  have  often  been  struck  by  the 
difficulty  which  certain  patients  feel  in  understanding  our  verbal 
explanations;  the  least  complicated  explanation  often  does  not 
penetrate;  this  is  therefore  a  very  serious  obstacle  when  making 
psychological  experiments  upon  them,  because  a  psychological 
experiment  is  always  dependent  u])()n  the  primary  condition  that 
the  explanatory  remarks  be  understood;  it  is  only  after  this  first 
requirement  is  realized  that  one  can  go  on  with  the  experiment. 

What  illustrations  we  could  give  of  this  difficulty  in  under- 
standing! Here  for  instance  is  the  old  woman,  Clauze,  wiio  has 
a  level  of  seven  years  and  who  besides  knows  how  to  count.  We 
show  her  four  single  sous,  and  ask  her,  "How  many  are  there?" 
She  replies  correctly,  "four  sous."  We  take  away  one  and  add 
three  double  sous  which  makes  nine  sous.  W^;  ask  her  again, 
"How  iiiiiiiy  ;iiv  1I1CIC  now?"  She  replies,  "6  sous."  As  this 
is  incorrect  we  say  to  her,  "C\iutit  nloud."  She  commences  to 
count,  counting  only  tlie  double  ones,  and  says,  "two,  four,  six 
sous." 

Here  is  the  rest  of  liie  dialogue. 

(J.   How!  thore  are  only  six  sous? 

.1.   Ah!  with  those  three  sous  there. 

Q.  C'ount  iif^aiu. 

Wc  imaKi'i''  sho  is  Roinn  to  (  (inni  I  lie  single  sous  with  I  lir  dcjiililr  oiies. 
Not  at  all. 

A.  (She  looks  attentively  at  each  sou  ,111(1  s;iys)  A  Keiiuhlic.  Otir  sou. 
Two  sous. 

The  idea  of  counting,  although  .so  naliuiil  wIkm  mie  sees  money,  lias 
rlisappoared.     We  .are  oMined  to  insist    in  order-  to  make  it    r'eturri. 

Q.   How  nrueh  money  does  lli;it   m.ake,  ;ili   tieit? 

.1.    Two,  four,  six,  seven,  ciglit,  nine. 


250 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


Here  at  last  is  the  exact  count.  So  she  knows  how  to  count 
but  she  is  not  able  to  grasp  the  idea  that  she  must  do  it.  This 
instructive  scene  ends  by  the  following  remarks  from  the  patient. 

"My  husband,  he  says,  you  ought  to  go  to  school.  Very  well,  I  am 
very  sorry  because  I  shall  never  get  away.  (She  weeps.)  So  it  was  the 
doctor  who  said  I  must  go  away  from  home.  I  did  not  know  that  it  was 
here." 


FIG.  20.  MLLE.  PHILIPPON;  GENERAL  PARALYTIC;  INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL 
OF  NINE  YEARS:  NOTE  THE  SMILE  OF  SATISFACTION  AND  DISARRANGED 
TOILET. 

Here  is  another  very  typical  example  of  the  difficulty  in  under- 
standing. We  wish  to  have  some  one  repeat  numbers  in  a  de- 
scending order;  for  example  to  start  at  20  and  recite  the  lower 
ones  19,  18,  17  to  0.  For  a  normal  this  explanation  would  be 
sufficient;  as  soon  as  our  brief  instructions  were  given  he  would 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GEXERAL  PARALYSIS 


251 


commence  to  pronounce  the  figures  in  the  indicated  order;  he 
might  be  obhged  to  go  very  slowly  or  he  might  commit  many 
errors,  the  execution  of  the  experiment  might  be  more  or  less 
defective  but  the  idea  of  the  experiment  would  have  been  grasped. 
Let  us  now  take  a  general  paralytic  and  see  how  much  time 
and  explanation  are  required  for  him.     Philippon  has  the  level  of 


FIG.  2L    PROFILE  OF  .MLLE.  PHILIPPON. 


nine   years   and    consequently    idaiiis   considci.iMc    iiilciligcnctv 
We  give  the  entire  dftail  of  the  test. 

Q.  Will  you  count  backwards  hoRinninj^  with  20,  as  far  as  0?     Do  you 
understand? 

A.   (With   a   satisfied   air),     'ihat    is   not    diflicult. 

Q.  Weil  begin. 

.1.  10,  20,  30,  40,  50,  (K),  70,  SO 


252  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  No,  not  that;  you  must  count  as  I  do.     20,  19,  18,  17 and  so  on 

down  to  0. 

A.  (With  a  nod  of  acquiescence.)     Yes. 

Q.  Commence,  20! 

A.  Ikt's  say  10. 

Q.  No,  say  20,   19,   18,  and  then? 

A.  30,  40,  50,  60,  70,  80,  90,  100,  1,000.     There! 

Q.    But  no.     Listen  to  me.     You  are  going  to  do  as  I  do.     I  will  do  it 
first,  20,  19,  18,  17,  16,  15,  14,  13,  12,  11,  10,  9,  8,  7,  6,  5,  4,  3,  2,  1,  0.     Do  you 
understand? 

A.  Yes 3,  4,  5,  6,  7 

Q.  But,  no! 


A.  (Continuing)  8,  9,  10,  11,  12,  13— 

Q.  But,  no! 

A.  (Continuing)  14,  16,  17 

Q.  But  no!     Stop!     That  is  not  it.     It   is   in   the   other   direction   you 
must  count. 

A.  Yes,  I  counted  forwards. 

Q.  You  must  count  backwards.     20,   19 

A.  20,  19 

Q.   (Prompting)  18,  and  then! 

A.  And  then  20,  so  22,  24,  26,  28,  30. 

Q.  Listen.     Do  as  I  do!    20,  19,  18,  17,  16,  15,  14,  13,  12,  11,  10,  9,  8,  7, 
6,  5,  4,  3,  2,  1,  0. 

A.  Oh!  very  well.     I  will  do  like  that.     20,  19,  18,  17,  16,  15,  14,  12,  13, 

10 I've  lost  it 9,  8,  7,  6,  5,  well  3,  5,  4,  3,  2,  and  1 and  to  goon 

25,  30,  etc. 

She  took  35  seconds  to  count  backwards,  a  considerable  time. 

Q.  Try    to    go    quicker,    20,    19, 

A.  36,  37. 

Q.  No,   not  like  that,  20,   19,   18, 

A.  20,  19,  18,  17,  16,  17,  16,  15.     I've  lost  it. 

Q.  14. 

A.  14,   13,  12,  11,   11. 

Q.  10. 

A.  10,  9,  8,  8,  6,  5,  3,  2,  and  1. 
This  time  it  required  45  seconds. 

In  analysing  this  long  attempt  it  can  be  seen  that  our  patient 
has  understood  onh^  because  we  have  had  the  patience  to  give 
her  six  complete  explanations,  while  in  general  a  single  one  suffices. 
But  notice  that  this  woman  knew  very  well  how  to  count  back- 
wards since  she  finalh"  succeeded;  it^is  not,  therefore,  tlieJuiawl- 
edge  that  is  Ia.ckiiig  but  the  comprehension  of  what  is  asked  of 
hen     All  this  is  a  remarkable  example  of  inertia  of  comprehension. 

We  ask  Vigne. "How  many  fingers  have  you  on  the  right 

hand?"     She  asks  to  have  the  question  repeated. 


PSYCHOLOGY    OF  GENERAL    PARALYSIS  253 

A.  On  the  right  hand?    I  have  two  hands. 
Q.  But  how  many  fingers  have  you  on  the  right  hand? 
A.  I  have  ten. 

Q.  On  the  right  hand?  I  ask  you  on  the  right  hand !  The  right  hand ! 
How  many  fingers  have  you? 

A.  Very  well  I  have  two  (showing  both  hands). 

Q .  No,  on  your  right  hand,  how  many  fingers? 

A.  (She  only  gives  a  questioning,  astonished  look.) 

Q.  How  many  fingers  have  you  on  the  right  hand? 

A.  Ah!     I  don't  know  what  you  mean. 

We  put  exactly  the  same  question  to  her  sometime  afterwards. 

A.  Well,  I  have  five. 

Q.  And  on  the  left  hand? 

A.  Oh!    well,  I  have  five. 

Q.  And  on  both? 

A.  Well  that  makes  ten. 

She  knows  then  how  to  reply  and  to  give  the  very  simple  in- 
formation that  is  asked  of  her,  but  she  does  not  understand 
what  is  wished  of  her. 

This  continual  lack  of  comprehension  often  prevents  their 
taking  part  in  a  directed  conversation,  a  very  striking  contrast 
by  the  way,  with  what  we  have  observed  among  imbeciles.  In  a 
disconnected  conversation,  especially  if  one  follows  their  lead, 
they  may  for  a  time  give  a  false  impression  of  the  value  of  their 
intelhgence,  as  they  habitually  show  a  greater  fluency  than 
imbeciles,  but  a  precise  and  definite  questioning  immediately 
brings  out  their  deterioration. 

Psychologically,  lack  of  comprehension  consists  in  the  absence 
of  suggestion  of  ideas.  A  person  who  understands  has  a  train  of 
ideas  following  the  words  heard,  and  the  ideas  correlate  with  the 
words;  a  person  who  does  not  understand,  to  whom  one  speaks 
for  example  an  unknown  language,  hears  the  sounds  but  the 
evocation  of  ideas  docs  not  take  place;  or  possibly  ideas  are  evoked 
whose  falsity  is  at  once  discernible.  Among  our  patients  we 
sometimes  observe,  in  cases  such  as  we  have  just  cited,  a  complete 
absence  of  evocation;  or,  at  least  if  the  absence  is  not  rigorously 
absolute,  which  probably  never  occurs,  it  is  sufficiently  striking 
for  the  patient  to  have  the  feeling  that  he  has  not  understood,  or 
indeed  for  the  idea  evoked  to  be  insignificant.  But  now  and  then 
a  false  idea  is  produced  which  constitutes  a  contradiction.  This 
contradiction  manifests  itself  more  clearly  in  two  somewhat 
different  cases  where  the  phenomena  is  a  little  more  complicated, 


254  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

which  we  shall  call  greffage  [grafting],  and  incongruous  replies. 
In  lack  of  comprehension  there  is  only  inertia  disclosing  itself 
by  a  negative  state,  a  repose;  in  greffage  there  is  a  certain  intel- 
lectual activity. 

Greffage.  In  a  conversation,  apropos  of  a  poorly  under- 
stood question  for  example,  or  a  picture  to  be  interpreted,  it  often 
happens  that  a  general  paralytic  daes-natoontent  himself  with 
an  irrelevant  reply,  but  grafts  upon  it  the  aimless  development 
of-aaidea. 

Let  us  cite  examples.  Samse  is  in  the  act  of  repeating  words 
that  have  been  given  her  and  this  is  the  way  that  greffage  occurs. 

Q.  Papa. 

A.  Papa. 

Q.  Shoe,  hat. 

A.  Shoe,  the  hat. 

Q.  I  am  cold,  I  am  very  hungry. 

A.  I  am  cold,  I  am  very  hungry. 

Q.  I  have  a  handkerchief.     I  have  clean  hands. 

A.  (Nowise  distracted.)     Of  course  I  have. 

Q.  You  did  not  repeat! 

A.  Oh!    yes,  I  did  say  it. 

Useless  to  argue.     Let  us  continue. 

Q.  (Giving  a  sentence  to  repeat.)  My  name  is  Gaston!  Oh!  the  dread- 
ful dog! 

A.  Ah!     ah!     that's  true,  so  it's  a  dog,  that's  all  right. 

Q.  (Giving  with  energetic  accent  a  new  sentence  to  repeat.)  It  rains 
in  the  garden!    Joseph  is  doing  his  lessons! 

A.  Ah!  ah!  that's  good. 

Q.  You  have  repeated? 

A.  Oh!  yes. 

Q.  What  did  you  say? 

A.  I  said  that  was  good.     Joseph  works  well  then. 

Let  us  notice  what  happens.  When  the  repetition  is  easy 
Samse  does  not  fail;  when  the  sentence  becomes  longer  and  the 
repetition  is  consequently  more  difficult  Samse  ceases  to  make 
the  necessary  effort  to  reproduce  the  sentence  verbatim;  she 
fixes  her  attention  upon  the  idea  expressed  by  the  sentence  and 
the  grafting  begins. 

Another  example  furnished  by  Bern.  We  have  her  repeat 
some  sentences.     She  does  it  correctly,  then  the  grating  begins. 

Q.  My  name  is  Gaston.     Oh!  the  dreadful  dog! 

A.  Oh!  the  bad  dog.     I  had  Turc,  a  pretty  bulldog 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  255 

Q.  We  enjoy  ourselves  greatly;  I  have  caught  a  mouse. 

A.  Oh  yes.     I  have  caught  a  mouse.     There  were  rats  above there 

is  a  granary,  etc. 

Here  is  a  similar  example  of  grafting  in  the  definitions. 

Q.  What  is  a  fork? 

A.  A  fork,  it's  a  fork.     I  have  three  of  silver.     But  they  are  marked. 

Q.  What  is  a  horse. 

A.  There  are  horses  at  Corbenay.  I  have  seen  cows;  and  ducks;  they 
lay  eggs,  and  then  the  chickens,  there  are  chickens.  Yes,  ducks  lay  eggs, 
etc. 

The  same  is  true  with  Philippon. 

Q.  Papa,  mama. 

A.  Papa,  mama,  my  sister,  my  brother,  cousins,  plenty  of  them,  my 
cousin  who  is,  etc. 

Q.  Shoe,  hat. 

A.  Shoe,  hat.     I  have  a  beautiful  hat  with  violets. 

Q.  It  is  cold,  I  am  hungry. 

A.  Oh  yes,  on  the  contrary  it  is  warm.  I  am  hungry,  I  hope  to  go 
home  to  have  good  things  to  drink  and  eat;  we  never  get  enough;  it  is  like 
the  two  ladies,  there,  they  have  eaten  nothing  this  evening,  it  is  too  long, 
it  is  necessary  to  force  everybody;  at  Crenelle  I  shall  stop  to  get  my  watch. 
And  then  I  am  going  to  have  my  teeth  pulled,  etc. 

Q.  We  enjoy  ourselves  greatly,  I  have  caught  a  mouse. 

A.  Oh!  the  poor  little  creature.  I  would  love  to  have  one  of  those 
little  creatures  in  a  cage.  I  used  to  sell  matches,  and  birds  at  the  market. 
I  have  done  everything.     I  did  then  as  well  as  my  sister-in-law,  etc. 

Exactly  what  is  this  greffage  from  a  psychological  point  of 
view?  It  supposes  indeed  a  certain  inertia  of  comprehension 
because  a  patient  who  understood  clearly  that  he  was  to  repeat 
a  sentence  and  nothing  else  would  avoid  adding  whole  sentences 
of  his  own  invention.  In  addition  to  this  there  is  nonsense,  that 
is  to  say  an  absence  or  a  weakness  of  direction;  there  is  also  a 
certain  cerebral  activity  that  manifests  itself  under  a  form  which 
has  no  need  of  reflection  nor  of  effort.  At  first  thought,  this 
intellectual  activity  seems  contradictory  to  our  hypothesis  of 
inertia  of  evocation;  if  all  their  ideas  were  struck  with  inertia 
how  would  all  this  garrulity  be  possible?  It  is  because  the 
inertia  of  evocation  may  manifest  itself  by  the  faihire  to  evoke 
the  correct  idea,  the  precise  one  whi(;h  is  needed,  and  while  the 
only  idea  of  which  there  is  need  is  not  aroused,  a  swarm  of  other 
ideas  rush  in  which  are  indifTerent  or  really  false. 

Incongruous  replies.  Here  arc  some  singular  replies. 
They  are  not  absolutely  lacking  in  sense  but  they  have  no  rela- 


256  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

tion  to  the  question.  These  repHes  are  frequent  among  certain 
general  paralytics  but  not  among  all.  So  far  as  we  know  they 
have  not  been  pointed  out  up  to  the  present;  they  have  without 
doubt  passed  unperceived;  and  we  understand  why  because 
we  ourselves  did  not  notice  them  for  a  long  time;  we  collected 
them  in  our  stenographic  work  without  realizing  their  import. 
When  one  of  our  patients  made  an  incongruous  reply  we  dis- 
regarded it;  we  attributed  it  to  some  casual  circumstance  without 
significance.  For  instance,  we  supposed  that  our  patient  in 
listening  to  us  had  a  moment's  distraction  or  perhaps  that  he 
was  hard  of  hearing.  Here  are  some  fragments  of  these  dialogues. 
We  choose  our  examples  of  course  from  the  clearest  cases;  not  all 
cases  are  equally  incongruous. 

We  ask  Holeg,  who  was  once  a  cabman  on  his  own  account  and 
later  was  coachman  for  another, 

Q.  Why  did  you  go  out  of  business  for  yourself? 

A.  The  hackney-coaches. 

Q.  Yes,  but  why  did  you  go  out  of  business? 

A.  Yes,  I  had  coachmen. 

A.  But  why  did  you  quit? 

A.  Ah!  because went  home.     Then  I  hired  out  to  some  employers. 

Q.  Yes,  but  you  had  been  proprietor.     Why  did  you  cease? 

A.  Because  I  had  enough;  because  I  had  to  work  myself. 

However  mediocre  this  last  reply  he  might  have  given  it  at  first. 

Q.  How  long  did  you  stay  with  your  employer? 

A.  Oh!     I  stayed  a  long  time  with  him,  three  years. 

Q.  Where  were  you  before? 

A.  I  was  in  business  myself. 

Q.  Where  was  that? 

A.  For  fifteen  years. 

He  replies  to  a  question  of  address  by  information  about  the  time. 

We  ask  another  patient,  a  women  36  years  old. 

Q.  Madame,  what  is  your  name? 

A.  Louise,  ApoUine. 

Q.  How  old  are  you? 

A.  I  am lay No.  3  (incomprehensible  reply). 

Q.  Let  me  see,  what  did  you  say? 
A.  It  was  in  the  blind  alley  Barrier. 

She  lived  rightly  enough  No.  3,  Blind  Alley  Barrier.     She  gives  her  ad- 
dress when  asked  her  age. 
Q.  But  how  old  are  you? 
A.  Thirty-si.x  years  old. 
Q.  In  what  year  were  you  born? 
A.  In  Crepe Sa6ne-et-Loire. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  257 

She  was  born  in  Crepy-en-Valois,  Oise. 

Q.  How  is  that? 

A.  How  is  that? 

Q.  In  what  year  were  j^ou  born,  I  ask? 

A.  Ah!  I  don't  know,  because  I  was  little  at  that  time. 

She  replies  by  giving  the  place  of  her  birth  when  asked  to  give  the  date. 

Again: 

Q.  How  much  does  your  husband  earn? 

A.  His  name  is  Vanbergh.     There  is  an  h  at  the  end. 

Q.  But  how  much  does  he  earn? 

A.  How  is  that? 

Q.  But  how  much  does  your  husband  earn? 

A.  His  name  is  Vanbergh. 

Q.  Yes,  but  how  much  does  he  earn? 

A.  1  do  not  know  what  he  earns. 

Q.  And  you,  what  do  you  do? 

A.  Yes,  he  has  a  lame  foot.    He  got  a  splinter  in  his  foot. 

Same  remark.  She  gives  her  husband's  name  when  asked  how  much 
he  earns. 

Bern,  a  woman  of  forty  who  has  a  level  of  seven  years,  abounds  in  in- 
congruous replies. 

Q.  At  what  age  were  you  married? 

A.  I  kept  house  for  twelve  years. 

This  is  not  a  reply  to  the  question. 

Q.  How  old  will  you  be  when  you  are  a  hundred  years  old? 

A.  I  will  be  old.     I  won't  go  to  a  hundred  years  nor  my  husband  either. 

Q.  But  how  old  will  you  be  when  you  are  a  hundred  years  old? 

A.  I  won't  go  to  a  hundred  years. 

Again  an  answer  which  does  not  fit  the  question. 

We  ask  of  Samse. 

Q.  Are  you  a  lady  or  gentleman? 

A.  (Laughing)    Oh!  I  am  not  a  gentleman, oh! 

Q.  Are  you  a  little  boy? 

A.  I  have  none. 

Always  the  same  incongruity. 

AiLLhesQ  ncmsensical  replies  suppose  that  the  qncstioil  has  only 
been  partially  urKlfrstoorl  by  the  patients.  They  understand 
that  a  question  ha.s  been  asked;  they  even  understand  some  words 
of  the  question  or  its  general  sense,  but  they  do  not  grasp  it  in 
its  integrity  nor  get  its  shade  of  meaning,  so  the  reply  is  indirect. 
It  is  the  same  mechanism  as  that  which  produces  partial  per- 
ceptions; the  mechanism  is  as  follows.  Not  all  the  words  heard 
evoke  their  appropriate  images;  there  is  only  a  fragmentary 
perception  of  the  sentence,  although,  a  circumstance  important 
to  note,  the  question  asked  is  not  above  tlie  inteUigcnre  of  the 


258  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

patient.  It  suffices  as  a  rule  to  insist,  to  raise  the  voice,  to  arouse 
the  attention,  in  order  to  destroy  this  psychic  deafness  and  finally 
to  obtain  a  correct  reply.  Furthermore  a  development  of  ideas 
is  produced  by  inertia.  The  patient  in  whom  an  idea  has  been 
previously  awakened  continues  it,  without  asking  himself  if  it 
applies  to  the  present  case.  The  following  example  is  characteris- 
tic. 

Q.  (To  Bernard)     Show  me  your  right  ear. 
A.  Here  it  is.     (She  points  to  it.) 
Q.  Show  me  your  left  hand. 
A.  These  are  my  little  ears. 

She  continues  to  think  of  her  ears  either  because  she  does  not 
understand  the  new  question  or  because  she  finds  it  difficult  te 
leave  the  first  question.  It  is  inertia;  but  it  is  the  inertia  of  move- 
ment, the  continuation  of  an  impulse,  a  ball  which  continues  to 
roll. 

In  that  which  precedes  we  have  taken  no  account  of  the  clinical 
signs  by  which  one  habitually  recognizes  general  paralysis.  These 
signs  are  too  complex  and  at  the  same  time  they  are  known  in 
too  inexact  a  manner  to  serve  in  the  building  up  of  a  psychological 
theory.  Indeed  they  are  known  chiefly  through  the  testimony 
of  relatives  or  sometimes  by  the  very  incomplete  accounts  given 
by  the  patients  themselves.  It  only  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
they  contradict  the  observations  which  we  have  here  presented. 
It  seems  to  us  that  they  do  not. 

An  important  fact  which  has  struck  all  alienists  is  that  it  is  by 
his  state  of  being  and  his  acts  rather  than  by  the  disorder  of  his 
speech  that  a  patient  betrays  the  change  which  takes  place. 
The  acts  which  attract  the  attention  are  variable.  They  differ 
according  to  the  individual,  according  to  circumstances,  according 
to  chance.  They  may  be  classed  as  errors  like  negligence,  for- 
getting important  matters,  destroying  useful  things,  delays, 
abandoning  of  work  for  no  reason;  faults  of  housekeeping,  for 
example,  meals  not  ready  on  time,  the  food  too  salty,  or  burned ; 
useless  expenditure;  carelessness  of  dress;  and  lastly  delinquent 
acts,  robbery,  petty  thieving,  indecencies,  etc. 

Among  these  clinical  facts  we  shall  choose  only  one,  which  is 
very  characteristic  and  which  may  be  observed  as  soon  as  the 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  PARALYSIS  259 

patient  enters  the  asylum;  it  is  the  unconsciousness  which  he 
shows  in  relation  to  his  new  situation.  Many  cannot  find  their 
direction,  they  do  not  know  where  they  are,  they  know  neither 
the  day,  the  month,  nor  the  hour  of  the  day;  they  do  not,  there- 
fore, take  into  account  the  little  external  signs  which  should 
permit  them  to  orient  themselves.  A  patient,  writes  Kraepelin, 
replies  that  it  is  January  notwithstanding  there  are  fresh  cherries 
on  the  table.  We  recall  having  seen  a  woman  about  fifty  years 
of  age  who  was  only  at  the  beginning  of  her  malady  and  who  in 
her  conversation  showed  herself  so  intelligent,  so  sensible,  that 
one  would  not  suspect  any  intellectual  weakening;  yet  already 
she  showed  that  injdiffereiice  to  her  surroundings-  which  Ts"  so 
chapacteriatic.  oi  paralytic  dementia.  To  thoroughly  under- 
stand this  indifference  and  above  all  to  judge  of  it  let  us  imagine 
how  a  perfectly  normal  person  would  feel  if  he  were  locked  up 
in  an  asylum ;  let  us  put  ourselves  in  the  place  of  such  a  person ; 
the  most  careless  of  us  would  be  disturbed  and  irritated  by  this 
sequestration.  We  should  want  to  know  where  we  were  and  why 
we  were  locked  up.  The  first  time  our  patient  was  brought  to 
the  office  and  introduced  to  us  she  seated  herself  tranquilly  in  a 
chair,  drew  her  glasses  from  their  case,  and  began  to  read  the 
paper  as  if  she  did  not  understand  that  it  would  be  to  her  interest 
to  know  who  we  were  and  what  we  wanted  of  her.  Note  that 
she  had  only  just  been  brought  to  the  hospital.  There  was 
therefore  in  her  a  lack  of  comprehension  of  the  surroundings, 
a  state  which  resembled  metaphoricall}''  that  of  partial  percep- 
tion; it  was  as  though  she  saw  only  the  table,  the  chairs,  the 
wholly  material  part  of  the  office,  and  perceived  nothing  beyond 
and  did  not  realize  that  the  office  belonged  to  a  hospital  and 
that  the  hospital  enclosed  her  like  a  prison.  The  ease  with  which 
such  patients  accept  their  sequestration  was  long  ago  noted 
by  alienists;  it  is  sometimes  the  only  sign  which  tiiey  give  of 
their  intellectual  weakening.  In  everything  else  they  seem 
normal. 

With-otlwH-ti.  the  troublf  l:il.<s  on  a  slightly  difTcrciit  form. 
They  demand  thcii"  release  every  time  they  nee  the  physician; 
but  they  do  not  seem  to  remember  that  the  previous  day  they 
asked  the  same  thing  in  identical  terms  and,  moreover,  that  it 
has  lead  to  nothing,  and  that  during  the  interval  of  the  visits 
of  the  physician  they  paid  no  more  heed  to  their  release  and  spoke 
of  it  to  no  one. 


260  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

It  seems  to  us  that  nothing  in  all  these  diverse  facts  is  contrary 
to  the  explanation  which  we  have  given  of  the  lack  of  power  of 
evocation;  to  forget  important  objects,  neglect  to  salt  the  food, 
or  salt  it  twice,  or,  again,  to  lose  the  sense  of  propriety,  of  modesty, 
or  even  of  duty,  all  this  attributed  according  to  the  case  to  loss 
of  memory,  of  judgment,  of  attention,  to  the  "I  have  forgotten," 
"I  did  not  pay  attention;"  but  all  this  should  be  explained,  as 
we  think,  by  a  weakening  of  the  power  of  evocation  of  ideas 
and  feelings;  the  last  idea  does  not  reappear  and,  hence,  forget- 
fulness,  inattention.  The  correcting  sense  which  would  inhibit 
the  grotesque  or  immoral  act  does  not  awaken,  and  hence,  the 
loss  of  judgment  or  of  moral  sense.  One  has  therefore  no  trouble 
in  harmonizing  chnical  facts  with  the  theory  which  we  have  just 
outlined;  but  let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  we  prefer  to  rely 
upon  personal  and  direct  observations,  rather  than  clinical  his- 
tories which  at-e  too  often  obtained  second  hand.  CHnical  facts 
will  not  serve  to  construct  or  to  demonstrate  our  theory;  let  us 
content  ourselves  with  proving  that  they  do  not  contradict  it. 

3.  Considerations  upon  the  difficulty  of  functioning, 
ITS  EXTENT  AND  ITS  CHARACTER.  We  have  already  cited  a  great 
number  of  examples  of  this  lack  of.  evocation  which  we  believe 
to  be  characteristic  of  paralytic  dementia.  We4iave_  been  able 
to  note  that  according  to  the  domains  considered  the  phenomenon 
of  evocation  takes  on  different  aspects;  for.  the., acts  of  memory 
it  constitutes  forgetfulness;  for  movements  and  acts  it  shows 
itself  either  by  lapses  in  writing  or  by  a  lack  of  continuity  in 
occupations;  for  perceptions  it  is  equivalent  to  defect,  almost 
to  anaesthesia  that  is,  as  it  were,  psychic  deafness.  At  other 
times  the  same  phenomenon  has  been  designated  under  the  name 
of  lack  of  attention,  or  distraction,  or  neghgence.  But  under 
these  different  aspects  and  in  spite  of  this  varying  terminology 
we  always  find  a  weakening  of  the  same  faculty,  the  faculty  of 
evocation. 

In  the  Hght  of  all  these  observations  this  faculty  appears  as 
one  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  intellectual  mechanism. 
It  does  not  consist  solely  in  awakening  an  isolated  memory, 
it  is  not  limited  to  a  mere  detail  of  the  memory  function;  it  comes 
into  play  in  all  intellectual  operations;  it  furnishes  them  their 
necessary  food  because  all  intellectual  work  is  performed  by 
means  of  ideas,   and   these  ideas   need  to  be  evoked.     Let  us 


DIFFICULTY   OF    FUNCTIONING  261 

illustrate  exactly  what  happens.  That  which  we  use  for  work 
is  not  at  all  a  single  idea  which  is  illuminated  for  a  moment  and 
is  quickly  extinguished,  hke  someone  who  has  only  one  gas  jet 
which  he  successively  hghts  and  extinguishes.  In  reahty  every 
work  supposes  a  considerable  number  of  ideas  which  have  some- 
times been  called  a  constellation.  For  an  instant  we  have  need 
for  example,  of  idea  1;  then,  to  continue  the  work  commenced, 
1  must  be  echpsed  and  ideas,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  quickly  illuminated; 
then  one  returns  to  1,  then  one  has  need  of  7  and  of  8;  then  they 
are  extinguished  and  one  hghts  2,  3,  4,  etc.  So  the  work  goes 
on  by  successive  extinguishings  and  re-lightings  which  require 
that  the  whole  range  of  ideas  remain  ready  for  active  service; 
this  is  what  assures  the  continuity  of  work,  and  what  gives  us 
the  impression  of  its  continuity  notwithstanding  the  discontinuity 
of  the  hghting;  it  is  this  which  permits  a  certain  direction  to 
be  followed  continually,  a  theme  to  be  developed  in  all  its  rami- 
fications. To  sum  up,  this  is  the  important  phenomenon  of  which 
the  cases  heretofore  studied  have  given  us  only  shght  examples. 
It  is  this  broad  sense  which  must  be  given  to  the  phenomenon 
of  evocation  of  the  states  of  consciousness.  And  consequently, 
whpri  y^a  of^y  ih^^f~i^...  vvoik  <»l  (' Vocation isimperiUed  in  paralytic 
dementia,^  it  is  as  if  we  said,  that  the  whole  operation  of  thought 
is  xendered  difficult. 

But  we  must  go  farther.  Upon  the  whole,  evocation  is  only 
one  example  of  mental  functioning  and  however  important  this 
may  be  it  does  not  include  all  the  rest.  Mental  functioning  sup- 
poses many  other  forms  of  activity.  There  exists  not  only  an 
evocation  of  the  states  of  consciousness,  but  besides  an  acquisi- 
tion, a  fixation  of  these  states;  and  when  they  are  evoked  they 
must  be  worked  over,  that  is  to  say,  compared,  judged,  com- 
bined, ampHfied,  or  on  the  contrary  analyzed,  reduced,  or  per- 
haps contradicted,  neutralized  or  inhibited.  Why  should  the 
reproduction  of  the  states  of  consciousness  be  the  only  disordered 
part  in  all  the  mental  mechanism?  There  is  no  reason  to  admit  it. 
On  the  contrary,  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  our  sul)ject8 
are  affected  in  all  their  mental  operations  whatever  they  may  be. 

To  shorten  this  demonstration  we  shall  cite  only  one  well 
known  example;  it  is  the  difficnilty  whi(;h  a  general  paral>i-ic 
experiences  in  fixing  new  impressions.  All  alienists  know  that 
tYiny  Iptij-Q  poorly.     We  give  a  simple  test,  which  very  clearly 


262  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

illustrates  this  difficulty.  Using  a  red  crayon  we  draw  a  head 
on  a  large  sheet  of  white  paper  placed  before  the  patient.  When 
it  is  finished  we  say,  "This  is  Ernest."  Then  by  its  side  we 
draw  another  figure,  using  a  blue  crayon  and  say,  "This  is  Louis." 
Lastly  we  draw  a  third  with  a  black  crayon  and  say,  "This  is 
Antoine."  Then  repeating  we  say,  "This  is  Ernest,  this  is 
Louis,  this  is  Antoine.  Pay  attention  to  the  names  what  I 
give  them,  Ernest,  Louis,  and  Antoine."  In  this  way  we  have 
named  each  figure  three  times  in  succession  and  each  time  the 
figure  was  pointed  out.  If  one  plays  this  Httle  game  with  a 
general  paralytic  one  will  be  surprised  at  the  difficulty  that  the 
patient  finds  in  retaining  these  three  names  and  in  applying  them 
correctly.  Thus  Philippon,  the  woman  with  a  level  of  nine  years, 
cannot  recall  anything  after  the  first  instruction  which,  as  we 
have  said,  consists  in  naming  the  figures  to  her  three  times. 
After  a  second  lesson  composed  like  the  first  of  three  namings 
she  makes  a  mistake  and  names  them  in  the  following  order, 
Louis,  Ernest,  Antoine.  It  requires  a  third  lesson  similar  to 
the  two  preceding  ones  for  the  three  figures  to  be  finally  named 
correctly. 

Samse,  another  general  paralytic  a  little  lower  than  the  pre- 
ceding having  a  level  of  seven  years,  fails  still  more  strikingly. 

After  the  first  lesson  she  says,  "Very  well,  Louis,  Antoine How 

about   it?    Joseph! "     The   name   of  Joseph   has   not   been 

spoken.     After  the  second  lesson  she  is  sure  that  she  can  repeat 

it  correctly,  she  says,  "Sure  enough,  Antoine How  about 

it?  What  is  his  name?  I  don't  remember."  After  a  third 
lesson,  she  says,  "Louis,  Antoine Yes,  his  name  is  Antoine." 

Without  further  comment,  and  without  the  necessity  for  bring- 
ing in  terms  of  comparison,  it  is  evident  that  these  defects  in 
exact  repetition  after  so  many  lessons,  denote  a  profound  weaken- 
ing of  the  memory  for  acquired  knowledge.  The  task  to  be 
performed  was  not  only  the  conservation  of  several  impressions, 
it  was  also  necessary  not  to  become  confused,  but  to  give  the 
correct  name  to  each  figure;  we  demanded  of  the  memory  a 
certain  gymnastic  feat  which  is  evidently  very  easy  for  an  adult, 
or  for  a  child  of  nine  years,  but  which  is  singularly  embarrassing 
for  our  subjects.  We  have  reproduced  this  example  at  some 
length  in  order  to  show  that  the  phenomena  of  deficiency  in 
these  paralytics  extends  not  to  evocation  alone,  that  evocation 


DIFFICULTY    OF   FUNCTIONING  263 

is  only  one  example,  which  in  fact  we  offer  because  it  is  clear, 
precise,  and  easily  demonstrable;  but  we  willingly  admit — al- 
though the  proof  has  not  been  rigorously  made — that  among  gen- 
eral p_ai:al3Ltics.,j]Iiorms  of  intellectual  functioning  are  affected. 

Will  it  be  possible  to  indicate  further  how  this  is  true,  and  in 
what  the  difficulty,  the  obstacle  consists? 

For  a  long  while  we  have  meditated  upon  these  facts;  and  at 
first  we  believed  that  we  could  explain  all  the  psychology  of 
general  paralysis  by  a  diminution  of  voluntary  effort.  We  said 
repeatedly  that  what  is  characteristic  of  the  general  paralytic 
is  the  impossibility  of  making  an  effort.  This  explanation  seems 
to  us  now  only  partially  correct;  we  take  it  up  here  only  to  pass 
beyond  it. 

At  first  sight  one  sees  clearly  that  many  of  the  tests  in  which 
the  patients  fail  demand  a  slight  effort;  thus  it  requires  an  effort 
to  count  backwards  or  to  work  rapidly  either  in  counting  figures 
or  in  turning  a  handle.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  particularly 
when  one  creates  a  slight  difficulty  for  them  that  their  intellectual 
incapacity  shows  itself.  If  one  is  contented  with  carrying  on  a 
colorless  conversation  with  them,  such  as  many  people  use  while 
visiting,  talking  of  nothing  but  the  weather  or  the  servants,  they 
can  reply  to  such  commonplace  remarks  by  others  which  are  of 
equal  value,  for  such  remarks  belong  to  their  level,  but  in  reality 
they  .cannot  make  an  effort. 

Let  it  be  understood  also  that  if  they  are  prevented  from  mak- 
ing an  effort,  it  is  not  because  of  a  special  attitude  of  the  will  or 
of  the  character;  they  are  neither  sulky,  stubborn,  nor  peevish 
like  certain  of  our  imbeciles  who  positively  refuse  to  submit 
to  our  experiments  when  they  could  easily  execute  them  if  they 
were  only  willing.  Nor  do  they  resemble  those  other  imbeciles 
who,  because  of  a  feeling  of  deference  do  their  best  like  good 
children.  The  paralytiiuirdjnanly  shows  neither  willingness  nor 
annoyam^'.yiMit-jath<tf-a  very  paHiettkr-  mental  state  of  iiuliffer- 
en££,  which  is  aui  generis  in  this  particular  nialudy. 

But  in  order  to  explain  all  that  takes  place  in  them  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  a.ssert  that  they  are  powerless  to  make  an  effort. 
That  would  be  an  error  of  interpretation.  The  effort  is  nothing 
else  than  an  additional  apparatus  which  gives  more  power  to 
the  intellectual  machine,  as  the  advancing  of  the  spark  is  a  par- 


264  THE    INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

ticular  condition  which  gives  more  speed  to  an  automobile. 
But  one  uses  these  reinforcements  only  when  there  is  an  unusual 
object  to  conquer;  under  ordinary  conditions  the  intelligence 
functions  without  effort.  But  just  so  with  our  dements  the  ordi- 
nary conditions  do  not  suffice  because  what  is  easy  for  a  normal 
has  become  difficult  for  them.  Let  us  recall  the  examples  that 
we  have  given  before.  The  citation  of  proper  names  and  of 
figures  which  comes  at  the  first  call  of  a  normal  memory  is  no 
longer  possible  with  them;  the  dividing  of  the  attention  between 
two  different  elements,  for  example  the  color  and  the  value  of 
a  card,  can  no  longer  be  made;  the  memory  of  a  sentence  is  dis- 
turbed if  we  merely  dictate  a  new  portion  while  the  subject  is 
finishing  the  writing  of  the  first  part. 

These  are  failures  of  evocation  and  not  disturbances  in  the 
production  of  effort.  In  order  to  agree  with  our  previous  ex- 
planation it  would,  however,  be  correct  to  say,  that  aiaoflrg'para- 
lytic  dements  the  faculty  of  evocation  functions  with  difficulty; 
and  that  because  of  some  aggravating  circumstance  the  faculty 
of  effort,  which  might  serve  to  compensate  for  this  difficulty 
of  functioning,  is  often  equally  affected  which  renders  the  case 
irremediable.  All  this  reminds  one  of  a  village  where  there 
is  not  only  a  fire,  but  where  the  firemen  are  absent.  The  disaster 
is  doubled,  but  the  direct  cause  is  the  fire;  the  absence  of  the 
firemen  only  aggravates  it. 

The  correctness  of  our  interpretation  is  proved  by  what  hap- 
pens to  our  patients  when  they  chance  to  be  still  capable  of  effort. 
Thus,  Jonas,  an  aged  woman  who  seems  intelligent  in  spite  of 
her  decay,  confided  to  us  one  day  something  of  which  we  give 
the  exact  reproduction:  "I  have  to  take  great  pains,"  she  said, 
"when  I  try  to  remember  what  day  it  is,"  and  again:  "You 
must  believe  that  I  do  all  I  can.  It  makes  me  angry  that  I  can- 
not  overcome   it this   apathy."     There   is   with  her  then  a 

shght  power  of  effort,  or  the  idea  of  effort,  the  willingness  to 
try,  but  that  is  not  sufficient;  her  effort  cannot  conquer  that 
state  which  she  calls  apathy  and  which  in  our  opinion  constitutes 
an  inertia  of  functioning.  This  proves  therefore  that  it  is  not 
alone  by  the  absence  of  effort  that  these  patients  are  characterised. 
The  absence  of  effort  when  it  occurs,  ^bsit-very  frequently  does, 
only  aggravates  the  inertia  of  functioning  which  constitutes 
the  essential  character  of  the  mentality  of  generah  paralytics. 


DIFFICULTY   OF   FUNCTIONING  265 

Is  this  term  inertia  exactly  correct?  This  is  the  last  question 
that  we  shall  discuss  in  this  chapter.  For  those  who  have  read 
attentively  what  we  have  written  there  can  be  no  doubt.  The 
troubles  revealed  so  far  with  our  patients  consist  especially  in 
not  doing  any  one  thing,  or  in  doing  it  incompletely,  or  in  making 
mistakes  in  doing  it,  or  in  doing  it  with  an  excessive  slowness; 
all  of  this  is  expressed  exactly  by  the  term  inertia.  And  the 
word  seems  all  the  more  fitting  because  so  many  of  the  patients 
have  a  heavj'-,  stupid  look  with  slow  gestures,  thick  speech, 
and  inexpressive  countenance,  and  they  appear  fatigued,  al- 
though when  questioned  upon  this  point  they  assure  us  that  they 
are  not  tired  and  even  that  they  never  feel  so.  All  these  facts 
harmonize  and  it  seems  to  us  that  we  may  well  apply  to  these 
functional  troubles  the  term  inertia. 

Nevertheless  we  find  many  patients  who  do  not  at  all  corre- 
spond to  this  conception ;  they  are  those  who  have  delirious  ideas 
and  who  fabricate  a  great  number  of  them  and  who  therefore 
show  a  strong  intellectual  activity.  Delirium  is  sufficiently 
frequent  among  general  paralytics  for  certain  authors  to  believe 
themselves  justified  in  describing  this  delirium  as  a  representa- 
tion of  their  mental  state. ^  It  would  seem  difficult,  at  least  at 
first  sight,  to  admit  that  a  delirious  patient  has  functional  inertia. 

Here  is  Ramonot,  a  young  man  of  about  twentj'^-five  years 
of  age,  who  is  worthy  of  being  studied  at  length;  let  us  interrupt 
ourselves  to  examine  him  in  detail.  The  first  time  that  we  saw 
him  he  overflowed  with  satisfaction  seating  himself  squarely 
in  his  chair,  tipping  himself  backwards  and  twisting  his  thumbs 
while  regarding  us  with  a  gleam  in  his  black  eye. 

Q.  What  have  you  to  tell  us? 

A.  Always  fortune  in  abundance.  Always  happy.  What  would  you 
have.  One  always  turns  them  (the  thumbs).  There  is  nothing  else  to 
do  to  be  happy.     Always  in  the  thirty  million  who  smile  at  you 

It  is  his  favorite  idea  that  he  is  soon  to  be  decorated  \)y  Falli^res. 
We  try  to  make  him  talk  freely  upon  this  tluMiio  wliilo  we  confine 

*  Let  it  be  said  in  passing,  there  is  here  an  error.  The  delirious  con- 
ceptions of  a  general  paralytic  are  quite  in  harmony  with  the  mental  state 
by  their  incoherent  and  often  childish  character;  but  their  description 
cannot  replace  that  of  the  mental  state  which  we  have  given;  they  are  a 
manifestation,  a  product  of  that  mental  state,  they  are  not  the  state  itself. 


266       THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

ourselves  to  listening;  he  speaks  slowly,  searches  a  little  for  words 
and  a  good  deal  for  his  ideas. 

Q.  What  are  you  going  to  do? 

A.  Well,  we  are  going  to  march  according  to  honor  all  over  Europe, 
we  are  very  good  friends,  very  good  friends,  from  all  countries.  We  can 
march  with  head  erect,  with  high  hats.  I  do  not  know  how  to  wear  a 
high  hat,  I  am  going  to  wear  a  soft  hat,  because  a  soft  hat  is  more  becom- 
ing to  me  than  a  high  hat.     One  always  smiles,  always.     When  one  feels 

that  everybody  adores  you  that  makes  you  happy oh!  that  good  M. 

Fallieres.     I  want  him  to  sign  next  to  me.     Mine  is  the  last  signature 

It  is  he  who  is  going  to  decorate  me.     And  you  know  that  everybody  is 

happy.     I  press  to  my  heart  the  Cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honor on  my 

heart — when  he  says,  "The  powers  which  devolve  upon  me."  He  will 
not  embrace  me  but  his  heart  will  be  in  it etc.,  etc. 

Upon  our  invitation  the  patient  is  pleased  to  dictate  to  us  a 
letter  to  Fallieres.     Here  it  is  reproduced  exactly. 

Monsieur  le  President  FalliIjres; 

I  thank  you  for  all  the  goodness  which  you  have  shown  me.  I  am  happy 
to  have  the  good  wishes  which  you  have  shown  me  in  your  company,  as 
have  all  the  Presidents  of  the  Republic  who  are  happy  to  have  me  in  their 
power.     And  I  will  always  do  my  duty  towards  all  the  comrades  who  are 

under  our  orders and  all  the  people  are  happy  to  amuse  themselves 

with  the  thirty  millions  of  which  we  are  in  possession,  everybody  will 
be  happy,  will  dance,  will  ride  on  bicycle  morning  and  night;  and  as  soon 
as  we  are  returned  from  the  bicycle  ride  we  will  have  a  good  meal,  and 
after  the  meal  we  will  dance  until  we  receive  further  orders  and  then  we 
will  continue  during  the  whole  year;  we  will  attend  the  vintage,  we  will 
drink  good  wine,  we  will  all  go  up  into  the  vat,  and  so  there  will  be  no 
need  of  a  wine  press  (he  laughs)  to  take  the  grapes  and  we  will  taste  the 
good  wine,  and  after  each  meal  we  will  take  a  glass  of  wine  of  cod-fish 
which  will  do  us  enormous  good.  I  am  happy  for  the  decoration  which 
I  have  the  pleasure  of  wearing,  I  greet  cordially  all  the  Presidents  of  the 
Republic  and  with  all  my  heart.  Also  signed:  all  the  Presidents  of  the 
Republic. — Ramomot  Louis. 

At  another  time  we  wished  to  arouse  some  doubts  in  his  mind 
concerning  the  object  of  his  delirium  or  to  scrutinize  the  reasons 
upon  which  he  bases  his  belief  in  this  story  of  his  decoration. 

The  following  dialogue  takes  place: 

Q.  You  have  seen  Fallieres? 

A.  I  have  always  been  in  his  service.  From  the  time  I  was  born  I 
was  always  in  his  service. 

Q.  As  domestic? 

A.  (In  nowise  offended)  As  friend,  as  president  and  for  my  goodness 
he  decorated  me  with  the  greatest  decoration  and  the  same  for  all  my 
brothers. 


DIFFICULTY    OF    FUNCTIONING  267 

Q.  But  you,  have  you  seen  him? 

A.  Yes  absolutely. 

Q.  Where  did  you  see  him? 

A.  At  Longchamps  where  every  one  passes. 

Q.  But  did  he  speak  to  you? 

A.  Like  a  brother. 

Q.  To  you? 

A.  Personally. 

Q.  At  Longchamps? 

A.  At  Longchamps. 

Did  he  then  have  hallucinations? 

Q.  You  believe  that? 

A.  And  even  last  year  I  found  myself  face  to  face  with  him  in  the  woods. 

Q.  And  then? 

A.  And  then  I  applauded. 

Q.  Did  he  get  down  from  his  carriage  to  speak  to  you? 

Listen  to  his  reply. 

A.  I  did  not  have  that  trouble  because  after  the  offerings  I  made  him 
that  went  from  my  place  to  his. 

Q.  Did  he  shake  hands  with  you? 

A.  Never. 

He  is  frank.     There  was  no  hallucination. 

Q.  But  how  do  you  know  he  is  going  to  decorate  you? 

A.  By  the  praises  he  has  given  me.  And  it  is  because  of  this  that  he 
gives  me  the  decoration  that  I  merit  and  my  certificate  of  good  conduct. 
And  the  flag  will  not  be  forgotten. 

Q.  But  how  do  you  know  it.     Has  he  told  you? 

A.  He  has  not  told  me  personally. 

Q.  How  do  you  know  it  then? 

A.  By  the  tone  of  his  voice.    When  he  reads  that  to  the  people 

Q.  What? 

A.  He  will  proclaim  it  to  all  the  soldiers. 

Q.  But  suppose  you  are  deceived? 

A.  Oh!  I  do  not  believe  it.     With  friends  like  you,  I  do  not  believe  it. 

His  amiability  extends  to  us  even  when  we  contradict  him. 

Q.  And  if  Fallieres  did  not  decorate  you? 

A.  Oh!  I  don't  doubt  that.  I  am  persuaded  because  the  crosses  are 
already  upon  his  desk. 

Q.  You  have  seen  them? 

A.  Oh!    no,  but  I  see  them  .from  here. 

Q.  That  is  indeed  a  proof. 

A.  I  see  all  the  crosses  lined  up. 

Q.  But  really,  you  are  not  sure? 

A.  Certain. 

Q.  (To  Dr.  Simon  who  is  present.)     That  is  very  well  organized. 

A.  It  could  not  be  bettor  orgiinizofl. 

Q.  But  you  have  not  seen  thorn,  the  crosses? 

A.  Gentlemen  my  friends,  you  have  seen  them  as  I  have.     And  you 


268  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

too  will  have  one  of  them.    And  we  will  pass  at  Longchamps  before  the 
soldiers. 

Q.  I  also? 

^.  Oh!  everybody.     All  the  staff  officers. 

Q.  Even  the  dogs? 

He  does  not  see  the  absurdity  of  the  idea. 

A.  The  dogs  too the  dogs  are  friends. 

Q.  There  will  be  a  tiny  decoration  for  them,  too? 

A.  Little  bows.     We  will  be  in  line. 

Q.  But  come  now,  the  decorations,  you  have  not  seen  them,  it  is  an 
idea  you  have  in  your  head? 

A.  It  is  an  idea  of  grandeur. 

Let  us  try  to  batter  down  his  idol. 

Q.  Fallieres  is  ugly! 

A.  He  is  ugly,  but  he  is  good  as  milk. 

Q.  When  he  gets  angry  he  breaks  everything. 

A.  He  must  not  break  the  decoration,  that's  sure! 

Q.  What  would  you  do? 

A.  I  would  weep. 

Q.  And  afterwards? 

A.  Oh,  well,  I  would  laugh. 

One  can  see  here  a  curious  character,  the  disconnected  nature  of  the 
enjotional  life  of  the  invalid. 

Q.  You  are  too  young  to  be  decorated. 

A.  But  I  have  a  good  heart.     It  is  there. 

Q.  Why  do  you  say  that  your  heart  is  good? 

A.  Because  it  is  my  mother  who  made  it. 

Q.  But  how  does  it  happen  that  it  is  good? 

A.  Everybody  loves  me 

Q.  Come,  come!    You  do  not  believe  all  you  have  told  me? 

A.  (with  irony)     Of  course  not.     It  is  a  dream. 

Q.  It  is  all  humbug? 

A.  It  is  all  humbug! 

And  as  an  attendant  whom  we  have  called  comes  to  take  him 
away,  he  says  to  him  graciously,  while  showing  him  his  trousers 
which  are  falling,  "Button  me  up,  my  old  fellow." 

This  happy  man  has  a  level  of  nine  years  and,  it  may  be  said  in 
passing,  one  can  see  that  his  delirium  has  nothing  to  do  with  his 
level;  some  of  our  patients  have  no  delirium  although  they  have  a 
level  very  inferior  to  nine  years. 

The  letters  dictated  by  this  Ramonot  remind  us  by  their  em- 
phatic tone,  by  their  basis  of  self-love,  by  the  slowness  of  their 
delivery,  of  the  discourse  of  our  imbecile  Cabussel  which  we  have 
already  published  (see  p.  80.)  These  lucubrations  and  these 
witty  conversations,  however  poor  in  ideas,  suppose  always  a 


DIFFICULTY   OF   FUNCTIONING  269 

certain  intellectual  activity.  Moreover,  Ramonot  talks  with 
considerable  fluency  upon  all  subjects.  One  may  see  in  this  a 
certain  objection  to  our  theory.  We  might  ask  ourselves  how  can 
this  intellectual  activity  be  reconciled  with  the  symptoms  which 
we  hold  as  characteristic  of  functional  inertia.  Inertia  and  ac- 
tivity, are  they  not  contradictory?  Yes,  they  are  contradictory 
but  not  incompatible.  Many  observations  have  shown  us  that 
these  are  two  symptoms  which  can  be  neighbors  in  the  same  mind. 
Exactly  what  is  functional  inertia?  It  is  a  hindrance,  a  grain  of 
sand,  the  lack  of  oil  in  the  wheels  of  a  machine.  The  intellectual 
activity,  to  continue  the  metaphor,  is  the  force  which  is  applied  to 
this  machine  and  which  should  be  given  out  again;  one  can  easily 
conceive  that  great  force  ma}^  be  applied  to  a  machine  and  that 
nevertheless,  the  machine  is  hindered  by  a  resistance  produced 
by  the  poor  condition  of  its  parts.  But  one  of  the  most  curious 
facts  that  we  have  observed  in  the  course  of  our  studies  upon  the 
insane  is  that  when  there  is  a  diminution  of  the  power  of  function- 
ing they  are  unable  to  solve  the  more  complicated  problems  al- 
though they  can  still  do  the  simpler  ones.  With  the  use  of  our 
measuring  scale  we  can  easily  perceive  this.  Let  us  cite  examples. 
A  little  imbecile  shows  ill  will  in  regard  to  us;  she  is  pouty,  sullen, 
scarcely  replies,  and  is  always  anxious  to  get  away  from  us.  This 
girl  still  does  the  simplest  tests,  those  of  four  or  five  years  for 
instance;  but  she  will  not  do  those  of  seven  or  eight  years  although 
she  is  capable  of  doing  them;  consequently  her  ill  humor  pro- 
duces an  apparent  lowering  of  her  level.  Another  example.  We 
recall  a  melancholy  patient  who,  at  the  moment  of  our  examina- 
tion, was  a  prey  to  a  violent  moral  affliction ;  wc  were  able,  how- 
ever, to  distract  her  from  it  for  a  few  moments  and  she  consented 
to  reply  to  some  simple  tests;  but  as  we  passed  to  more  difficult 
tests  she  had  more  trouble  and  finally  ended  in  failure;  a  week 
later  when  the  crisis  of  her  attack  was  over  we  saw  her  again  iind 
when  we  measured  her  intellectual  level  we  were  surprised  to  find 
it  higher.  The  hysterical  attack  of  this  melancholia  patient  has 
then  produced  the  same  result  as  the  ill  humor  of  the  imbecile,  an 
apparent  lowering  of  the  level.  The  result  comes  from  a  dy- 
namic action,  an  inhiljition.  Among  general  paralytics  the  action 
is  of  a  different  nature;  it  is  not  temporary,  but  permanent;  it  is 
not  suspended  l)ut  destructive  since  they  arc  incurable.  P>nt 
setting  aside  these  differences  the  law  reniains  the  same  and  this 


270  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

law  may  be  expressed  in  the  following  manner.  When  some  dis- 
turbance occurs  in  the  mental  functioning,  either  under  the  in- 
fluence of  ill  humor  or  chagrin,  or  the  material  process  of  decay, 
this  trouble  manifests  itself  by  an  impossibility  of  solving  the 
more  complicated  problems  while  the  simpler  problems  still  re- 
main attainable. 

Starting  from  this  point  it  is  easy  to  understand  what  takes  place 
when  a  dement  begins  his  ravings ;  the  fabrication  of  his  delirium 
implies  that  a  certain  intellectual  activity  sets  the  wheels  of  his 
machine  in  motion,  but  this  activity  is  counteracted  by  inertia 
and  the  subject  remains  incapable  of  solving  complicated  problems; 
however,  under  the  influence  of  this  spur  he  will  produce  very  simple 
intellectual  results ;  for  example,  he  will  follow  elementary  associa- 
tions of  ideas,  he  will  always  discuss  the  same  projects,  repeat  the 
same  words  and  the  same  sentences.  His  intelligence  is,  as  it 
were,  divided  into  two  parts;  there  is  inertia  for  all  that  is  com- 
plicated and  on  the  contrary  superactivity  for  all  that  is  easy.^ 

^  Let  us  prevent  any  misunderstanding;  in  speaking  of  functional  inertia 
we  study  the  symptoms  only  from  the  psychological  point  of  view  and 
without  being  unaware  that  these  may  be  caused  by  anatomical  lesions. 
We  might  be  misunderstood,  for  in  the  habitual  clinical  language  the 
troubles  called  Junctional  are  the  troubles  where  there  are  no  observable 
anatomical  lesions.  Also  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding  we  have  employed 
the  terms  lack  of  functioning  rather  than  those  of  functional  disturbances. 
But  after  these  explanations  there  can  remain  no  doubt  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  words  which  we  have  employed. 


III.  DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  THE  TWO   NOTIONS  OF 
FUNCTIONING  AND  OF  DEVELOPMENT 

1.  The  mentality  of  the  dement  compared  with  that  of 
THE  defective.  This  chapter  is  a  logical  and  necessary  supple- 
ment to  the  preceding.  We  are  attempting  to  introduce  into 
psychology  a  new  idea,  a  distinction  not  previously  made  or 
only  verbally  made  between  the  functioning  of  the  intelligence 
and  the  development  of  the  intelligence.^ 

The  problem  would  indeed  be  very  difficult  to  solve  if  it  were 
put  in  abstract  terms;  fortunately  for  us  we  can  materialize  it  in 
our  own  patients.  In  the  pages  which  follow  it  will  suffice  for 
us  to  demonstrate  the  psychological  difference  between  the  de- 
ment and  the  imbecile  because,  as  we  see  it,  the  chief  lack  of  the 
dement  is  in  intellectual  functioning  and  of  the  imbecile  is  in 
intellectual  development. 

It  is  evidently  necessary  to  distrust  appearances  and  particu- 
larly to  discern  the  true  value  of  the  symptoms.  All  that  we  have 
described  as  disturbances  of  functioning  appears  trivial  enough  and 
even  so  general  that  it  seems  impossible  to  imagine  anything  else 
as  intellectual  disturbances  through  defect.  In  the  first  place 
have  we  not  all  of  us  experienced  these  various  disturbances? 
Who  is  there  among  us  who,  distracted  or  fatigued,  has  not  ex- 

•  We  exaggerate  perhaps  when  we  say  in  the  text  that,  up  to  the  present 
time,  no  alienist  has  contrasted  the  lack  of  functioning  of  the  intelligence 
and  the  lack  of  development.  These  expressions  are  not  new.  Recently 
an  alienist  remarked  nearly  the  following:  that  which  is  a  loss  or  an  im- 
poverishment in  a  dement  is  a  lack  of  acquisition  and  of  development  with 
born  defectives.  Furthermore  this  terminology  only  gives  a  clear  expres- 
sion to  ideas  already  very  ancient  and  very  reasonable  as  to  the  relation 
between  mental  defect  and  dementia;  but  it  does  not  go  farther  than  the 
metaphor  which  sees  in  the  defective  a  person  born  poor  never  having 
acquired  anything,  and  in  the  dement,  a  rich  person  who  has  lost  his 
possessions  and  who  is  consequently  impoverished.  Under  our  pen  these 
expressions  acquire  a  new  sense,  because  they  are  the  result  of  observations 
and  experiments  which  we  reproduce  in  detail,  and  which  show  with  pre- 
cision the  difference  between  functioning  and  devcIoj)in(!nt. 

271 


272  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

perienced  those  states  where  one  passes  over  words  in  writing, 
where  one  feels  a  proper  name  escaping  him  at  the  moment  of  a 
pressing  need  to  speak  it,  or  where  one  fails  to  grasp  the  meaning 
of  a  sentence  which  he  hears,  where  one  makes  errors  of  addition  or 
loses  himself  in  a  problem?  This  is  very  common.  But  there  is 
even  a  stronger  objection.  Do  we  not  encounter  among  the  im- 
beciles themselves  these  same  troubles  of  evocation  which  we  have 
analysed  among  general  paralytics?  Imbeciles  also  have  difficulty 
in  acting  quickly,  in  counting  backward,  and  are  embarrassed  by  a 
problem ;  they  also  make  at  times  incongruous  replies,  and  are  even 
guilty  of  greffage  (grafting). 

There  is  a  certain  test  of  an  essentially  functional  nature,  the 
arrangement  of  weights,  which  presents  so  much  difficulty  for 
general  paralytics  that  one  would  be  tempted  to  recommend  it  to 
practitioners  as  a  test  to  detect  slight  cases  of  insanity  or  its  be- 
ginnings, which  would  be  very  useful  indeed  in  these  cases,  but 
when  one  tries  this  test  on  imbeciles  they  also  fail  equally  with 
dements.  Therefore,  since  this  is  true,  we  are  certainly  going  to 
be  asked  what  clear,  palpable,  evident  difference  could  be  given 
between  the  imbecile  and  the  dement,  and  how  could  this  differ- 
ence enable  us  to  understand  the  distinction  which  we  propose 
to  establish  between  intellectual  development  and  intellectual 
functioning? 

A  preliminary  remark  is  necessary  to  the  effect  that  the  reason 
a^general  paralytic  fails  in  a  test  is  not  the  same  asfor-an-inafeeeile. 
The  practical  result  is  the  same;  it  is  failure  but  the  cause  is  dif- 
ferent. Thusjdien  an  imbecile  fails  to  name  the  colors  correctly, 
when  he  calls  red,  blue  and  yellow,  green,  it  is  generally  because 
he  does  not  know  the  names  of  the  colors,  or  because  he  knows 
then  insufficiently  and  his  n'importequisme  is  the  result  of  his 
ignorance.  With,  a  dement  we  shall  have  the  same  errors  of  nam- 
ing, but  the  subjects  knows4rhe  names  of  the  colors  very  well  and 
his  errors  are  made  not  because  of  his  ignorance  but  in  spite  of  his 
knowledge.  The  same  is  true  in  naming  cards;  the  errors  of  the 
imbecile  are  those  of  ignorance;  those  of  a  paralytic  dement  can 
not  be  explained  by  ignorance  because  by  exciting  him,  by  urg- 
ing him  forcibly,  we  can  succeed  in  making  him  name  them  cor- 
rectly. In  the  same  way  when  an  imbecile  fails  in  counting  cor- 
rectly a  small  sum  of  money,  it  is  either  because  he  does  not  know 
the  series  of  figures  or  because  he  does  not  know  how  to  apply 


MENTAL    DEFECTIVE    VS.    DEMENT  273 

them ;  it  is  alwa3's  ignorance  under  one  form  or  another.  Our  de- 
ment on  the  contrary  knows  how  to  count  but  in  spite  of  his 
knowledge  he  becomes  confused. 

Is  the  difference  which  we  attempt  to  bring  out  between  these 
two  mental  states  after  all  very  important?  Perhaps  it  will  be 
thought  not.  It_can  Jbe  summed  up  in  the  contrast  between 
knowledge  and  power.  But  it  may  be  said  this  difference  exists 
among  all  of  us;  knowledge  is  a  great  circle  and  power  is  a  verj- 
much  smaller  circle  which  is  inscribed  within  the  other.  In  less 
metaphysical  terms  we  always  know  nuich  more  than  we  have 
power  to  perform.  A  child  must  thoroughly  know  the  rule  of  the 
agreement  of  participles  in  order  to  apply  it  easily;  and  yet  many 
years  may  pass  during  which  he  has  been  able  to  recite  the  rule 
glibly  while  all  the  time  making  a  host  of  errors  of  agreement 
when  writing.  We  are  all  children  in  this  respect.  In  its  appli- 
cation we  are  alwaj^s  inferior  to  the  lesson  which  we  have  learned 
and  which  we  can  recite. 

We  reply  to  this  objection  that  it  is  true,  only  there  is  an  im- 
portant difference  of  degree  which  we  must  take  into  account. 
If  the  distance  between  knowledge  and  power  is  great  for  all  of  us, 
it  becomes  enormous  in  general  paralytics  because  they  are  hardly- 
able  to  perform  the  hundi-edth  part  of  what  they  know.  A  case 
in  point,  previously  reported  at  length,  is  that  of  the  patient  to 
whom  it  was  necessary  to  repeat  six  times  in  succession,  using  dif- 
ferent terms  each  time,  the  mechanism  of  the  act  of  counting 
backwarrls.  Antl  yet  she  knew  how  to  count  backwards  as  the 
event  fully  proved. 

2.  Two  PRACTICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  BY  WIIK  11  ID  DISTINGUISH 
THE  MENTAL  DEFECTIVE  FROM  THE   DEMENT.      Froni    this    point   of 

view,  two  practical  signs  result  whose  use  we  reconmiend  in  I  lie 
clinic  in  order  to  make  the  distinction  l)ctween  the  mentality  of  a 
defective  and  that  of  a  general  paralytic. 

In  the.  fi-r^it  fxloiuv,  that  which  distingushes  the  ignorance  of  the 
imbecile  frf)m  the  functional  inttrliaof  t-Uu tUuiuuiL  is  liiaL-with  the 
latter  the  failuics  and  theerrors  have  a  remaikaljle  degree  of 
inconsistence,  which  indic;ates  cFist uri )ances, ^ccicjen ts,  while  the 
negativc-i:eiult.w- of  \.\m  intbc.ciU*-pre!ient  on  tho  (tontrtiry  consid- 
erable consistency, something  whi<-h  in^tmf-it-distrrrbnTiirebut  is  the 
expression  of  the  limit  of  iiia  mind.  In  f:\r\  we  have  seen  certain 
dements  fail  before  some  (liflirnlt  \-  ;iii(l  (i\c  iiiinules  l;i(ei'  Iriuinpli 


274 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


over  it  brilliantly.  It  is  the  same  for  their  disturbances  of  articu- 
lation. Give  thcni  a  word  difficult  to  pronounce,  they  fail;  then 
at  a  moment  when  one  expects  it  least  they  pronounce  it  without 
difficult}'.  From  this  come  many  surprises.  We  wish  to  demon- 
strate that  a  certain  general  paralytic  always  errs  in  counting- 
money.  He  is  asked  to  count  twenty  sous,  and  this  time  he  does 
so  correctly,  without  a  single  mistake.  This  is  quite  embarrass- 
ing for  a  demonstration.  In  a  general  way  one  can  hardly  foresee 
how  such  a  one  is  going  to  conduct  himself. 


FIG.  22.     MME.  SOLAS.     GENERAL  PARALYTIC. 


The^^concLdistinctive  sign  between  the  mentality  of  an  imbecile 
and  that  of  a  general  paralytieis  furnished  by  the  consideration -oL 
the  iatellectual  leveh  It  is  in  fact  by  relation  to  their  level  that 
one  must  judge  of  the  importance  of  the  phenomena  of  deficiency 
which  they  present.  Tlre^errors-eoniniitteiLbX-Qi^sabedLeaTe  not 
surprising  since  his  jntelligence  is  so  limited.     On  the  contrary  the 


MENTAL    DEFECTIVE   VS.    DEMENT  275 

errors  of  a  pQral}^^  are  at  v^gTiance  with  hislevel.  Thus  Albert, 
an  imbecile  of  five  years,  can  not  correctlj''  name  the  colors;  that 
is  not  surprising  for  it  belongs  to  a  child  of  five  years;  we  have 
seen  the  paralytic,  Colon,  formerly  a  house-painter,  call  blue 
green,  and  yellow  blue;  these  are  errors  which  surprise  us  be- 
cause Colon  has  a  level  of  ten  years;  the  error  under  these  condi- 
tions is  not  justified  by  the  level;  it  has  an  unusual  character. 

We  could  give  here  numerous  examples  of  failures  of  general 
paralytics  which  have  this  striking  character  of  being  out  of  rela- 
tion to  their  level,  but  we  prefer  to  limit  ourselves  to  one  particu- 
cal  case  and  develop  it  fully.  Here  is  the  history  of  a  patient 
whose  intellectual  level  is  still  good  and  nevertheless  what  diffi- 
culties of  functioning  are  perceived  when  she  is  closely  examined! 

Madame  Solas  is  a  woman  of  forty-five  years  who  has  a  calm, 
serene,  almost  indifferent  aspect.  Her  physiognomy  is  but  slightly 
expressive.  Her  voice  is  weak,  her  gestures  slow.  Her  speech 
presents  the  peculiar  difficulties  of  articulation  which  are  char- 
acteristic of  general  paralysis.  To  the  questions  asked  her  she 
rephes  with  exactitude,  with  good  sense,  often  even  with  witti- 
cisms; this  indicates  that  the  intelligence  has  held  itself  well; 
one  would  almost  have  the  feeling  that  she  is  normal  if  precise 
tests  did  not  prove  her  decay.     We  will  let  her  talk  a  Uttle. 

Q.  What  is  your  name? 

A.  Blanche  Gaudis. 

Q.  And  your  first  name? 

A.  Blanche  Solas  Blanche.     (She  spells  her  first  name.) 

Q.  And  your  age? 

A.  Forty.     I  shall  be  forty-five  the  18th  of  February forty-four  at 

least.     I  am  stupid. 

Q.  Why? 

A.  I  was  born  in  66.  (If  she  was  born  in  66,  as  it  is  now  1907,  she  would 
be  forty-one.     Already  we  have  difficulties  and  errors  of  evocation.) 

Q.  Is  it  old  or  young  to  be  forty-four  years  old? 

A.  What  is  that,  monsieur? 

A  little  psychic  deafness. 

Q.  The  question  is  repeated. 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  knew,  it  is  enough  for  me. 

Q.  Would  you  like  to  l)0  scvcinty-five? 

/I.  Oh  no!     too  old.     Wluit  for?     I  couldn't. 

Q.  What  couldn't  you? 

A.  I  could  not  be  that  old.     I  couldn't  endure  it. 

Q.  You  would  rather  be  dead? 

A.  Oh!    surely. 


276  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  Were  you  young  once? 

A.  (With  a  smile)    Oh!    I  suppose like  everyone  else. 

Here  we  have  intelligent  reflection. 

Q.  How  old  is  one  at  twenty? 

A.  At  twenty  years?    Twenty  years.     (The  smile  continues.) 

Q.  What  has  been  your  profession? 

A.  Embroiderer. 

Q.  How  much  does  one  earn  at  that  trade? 

A.  I  earned  a  living  once. 

Q.  And  now? 

A.  Now  it  is  lost.     Like  all  the  rest. 

Q.  But  how  much  money  could  you  make  at  your  trade  of  embroidery? 

A.  Three  or  four  francs. 

Q.  By  the  day  or  the  week? 

A.  By  the  day. 

Q.  How  much  did  that  make  a  week,  three  francs  a  day? 

A.  That  made  eighteen  francs  a  week. 

All  this  was  correct. 

Q.  Were  you  married? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  What  does  your  husband  do? 

A.  He  is  dead.     I  am  a  widow. 

Q.  What  did  he  do  when  living? 

A.  A  hatter.     (Chapelier.) 

Q.  He  built  chapels  (chapelles)  then? 

A.  A  hatter  I  say!    hats!    You  are  making  fun  of  me. 

Q.  No,  I  am  a  butcher,  so  I  understand  nothing  about  hats. 

A.  Well,  its  different. 

Q.  Your  husband's  name? 

A.  Peau. 

Q.  Did  you  have  any  children? 

A.  No,  sir,  I  never  had  any. 

Q.  They  are  dead? 

A.  Yes,  sir,  they  were  dead  when  born. 

Q.  You  have  had  two? 

A.  Ah!     I  only  had  one. 

Q.  What  is  the  year  we  are  in  now? 

A.  I  do  not  know,  I  hardly  know  how  I  live. 

Q.  Think! 

A.  Ah!  I  know  nothing.  I  have  no  memory.  (She  makes  no  effort 
to  remember;  it  is  very  singular  that  with  the  succession  of  reasonable 
answers  which  she  had  just  given,  she  confesses  to  such  a  lack  of  orienta- 
tion.) 

Q.  You  have  no  memory? 

A.  None  whatever. 

Q.  Why  do  you  say  that? 

A.  Because  I  see  it,  monsieur.  I  have  noticed  it  more  than  once.  I 
have  none  at  all. 


MENTAL    DEFECTIVE    VS.    DEMENT  277 

Q.  What  is  it  you  forget? 
A.  Ever3^thing. 
Q.  Give  an  example. 

A.  For  instance,  my  pocketbook.     I  would  leave  it  on  the  table.     Ten 
seconds  later  I  would  have  forgotten  where  it  was. 
Q.  And  what  else  do  you  forget? 
A.  (With  irony)     Well,  my  head  on  my  shoulders. 
Q.  You  have  lost  much  money  in  that  way? 
A.  No,  because  some  one  took  care  of  it  for  me. 

These  are  characteristic  disturbances  of  the  memory,  of  evoca- 
tion. They  are  conscious.  The  patient  perceives  them  and 
passes  judgment  on  herself. 

Q.  Your  mother,  is  she  younger  than  you? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Is  she  older? 

A.  She  is  sixty  years  old. 

Q.  Can  a  mother  be  younger  than  her  daughter? 

A.  It  is  comprehensible.  (She  did  not  understand  the  question,  and 
doubtless  relied  upon  the  reasonable  tone  which  we  employed  in  question- 
ing her.) 

Q.  But  can  a  daughter  be  older? 

A.  Ah!    no! 

The  judgment  is  good. 

Q.  So  you  do  not  know  the  year? 

A.  Oh!     faith,  yes,  we  are  in  the  year  '99. 

Q.  Is  it  winter  or  summer? 

A.  It  is  summer. 

Q.  What  month? 

A.  June. 

This  is  nearly  correct. 

Q.  Name  the  months  of  the  year. 

A.   (She  names  them  correctly.) 

Q.  That  makes  how  many? 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  know. 

Q.  Think  again!  how  many  rnonth.s  arc  there  in  a  year? 

A.  12. 

Note  this  inertia;  she  knows  but  does  not  attempt  to  reply.   . 

Q.  Why  are  you  here? 

A.  To  take  care  of  my  health. 

Q.  In  what  way? 

A.  My  nerves. 

Q.  Arc  you  SHtisfied  hrre? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  But  there  are  crazy  people  here? 

A.   \  do  not  believe  it.     There  are  Home,  but  I  .'ini  not  crazy,  not  I, 


278  THE    INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  So  it  does  not  annoy  you  to  be  with  crazy  people? 

A.  That  annoys  me  because  I  am  very  impressionable.     (She  speaks 
indistinctly.)     I  do  not  speak  well. 
•    Q.  Still  you  are  satisfied  here? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur,  because  I  hope  that  you  will  cure  me. 

Q.  What  was  your  illness? 

A.  It  was  St.  Vitus's  dance,  monsieur.     I  had  it  as  a  child  from  a  fright. 

Q.  So? 

A.  Always  impressionable.  At  the  least  thing,  I  cry  without  being 
able  to  stop.     It  is  the  same  with  laughing. 

On  the  whole  she  is  indifferent  to  her  confinement,  and  there  is  a 
curious  contrast  between  this  indifference  and  this  emotivity.  In 
reahty  everything  is  aUke  to  her;  nevertheless  she  is  easily  affected, 
she  weeps  or  she  laughs  at  nothing.  This  seems  contradictory, 
But  in  the  main  her  tears  and  smiles  are  very  superficial.  This 
mental  state  is  the  rule  with  general  paralytics. 

She  is  very  modest  in  appearance.  Let  us  see  if  she  has  some 
vanity. 

Q.  You  have  nevertheless  some  special  talents? 

A.  Oh!    no,  monsieur,  I  have  none. 

Q.  You  are  not  an  ordinary  woman? 

A.  Surely  not. 

Q.  You  were  not  bad  looking  once? 

A.  In  my  time,  no. 

Q.  You  were  pretty? 

A.  I  had  like  all  young  girls,  la  beaute  du  diable — youth. 

Q.  But  something  of  it  remains? 

A.  I  don't  know.     For  all  that  I  could  do  without  it! 

Judgment  very  good.  We  did  not  succeed  in  arousing  the  least 
feeling  of  self-importance. 

Here  then  is  the  portrait  of  Madame  Solas.     All  her  replies 

harmonize  and  are  in  good  order;  the  mentality  does  not  seem  to 

be  at  all  in  ruins.     In  precise  tests  she  shows  the  keenness  of  her 

-  intelligence.     We  ask  her  to  define  some  words.     Certain  of  her 

definitions  are  charming. 

Q.  What  is  a  fork? 

A.  It  is  what  goes  with  the  spoon. 

Q.  What  is  a  mother? 

A.  That  is  the  best  of  all,  ah! 

Q.  Justice? 

A.  Ah!  it  is  great;  and  injustice,  it  is  greater  still. 

A'sch'olar  would  hot  disavow  such  replies. 


MENTAL    DEFECTIVE    VS.    DEMENT  279 

Her  manner  of  welcoming  pleasantries  indicates  a  clear  mind. 

Q.  Is  snow  sometimes  red? 

A.  Oh!    no,  it  is  white.     I  have  never  seen  it  (red)  myself. 

Q.  What  was  the  color  of  the  white  horse  of  Henry  IV? 

A.  (Laugh.)     What  do  you  ask  now,  I  do  not  remember,  I  never  saw  it. 

Q.  But  what  is  there  absurd  in  my  question? 

A.  (Laughing.)     Because  it  was  red. 

This  was  sufficient  to  give  an  idea  of  the  intellectual  level  of 
Madame  Solas.  She  is  evidently  not  an  imbecile  nor  even  a  moron. 
It  is  in  relation  to  this  mental  level  that  we  must  judge  her  disturb- 
ances of  evocation;  these  disclose  a  weakness  that  is  truly  aston- 
ishing. Thus  she  cannot  count  backwards;  she  says  "20,  17,  19, 
15"  and  can  go  no  farther.  We  try  again  another  day  but  with 
no  better  results.  In  the  same  way,  although  she  knows  how  to 
count,  she  makes  continual  mistakes  in  counting  money  or  pins. 
She  counts  9  pins  where  there  are  only  8.  A  small  sum  of  19 
sous  (composed  of  a  50-centime  piece,  4  two-sou  pieces,  and  a  1-sou 
piece)  is  too  difficult  for  her;  the  first  time  she  counts  14  sous  and 
the  second  20  sous. 

Another  example.  Several  additions  of  two  numbers  of  two 
figures  each  are  proposed  to  her  in  writing;  the  pen  is  put  in  her 
hand  and  sfie  is  told  to  add.  She  is  willing,  but  note  closely  how 
she  performs  the  operation. 

That  it  may  be  well  understood  we  give  the  details ;  in  the  first 
addition  she  must  add  59  to  73;  the  two  numbers  are  placed  one 
below  the  other,  the  line  drawn  and  thus  the  way  made  clear. 
The  patient  places  the  figure  2  under  the  first  column,  she  has 
therefore  correctly  added  9  and  3,  finding  12,  placing  2,  but  she 
must  carry  the  1 ;  now  she  must  add  5  and  7  and  add  the  1  carried 
over.  This  embarrasses  her.  She  prefers  not  to  attempt  it  and 
pas.ses  to  the  second  addition.  There  she  finds  52  to  be  added  to 
79;  she  adds  the  first  column  2  and  9  and  finds  11,  writes  1;  but 
there  is  here  also  1  to  carry  over;  a  new  difficulty;  she  prefers  to 
leave  this  also  and  pass  to  the  next  addition;  here  a  similar  diffi- 
culty has  been  arranged,  because  the  numbers  were  chosen  so 
that  there  would  always  be  something  to  carry;  she  gives  this  up 
after  adding  the  first  column  and  passes  to  the  fourth  example 
which  meets  the  same  fate  as  the  other.  'I'lius  we  find  hvv  four 
times  in  succession  passing  the  difficulty  l)y.  (Jne  can  tiicrcfore 
attribute  to  her  this  rule  of  conduct:  "Notiiing  is  nnp()Hsil)lc  to 
man;  that  which  he  cannot  do  he  leaves." 


280  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Her  reaction  times  to  sound — the  last  detail  which  we  cite — are 
unusually  long.  She  has  apparently  understood  how  she  must  re- 
spond but  she  reacts  with  extreme  slowness;  we  have  each  time 
done  our  best  to  encourage  her  to  go  more  quickly;  her  reaction 
times  are  about  50  one-hundredths  of  a  second,  while  with  a  nor- 
mal they  are  12  one-hundredths;  and  when  she  tries  to  hasten  the 
movement  she  only  gives  anticipated  reactions.  In  this  respect 
she  is  altogether  inferior  to  a  certain  imbecile  named  Albert  of 
whom  we  have  elsewhere  spoken;  Albert  has  more  difficulty  in 
understanding  the  experiment  but  when  it  is  understood  his  reac- 
tions are  quicker  and  better. 

Thus,  as  has  been  clearly  shown,  the  disturbances  of  function- 
ing which  Madame  Solas  presents  do  not  belong  to  her  level; 
I  they  are,  so  to  speak,  unworthy  of  her  intelligence ;  this  is  one  of  the 
I  characteristics  which  these  disturbances  present  among  general 
\  paralytics  and  thus  provide  a  means  of  distinguishing  the  failures 
and  blunders  to  which  imbeciles  are  Hable. 

3.  Residues.  We  must  attempt  to  specify  to  some  extent  what 
constitutes  the  contrast  which  exists  between  certain  defective 
replies  of  general  paralytics  and  their  level,  which  is  higher  or 
appears  to  be  higher  than  their  replies.  The  question  is  very  com- 
plicated in  itself  and  it  is  further  obscured  by  all  that  we  know  of 
the  nature  of  residues.  We  must  remember  that  the- dement, 
differs  from  the  imbecile  by  having  a  past  of  normal  intelligence; 
andjjQiisequently  we  should  expect  that  instruction  and  the  varied 
information  acquired  by  the  dement  would  leave  some  traces  in 
his  conversation  which  would  not  accord  with  his  present  intelli- 
gence. These  evidences  of  an  earlier  condition  superior  to  the 
prggent  are -what  we  call  residues.  Alienists  who  question  these 
patients  are  on  the  watch  for  residues  which  may  serve  to  bring  to 
hght  the  differences  which  we  note  between  the  imbecile  and  the 
dement.  Perhaps  it  will  be  thought  that  it  is  to  the  presence  of 
numerous  residues  that  we  owe  the  contrast  which  we  note  among 
dements  between  their  level  and  some  of  their  rephes. 

This  opinion  contains  indeed  a  part  of  the  truth ;  but  it  must  not 
be  exaggerated;  or  rather  we  must  take  into  account  the  quaUty 
of  the  facts  which  may  survive  from  the  earlier  epoch. 

We_distinguish  three  elements. 

1.  Scholastic  knowledge. 


RESIDUES  281 

2.  General  knowledge  of  practical  life. 

3.  The  form,  of  verbal  replies  from  the  point  of  view  of  gram- 
mar ,anci  of  the  voeabular}-. 

1.  Schobxsttc  knowledge- is  eertatftly-jaost  lacking  among  de- 
ments. We  have  taken  the  pains  to  studj^  their  reading,  writing 
and  arithmetic,  not  with  any  foregone  conclusions,  wliich  unfortu- 
nately is  too  often  done  and  which  signifies  nothing,  but  by  em- 
plojdng  two  distinct  known  quantities;  we  first  take  their  level  of 
intelligence  by  means  of  our  measuring  scale;  afterwards,  with 
some  very  precise  tests  of  instruction  arranged  by  our  collabora- 
tor M.  Vaney,  we  examine  these  patients  to  see  if  they  are  equal 
in  reading,  writing  and  arithmetic  to  normal  children  of  the  same 
level.  ^ 

We  expected  that  these  tests  would  enable  us  to  discover  many 
residues.     Our  error  was  great. 

It  is  in  reading  that  they  acquit  themselves  the  best.  Out  of 
seven  patients,  five  read  as  well  as  would  be  expected  from  their 
level;  two  are  a  year  behind;  one  is  two  years  ahead,  a  very  ex- 
ceptional fact;  this  is  Beauchamp,  the  poor  teacher  who  has 
fallen  to  the  level  of  five  years;  in  spite  of  her  profound  decay 
she  can  still  read  as  one  reads  at  seven  years.  But  note  care- 
fully that  what  is  best  retained  among  these  subjects  is  reading 
as  an  exercise  of  articulation  but  without  the  understanding  of 
what  they  read.  Thus  we  encounter  several  of  these  dements 
who  <pad  the  selection  correctly  and  fluently  enough,  but  who  can 
tell  almost  nothing  of  what  they  read;  they  are  very  inferior  to 
normal  children  who  read  less  fluently  and  less  correctly  than 
they,  but  who  can  retain  manj^  facts  after  the  reading  is  over. 

^  Since  at  the  present  time  we  arc  working  for  the  clinic  wc  think  it 
profitable  to  reproduce  the  table  of  tests  serving  as  a  measure  of  the  degree 
of  instruction,  in  order  that  the  clinician  may  have  at  hand  ail  that  is 
necessary  for  him  to  apply  this  measure.  'I'he  table  that  wc  give  has  been 
devised  by  M.  Vaney;  we  have  already  published  it  in  our  book  E>i/nntn 
Anormaux." 

*  Editor's  Note:  English  translation  Feeble- Minded  Children.  I'ub- 
lisbed  by  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  New  York. 


282 


THE   INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


Reference  Table 

of  Pedagogical  Examination 

DEGREES   OP 
BEADING 

ARITHMETIC 

TYPE   PROBLEMS   TO 

DICTATE 

ORTHOGRAPHY 

AGE    OF  THE  CHILDREN 

Mistakes    of 
s  pel  1  ing 
and  gram- 
mar 

Type  sentence 
to  dictate 

From  6  to  7  years 

Syllabic 

From     19     apples 
if  one  takes  6  ap- 
ples how  many  will 
remain? 

16 

From  7  to  8  years 

Hesitating 

Subtract  8  sous  from 
59  sous. 

11 

From  8  to  9  years 

Hesitating 
fluent 

From  a  case  of  604 
oranges    58    are 
sold.    How    many 
remain? 

8 

"The  pret- 
ty little 
girls  stud- 
ied  the 
fi  0  w  e  r  s 
which  they 
g  a  t  h  e  red 
y  e  8  t  e  r- 
day" 

From  9  to  10  years 

Fluent 

It  requires  7  meters 
to   make   a   dress. 
How  many  dresses 
could  be  made  with 
89  meters  and  what 
would    be    the 
length  of  the  rem- 
nant? 

6 

From     10     to 
11  years 

Fluent-ex- 
pressive 

A  workman  earns  250 
francs     in     the 
month  of  February 
which  has  28  days. 
He    spends  195 
francs.    How  much 
did  he  save  a  day? 

4 

Writing  from  dictation,  judged  by  the  orthography,  is  always 
faulty.  The  number  of  errors  of  spelHng  and  grammar  is  not  at 
all  that  of  children  of  the  same  level;  there  is  a  retardation  of  at 
least  a  year  and  much  indulgence  is  required  to  record  only  this  dif- 
ference; it  is  only  by  disregarding  the  numerous  lapses  which  they 
''  commit  in  writing. 

The  retardation  is  still  more  accentuated  in  arithmetic;  we  have 

"^studied  this  by  means  of  the  extremely  simple  problems  of  the 

table  of  M.  Vaney;  the  problem  of  the  apples  is  a  limit  very  rarely 


RESIDUES  283 

attained.  Out  of  five  patients  studied  with  the  greatest  care  we 
observed  in  one  a  retardation  of  one  year,  in  two  a  retardation  of 
two  years,  and  in  two  a  retardation  of  three  years.  Thus  Colon, 
who  has  the  level  of  ten  years,  is  absorbed  for  a  minute  and  a  half 
in  solving  the  problem,  "If  I  have  17  apples  and  I  eat  8  of  them, 
how  many  are  left?"     And  he  finds  8  apples. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  all  this  is  that,  if  we  employ 
the  method  which  we  have  just  indicated  and  which  consists  in 
first  fixing  the  intellectual  level  by  a  group  of  tests  and  then  com- 
paring the  scholastic  knowledge  of  the  dement  with  that  which 
normally  belongs  to  his  intellectual  level,  w«-find.U- marked  re-  . 
tardation  esp&ciaIlyLfQi--scholastic  problems.  This  is  therefore  th^ 
exaet-opposite  of  residues.  Perhaps  some  one  will  object  to  our 
manner  of  proceeding;  and,  while  admitting  that  it  is  superior  to 
the  empirical  method  of  certain  ahenists,  who,  struck  by  the 
cleverness  of  a  reply,  say  from  intuition  "There  is  a  residue!" 
will  perhaps  object  that  our  procedure  is  conventional  and  conse- 
quently artificial.  Everything  depends,  he  will  say  to  us,  upon  the 
way  in  which  you  fix  the  level;  if  for  example  you  fix  it  by  means 
of  the  remnants  of  instruction  that  are  observed  among  the  pa- 
tients, all  the  other  tests  would  be  residues;  indeed,  if  a  dement  is 
two  years  retarded  in  arithmetic,  and  if  you  fix  his  level  by  that 
test  alone,  the  result  would  be  that  he  is  advanced  for  a  host  of 
other  tests.  That  is  true,  only  we  believe  that  such  a  convention 
would  be  open  to  criticism;  it  seems  to  us  decidedly  preferable  to 
fix  the  level  by  a  group  of  tests,  by  the  greatest  possible  number  of 
tests,  and  by  those  as  varied  as  possible;  this  is  what  we  have  done 
and  in  so  far  as  we  are  right  in  so  doing  we  maintain  that  the 
instruction  in  reading,  writing  or  arithmetic  would  never  consti- 
tute a  residue. 

And  now  one  last  remark;  iL.reading-if»-better- -prescr vcd-thrm 
writing  from  dictation^  and  this  again  better  preserved  tlum  arith- 
metic, it  is  because  it  contains  a  greater  part  of  automatic  activity. 
We  have  noted  this  singular  fact  that  a  dement  may  read  as 
easily  and  as  fluently  as  a  child  of  the  same  level,  but  he  docs  not 
understand  nor  explain  his  reading  nearly  so  well;  it  is  the  difTcr- 
ence  between  an  automatic  memor}'  and  an  expression  of  intelli- 
gence. These  patients  are  weak  in  arithmetic  because  we  demand 
of  them  the  solution  of  pro})lcins,  that  is  to  say  an  exercise  of  the 
judgment  and  not  of  the  automatic  memory.     By  taking  another 


284 


THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 


direction  and  demanding  more  of  their  automatic  life  we  should 
have  different  results.  Thus,  certain  dements  still  know  their 
multiplication  tables  very  well;  but  when  memory  fails  and  they 
.try  to  conceal  this  lack  the  errors  they  make  are  fantastic. 
Sanise,  seven  year  level,  replies  thus  to  our  questions. 


QUESTIONS 

ANSWERS 

QUESTIONS 

ANSWEE8 

2  and  2? 

3  and  3? 
5  and  4? 
9  and  17? 

4 

6 

9 

14 

12  and  12? 

12  and  13? 

13  and  12? 

24 
16 
15 

-The  reply  12  and  12  makes  24  is  automatism;  while  the  reply 
12  and  13  makes  16  is  an  expression  of  intelligence  in  which  the 
subject  remembers  nothing;  this  is  evidence  of  what  she  does  when 
automatism  fails  her. 

Holeg,  level  of  nine  years,  shows  the  same  contrast  in  a  still 
more  obvious  manner. 


QUESTIONS 

ANSWERS 

TIME 

seconds 

3  times  3? 

9 

6  times  6? 

36 

5  times  7? 

35 

2 

8  times  7? 

42 

2 

7  times  9? 

36 

2 

7  times  9? 

63 

3 

8  times  5? 

40 

U 

3  times  9? 

27 

2 

8  times  8? 

48 

2 

8  times  8? 

16 

2 

No!  8  times  8? 

48 

2 

No!  8  times  8? 

16 

No! 

8  and  8  are 

16 

But  8  times  8? 

48 

No! 

What? 

8  times  8? 

Oh— 4  times  8- 

-8  and  8—16  and  8- 

-24  and  8—32 

And  then? 

8  and  8- 

-16  and— 13  and  8- 

-24r-and  8- 

-32  and 

8—12  and  8- 

-50 

No,  not  50! 

52 

RESIDUES  285 

The  example  is  clear.  Having  lost  the  memory  of  8  X  8  =  64 
this  patient  cannot  multiply  8  times  8  and  when  he  tries  to  do  so 
to  repair  his  failure  of  memory  he  commits  enormous  errors. 
Here  is  a  curious  contrast  between  automatism  and  an  expression 
of  the  intelligence.  We  terminate  therefore  this  part  of  our  work 
with  the  conclusion  that  their_auiQmalism_wlieiLitis.ijetai^ 
alway.s  ^ove  their  intelligence. 

2.  The  knowledge  of  practical  life  has  given  rise  to  the  same 
illusion;  to  our  surprise,  we  confess,  we=%flAie-«ot_fQund  residues 
h©re-or  indeed  but  rarely;  and  the  proof  of  this  is  that  the  deuient- 
compared  to  an  imbecile  or  to  a  moron  of  the  same  level  has  no 
greater  general  knowledge. 

We  cite  the  example  of  a  woman  Vigne,  who  has  a  level  of  nine 
years,  and  in  whom  one  might  expect  the  conservation  of  a  mass 
of  ideas.  She  has  become  very  ignorant  and  does  not  know 
how  to  reply  even  when  asked  very  easy  questions  of  practical 
Ufe. 

Q.  Where  were  you  born? 

A.  At  Strasbourg. 

Q.  What  is  your  fatherland? 

A.  I  am  French. 

Q.  What  is  the  capital  of  France? 

A.  (She  limits  herself  to  sticking  out  her  tongue.  She  does  not  even 
know  the  capital  of  France.     Extraordinary  ignorance!) 

Q.  What  is  the  capital  of  France? 

A.  \  do  not  know. 

Q.  What  is  it  you  do  not  know?  (Because  we  are  wondering  if  she  under- 
stood the  question.) 

A.  The  capital  of  France. 

Q.  And  the  government  of  France,  what  is  it? 

A.  You  ask  me  too  much. 

Q.  Is  it  a  kingdom,  a  roj)ubli(r,  an  empire? 

A.  You  ask  me  too  much. 

Q.  Is  there  a  king  in  France? 
^    A.  No. 

Q.  An  Emperor? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  What  is  his  name? 

A  .   I  do  not  know. 

Q.  What  river  flow.s  through  I'aris? 

A.  The  Seine.     Th(;re  is  a  place  where  it  is  low. 

Q.  Did  you  know  Carnot? 

A.  I  have  seen  him  in  a  l>ook. 


286  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  How  did  he  die? 

A.  I  have  seen  his  tomb  in  a  book. 

Q.  Yes?    How  did  he  die? 

A.  1  do  not  know. 

Q.  And  Victor  Hugo  was 

A.  Victor  Hugo  is  also  dead. 
Q.  But  who  was  he? 

A.  Victor  Hugo  was Ah,  I  forget. 

Q.  Did  you  know  Pasteur? 

A.  A  pastor,  yes. 

Q.  What  did  you  know  of  Pasteur? 

A.  A  pastor  is  a  man  who  is  intelligent. 

Q.  Have  you  ever  heard  of  Louis  XIV? 

A.  I  knew  Louis  XIV,  but 

Q.  Charlemagne? 
A.  Yes. 

Q.  Who  was  Charlemagne? 

A.  An  interesting  man.  I  ought  to  know  much  about  him;  I  have  read 
that  in  books. 

But  where  are  her  school  memories?  Where  are  the  snows  of 
last  year? 

Q.  What  is  the  capital  of  Italy? 

A.  That  I  don't  know. 

Q.  What  is  the  Pope? 

A.  The  Pope  is  the  king  of  all  the  world. 

She  lived  five  years  in  Hyeres,  her  husband  worked  at  the  Seyne. 

We  ask  her. 

Q.  What  is  the  sea  called  at  Toulon? 

A.  There  is  a  sea  at  Toulon,  more  or  less  high;  sometimes  it  overflows, 
and  destroys  the  houses;  it  goes  all  the  way  to  Hyeres. 

Q.  But  what  is  it  called,  the  sea  that  bathes  Toulon? 

A.  The  sea  of  Toulon. 

Let  us  question  her  further. 

Q.  How  much  does  it  cost  to  send  a  letter  from  Paris  to  Marseilles? 

A.  Oh!  I  never  sent  a  letter  from  Paris  to  Marseilles. 

Q.  And  from  Paris  to  Toulon,  how  much  does  that  cost? 

A.  A  letter  from  Paris  to  Toulon  does  not  cost  much,  not  more  than  5 
sous. 

Q.  How  many  minutes  in  an  hour? 

A.  12. 

Q.  How  many  days  in  the  year? 

A.  There  are  thirty  days  in  a  month. 

Q.  But  in  a  year? 

A.  Oh,  I  would  have  to  count  that.     (She  recites  the  months.) 

Q.  That  makes? 

A.  10  and  3,  13  months,  isn't  it? 

Q.  But  how  many  days? 


RESIDUES  287    ) 

A.  Ah — I'd  have  to  count  that.     I'd  have  to  count  by  30. 
We  deem  it  iinnecessary  to  make  her  perform  this  calculation. 

She  can  no  longer  recite  to  the  end,  "Our  Father  who  art  in  ] 
heaven."     Nevertheless,  she  is  not  absolutely  ignorant;  she  knows 
what  a  dozen  eggs  cost,  a  pound  of  lard,  a  cutlet,  and  also  where  ^ 
wine  and  milk  come  from;  she  describes  fairly  well  how  one  fries  ' 
an  egg. 

When  one  reahzes  that  for  thirty  years  she  lived  the  social  life 
of  the  world,  one  can  judge  of  the  actual  poverty  of  her  ideas. 
She  has  no_mQre__memories  than  a  moron,  for  instance  Griffon, 
whose  history  we  have  given  in  a  previous  article  upon  the  intel- 
ligence of  imbeciles  (page  120).  In  order  to  be  able  to  judge  the 
value  of  the  practical  knowledge  of  dements  we  must  compare 
them  with  imbeciles  or  morons  and  not  with  children  of  the  same 
level;  because  imbeciles  like  dements  have  had  a  long  past  life 
and  in  consequence  have  had  an  experience  which  is  lacking  in 
children. 

3.  The  form  of  verbal  replies.  If  residues  of  memories 
do  not  exist,  one  must  not  conclude  therefore  that  all  residues 
are  absent  in  the  psychic  life  of  dements;  one  could  not  draw 
such  a  conclusion  because  it  would  be  directly  contrary  to  clini- 
cal experience.  Every  experienced  clinician  when  in  the  presence 
of  a  dement  has  had  the  impression  that  his  mentality  is  not  the 
same  as  that  of  a  moron,  that  it  is  richer,  nobler,  more  impreg- 
nated with  traces  of  a  previous  normal  life.  This  impression 
cannot  be  ignored;  since  it  rests  upon  long  experience  it  must  con- 
tain some  truth.  After  much  reflection  we  have  finally  reached 
the  following  conclusion.  Kxisidaics^ertaij^lxexist.among  deinonts 
and  they  contriliute  t^  the  production  of  the  contract,  which  wc 
have<,^Q  St.iongly  insisted  upoH,4>Hw«ftii-tlH'ir  l;i,psc.s-  and,  llu-ir 
lov-ol^-  l)ut  we  must  not  searcli  for  them  wIutc  they  do  not  exist. 
They-B«ver-r^i«ultfront-aiT  expression  of-thc  intellij!;(ii(c  <(»f»f*iMt- 
ing_ior  instance  in  making  a  clever  remark  <»r  in  oxprrssinp^  a  i 
judicious  judgment  or,  still  less^  in_solviiig.-a- problcui,  iM»r  do 
they—consist  in  conscious  mcuiorics  wIkj.-i  .ipplitvaliou  would 
demand  some  intelligence;  they  (lonsist  in  Liio  siunU'  of  cxprciisiun 
and  gesture,  the  form  of  lan^uai'v,  the  turn  of  n  phnsr,  the  choice 
of  words  which  ar(!  in  harmony  with  a  latlicr  high  intelligence 
which  today  is  lost.  As  a  result  of  this  we,  the  observers,  meet 
with  a  host  of  slight  perceptif)ns  more  or  less  conscious,  oft<'n 
badly   confused,   which    n-vcal    Uw   contrast   between    what,   the 


288  THE    INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

dement  actually  is  and  what  he  once  was.  We  could  cite  cer- 
tain sentences  of  a  dement  the  nobility  of  which  has  the  odor 
of  a  normal  life  and  of  which  an  imbecile  would  be  incapable. 
It^is^  not  then  by  the  content  of  their  replies  that  the  dements 
^prove  that  they  have  residues,  it  is  rather  by  the  form,  so  far  at 
least  as  one  is  able  to  separate  the  word  from  the  thought  because 
the  whole  is  bound  together.  In  general  a  common  thought 
is  not  clothed  in  noble  words. 

Thus  Beauchamp,  who  has  the  level  of  five  years,  when  asked 
the  trade  of  her  husband  cannot  surpass  the  childish  and  im- 
becile formula  he  works.  But  a  few  seconds  later  she  gives  to 
another  question  this  remarkable  reply,  "I  do  not  know  what 
it  is  that  you  wish  me  to  say."  It  is  clear  that  no  child  of  five 
years  unless  it  were  very  precocious  would  ever  construct  sen- 
tences in  so  complicated  a  manner. 

Another  dement,  generally  very  taciturn,  the  one  who  was 
taken  by  an  expert  alienist  for  an  imbecile,  replied  to  the  ques- 
tion, "Are  you  beautiful  or  ugly?" — "You  see  very  well  how  I  am!" 
And  another  time  she  said  to  us,  speaking  of  her  past,  "I  was 
very  beautiful,  I  assure  you."  This  form  of  language  is  superior 
to  her  level  which  is  only  that  of  four  years. 

Samse,  a  paralytic  of  the  level  of  seven  years,  also  makes 
reflections  whose  verbalism  is  quite  superior. 

Q.  You  have  not  received  any  treatment? 

A.  Oh,  no,  only  I  take  wine,  good  wine  that  the  doctor  has  ordered  for  me. 
So  when  I  leave  here,  I  shall  go  and  buy  a  quart,  because  it  is  good  for  me. 
It  comes  a  little  dear,  but  no  matter!     When  one  needs  care! 

We  have  put  in  italics  whatever  in  her  reply  has  seemed  to 
us  somewhat  superior,  the  onlys,  the  thats,  the  whens,  these  words 
'are  as  it  were  the  aristocracies  of  language. 

Vigne,  whose  level  is  nine  years,  tries  to  arrange  five  boxes 
in  the  order  of  their  weight  and  during  the  task  makes  reflections 
that  are  worthy  of  note.     "They  seem  to  be  all  of  the  same  weight. 

Ah!  no this  one They  must  be  nearly  equal.     /  do  not 

believe  that  I  am  much  mistaken.  But  it  is  quite  difficult  inasmuch 
as  the  difference  is  slight,  especially  weighing  them  thus  in  the 
hand."  Again  we  put  in  italics  what  seems  to  us  of  a  style  superior 
to  her  level. 

Philomene,  of  the  nine  year  level,  abounds  in  sentences  which 
are  striking  because  of  their  elegance.     Speaking  of  her  past 


DEVELOPMENT   VS.    FUNCTION  289 

existence  she  says,  "It  is  quite  a  romance,  my  life!"  Describing 
a  picture  which  represents  an  old  man  seated  on  a  bench  she  says, 
"Oh!  that  white  beard;  how  beautiful  it  is,  how  respectable!" 
After  reading  for  us  the  story  of  a  fire  started  through  carelessness 
she  said,  "I  cannot  understand  why  anyone  should  not  take 
more  precaution  than  that."  Another  time,  after  having  de- 
scribed with  much  boasting  the  talent  she  had  for  dressing  the 
hair  and  for  combing  out  the  tangles  she  said,  "And  gentle  above 
everything  else  with  so  much  care  and  gentleness!  Separate 
the  hairs  almost  one  by  one  with  infinite  care  without  annoying 
the  person,  etc." 

Perrot,  another  woman  of  the  level  of  nine  years  of  whom  we 
ask  what  is  charity,  replies,  "What  is  it  that  j^ou  wish  me  to  say? 
It  seems  to  me  that  any  one  who  exercises  charity  does  well, 
because  there  are  so  many  unfortunates!  You  should  exercise 
it  too, — and  look  after  some  poor  people."  When  we  have  her 
count  some  sous  on  the  edge  of  the  table  she  makes  this  superior 
reflection,  "This  is  really  child's  play!" 

After  these  examples  we  can  do  no  more  than  give  our  feeling 
because  we  have  not  made  the  necessary  studies  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  language  which  would  permit  us  to  afiirm  the  age  to 
which  each  grammatical  form  corresponds.  We  shall  supply  this 
lack  when  we  are  able.*  For  the  moment  we  must  be  content 
with  saying  that  m  the  thoughts,  the  locutions,  the  choice  of 
words  and  the  syntax  of  paralytic  dements  we  find  very  rnany^ 
residues,  which  consist  especially  in  automatic  memories;  they 
are  skeletons  from  which  the  conscious  life  has  withdrawn.  With 
this  point  which  presents  some  practical  interest  we  conclude 
by  saying  that  the  inertia  of  functioning  which  we  observe  in 
general  paralytics  is  especially  recognized  by  the  contrast  which 
exists  between  their  failures  and  their  intellectual  level  in  so  far 
as  one  can  accurately  measure  it;  and,  furthermore,  their  intel- 
lectual level  appears  to  be  higher  than  it  really  is  because  of  the 
presence  of  residues,  which  consist  in  the  verbal  form  of  their 
replies  rather  than  in  the  content. 

4.  Insufficikncy  of  develop.ment  opposed  to  insuffi- 
ciency OF  FUNCTIONING.     It  remains  for  us  now  to  go  a  little 

»  It  is  supplied.  One  of  us  has  just  finished  a  study  on  the  lanKUiiRo  of 
children  (A.  Binet). 


290  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

farther  and  having  explained  what  a  disturbance  of  functioning 
is,  to  contrast  it  with  a  lack  of  development.  For  this  we  shall 
speak  mainly  of  imbeciles.  Let  us  employ  first  of  all  some 
metaphors. 

Let  us  take  a  watch.  In  the  mechanism  of  a  watch  there  are 
two  things  to  consider:  first,  its  degree  of  complexity;  a  certain 
watch  indicates  only  the  hour,  another  indicates  the  hours  and 
minutes,  another  adds  to  this  the  seconds;  second,  we  must 
consider  the  functioning  of  the  watch,  that  is  to  say  the  regularity 
of  its  movement,  its  rapidity,  the  length  of  time  it  can  go  without 
being  wound  up,  etc.  It  is  this  distinction,  which  is  so  clear 
for  a  watch  or  any  piece  of  mechanism,  that  we  are  attempting 
to  apply  to  an  intelHgence,  because  it  seems  to  us  to  be  a  very 
convenient  illustration  by  which  to  express  the  essential  difference 
which  exists  between  an  imbecile  and  a  general  paralytic,  and 
the  numerous  points  in  which  the  two  resemble  each  other.  The- 
imbecile  has  an  intelligence  but  slightly  developed;  it  is,  as  it 
were,  a  rudimentary  watch  which  indicates  only  the  hours,  but, 
so  far  as  it  goes,  this  intelligence  functions  well ;  every  time  this 
intelligence  fails  before  a  problem  it  is  through  lack  of  develops 
ment.  On  the  contrary,  with  the  general  paralytic  it  is  always 
the  functioning  that  is  at  fault,  that  is  to  say  the  intellectual 
work.  Theoretically,  this  dement  must  be  considered  as -an 
intelligent  man  who  can  no  longer  use  his  intelligence  and  whose 
intelligence  betrays  him  at  every  moment. 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  distinction  between  the  imbe- 
cile and  the  dement  is  therefore  very  clear.  But  exactly  what  is 
the  development  of  the  intelligence?  In  what  does  it  consist? 
Certainly  in  many  things;  he  would  be  very  daring  who  tried 
to  define  such  a  complexity  with  a  single  word.  But  we  can 
state  what  seems  to  be  the  most  important  trait  in  all  mental 
development  and  what  seems  on  the  contrary  the  accessory 
trait.  In  addition  we  may  note  the  tendency  to  organization 
which  is  undeniably  weaker  in  the  child  than  in  the  adult;  witness 
the  inconstancy  of  the  desires,  the  caprices  of  ideas,  the  lack  of 
continuity  which  we  find  in  a  young  child.  Follow  in  the  street 
a  httle  school  boy  going  to  school  and  compare  the  path  he 
follows  with  that  of  an  adult;  the  adult  goes  more  or  less  directly 
to  his  destination  while  the  child  takes  a  zigzag  course  which 
shows  the  insufficiency  of  his  direction  and  control.     Here  then, 


DEVELOPMENT   VS.    FUNCTION  291 

ID  our  opinion,  is  /^^.o  r>f-  |^|ip.  |.y^jf.R  pf  TTirntnl  rln-rlTpTFTfTrl--  it 
produces  n  licit n  anrl  tilinnnrr  i>i'CMii>iiii>lii>ii>  and  consequently 
it  is  to  be  expected  that  yount>-  r^ultif-rt^,  who  nre~twt"°yet" com- 
pletely developed,  should  s!if)\v  siiiiis  of  a  weakness  of  organisa- 
tion; in  t-his  way  they  must  of  necessity  shghtly^resemtJe  general 
paralytics-Jn  wliom  the  insufficiency  of  direction  and  control 
fllsa-manifpsts  itsplf,  huL.i  _u  ut  disorgauisation. and  not  as 

the^  beginning  of  organisation.  There  is  not,  however,  with 
the  child  any  lack  of  evocation  but  rather  lack  of  co5rdination, 
tl\rough  the  pullulation  of  ideas  and  of  heteroclitic  sentiments. 
But  that  which  especially  and  essentially  characterizes  a  men- 
tal development  is  the  process  of  differentiation.  If  one  refers 
to  our  chapter  upon  the  Scheme  of  Thought,  which  we  have  in- 
cluded in  our  more  extensive  study  of  the  mental  development 
of  imbeciles^  he  will  find  there  the  law  formulated  and  described 
according  to  which  a  thought  develops;  it  is  by  the  progressive 
passing  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  from  the  indefinite  to 
the  definite,  from  the  accessory  to  the  essential,  a  progress  thanks 
to  which  the  thought  adjusts  itself  better  and  better  to  its  end. 
The  development  of  intelligence  manifests  itself  therefore  in 
the  quality  of  the  states  of  consciousness.  Of  two  states  of 
consciousness  that  one  is  of  superior  quality  which  is  less  simple, 
less  commonplace,  less  vague,  less  indeterminate,  more  definite, 
more  rich,  more  special;  or  rather,  to  take  a  broader  view,  the 
superior  state  is  that  which  adapts  itself  the  best,  the  most  com- 
pletely to  its  environment;  but  for  the  adaptation  to  be  as  per- 
fect as  possible  the  thought  must  reflect  at  the  same  time  that 
which  is  special  and  essential  in  the  environment  in  which  one 
acts.  A  curious  experiment  that  we  have  often  tried  with  chiUircn 
of  all  ages,  adults  of  every  social  condition,  imbeciles  and  morons 
of  every  level,  and  general  paralytics  of  every  degree  of  disor- 
ganisation shows  admiral)Iy  in  what  this  development  consists. 
We  refer  to  the  comments  upon  pictures.  We  place  before  an 
imbecile  and  a  general  paralytic  a  picture  representing  two  old 
people  in  want,  stranded  upon  a  bench;  one  of  them  is  an  old  man 
with  a  white  beard  and  eyes  dosed;  the  other,  a  woman,  is  lean- 
ing against  him.  An  imbecile  is  satisfied  with  the  response, 
''It  is  a  man."     A  general  paralytic,  impressed  no  doubt  by  the 

'  L'Ann6e  Paychologique,  Vol.  XV,  1909,  p.  122. 


292  THE   INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

head  and  beard  of  the  man,  makes  this  reflection,  "One  would 
say  Victor  Hugo."  Who  would  not  perceive  the  abyss  between 
these  two  responses;  the  thought  of  the  imbecile  is  almost  in- 
determinate; would  apply  quite  as  well,  not  to  say  quite  as  poorly 
to  an  immense  number  of  different  pictures.  It  would  be  well 
to  recall  here  that  we  made  a  collection  of  some  fifteen  reproduc- 
tions of  paintings  which  we  showed  to  our  imbeciles  and  for  these 
pictures  they  have  almost  always  made  the  same  reply,  "It  is 

a   man — Those   are   women That   is   again   a   man And 

then  that  is  a  woman,  etc."     It  would  be  impossible  for  one  to 

reproduce  the   picture  from   such   commonplace  indeterminate 

comments.     On    the    contrary    the    reflection    which    compares 

.the  old  man  with  the  white  beard  to  Victor  Hugo  is  much  more 

Vomplex,  much  more  special;  it  would  apply  only  to  a  very  small 

number  of  pictures.     There  is  here  the  cfeft#ftetei;:..oL-speciaIty 

which.- we  consider  one  of  the  qualities  of  intellectual  develop- 

ilig5.t.     A -second  character  is  that  of  representing  what  is  essen- 

iiial"in  the  reality.     Here  again  the  comments  upon  pictures 

furnish  us  with  many  examples.     Many  children  looking  at  the 

pictures  are  struck  by  some  insignificant  detail;  they  designate 

/  first,  for  example,  the  branch  of  a  tree  instead  of  the  active  per- 

/  sons  and  thus  subordinate  the  principal  to  the  accessory,  the 

whole  to  the  part;  in  the  same  way  dull  intelligences  take  only 

the  immediate  appearance  of  the  reality  and  neglect  what  they 

do  not  see  but  what  is  nevertheless  of  infinitely  greater  importance. 

Much  might  be  said  upon  this  subject. 

Combine  these  two  qualities  of  the  states  of  consciousness  and 
we  see  that  they  assure  an  adjustment  of  each  state  of  conscious- 
ness to  its  own  end,  that  they  thus  make  the  theory  of  adapta- 
tion enter  into  an  exact  conception  of  intelligence,  and  that  we 
arrive  at  a  very  clear  and  very  satisfactory  idea  of  intellectual 
development. 

In  opposing  thus  the  quality  of  the  states  of  consciousness  with 
their  evocability^°  we  make  a  distinction  between  the  develop- 

i''  For  those  who  are  seeking  some  synthetic  views,  we  recall  that  the 
quality  of  the  states  of  consciousness  or  the  development  of  the  intelli- 
gence depends  on  two  factors,  invention  and  judgment;  invention  corre- 
sponds to  the  complexity  of  the  states  of  consciousness  and  judgment  to 
their  exactness.  But  we  have  seen  on  other  occasions  that  there  are  two 
principal  intellectual  types,  the  observational  and  the  imaginative,  which 


DEVELOPMENT   VS.    FUNCTION  293 

ment  of  the  intelligence  and  its  functioning,  and  at  the  same  time 
between  the  mentahty  of  the  imbecile  and  that  of  the  paralytic; 
the  mentality  of  the  imbecile  is  composed  of  simple  states  of 
coiLseiousness  which  are  evoked  with  normals-facility^  the_inen- 
talifcji^of  the  paralytic  is  composed  of  states  which  are  more 
complex- biit  which  have  become  difficult  of  evocation. ^^ 

5.  For  the  clinic.  We  have  thus  examined  our  problem 
placing  ourselves  first  at  the  theoretical  point  of  view  of  the 
psychologist,  then  at  the  practical  point  of  view  of  the  ph3'sician. 
It  is  at  this  latter  point  of  view  that  we  again  place  ourselves 
to  ask  if  the  description  we  have  made  of  the  slight  psychological 
signs  of  dementia^^  and  the  theories  which  we  have  drawn  from 
them  have  contributed  to  the  diagnosis  of  dementia  and  how  far. 

It  would  seem  that  we  have  reached  a  conclusion  which,  set- 
ting aside  the  difference  of  language,  is  equivalent  to  saying 
that  the^paralytic  dement  presents  a  weakening  of  the  whole  in- 
telligence ^hnt  this  is  also  the  conclusion,  or  to  put  it  better,  the 
quintessence  of  the  classical  theory.  First  let  us  say  in  what 
way  we  are  in  perfect  accord  with  this  theory,  then  we  shall  state 
how  we  believe  we  surpass  it. 

In  accordance  with  the  classical  theory  we  admit  that  pia 

are  distinguished  by  the  predominance  of  the  judgment  or  of  the  imagi- 
nation (see  A.  Binet  I'Slude  Experimentale  de  I' Intelligence).  Thus  all  of 
those  studies  hold  together  and  lend  mutual  support  to  one  another. 

"  It  is  important  to  define  here  the  point  to  which  we  have  arrived. 
Nearly  all  our  study  has  been  made  in  an  office  through  which  the  insane 
patients  pass;  we  have  been  able  to  study  these  patients  only  during  brief 
sittings  in  a  consultation  room;  we  have  summoned  them  there  for  certain 
tests  of  intelligence;  we  have  not  had  the  means  of  observing  in  them  the 
spontaneous  phenomena  which  occur  in  the  life  of  the  asylum  and  which 
are  the  manifestation  of  their  emotivity  and  of  their  character.  Conse- 
quently our  analysis  bears  solely  upon  the  functioning  of  their  intelligence. 
In  order  to  complete  it  other  studies  on  their  character  would  !>(>  neces- 
sary. We  hope  soon  to  have  tiie  opportunity  of  completing  it  in  another 
hospital;  and  even  at  the  present  time  we  believe  that  we  sec  the  exact 
point  where  additions  will  be  made;  but  we  are  not  willing  to  present  any 
theory  without  sufficient  records  and  honrf,  we  prefer  Ui  postpone  the 
exposition  of  our  views. 

'*  It  is  a  fact  that  the  slight  psychological  signs  that  we  have  described 
have  been  noted  more  or  less  by  writers;  only  they  present  them  in  common- 
place inventory,  without  giving  them  any  other  connection  than  that  of 
co-existence,  while  we  have  sought  to  classify  them,  to  interpret  them, 
and  to  make  use  of  interpretation  for  perfecting  their  analysis. 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

weakcniiiff  o^^ese'paliente-4»-ffi!oba^4n  -efeftyfteter ;  but  if  we  admit 
it,  it  is  because  we  have  demonstrated  it  by  very  different  means. 
For  clinicians  the  disturbance  is  global  because  it  is  manifested 
in  all  the  functions,  memory,  attention,  judgment,  etc.,  by  means 
of  observations  in  detail  but  without  connection  one  with  an- 
other; and  because  one  makes  in  a  way  an  addition  of  all  these 
disconnected  observations  and  one  sees  that  in-4fe«-dement  -ntme 
ol-tlie -faeultiee  is  spared,  none  functions  normally.     For  us  ther- 
disturbance  is. ^Za6a^,  because,  we  see  that  it  results -from-ar-eeftain 
mode  of  functioning,  always  the  same,  which  is  found  in  the  whole 
intellectual  activity;  for  us  it  is  an  affair  of  psychological  analysis 
and  not  an  accumulation  and  a  generalization  of  particular  ob- 
servations; it  is,  in  a  word,  because  dements  have  a  disturbance 
in  evocation  and  because  evocation  is  the  basis  of  all  intellectual 
work  that  these  patients  seem  to  be  affected  by  a  general  weaken- 
ing.    It  results  from  this  that  our  interpretation  is  much  more 
flexible  than  the  classic;  it  permits  the  conception  of  other  forms 
of  global  dementia,  but  they  will  not  be  so  in  the  same  manner 
as  paralytic  dementia,   dementias  for  example  where  the  dif- 
ferent intellectual  functionings  are  all  affected  but  unequally 
in  degree  or  differently  in  quality.     It  can  thus  be  seen  that  we 
give  to  this  expression  of  global  a  new  sense. 

The  same  remarks  can  be  made  in  regard  to  the  term  weak- 
ening. One  beheves  that  he  understands  this  word  and  it  seems 
precise  and  sufficient,  until  he  takes  the  pains  to  analyse  it. 
The  analysis  which  results  from  the  classical  theory  is  extremely 
incomplete;  by  intellectual  weakening  of  general  paralytics  we 
understand  simply  a  group  of  errors  of  memory,  of  judgment, 
etc.,  but  there  are  indeed  errors  of  many  sorts;  those  of  general 
paralytics'  are  not  those  of  epileptics,  not  those  of  senile  dements. 
It  is  true  that  we  say  that  the  errors  of  general  paralytics  indicate 
a  demential  level.  But  is  this  true?  The  errors  of  general  para- 
lytics seem  rather  in  contrast  than  in  accord  with  their  level  of 
intelligence.  When  the  patient  Philippon,  who  has  a  level  of 
nine  yeare,  cannot  tell  the  date  and  we  suggest  to  her,  "It  is 
perhaps  the  50th"  and  she  replies,  "Perhaps  it  is,"  the  error  has 
not  its  raison  d'etre  in  the  demential  level  of  her  disease.  Philip- 
pon is  not  so  low  grade  since  she  still  retains  a  level  of  nine  years. 
We  think  the  error  can  be  explained  by  a  defect  of  functioning 
and  the  absence  of  evocation;  the  number  50  has  not  evoked 


DEVELOPMENT    VS.    FUNCTION  295 

the  precise  and  appropriate  idea  and  consequently  has  not  been 
judged,  ^nd  it  is  this  defect  of  functioning  which  characterises 
the  errors  of  these  patients. 

"The  novelty  of  our  point  of  view  in  the  use  of  the  word  weaken- 
ing can  be  very  easily  seen  if  one  recalls  the  discussions  that 
daily  occur  in  cases  where  the  diagnosis  of  general  paralysis  is 
doubtful.  It  seems  for  these  authors  that  the  intelUgence  is 
a  quantity  and  that  the  weakening  is  only  a  diminution  of  this 
quantity.  Thus  one  often  hears  this  objection  to  a  diagnosis, 
"But  this  patient  has  memory!  See  all  the  information  he  can 
give.  Now  listen  to  the  reflection  which  he  makes;  it  proves 
that  he  is  not  lacking  in  judgment."  It  would  seem  that  these 
objections  were  correct.  When  a  patient  furnishes  exact  informa- 
tion as  to  his  trade,  his  income,  his  first  entrance  into  the  asylum, 
or  recalls  some  event  that  you  yourself  have  forgotten  and  which 
you  are  obhged  to  verify,  one  may  recognize  in  him  a  general 
paralytic,  but  it  is  not  by  virtue  of  the  conception  which  these  j 
authors  have  formed  upon  the  subject  of  the  weakening  of  the 
intelligence,  because  the  conservation  of  the  attention,  of  judg- 
ment, of  memory,  is  incompatible  with  this  conception.  On 
the  contrary  our  theory  puts  us  completely  at  our  ease  with  these 
embarrassing  facts.  Dementia  is  not  characterized  by  a  lower- 
ing of  level  and  the  lowering  of  the  level  is  not  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute dementia;  one  does  not  speak  of  dementia  in  melancholia 
although  the  intellectual  functions  are  very  much  dhninishcd. 
The  intelligence  of  the  general  paralji;ic  is  lowered,  disturl)cd, 
by  accidents  which  manifest  themselves  in  his  functioning,  acci- 
dents which  constitute  veritable  defects.  There  does  not  exist 
in  the  beginning,  for  instance,  deterioration  of  judgment,  i)ut 
faults  of  judgment,  repeated  accidents,  blunders.  The  inertia! 
of  functioning  is  in  the  beginning  only  accidental,  hence  the  con- 
trast with  the  whole  of  the  personality;  it  occurs  at  intervals 
very  irregularly,  and  of  course  it  manifests  itself  particularly 
in  difficult  and  complicated  cases  which  demand  elTort,  care, 
attention  to  detail;  for  the  diagnosis  to  be  established  it  suf- 
fices that  one  of  these  characttsristic  defects  manifests  itself 
clearly.  By  the  repetition,  the  multiplication  of  th(\so  defects, 
we  have  a  lowering  of  the  level,  because  these  defects  interfere 
with  and  consequently  diminish  the  output  of  the  individual. 
Compared   to   each    other    tiie    imbecile    and    llic    dement    are 


296  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

like  two  poor  walkers  who  have  different  reasons  for  not  going 
a  long  distance,  the  imbecile  because  he  has  very  short  legs, 
the  dement  because  he  makes  false  steps  and  is  constantly 
falling  down.  That  which  dominates  the  whole  question  is 
the  mechanism  of  the  errors  produced  by  the  dements.  We  re- 
place the  old  conception  then  by  a  conception  that  is  more  pre- 
cise. The  old  conception,  according  to  which  the  demential 
states  depend  upon  a  quantitative  diminution  of  the  intelligence 
or  upon  an  injury  of  all  the  faculties,  was  a  constant  source  of 

•  confusion.  One  had  indeed  the  impression  that  there  was  some- 
thing besides  this;  but  whenever  the  diagnosis  of  dementia  was 
doubtful,  or  when  one  attempted  to  determine  exactly  the  con- 
stituent elements,  the  ground  that  he  believed  soHd  gave  way 
under  his  feet.  To  the  vagnp  and,  inexact  affirmation  of  a  global 
diminution  of  the  whole  intelligence  must  be  added,  and  even 
substituted  for  it,  the  conception  of  individual  errors  of  func- 
tioning, of  defects  of  every  sort,  which  by  their  multiplication 

/  lower  the  intellectual  level  and  which  present  the  two  following 

1  characteristics:   irregularity   and    extensiveness   relative    to    the 

\level  of  the  subjects. 


IV.     DISTmCTION   BETWEEN  IDEATIONAL    INTELLI- 
GENCE AND   INSTINCTR^  INTELLIGENCE 

1.  Portraits  of  two  senile  dements.  Serious  objection 
could  be  made  to  the  theory  of  paralytic  dementia  which  we  have 
just  set  forth;  or  to  put  it  better,  we  shall  make  some  observations 
which  at  first  sight  seem  to  contradict  the  preceding  theor}^ 
but  which  on  the  contrary  when  rightly  interpreted  will  support 
it  and  will  permit  its  meaning  to  be  enlarged. 

We  allude  to  a  whole  category  of  patients,  the  senile  dements, 
who  present  extremely  accentuated  disturbances  of  mcmoi-y 
and  consequently  of  the  faculty  of  evocation,  and  who  neverthe- 
less have  not  at  all  the  same  mentality  nor  the  same  attitude 
as  general  parah'tics.  Instead  of  making  a  clinical  table  of 
senile  dementia  let  us  observe  a  patient,  make  her  talk  and  sub- 
mit her  to  different  tests  which  show  all  the  consequences  of 
the  amne.sia  with  wliich  she  is  affected. 

We  present  to  our  readers  an  old  woman  who  seems  to  be  sixty- 
five  or  sixty-six  years  old;  she  is  small,  thin,  with  slightl}-  anemic 
skin  and  delicate  featuies.  She  is  ciuite  lively,  her  expression 
is  serious  and  attentive,  she  has  even  an  intelligent  glance  which 
meets  ours  directl3\  This  lady  is  not  without  good  manners. 
She  says  good  morning  on  entering,  seats  herself  on  a  chair  and 
awaits  our  questions  in  a  polite  manner.  She  at  once*  gives  tiie 
impres.sion  of  a  reasonable  person  and  licr  ((inversatinn  finm 
the  star!  confirms  this  impression.  Slic  shows  ncithci-  f;nnili;irily 
nor  lack  of  i;ic1.  Tlic  social  sense  is  well  preser\'C(l  in  her.  Ilci 
air  of  dignity  and  ol'  cii'cumspcclion  would  pass  vcrx'  well  in  .-i 
waiting  wfjman  of  a   piil)lic  building. 

.Mrcady  this  attitude  |)ermi1s  us  to  undcr.-l.'ind  with  whom 
we  have  to  deal;  slu;  is  not  an  iinbecilc  nor  a  paralytic.  I'm  I  his 
is  perhaps  only  :i  dcccptixc  ;i|)|)(a ranee;  peili.ips  also  tlu*  cori'ect- 
ne.ss  of  her  ;i1l  it  nde  is  only  a  residue  of  a  I'oinier  state,  the  well 
ijn^erved  faf;ade j)f  _an_edificc'_iii  ruins,  sucli  iis  one  might  exp(><^t 
tf)  find  in  dementia  patients.  \\'e  nnist  not  theref»»re  stoji  ;i1 
lliesc  exterioi-  signs.     Let    us  make  our  p;itient    t;ilk. 


298 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 


Her  conversation  when  followed  for  some  time  astonishes  us. 
We  commence,  according  to  our  custom,  by  giving  general  ques- 
tions: we  ask  her  age,  her  profession,  her  family,  her  past  hfe. 
It  is  impossible  to  obtain  a  single  precise  reply  or  any  trustworthy 
information.  Facts  that  are  of  prime  importance  she  declares 
she  does  not  remember;  for  others  her  explanations  are  not  at 
all  clear,  they  are  even  contradictory.     Let  us  see. 


FIG.  23.    MME.    MACOLARD,  SENILE  DEMENT,  PRESENTS  HERSELF  WITH  AN 

AIR  or  GREAT  DIGNITY. 


Q.  What  is  your  name? 

A.  I  am  called  Mme.  Macolard. 

Q.  What  is  your  age? 

A.  Oh!    monsieur,  I  am  not  young 

Q.  But  what  is  your  age? 

A.  Seventy-two  or  seventy-five  years. 

Q.  Are  you  from  Paris? 

A.  Ah!     no,  I  am  from  Clermont. 


-oh!  no! 


TWO    SENILE    DEMENTS  299 

Q.  What  is  your  profession? 

A.  (Pointing  to  Dr.  Simon  who  is  writing.)  Well  my  profession — to 
do  what  that  gentleman  there  writes.  (Impossible  to  know  what  she  means 
to  say.) 

Q.  You  were  in  business? 

A.  Yes,  in  business,  the  hardware  business. 

Q.  What  did  you  do  in  business? 

A.  We  made  the  circuit.  We  did  it,  it  was  very  well.  (Confused 
explanations,  numerous  details  that  no  one  could  hear  or  understand.) 

Q.  You  have  had  many  children? 

A.  I  was  the  only  child. 

Q.  You  have  not  understood.  I  ask  you  how  many  children  you  have 
had. 

A.  It  would  be  hard  for  me  to  tell. 

Q.  Why  so? 

A.  Because  I  do  not  know  exactly. 

Q.  Let  us  see,  explain  yourself.     Have  you  had  more  than  one? 

A.  Oh!  I  should  say.  I  have  had  more  than  four  since  I  came  here. 
(Unintelligible.) 

Q.  Have  you  had  ten? 

A.  You  would  not  wish  it. 

Q.  Less  than  ten  then? 

A.  Oh!     I  think  so. 

Q.  More  than  five? 

A.  Oh!  surely  five.  Because  one  must  come  and  go. — I  would  not  tell 
you  that  I  had  less  than  five. 

One  can  already  see  from  these  few  words  how  her  memory 
has  gone.  There  are  singular  omissions  and  obscurities  in  her 
replies.     Note  now  some  contradictions. 

Q.  Your  mother  is  still  living? 
A.  Oh!    yes,  monsieur. 
Q.  How  old  is  she? 
A.  She  is  younger  than  I. 
Q.  She  is  not  your  real  mother  then? 
A.  Yes,  my  real  mother. 
Q.  You  say  she  is  younger  than  you? 
A.  Once  she  was  younger  than  I. 
Q.  But  now  she  is  olfler? 

A.  Since  Monsieur  (pointing  to  Dr.  Simon)  is  younger  than  I — well  it 
is  the  same  thing.     (Unintelligible.) 
Q.  You  have  told  your  age? 
A.  Oh!    yes,  monsieur. 
Q.  Tell  me  again.     What  is  your  age? 
A.  Perhaps  sixty,  sixty-five.     How  much  I  do  not  know. 
She  had  said  seventy-two  or  seventy-five  a  moment  before. 


300  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  And  your  mother,  what  is  her  age? 

A.  Mama  is  older  than  I.     Very  often  she  stays  in  the  country. 
Q.  How  old  is  she? 

A.  I  do  not  know — If  it  was  read — (pointing  to  Dr.  Simon  who  writes) 
If  that  page  that  is  being  written  were  read — 

Q.  But  you  said  your  mother  was  younger  than  you? 

A.  Oh!    she  is  not  younger  than  I.     She  is  about  like  me,  my  age. 

It  can  be  seen  how  contradictory  are  the  words  of  this  woman 
since  in  an  interval  of  five  minutes  she  affirms  that  she  is  older 
than  her  mother,  then  that  she  is  younger  and  finally  that  they 
are  of  the  same  age.  But  in  reality  it  is  because  she  has  no  pro- 
nounced definite  convictions  about  the  words  she  uses.  She  con- 
tradicts herself  because  she  forgets  the  sense  of  the  phrase  which 
she  has  started  and  also  the  end  which  she  has  in  view  while 
speaking.  Obviously  none  of  these  contradictions  would  be 
encountered  in  a  conversation  with  mibeciles. 

The  memory  of  Mme.  Macolard  presents  in  fact  a  very  accen- 
tuated weakening.  That  which  is  conserved  in  her  is  the  use  of 
language  and  that  which  constitutes  knowledge  not  memories; 
for  instance,  reading  (she  reads  quite  fluently),  writing,  the  knowl- 
edge of  money,  the  names  of  colors,  etc.  But  for  whatever 
concerns  recent  acquisitions  she  is  deeply  stricken.  It  may  be 
said  that  she  has  knowledge  but  not  memory.  Thus  she  cannot 
find  her  bearings  from  any  point  of  view;  she  knows  neither  the 
hour,  the  day,  the  month,  the  season,  nor  even  the  year. 

Q.  What  day  is  today? 
A.  1  do  not  even  know  anything. 
Q.  Is  it  afternoon  or  morning? 
A.  Ah,  indeed,  I  do  not  know. 
Q.  Try  to  tell  which  it  is,  afternoon  or  morning? 
A.  It  is  still  morning. 

Q.  And  what  morning?     (In  reality  it  is  five  o'clock  in  the  evening.) 
A.  You  have  asked  me  too  much. 
Q.  What  did  you  eat  this  morning? 
A.  Ah!    it  would  be  very  hard  for  me  to  tell  you. 
Q.  What  month  is  this? 
A.  I  know  nothing  about  it. 
Q.  Oh!    yes,  tell  me  what  month  it  is? 
A.  Is  it  the  same  as  you? 
Q.  Yes. 

A.  If  it  is  the  same  we  are  equal.     (Happy  way  for  her  to  escape.) 
Q.  This  is  December!     (In  reality  it  is  May,  it  is  warm,  the  fruit  trees 
are  in  bloom.) 


TWO    SENILE    DEMENTS  301 

A.  That  surprises  me.     December  and  January.     We  are  not  in  the 
month  of  January.     It  is  possible. 
Q.  What  year  is  this? 

A.  Faith,  I  know  nothing.     What  year  did  you  say  it  was? 
Q.  1809. 

A.  1809,  that  is  nothing. 

Q.  And  do  you  know  who  just  died?    Louis  XIV. 
A.  I  have  heard  of  him. 

We  shall  not  attempt  to  characterise  this  forgetfulness  as  lack 
of  attention.  WTien  the  memory  is  affected  to  this  degree  it  is 
evident  that  the  attention  must  be  also  affected.  It  forms  a 
complicated  mass  of  disturbances.  What  seems  to  us  certain 
is  that  the  great  loss  comes  in  the  memory;  not  to  know  the  year 
in  which  one  is  hving  cannot  come  from  a  falHng  off  of  the  power 
of  attention;  not  to  know  if  it  is  morning  or  afternoon  cannot 
come  from  a  lack  of  attention;  however  weak  the  attention  the 
meals  are  noted.     These  lapses  come  from  loss  of  memory. 

Let  us  proceed  to  a  methodical  study  of  her  memory,  by  way 
of  experiment.  She  can  repeat  four  figures;  she  attains  occasional- 
ly this  maximum  of  four.  Out  of  tliirteen  pictures  shown  her  she 
does  not  remember  a  single  one.  All  that  she  can  do  is  to  repeat  a 
sentence  of  eight  syllables.  We  give  her  three  simple  com- 
missions. She  understands  them  very  well  but  the  moment 
she  rises  to  perform  them  she  is  much  embarrassed.  The  three 
commLssions  are  as  follows :  to  carry  a  music  box  to  another  table, 
to  take  a  flower  from  a  bouquet  and  bring  it  to  us,  to  move  a 
chair.  The  dement  rises,  saying,  "Well,  I  must  take  the  bouquet." 
She  goes  to  the  table,  looks  at  the  bouquet,  "I  am  to  take  only 
one  flower."  She  is  deeply  embarrassed,  turns  to  us,  looks  at 
us,  seeking  to  implore  our  assistance.  But  we  remain  as  im- 
movable as  sphinxes.  She  decides  to  pick  a  flower.  Her  em- 
barrassment   continues.     "Perhaps    I    must    not    bring    it " 

She  lays  it  on  a  chair  and  comes  back  to  her  seat  without  any 
concern  as  to  the  commission  she  has  forgotten.  Such  a  loss 
of  memory  renders  her  completely  useless. 

Nothing  shows  us  more  clearly  the  fugitive  character  of  her 
memory  than  the  experiment  with  cards.  We  present  to  her 
two  cards  and  ask  her  to  name  thcni;  then  we  conceal  the  two 
cards  and  fifteen  seconrls  later,  which  is  a  very  short  period, 
we  ask  her  to  name  the  two  cards;  she  has  forgotten  them.     Since 


302       THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

we  did  not  succeed  with  simple  cards  we  show  her  some  face 
cards,  the  king  of  diamonds  and  the  queen  of  clubs.  Thirty 
seconds  are  used  in  showing  and  making  her  name  the  two  cards. 
She  is  very  attentive.  Then  we  turn  them  over  on  the  table 
and  ask  her  to  name  them  after  allowing  exactly  fifteen  seconds 
to  pass. 

Q.  Well?    What  were  they? 

A.  But  I  did  not  see.  They  were  red  on  the  back.  I  did  not  want  to 
raise  the  other. 

Q.  Yes,  but  what  did  I  show  you? 

A.  You  showed  me 1  am  not  sure  that  one  wasn't  the  six. 

Q.  And  the  other? 

A.  Turn  it  over You  only  look  at  it  yourself. 

We  begin  and  show  her  the  same  cards  and  again  we  allow  fifteen  seconds 
to  pass. 

Q.  Well  now,  this  time  you  are  going  to  name  them. 

A.  King  of  clubs — and  the  Queen — perhaps  of  clubs  also  or  of  spades — 
I  only  glanced  at  them.     (It  is  her  habit  always  to  complain.) 

It  can  be  seen  with  what  difficulty  we  succeed  in  giving  her 
a  trace  of  memory  which  probably  did  not  endure  more  than 
two  seconds.  This  is  however  one  of  the  easiest  experiments 
with  memory  that  could  be  made.  That  is  the  reason  we  use  it 
in  senile  dementia.  In  paralytic  dementia  we  employ  a  more 
difficult  test,  that  of  the  three  figures,  Ernest,  Louis,  Antoiae. 
But  it  would  be  out  of  the  question  here  for  it  would  be  too  diffi- 
cult for  our  patient  to  retain.  Let  us  conclude  with  an  incident. 
While  Mme.  Macolard  is  with  us  we  send  for  Denise,  an  imbecile 
whose  presence  cannot  escape  notice  for  she  laughs  aloud  inces- 
santly. Denise  remains  a  full  quarter  of  an  hour  with  us;  Mme. 
Macolard  often  speaks  to  her  to  admonish  her,  telling  her  to 
be  quiet,  etc.  The  scene  is  not  devoid  of  humor.  Mme.  Macolard 
has  received  from  us  a  paper  with  the  request  to  read  us  something. 
She  consents  but  she  has  the  habit  of  not  being  able  to  decide; 
she  always  finds  that  something  is  wrong,  she  turns  the  paper 
in  every  direction.  Denise  near  her  laughs  loudly.  The  de- 
ment is  offended  at  her  laughter,  and  addresses  a  reprimand 
full  of  feeling  to  Denise,  ''Mademoiselle,  do  not  laugh;  you  must 
be  more  respected.' '  If  certain  words  are  inexact  the  tone  is 
there.  The  imbecile,  impressed,  quiets  herself.  The  dement 
goes  back  to  her  paper.     She  complains  that  she  cannot  see. 


TWO    SENILE    DEMENTS  303 

"With  glasses,"  she  says,  "I  could  see  all  right."  Seeing  that 
we  wear  glasses  she  says  to  us,  "But  you  have  them,  then  you 
read,"  and  she  hands  us  the  paper.  We  refuse  it.  This  excites 
a  new  burst  of  laughter  from  the  imbecile  and  the  dement  repri- 
mands her  again,  "My  dear,  you  must  not  laugh  like  a  child  of 
three."  The  scene  lasts  quite  a  while,  after  which  the  two 
women  are  taken  into  the  garden  to  be  photographed ;  this  took 
a  long  time  because  we  took  three  photographs  of  one  and  two 
of  the  other  and  the  poses  had  to  be  arranged.  All  then  returned 
to  the  office  and  after  a  little  while  Denise  was  allowed  to  go. 

A  half  hour  after  the  imbecile  had  left  us  we  questioned  Mme. 
Macolard  about  the  affair. 

Q.  Did  any  one  come  in  here  with  us? 

A.  Not  that  I  know  of  any  waj*. 

Q.  We  three  have  not  been  alone  all  the  time?  Think.  Besides  we 
were  not  in  this  room  all  the  time. 

A.  (In  substance  she  says  that  once  we  went  out  together.) 

Q.  Are  you  sure  that  we  opened  that  door? 

A.  I  think  so.     (It  was  by  that  door  that  we  had  gone  into  the  garden.) 

Q.  So  no  one  came  in  since  we  have  been  here? 

A.  But  we  have  not  been  here  long. 

(In  reality  we  had  been  there  at  least  two  hours.) 

Q.  You  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  a  patient  enter  here? 

.A.  Ah!    a  patient  who  could  not  stand  up. 

Q.  Madame,  a  patient  did  come  in  here! 

A.  Yes.     I  do  not  know.     I  say  yes,  but  I  do  not  know. 

Q.  A  patient  came  in  here! 

A.  Here?  You  have  scarcely  had  any  patients  this  year.  (Unintel- 
ligible.) 

Q.  It  was  a  patient  who  laughed  all  the  time. 

A.  That  stout  woman  who  came  here!     She  did  nothing  but  laugh. 

Q.  You  remember  her  then? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur,  it  was  easy  to  remember  her.  She  sat  here  on  this 
chair,  and  then  she  laughed  with  her  fat  face.  (Correct,  the  imbecile 
has  a  fat  face.) 

Thus  it  can  be  seen  with  what  difficulty  we  awaken  in  her 
this  very  striking  and  very  recent  memory. 

It  is  certain  that  so  great  a  psychological  di.sturbance  must 
produce  many  repercussions  in  the  mental  stage  of  tlie  patient. 
The  principal  repercussion  that  became  visible  during  our 
examination  was  besides  the  loss  jof  memory  the  inuppropriutc- 
ness  of  language.     This   dement   had   great   troui)Ie   in    naming 


304  THE   INTELLIGENCE   OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

familiar  objects  shown  to  her.  A  gas  jet  was  called  a  lamp; 
a  wash  basin  was  called  porcelain  or  a  thing  to  wash  in;  a  water 
pitcher  received  this  picturesque  appellation,  "It  is  one  that  waits 
for  water  to  be  put  in."  The  expression  of  ideas  suffers  from 
this  poverty  of  words  and  the  patient,  as  one  can  see  from  the 
bits  of  dialogue  which  we  have  given,  often  uses  unintelligible 
phraseology  or  aflfirms  facts  which  a  few  minutes  before  she  had 
denied.  This  comes  from  incoherence  of  language  much  more 
than  from  incoherence  of  ideas. 

But  let  us  examine  the  effect  which  the  amnesia  has  had  upon 
the  judgment  of  the  dement.  Does  she  commit  gross  blunders? 
Does  she  accept  without  any  critical  sense  the  enormities  that 
one  affirms  before  her?  Has  she  lost  the  sense  of  the  ridiculous? 
Is  she  suggestible  to  a  supreme  degree?  Aheady  it  has  been 
possible  to  note  a  certain  ironic  tm'n  in  her  sentence;  whatever 
the  value  of  this  irony  it  is  evidently  of  a  quahty  that  would 
be  impossible  in  an  imbecile.  Mme.  Macolard  is  not  devoid 
of  wit.  Once  we  asked  her  to  make  some  mental  additions; 
she  could  not  perform  them  but  neither  did  she  satisfy  herself 
as  would  an  imbecile  by  replying  at  random. 

Q.  How  much  does  9  and  8  make? 

A.  Very  well,  9 How  much  does  9  and  8  make? 

Q.  Answer  first,  I  will  tell  you  afterwards. 
A.  Very  well  that  will  be  time  enough. 

Notice  also  that  she  never  rephes  haphazard  as  would  an  im- 
becile; when  she  does  not  know  she  does  not  reply  at  all  and 
declares  she  does  not  know,  which  is  very  sensible  on  her  part. 
On  the  whole  her  memory  is  extremely  weakened  but  her  judg- 
ment is  far  from  being  equally  so;  it  is  even  quite  good. 

Let  us  introduce  another  senile  dement,  Mme.  Langlais.  She 
has  the  brusque,  surly  but  good  manner  of  a  country  woman. 

She  has  lost  her  memory  even  more  than  Mme.  Macolard 
but  her  judgment  remains  equally  good.  She  has  less  dignity 
than  Mme.  Macolard  and  more  good  natm-e,  more  gayety,  es- 
pecially at  the  beginning  of  the  sitting;  as  time  goes  on  she  changes 
as  will  be  seen. 

Q.  What  is  your  name? 

A.  My  name  is 1  have  forgotten  it  already 1  have  forgotten  it. 

I  was  born  at  Sucy there 


/ 


TWO    SEXILE    DEMENTS  305 

Q.  You  do  not  remember  your  name? 

^.  Ah!    to  be  sure the  name  of  course.     I  know  well,  only  at  times 

one  does  not  pay  attention.     I  was  born  at  Sucy. 

Q.  You  do  not  know  your  name? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  What  is  your  name? 

A.  Augustine. 

Q.  And  your  family  name? 

A.  My  family Oh,  that's  at  Sucy. 

Q.  But  your  family  name. 

A.  I  have  forgotten,  I  have  forgotten. 

We  have  never  encountered  a  more  complete  case  of  amnesia. 

Q.  What  is  your  age? 

A.  Ah!    monsieur  I  am  old.     I  cannot  always  remember. 

Q.  Is  it  morning  or  evening? 

A.  I  cannot  tell  you.     I  do  not  know,  I  do  not  know  if  it  is  morning  or 
evening.     I  do  not  know,  I  cannot  tell  you. 

Notice  the  tone,  the  gay  manner. 

Q.  What  is  a  fork? 

A.  Monsieur? 

Q.  What  is  a  fork? 

A.  What  is  a  fork.     Well  it  is no.     I  cannot  say  what  it  is A 

fork  is  a  fork so to  eat  with. 

Q.  What  is  a  table? 

A.  A  table?    Well  a  table,  it  is  to  be  useful  for Well  I  cannot  tell 

you  any  better. 

Q.  A  chair? 

A.  Well  a  chair,  it  is  useful  for well,  to  sit  down. 

Q.  A  horse? 

A.  Ah!    well,  faith,  a  horse,  to  work to  work.     And  then.     I  don't 

know  how  to  do  any  more. 

Q.  And  a  mama? 

A.  (She  laughs.)     Ah!    That,  she  does  all  sorts  of  things. 

Q.  What?    What's  that? 

A.  Yes,  it  is  a  marmot,  a  fichu,  it  is  all  sorts  of  things,  and  then  one 
puts 

Q.  Where  is  your  nose? 

A.   (First  she  laughs  because  she  seems  surprised  and  struck  with  the 
unusual  character  of  the  question.     This  proves  in  itself  that  tlie  judginciit 

is  good.)     Well,  here  it  is,  my  nose here  Monsieur,  it  is  here It  is 

large  but  here  it  is  all  the  same.     (And  as  wc  laugh  at  her  remark  she  adds) 
Faith,  you  make  me  say  silly  things! 

Q.  Now  you  are  going  to  repeat  some  figures  that  I  give  you. 

A.  Yes,  sir. 

Q.  2! 

A.  2  what? 

(J.  2! 

A.  2. 


306       THE  INTELLIGENCE  OF  THE  FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  4,  9! 

A.  (Silence.) 

Q.  4,  9! 

A.  4,  9! 

Q.  6,  1,  8! 

A.  How  is  that?    I  forget.     Ah!    when  one  is  old. 

Q.  3,  0,  7! 

A.  Oh!    well,  I  cannot  tell  you  that,  like  that. 

Q.  You  know.     2! 

A.  2! 

Q.  Wait! 

A.  Well,  I  do  not  know. 

Q.  3,  0,  8! 

Q.  Oh!    well,  there   is   too   much.     There  was  3  and  then Must  I 

say  that?  I  have  no  more  memory,  nothing  of  anything.  My,  but  it  is 
provoking! 

She  is  right,  her  memory  has  become  very  weak;  but  she  criticizes  her- 
self, she  accuses  her  age! 

Q.  What  is  this  house  here? 

A.  Yes,  monsieur. 

Q.  What  is  this  house  here? 

A.  Well,  what  do  you  want?  I  have  the  name,  but  I  have  forgotten. 
It  is  provoking,  the  least  thing. 

Q.  Is  it  a  castle? 

A.  Yes,  it  is  a  castle,  but  it  is  not  ours. 

Q.  Here,  is  it  a  prison? 

A.  Ah!    no,  it  is  not  a  prison. 

Q.  A  hospital? 

A.  Yes,  a  little  farther They  call  that (She  stops,  not  finding  the 

word).  What  do  you  wish  since  I  tell  you  I  do  not  know  anything  about 
anything. 

There  is  a  little  confusion  in  her  words  because  she  has  verbal  amnesia 
and  cannot  find  her  words  easily. 

Q.  What  is  this?     (Showing  a  key.) 

A.  A  key. 

Q.  And  that?     {"crayon" — a  pencil.) 

A.  (After  having  looked  closely.)     A  "cqrroy" No,  I  see  all  right 

what  it  is a  "crochon" No,  I  tell  you  I  am  stupid  as  anything. 

Q.  What  is  it? 

A.  I  see  a  pencil Ah!    what  do  you  want?     I  cannot  see  well. 

Q.  And  this?     (A  sou.) 

A.  Oh!  that,  well,  think,  that  is  a  2-sou  piece. 

She  has  the  same  trouble  with  the  colors;  she  names  correctly  yellow, 
blue,  and  green;  the  red  embarrasses  her. 

A.  That,  it  is  a It  is  a  thing How  now?    I  see,  I  know,  I  cannot 

say  it It  is  violet not  violet 1  cannot  say  it.     Oh  how  tiresome! 

It  is  garnet. 

Q.  How  many  children  have  you  had? 

A.  Yes. 


TWO    SENILE    DEMENTS  307 

Q.  How  many  children  have  you  had? 

A.  I  have  had  four. 

Q.  No  more? 

A.  Really,  I  don't  know  if  there  are  others.  Faith,  when  they're  all 
gone 1  don't  know. 

Q.  What  are  their  names? 

A.  My  boy,  he  is  the  oldest.     He  is  good  in  business,  but  the  others 

They  do  not  know.  (Sighing)  Ah!  mon  Dieu,  mon  Dieu,  I  am  half  dead. 
It  is  unfortunate  when  one  cannot  see!  (She  constantly  complains  of  her 
eyes.) 

A  moment  later  admitting  that  she  gets  confused  when  she  is 
told  to  count  thirteen  sous  she  makes  this  picturesque  reflection; 
"My  grandmother  used  to  say  to  me  when  you  are  old  you  will 
see — And  now  here  I  am."  We  pass  on  to  other  tests  which  we 
make,  in  order  to  get  her  level;  because  of  her  amnesia  we  can 
accomplish  nothing;  suffice  it  to  say  that  she  reaches  only  the 
level  of  intelligence  of  four  years. 

At  the  moment  of  parting  we  thought  of  a  little  by-play  which 
shows  very  well  that  this  old  woman  has  good  sense  and  can 
defend  herself  from  our  suggestions.  The  attendant  came  to 
bring  a  basket  of  apples  into  the  office;  the  apples  were  red  and 
had  an  appetizing  appearance.     We  said  to  Mme.  Langlais, 

Q.  Here  are  apples.     Take  one. 

A.  No.     I  don't  want  to. 

Q.  Oh!     yes,  take  one. 

A.  No,  they  are  not  mine.  So  people  can  say  that  I  took  the  apples. 
(With  energy)     When  I  eat  apples  it  is  because  I  buy  them. 

Q.  But  he  (pointing  to  the  other)  he  stole  the  apples. 

A.  Ah\    that,  that's  not  my  affair. 

Q.  Take  one! 

A.  There  is  no  danger.  I  do  not  want  to  take  other  people's.  If  any 
one  gives  them  to  me  I  will  take  them.  But  I  do  not  wish  to  take  tluin. 
There! 

This  was  the  first  skirmish  and  we  already  see  that  she  can  de- 
fend herself  against  temptation.  But  here  is  something  l)etter, 
the  scene  which  follows  indeed  astoni.shed  us.  We  were  not  pre- 
pared for  this  conduct  on  the  part  of  a  woman  whom  amnesia 
had  driv(!n  to  forgetting  her  own  name.  We  simulated  wishing 
to  borrow  money  from  her. 

Q.  (With  an  insinuating  tone)     I  need  some  money. 

A.   (Without  disturbing  herself,  remaining  seated)     Very  well,   every- 


308  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

body  needs  that.  But  you  understand  that  if  I  were  to  come  and  hunt  for 
twenty  sous,  somebody  would  have  to  give  it  to  me.     One  must  eat. 

This  is  the  nonsense  of  asphasia.     Let  us  continue. 

Q.  But  I  need  money. 

A.  Me  too— Faith! 

Q.  I  am  going  to  write  a  note  for  you  to  give  me  money. 

A.  No,  monsieur,  I  have  no  money  for  that. 

Q.  (Taking  a  pen)     I  am  going  to  write  a  note  for  you  to  give  me  money. 

A.  I  have  none;  I  cannot  give  you  any. 

Q.  One  always  has  money. 

A.  I  should  like  to  know,  I  who  am  all  alone. 

Q.   (Writing)     I  write,  Mme.  Langlais  will  give  me  ten  francs. 

A.  (Raising  her  voice)  No,  no,  no.  I  cannot  give  money  to  anybody. 
I  have  none.  Well,  my  husband  left  me  well  fixed.  No  I  won't  give  any 
of  it.     With  that  the  merchants  are  very  kind. 

Q.  (Showing  the  note)  Very  well  I  have  made  the  note  for  ten  francs. 
You  will  sign  it. 

A.  No,  no.  Monsieur,  I  have  none,  no  money. 

Q.  Come  on,  sign  this. 

A.  No,  no,  I  cannot!  I  have  no  money.  I  am  all  alone  (indignant). 
And  then,  I  must !  If  I  earn  twenty  sous  and  I  eat  at  the  same  time,  I 
would  have  nothing,  no,  I  cannot. 

Q.  See  here!    Madame  Langlais,  you  must  sign. 

A.  No,  I  cannot!  I  cannot  give  money  when  I  have  none.  (She  is 
angry,  she  wheels  in  her  chair  and  turns  her  back  to  us)  And  my  son,  he 
would  fix  me.  He  would  say  you  are  indeed  crazy!  I  have  not  worked 
all  winter. 

Q.  Give  me  ten  francs  because  I  want  to  buy  a  bicycle. 

A.  Well,  yes,  I  do  not  say  no,  but  I  have  no  money.  You  understand,  a 
woman  who  works.     If  I  had  I  might  say  I  have  some. 

Q.  1  need  it  for  a  wedding. 

A.  To  go  to  a  wedding!  You  have  more  than  I.  You  earn  more  than 
I.     I  cannot,  I  cannot.  ^ 

Q.  Have  you  much  of  a  fortune? 

A.   (Indignant)     I  have  the  money  that  I  earn. 

Q.  About  how  much  have  you? 

A.  I  don't  need  to  tell  you  what  I  have.  You  have  more  than  I.  You 
understand,  a  w^oman  of  my  age  cannot  have  much. 

Q.  But  you  have  a  house? 

A.  And  if  I  had  a  house  it  wouldn't  be  for  you! 

Q.  You  must  have  money  in  an  old  drawer. 

A.  And  if  I  had  I  wouldn't  give  it  to  you.  My  dear  friend,  if  you 
have  only  that — 

Q.  (Insinuatingly)  Shall  I  write  to  your  son  for  him  to  give  me  your 
money? 

A.  (Furious)     Well,  well,  well There  are  children If  there  is  a 

20-franc  piece,  and  he  were  to  give  it Money,  I  have  none  nor  my  son 

either. 


TWO    SENILE   DEMENTS  309 

Q.  I  assure  you  I  need  money  because  I  love  delicate  food. 
A.  Well,  we  eat  potatoes  with  oil  and  vinegar.     I  eat  that  and  it  is 
good.     Since  I  came  I  have  had  nothing  at  all. 

Q.   (Without  saying  a  word  we  hand  her  the  pen.) 
A.  No,  I  have  no  money  at  all. 

In  her  indignation  she  rises  and  walks  about  the  room  while  we 
both  remain  seated  at  the  table.  Her  countenance  is  animated. 
She  pronounces  her  words  indistinctly.  She  encounters  the  bas- 
ket of  apples,  she  takes  one  and  tries  to  break  it  while  saying  words 
like  this,  "No,  I  have  no  money  for  anyone."  We  offer  to  help 
her  cut  her  apple.  She  refuses.  "  A  woman  all  alone !"  she  scolds. 
"What  money  can  she  have!  a  woman  all  alone."  She  seats 
herself  apart  and  eats  her  apple  with  a  surly  air  all  the  time  re- 
peating the  same  words.  Time  passes;  already  ten  minutes  have 
elapsed  since  she  took  the  apple  but  her  anger  does  not  leave  her. 
That  demand  for  money  is  alwaj^s  on  her  heart.  She  talks  to  her- 
self about  it  constantly.  Finally  the  one  of  us  who  had  conducted 
the  dialogue  (Binet)  leaves  the  room  and  she  draws  close  to  Dr. 
Simon  and  says  to  him  under  her  breath,  "Who  is  that  man 
there?  I  cannot — I  have  only  just  enough  for  myself.  No  I 
will  not!  My  husband  would  scold  me.  I  don't  want  to  be  tor- 
mented like  that !     If  Louis  came  he  would  lead  me  such  a  life 

Why "     Her  grudge  is  so  strong  that  when  B returns  to 

the  room  the  dement  refuses  to  speak  to  him;  we  insist  upon  photo- 
graphing her.  She  refuses  obstinately.  She  continues  to  dig  in 
the  basket  for  apples  and  to  crunch  them.  We  wish  to  call  licr 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  apples  do  not  belong  to  her. 

Q.  Where  did  you  buy  that  apple?  "^V..^, 

A.  It  was  given  to  me. 

Q.  Who  gave  you  that  apple? 

A.  That  is  not  your  afTair. 

Q.  See  here,  where  did  you  get  that  apple? 

A.  There  are  more  in  the  field. 

Q.  Hut  you  did  not  go  into  the  field  to  get  it? 

A.  That  is  nothing  to  you.     It  came  from  the  field. 

Q.  Did  you  steal  it? 

A.  That's  none  of  your  affair.  Why  no.  Why  do  you  come  asking  inr 
that?  I  ask  you  a  little- — There,  who  is  going  to  ask  me?  (Slio  (.ikcH 
another  apple.) 

Q.  Apples  cost  four  sous. 

A.  That's  none  of  vour  afTairs. 


310  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

Q.  It  is  worth  four  sous. 
A.  It  isn't  yours. 

Impossible  to  talk  any  more  with  her,  she  has  become  intract- 
able; we  are  obliged  to  let  her  go.  An  attendant  comes  and  gets 
her  and  takes  her  to  the  hall. 

This  curious  scene  lasts  for  nearly  three-quarters  of  an  hour. 
There  was  not  a  moment  of  forgetfulness.  The  patient  never 
for  an  instant  forgot  that  her  money  was  wanted;  her  anger  in- 
creased steadily  in  a  sort  of  classical  manner  first  restrained  by  a 
feeling  of  propriety  then  overflowing,  allowing  such  remarks  as 
"That's  none  of  your  affairs"  and  ending  in  a  calmer  state  of  per- 
sistent rancor  against  the  one  who  attempted  to  take  her  money. 
It  is  really  interesting  to  see  such  a  continuity  of  thought  in  a 
patient  suffering  from  profound  amnesia. 

2.  Comparison  between  senile  dementia  and  paralytic 
DEMENTIA.  It  remains  for  us  to  draw  from  these  two  observations 
of  senile  dementia  a  conclusion  relative  to  the  theory  of  dementia 
in  general. 

Senile  dementia  has  been  judged  from  very  different  points  of 
view.  In  the  first  place  one  has  been  so  deceived  by  the  inco- 
herence of  their  words  that  it  has  been  supposed  that  they  had 
incoherence  of  ideas,  or  delirium;  let  us  recall  in  this  connection 
the  contradictory  replies  which  the  old  women  gave  of  the  age  of 
their  mothers  and  the  number  of  their  children.  A  more  exact 
interpretation  has  shown  that  in  this  case  the  incoherence  is 
more  apparent  than  real;  it  indicates  disturbance  of  language, 
the  unconscious  use  of  inexact  words  and  this  paraphrasing  is 
only  one  of  the  many  manifestations  of  a  more  considerable 
disturbance  of  memory.  Senile  dements  present-in  rea:lrty  the 
characteristic  trait  of  having  become  incapable  of  remembering; 
tlie;j^aveJogLtb£Jaculty.x:)f--evocation  and  of  fixation,  so  far  as  it 
can  be  lost.  For  proof  of  this  we  need  nothing  more  than  the 
game  with  the  cards  described  above  which,  indeed,  gives  positive 
results  only  with  patients  of  this  category. 

If  senile  dements  are  especially  affected  in  the  evocation  of  their 
memories,  is  it  right  to  say  that  we  should  compare  them  to  general 
paralytics,  since  we  have  admitted  that  with  the  latter  the  impo- 
tence of  evocation  gives  the  key  to  all  or  nearly  all  of  their  dis- 
turbances of  functioning?     No,  this  comparison  would  not  be  cor- 


SENILE    VS.    PARALYTIC   DEMENTIA  311 

rect,  because  when  one  talks  with  senile  detaonte  one  notes  this 
extremel}^  important  fact  that  they  have-good  sense -aia4-ar€  con- 
scious t)f  their  sorry  state  of  decHypwM^^h-cojitrastSL.cleaiiy  with 
the-ttBConsciausness  which  marks' most  gen©F«:l  par-alytics.  ]\Iore- 
over,  for  a  long  time  it  has  been  acknowledged  that  tlie_di£fereiLCg 
between-thetwo^  foHifts-^demeniia^lies.in  the  fact  that  in  senile 
dementia  the  judgment  is -better-  preserved  than  in  paralytic 
dementia. 

We  admit  this  point  of  view  without  hesitation,  but  we  believe 
it  important  to  emphasize  the  psychological  consequences  which 
proceed  from  this  because  these  consequences  so  far  have  not 
been  pointed  out.  If  it  is  true,  as  we  believe,  that  senile  de- 
ments are  not  lacking  in  good  sense  or  in  judgment,  this  makes 
the  mental  nature  of  judgment  appear  in  a  new  light. 

Our  classical  theories,  which  constantly  put  the  accent  on  the 
clearest  and  most  conscious  part  of  the  mental  processes,  the 
idea,  which  admit  that  the  intelligence  is  a  combination  of  ideas, 
and  that  the  law  of  the  intelligence  is  a  logical  law,  these  theo- 
ries, we  say,  consider  the  judgment  also  as  an  ideational  manifes- 
tation, as  an  act  which  consists  in  grasping  the  relation  of  two 
ideas,  in  uniting  them,  or  in  opposing  them.  If  it  were  really 
so,  the  facts  of  pathological  observation  which  we  have  just  re- 
ported could  not  be  understood.  One  who  was  incapable  of  hav- 
ing ideas  would  be  incapable  of  judging;  and  our  two  poor  old 
women  who  are  able  to  recall  almost  nothing  in  the  form  of  words 
or  images  could  neither  judge  nor  appreciate.  How  would  Mme. 
Macolard  ever  have  come  to  judge  the  laughter  of  the  imbecile 
Denise  as  childish  and  unmannerly  if  it  had  been  necessary  for 
her  to  represent  to  herself  under  the  form  of  ideas  the  attitude  of 
good  manners? 

We  much  more  readily  believe  that  the  act  of  judging  consists 
essentially  in  an  emotive  and  motor  tendency  to  approve  and  to 
disapprove;  this  tendency  may  indeed  manifest  itself  by  ideas 
which  are  the  motifs  of  judgment;  Init  often  the  ideas  do  not 
form  themselves  dearly  after  the  judgment  is  i)ronounce(l,  and 
often  they  are  so  slow  in  forming  themsclve.s  that  they  never  ap- 
pear; one  judges  without  m<^tif,  without  justification,  without 
ideas,  but  nevertheless,  one  judges.  Al  llic  moment  of  jud  ing 
one  is  animated  by  a  certain  feeling  wliicli  draws  one  towards 
or  turns  one  from  the  object  judged.     It  is  this  feeling  which  is 


312  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 

the  foundation  of  the  matter.  The  painter,  to  whom  one  submits 
a  canvas,  says,  "That  is  no  good,"  but  he  can  not  always  express 
clearly  what  is  "no  good;"  he  has  the  feeling,  and  this  feehng 
is  often  as  strong,  as  imperious,  as  irresistible  as  the  most  clearly 
deduced  reasoning.  In  the  same  way  one  may  have  the  feeling 
that  an  action  is  impossible,  or  that  a  certain  course  is  unreason- 
able, or  that  a  certain  expression  is  immoral,  and  one  disap- 
proves because  he  is  animated  by  a  certain  feeling  of  disappro- 
bation without  having  a  single  clear  idea,  without  attempting  to 
give  any  justification,  without  referring  to  a  norm  of  things  pos- 
sible, reasonable  or  moral. 

We  might  even  go  farther.  One  could  insist  that  there  are 
certain  acts  of  judgment,  that  are  performed  only  by  ideas,  which 
are  the  simulations  of  judgment  rather  than  real  judgments.  One 
submits  an  action  to  a  person  for  his  judgment;  if  that  person 
possesses  the  instinctive  part  of  judgment  he  will  exclaim,  "But 
that  is  crazy,  that  is  idiotic,  etc."  Exactly  as  another  to  whom 
we  present  a  foreign  food  after  having  put  it  in  his  mouth  ex- 
claims, "That  nauseates  me."  On  the  contrary,  one  who  has  not 
this  instinctive  reaction  is  obliged  to  compare  the  act  submitted 
to  him  with  the  memory  of  other  similar  acts  and  to  recall  to  him- 
self if  in  analogous  circumstances  the  action  has  been  generally 
disapproved,  has  appeared  ridiculous  or  imprudent;  thus  he  makes 
a  comparison,  an  appreciation  by  means  of  a  norm  which  is  fur- 
nished to  him  by  his  experience.  This  diverted  process  is,  we  be- 
lieve, the  rock  of  salvation  for  those  who  have  no  judgment  and 
who  endeavor,  nevertheless,  not  to  be  deceived.  This  certainly 
is  not  to  say  that  the  judgment  by  ideas  is  always  false  or  bad,  but 
in  itself  it  is  rather  empty  and  very  subject  to  errors  in  the  same 
way  that  judgment  by  instinct  is  very  narrow;  the  true  judgment 
is  a  synthesis  which  includes  at  the  same  time  both  feeling  and 
idea. 

Let  us  conclude  by  a  little  psychological  experiment  which 
throws  a  clear  light  upon  the  important  role  of  feeling  in  judg- 
ment. Suppose  that  some  one  writes  before  us  a  list  of  one  hun- 
dred common  words,  like  duck,  hat,  meadow,  etc.;  we  have  read 
them  over  so  as  to  practically  know  them.  Now  the  list  is  hid- 
den; we  are  given  a  word  at  random,  and  we  must  reply  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  is  in  the  list.  The  necessary  time  for  judging 
varies  a  little,  according  to  the  case,  according  to  the  word,  accord- 


SENILE    VS.    PARALYTIC    DEMENTIA  313 

ing  to  the  persons  who  serve  as  subjects  and  a  host  of  other  cir- 
cumstances impossible  to  evaluate;  but  on  the  average  the  time  is 
very  short.  Two  or  three  seconds  suffice  to  decide  whether  the 
word  is  new  or  known.  Now  two  or  three  seconds  is  not  sufficient 
to  recapitulate,  even  mentally,  the  list  of  one  hundred  words  and, 
moreover,  the  testimony  of  the  subjects  is  that  they  never  make 
the  mental  recapitulation;  they  do  not  make  it  because  they  do  not 
feel  the  need  of  it.  One  passes  judgment  upon  the  word  whether 
it  is  new  or  known  according  to  a  particular  feeling  which  is 
awakened  by  the  audition,  a  feeling  of  novelty,  of  surprise  if  it  is 
unknown;  a  feeling  of  having  been  already  seen,  of  familiarity,  in 
the  contrary  case.  Here  then  is  a  case  of  an  act  of  judgment, 
very  clear,  very  easy  to  analyse,  which  would  require,  if  one  con- 
formed to  the  rules  of  logic,  a  detailed  comparison  with  images  or 
perceptions,  but  which  in  reality  disregards  all  this,  is  nothing 
less  than  intellectual,  and  is  produced  bj--  the  wholly  instinctive 
operation  of  feeling. 

This  is  the  point  to  which  reflection  upon  the  results  of  our  ex- 
perimental psychology  leads  us.  These  results  are  confirmed  by 
the  results  of  pathological  psycholog5\  We  have  just  seen  two 
old  women  who  have  a  remarkable  povertj^  of  ideas  and  who  often 
show  a  positive  inability  for  evoking  the  proper  idea;  in  spite  of 
this  they  judge  and  they  judge  exceedingly  well.  By  their  atti- 
tudes they  show  that  the}^  have  preserved  their  feeling  of  pro- 
priety; by  the  way  in  which  the}^  refuse  to  reply  haphazard  to 
what  they  do  not  know  thej^  prove  that  they  have  the  feeling  of 
true  and  false;  certain  ones  have  also  in  the  most  touching  manner 
the  painful  feeling  of  their  own  decay  and  are  sorrowful  over  the 
effects  of  old  age;  often  they  have  also  the  consciousness  of  being 
in  a  hospital.  We  have  seen  in  Mmc.  Macolard  the  feoHiig  of 
disapprobation  for  the  puerile  laughter  of  an  im])eci!e.  Kvcu  at 
our  own  expense  we  have  learned  how  much  Mme.  Langlais 
judges  the  danger  of  putting  her  signature  to  a  note,  because  she 
never  pardoned  the  proposition  which  we  made  to  iier  of  bor- 
rowing ten  francs. 

All  these  judgments  arc  the  indications  of  a  character  whicli  in 
spite  of  amnesia  is  not  yet  disorganized;  thus  in  tlie  presence  of  a 
senile  dement  one  has  the  clear  impression  that  there  is  before 
him  a  personality  that  holds  itself  together  and  not  one  that  is 
amorphous. 


314  THE   INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 

In  terminating  this  point  let  us  harmonize  these  conclusions  with 
those  acquired  from  another  study  which  we  made  upon  the 
relation  of  speech  and  thought.     We  have  seen  that  there  are 
thoughts  without  images  even  among  normal  adults  who  are  in 
full  possession  of  themselves,  because  it  was  among  them  that  we 
-.V     made  this  unexpected  observation,  they  are  able  to  have  an  image 
^"      and  to  think  far  beyond  this  image,  to  think  things  very  much 
!^       more  complicated  which  the  images  can  not  represent. ^^ 
^  .      We  have  further  seen  that  there  are  some  thoughts  without 
^    *'  words ;  we  have  found  the  proof  of  this  among  imbeciles  and  cases 
I       of  aphasia. ^^    What  remains  of  a  thought  from  which  its  two 
principal  elements  consciousness  and  analysis  have  been  removed? 
We  have  shown  that  there  remains  a  particular  tendency,  which 
A  manifests  itself  under  the  form  of  an  indefinable  feeling.     One  has 
the  feeling  of  an  intention.     We  now  extend  this  theory  to  judg- 
"SJ  ment  and  it  certainly  does  not  require  a  great  effort  of  the  imagi- 
nation to  make  such  an  extension  because  to  think  is  to  judge, 
and  what  is  true  of  thought  in  general  must  be  equally  true  of 
judgment.     In  every  thought  there  is  an  appreciation  and  this 
appreciation  is  a  judgment.     We  have  besides  direct  proof  that 
this  theory  is  true  of  judgment,  because  we  have  just  seen  that 
patients  afflicted  with  amnesia,  incapable  of  recalling  the  vast 
majority  of  their  memories,  can  nevertheless  continue  to  judge 
correctly.     They  have  had  the  experience  and  they  xgtain^good 
sense_and  a  critical  mind,  even  though  they  can  no  longer  evoke 
the  precise  memories  of  their  experiences  nor  cite  the  least  fact; 
in  the  place  of  precise  memories  they  have  the  feeling  of  things, 
and  that  suffices;  it  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  it  permits  them  to 
make  a  judgment. 

According  to  our  hypothesis  the  feeling  presents  itself  in  Vdefi- 
nite  relation  to  the^ij^fi^^.  Ide^^nd  feeling  make  one;  they  arfi 
two  successive  stages  of  the  same  process;  that  which  is  idea  was 

"Thus  a  persons  who  thinks,  "I  shall  leave  tomorrow,"  may  indeed 
have  images  of  the  train,  the  trunks,  the  country  he  is  leaving,  the  friends 
who  expect  him,  and  of  all  sorts  of  other  details;  but  these  are  only  details, 
and  the  essential  idea,  "I  shall  leave  tomorrow,"  does  not  and  can  not 
figure  in  these  images. 

"  Let  us  recall  the  observation  of  that  aphasic  patient  who  when  asked 
a  thing  too  difficult  for  him  replied  in  an  energetic,  slow  tone,  "Ca,  non" 
that  is  to  say,  "I  can  not  do  that;"  he  had  then  a  thought  without  adequate 
words,  and  consequently  some  part  of  the  thought  without  any  words. 


SENILE    VS.    PARALYTIC    DEMENTIA  315 

alrfoet-a  feeling^  and  the  feeling  in  evolving  and  rendering  itself 
precise  becomes  at  the  same  time  idea,  word,  action;  the  feeling 
is  th©  obscure,  heated  stage ;  when  it  clears  it  becomes  more  com- 
prehensible and  rational,  it  produces  ideas.  In  senile  dementia 
it  is  the  last  part,  the  flower  of  the  process  as  it  were,  the  idea 
that  is  struck  and  withers;  but  the  instinctive  part  remains  vivid; 
and  it  is  thus  that  senile  dements  are  reduced  to  an  instinctive 
existence  consequently  very  low,  very  animal,  but  still  coordinate. 
Let  us  recall  in  this  relation  our  scheme  of  thought  which  con- 
sists in  a  triple  phenomenon  of  direction,  adaptation  and  control. 
It  now  appears  to  us  that  it  is  not  only  the  control  which  can 
occur  under  the  form  of  feeling,  but  also  the  direction,  since  senile 
dements  in  spite  of  their  amnesia  know  how  to  keep  a  given  direc- 
tion and  a  prolonged  attitude.  Moreover,  we  can  no  longer  be 
content  with  the  conclusion  that  in  senile  dementia  there  is  a  con- 
servation of  the  judgment;  we  go  farther  even  to  the  much  more 
interesting  and  more  profound  conclusion  that  senile  dementia 
tends  toward  a  destruction  of  the  ideational  life  with  conserva- 
tion of  the  instinctive  part  of  the  thought. 

Certainly  this  word  instinct  is  one  which  has  been  most  seriously 
and  most  dangerously  abused;  and  perhaps  one  would  not  find  two 
psychologists  or  two  naturalists  who  would  give  the  same  defini- 
tion of  instinct.  It  is  therefore  perhaps  dangerous  to  introduce 
this  word  of  equivocal  meaning  into  a  new  analysis  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  intelligence.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  all  these  objec- 
tions, in  terminating  this  study  of  senile  dementia  we  have  de- 
cided to  present  a  proposition  relative  to  the  distinction  to  be 
established  between  ideational  intelligence,  which  as  its  name  indi- 
cates operates  by  means  of  ideas  and  of  words,  and  instinctive 
intelligence;  the  latter  evidently  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
certain  characteristics  which  rightly  or  wrongly  arc  attributed 
to  the  instinct  of  animals,  when  one  wishes,  chiefly  for  theoretical 
reasons,  to  make  a  distinction  between  instinct  and  reason;  we 
do  not  in  the  least  attribute  to  that  which  we  call  "instinctive 
intelligence"  the  (luulities  of  innatcness,  infallil)ihty,  specific- 
ness,  imperfectiljility,  necessity.  A  single  character,  a  character 
wholly  negative,  without  doubt  the  most  important  character  of 
instinct,  is  found  in  ilic  instinctive  manifestation  of  tlx'  intelli- 
gence; that  is,  it  is  the  lack  of  an  exact  image  picturing  the  end 
to  be  attained  and  the  means  to  be  employed,  which  wouUI  give 


316  THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF   THE   FEEBLE-MINDED 

to  all  this  a  clear  awareness.  There  is  here  the  lack  of  a  logical 
perception,  of  a  verbal  reasoning,  which  would  permit  of  explain- 
ing and  of  demonstrating  a  succession  of  truths;  it  is,  in  a  word, 
in  the  realm  of  the  unknown  and  the  mysterious,  surrounding 
actions  which  are  none  the  less  adapted  and  intelligent  in  their 
effects. 

Let  us  go  back  and  compare  our  two  senile  dements  with  our 
general  paralytics.  It  has  long  been  said  that  judgment  remains 
in  senile  dementia  but  is  lost  in  paralytic  dementia.  This  truth 
is  open  to  criticism  when  affirmed  in  such  absolute  terms;  be- 
cause it  is  possible  to  find  some  traces  of  judgment  among  general 
paralytics  who  are  at  the  beginning  of  their  malady;  there  are 
others,  quite  advanced  in  certain  symptoms,  who  still  retain  a 
certain  amount  of  good  sense.  We  have  drawn  at  some  length 
the  portrait  of  Mme.  Solas,  a  paralytic  who  passed  judgment 
upon  herself  and  found  herself  very  stupid.  One  could  not  have 
said  of  her  that  paralytic  dementia  always  destroys  the  judgment. 
To  avoid  these  contradictions  one  must  take  into  account  the 
fundamental  idea  of  level.  Without  doubt  at  a  given  level  the 
general  paralytic  has  infinitely  less  judgment  than  the  senile  de- 
ment. Mme.  Langlais  has  an  intelligence  of  scarcely  four  years; 
the  paralytics  of  seven  or  eight  years  judge  much  less  correctly 
than  she  and  have  consequently  very  much  less  common  sense. 

Here  is  an  incident  in  proof  of  this.  Some  pages  back  we  spoke 
of  the  anger  of  Mme.  Langlais  whom  we  requested  to  sign  a  note 
for  ten  francs.  It  is  well  known  that  paralytics  on  the  contrary 
are  very  generous  and  would  give  away  millions  when  delirious. 
But  even  apart  from  all  delirium  one  very  easily  obtains  from 
many  of  them  gifts  by  writing.  When  Mme.  Langlais  left  us  we 
had  the  curiosity  to  call  into  the  office  a  general  paralytic  whom 
we  knew  very  well,  a  woman  named  Bernard,  and  to  demand 
money  of  her  in  a  similar  manner.  The  reception  was  altogether 
different. 

This  woman  has  a  level  of  seven  years. 

Q.   (Writing)     Mme.  Bernard,  have  you  a  little  money? 

A.  None. 

Q.  But  one  always  has  a  little  money. 

A.  I  had  some  money  once. 

Q.  You  see,  I  need  some  money. 

^.  Ah!    ah!    ah!    I  also  need  some,  and  I  shall  have  some  money. 


SENILE    VS.    PARALYTIC    DEMENTIA  317 

Q.  How  much  have  you? 

A.  A  good  deal  of  money. 

Q.  A  million? 

A.  Oh!  no.  more  than  that;  not  a  million,  no,  no. 

Not  very  clear;  her  replies  seem  contradictory. 

Q.  I  need  some  mone}'.     I  wish  you  would  sign  a  note  for  me. 

A.  (By  no  means  offended)     Ah!     Yes,  a  note. 

Q.   (Writing)     Your  name  is  Mme.  Bernard? 

A.  That  was  mj-  maiden  name. 

Q.  And  your  married  name? 

A.  Mme.  Dubos. 

Q.  Now  you  are  going  to  sign  this?  'Slme.  Bernard  will  give  100  francs 
to  M.  Francois. 

A.  Ah!     j-es.     (She  laughs  and  signs.) 

Q.  So  vou  will  give  me  100  francs? 

.4.  (Without  the  least  concern)  I  have  800  francs  I  can  get,  20  francs, 
one  glass. 

Thus  it  is  extremely  easy  to  obtain  the  signature  of  Mme. 
Bernard.  To  make  her  hiugh  a  little  and  terminate  the  scene 
we  risk  a  pleasantly,  but  she  does  not  understand  it. 

Q.  In  order  that  your  debt  may  be  altogether  serious,  I  am  going  to 
make  you  swear  upon  the  tail  of  a  cow. 

A.  (Seriously)     Ah!     there  are  cows  at  Partenaj\     (Her  native  city.) 

This  has  only  the  value  of  an  anecdote.  We  cite  it  merel^yto 
establish  a  striking  contrast  from  the  point  of  view  of  feeling  be- 
tween the  woman  Langlais,  the  .senile  dement  who  has  a  level  of 
four  years,  and  the  woman  Bernard,  paralytic  dement  who  has  a 
level  of  seven  j-ears.  While  the  former  so  easily  evokes  feelings 
which  prevent  her  from  loaning  the  money,  the  latter  evokes 
nothing,  lets  things  go,  remains  indifferent.  This  state  of  iiKhlTcr- 
ef*er-hy  the  way  is  vPXi'Xcmarkable  with  general  paralytics;  and 
we  suppose  that  their  indifference  nuist  be  attributed  to  troubles  of 
functioning.  1licv  still  ix)ssess  the  necessary  feeling  but  they 
caimot  ev(jke  it,  tiieii-  difficulties  of  evocation  bear  liierefore  at 
the  same  time  upon  their  feelings  and  upon  their  ideas. 

But  in  Older  for  this  thesis  to  be  (|uite  clear  it  iiiust  be  liriiilcij 
and  defined  by  acvernl  icniarks.  It  does  not  seem  lliat  general 
piH'atyTics  have  wholly  lost  the  faculty  of  bcMug  emotionally 
arorn^ed.  Sucli  an  :iffinii;it  ion  would  ix-  opposed  to  every  d;iv  ob- 
.scrvation.  Tiny  are  patients  that  under  many  circumstances 
show  themselves  ve?y  emotif)nal.      It   is  e.asy  to  anger  lliein.  easy 


318 


THE    INTELLIGENCE    OF    THE    FEEBLE-MINDED 


to  make  them  weep.  We  recall  a  woman  with  the  level  of  nine 
years  to  whom  we  said,  by  way  of  exjjeriment,  that  they  never 
gave  the  patients  anything  to  eat  at  the  hospital  which  she  had 
just  entered.  Immediately  she  burst  into  tears  like  a  child.  It 
proved  to  be  also  the  grief  of  a  child  which  did  not  last  long  and 
which  was  easily  consoled.     Inside  of  three  minutes  we  took  th^ 


FIG.  24.  MME.  POIRE;  GENERAL  PARALYTIC;  INTELLECTUAL  LEVEL  OF 
NINE  YEARS.  WE  HAVE  JUST  ANNOUNCED  TO  HER  THAT  AT  THE  HOSPITAL 
THEY  NEVER  EAT.    THE  PATIENT  AT  THIS  NEWS  BEGINS  TO  CRY. 

two  photographs  with  contrary  expressions.  Th£-_£motions  of 
these  patients  seem  to  us  to  lack  continuity;  they  can  be  int-ense 
but  they  do  not  last  long.  Moreover  they  are  incongruous  and 
are  often  followed  by  states  which  are  quite  incompatible  with 
them.  We  have  seen  an  example  of  this  in  Kamonot,  who  said 
to  us  all  in  the  same  minute  when  we  were  conjecturing  a  cer- 
tain event,  sad  for  her,  "I  would  weep,"  then  "I  would  laugh." 
In  a  word  it  is-Oiilj^-the-simplest,  the  most-nrdiTfientary  feelings 


SENILE    VS.    PARALYTIC    DEMENTIA 


319 


which  manifest  themselves  among  general  paralytics.  There  is  a 
complete  hierarchy  in  the  emotional  life.  The  so-called  intellec- 
tual sentiments,  those  which  form  the  substance  of  judgment, 
occupy  the  most  elevated  part  of  the  scale;  feelings  of  piojiriety, 
truth,  probability,  justice,  are  among  those  which  are  lost  in  the 
general^ paralytic.     Thus  the  paraljtic  appears  to  us  like  a  being 


FIG.  25.     TWO  .MINU'JKS  I..\Ii;i;   \\i;  AS.-^l   l!l'    MMi;.    I'ollil';    THAI 
JOKE;  SHE  AT  ONCE  KESl'.MKS  HKK  S.MILE  OF  SATISFACTION. 


ir  WAS  .\ 


whose  personality  is  i)rofoiui(lly  disluibcd;  if  one  compares  a 
paralytic  with  a  senile  demciil .  both  having  tlic  level  of  lour  ye:ii>, 
one  has  the  impression  thai  in  llie  case  of  the  senile  dement  he 
is  in  the  pj-esence  of  somebody  while  with  t  he  |);ii;dyl  ic  llieie  is  no 
longer  anyljody. 


CONCLUSION 

As  much  to  close  this  study  as  to  begin  others,  we  terminate 
by  summing  up  whatever  our  experiments  and  reflections  have 
taught  us  as  essential  in  the  psychology  of  senile  and  paralj'tic 
dementia.     It  will  mark  a  stage  of  the  journey  for  later  works. 

These  tw^o  forms  of  dementia  correspond  to  a  lowering  of  intel- 
ligence which  is  measurable,  as  we  have  seen;  from  this  comes  the 
practical  conclusion  that  demente  are  unable  to  adapt  themselves 
any^longer  to  the  ordinary  condition  of  life  and  have  need  of  the 
simpler  life  of  the  hospital.  There  is  here,  of  course,  a  common- 
place phenomenon  which  is  to  be  found  in  a  great  number  of 
forms  of  insanity  and  can  characterise  none,  because  it  is  almost 
an  absolute  rule  that  the  insane  undergo  a  lowering  of  level. 

Second,  traits  more  important  than  the  preceding,  senile  and 
paralytic  dementia  belong  to  the  category  of  deficient  mental 
states;  let  us  understand  by  that  that  these  mental  states  sepa- 
raifi-themselves-  from  the  normal  not  Ijy  the  addition  of  certain 
positive  symptoms,  which  would  constitute  originality,  but  rather 
b^the-alisence,  the  gap,  the  weakness  of  certain  integral  parts  <)f 
the  normal  mechanism.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  insanities 
resemble  the  original  states  of  idiocy,  imbecility  and  moronity, 
which  constitute  also  the  states  frankly  defective. 

Only,  that  which  is  a  loss  among  dements  is  a  lack  of  acquisi- 
tion-amoBg-^lefectiyes.  The  difference  between  the  one  and  the 
other  is  that  the  one  is  inertia  of  functioning  and  the  other  an  in- 
sufficiency of  development;  this  was  already  known  or  at  least 
suspected;  our  work  has  especially  consisted  in  putting  precision 
into  the  statement  and  in  filling  out  formulas  that  were  rather 
empty.  We  know  now  that  the  inertia  of  functioning  consists  in  a 
weakness  of  the  evocation  of  the  states  of  consciousness  and  that 
the  lack  of  development  is  manifested  in  the  quality  of  the  states  of 
consciousness  which  are  not  sufficiently  differentiated.  These 
few  words  sum  up  a  considerable  experience  to  which  one  must 

320 


CONCLUSION  321 

return  in  order  to  appreciate  its  value  and  which  can  serve  the 
clinician  for  the  diagnosis  of  embarrassing  cases.^° 

Here  then  is  what  we  have  learned  about  the  intimate  nature  of 
dementia;  we  know  how  to  distinguish  it  from  original  defective- 
ness; we  do  not  distinguish  it  by  means  of  incidents  but  by  its 
characteristic  form.  It  remains  now  to  complete  the  comparison 
of  dementia  with  other  insane  states.  This  comparison,  if  we 
sometime  have  the  time  and  the  means  to  pursue  it,  will  permit 
us  better  to  understand  dementia,  because  by  multiplying  the 
points  of  comparison  we  make  the  study  more  profound.  It  will 
permit  us  especially  to  prolong  our  analysis  of  alienation.  Since 
the  study  of  imbeciles  has  enabled  us  to  know  dements,  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  study  of  dements,  in  their  turn,  will  enable  us  to 
comprehend  confusional  states  and  delirium.  In  a  well  ordered 
sequence  of  works  the  results  acquired  facilitate  the  subsequent 
conquests,  just  as  a  stone  placed  in  an  edifice  serves  as  a  base  for 
new  stones. 

Alfred  Binet  and  Th.  Simon. 

"  It  will  be  noted  that  we  seem  in  all  our  study  to  have  considered  the 
weakness  of  evocation  as  a  most  important  fact;  it  is  a  most  important 
fact  for  the  present  article  in  which  we  are  obliged  to  limit  ourselves;  but 
we  are  far  from  thinking  that  this  should  be  a  most  important  fact  for 
psychological  explanations,  and  especially  for  physiological  explanations. 
Only  there  should  be  an  agreement  as  to  the  value  and  the  import  of  cer- 
tain physiological  explanations.  Since  Mathias  Duval,  some  neurologists, 
some  alienists  have  believed  that  they  could  explain  a  host  of  psychic 
phenomena,  anaesthesia,  amnesia,  delirium,  by  supposing  that  these 
phenomena  were  due  to  the  fact  that  some  cerebral  neurones  had  been 
severed  from  their  communications.  These  are  surely  suppositions  too 
convenient;  they  explain  everything  and  consequently  explain  nothing. 
We  refu.se  to  explain  in  this  manner  the  failure  of  evocation  met  with  in 
dements.  For  the  same  reason  we  shall  not  state  the  very  vague  ideas 
that  have  been  expressed  on  psychological  phenomena  considered  as 
forces,  which  have  been  ingeniously  described  as  a  nerve  force,  a  tension, 
a  flow,  a  latent  energy,  comparing  them  to  the  physical  force  engendered  by 
a  reservoir  full  of  water.  It  would  be  easy  to  apply  these  notions  to  the 
mental  state  of  dements,  and  to  say  tliat  their  psychic  processes  arc  lark- 
ing in  nerve  force  or  in  tension.  But  what  is  the  use?  Without  ccjiijectur- 
ing  what  the  future  may  teach  ua  about  cerebral  dynamics,  wc  can  say 
that  for  the  present  these  are  only  metaphors. 


INDEX 


Acquisitions,     distinction     be- 
tween the  faculties  and  the.  130 

Adaptation 137 

power  of  vs.  faculty  of 85 

Addition  executed  by  Philippon  242 

Adjustment,  tests  of 103 

Alalia 173 

Albert,  the  definitions  of 98 

imbecile 23,74 

reaction  time  of 34 

with  the  general Ill 

writing  of 49 

Algebra,  to  solve  a  problem  in.  139 

America 151 

Amiability 24 

Animal  memory 88 

Animals  and  number 87 

react  to  pain 59 

understand  gesture 183 

Aphasia 162 

an  acquired 178 

and  poverty  of  language 188 

congenital  motor 179 

Aphasic 189 

Arithmetic,  patients  are  weak  in  283 

Arithmetical  faculty 86 

two  operations 87 

Arsenal,  equipped 132 

Articulation 171 

movements  necessary  for 183 

of  words 186 

Assent  without  motive 106 

Association  of  ideas 64 

Attention 141 

depth  of 43 

forced,  value  of 42 

its  concentration 26 

means  of  reinforcing 28 

mono-idci.sm 151 

tests  of 32 

tests  of  effort  of 43 

the  four  dcKrens 30 

without  coordination  there  is 
no 137 


Attitude,  difference  of 113 

Atomism,  theory  of  psychic. . .  137 

Auto-censure 146 

Automatism 129 

Autopsies 179 

Beauchamp,     measurement    of 

the  level  of 225 

Beauvisage,  imbecile 17,  37 

Box,  the  refilling  of  a 106 

Brain  of  the  idiot  diseased 58 

Cabussel 145 

discovering  slight  differences .  55 

head  measurements 38 

imbecile 79 

reaction  time 34 

Center  "O" 129 

Cephalometry 38 

Chair  is  called  a  cork  screw —  107 

Children  and  animals 177 

Choice 138 

Colors,  naming  of  by  a  general 

paralytic 237 

Comparison,  necessity  of  mak- 


mg  a. 


136 

Comprehension  of  words 186 

surpasses  execution 178 

Concrete,  value  of  the 94 

Confession,  Albert's 116 

Consciousness,  a  directing  state 

of 135 

Control,  effect  of  the 147 

Coordination,  a  lack  of 130 

Correction,  the 116 

Counts  backwards,  Philippon..  251 

Counting 89 

Cretin,  imbecile 15 

Critical  scn.se 146 

Critics  of  tomorrow 10 

Darwin 57 

Deafness,  congenital  word 179 


323 


324 


INDEX 


Defective,  a  normal  who  lacks 

something 128 

difference  between  the,    and 
the  normal  not  the  absence 
of  a  particular  faculty. .  .  .   133 
Defectives,   age  of  the  intelli- 
gence of 9 

like  young  normal  children .  .     96 

Deference 112 

Definitions  superior  to  use 97 

Degenerates 148 

Dement  distinguished  from  the 

mental  defective 273 

Dementis,  comparison  between 

senile  and  paralytic 310 

criticism  of  definitions  of . . . .  219 

global 294 

intellectual  level  in 222 

not  characterized  by  a  lower- 
ing of  level 295 

patients  obey 107 

Denise 164 

handwriting  of 46 

imbecile 21 

language  of 212 

Description  higher  than  enum- 
eration      97 

Development,  insufficiency  of. .  289 

Diderot 147 

Difference,  slightest  perceptible     53 

Differences,  perception  of 51 

Differentiation,  lack  of 144 

Direction,  power  of 137 

weak  among  imbeciles 136 

Dissociation,  Denise  a  case  of. .   177 

Distraction 28 

Docile  group 20 

the 11 

Docility 104,  116 

and  rebelliousness 23 

what  is? 117 

Dog,  the,  recognizes  his  name. . .   178 

the  suggestion  of  the 108 

Dreams 135 

Duneize 37 

Dupont,  M.  Marius 173 

Dynamometer,   two  factors  at 
work 32 


Dysalalia 172 

Echolalia 183 

Effort,  absence  of,  characteris- 
tic   101 

depends     upon     intellectual 

level 43 

of  adaptation 145 

Embarrassment  not  in  imbeciles  65 

English  school 151 

Enumerators 96 

Esthetic  sense, imbecile  has. . . .  133 

Evocation 134,  261 

characteristic  disturbances  of  277 

of  coordinated  movements  . .  186 

a  defect  of 246 

failures  of 264 

of  an  idea 144 

mental 183 

weakness  of  the 320 

Evolution  of  the  writing  move- 
ment   50 

Faculties,   distinction  between 

the,  and  the  acquisitions. .  130 

inventive  and  corrective 127 

mental,     not    found     among 

defectives 132 

Fallieres 266 

Fatigue,  relation  of  to  the  ab- 
sence of  effort 43 

Feeling,  idea  and,  make  one. . .  314 
Figures,    immediate   repetition 

of 32 

memory  for 39 

recitation  of 89 

Fool,  an  educated 125 

Functioning  and  development..  271 

difficulty  of 236 

difficulty  of 260 

insufficiency  of 289 

Galiard 37 

General  paralysis 219 

psychological  signs  of 234 

General     paralytics,     delirium  |p 

frequent  among |265 

mental  level  of 1224 

paralytic,  Samse |262 


INDEX 


325 


General,  the  suggestion  of  the.  109 

Gentil,  handwriting  of 47 

Gestures,  slowness  of 240 

Global,  disturbance  is 294 

Grammar  of  Victor 207 

Greffage 236,  254 

Griffon,  moron 23,  37,  119 

reaction  time 35 

Hearing-mutes 178 

Horse,  a  learned 176 

Idea,  directing,  fails 135 

the  directing 134 

Idiot,  capacity  of 168 

does  not  coordinate 137 

extra-social 25 

Idiots  are  mute 132 

character  of 12 

pain  among 58 

Illusions  in  exterior  perceptions  247 

in  verbal  perceptions 248 

Images,  motor,  of  articulation.  183 

thought  without 151,216 

Imagination,  too  much 127 

weak 127 

Imbecile,    an,    and    a    general 

paralytic 290 

anti-social 25 

a  well  behaved  pupil 29 

capacity  of 168 

does  not  actually  resemble  a 
normal  child  of  same  mental 

age 161 

equal  to  a  normal  person. . . .  140 

ideation  of 71 

is  one  born  poor 234 

loquacious  (Cabusscl) 78 

observation  of  an 164 

of  forty,  the  same  he  was  ten 

years  ago 161 

the  mr-ntality  of 140 

the  work  of  an 103 

Imbeciles,  a  pity  to  teach 94 

and  number  sense 86 

character  of 10 

obtusenoss  to  pain 63 

the  advantage  of  studying. . .  161 


Imbeciles,   the  species  for  the 

genus 9 

vocabulary  of 37 

Impossible,  nothing  is,  to  man.  279 

Inertia 265 

of  comprehension 249 

what  is  functional 269 

Instinct,  abused  word 315 

Instincts,  dominate  the 140 

Instruction,  a  matter  of 130 

attribute  errors  to 125 

dangerous 93 

Intellectual,  acts  in  general. ...  95 

Intelligence 131 

a  certain  quality  in 43 

activity  of,  distinguished  from 

level  of 73 

and  perception 51 

distinction      between      idea- 
tional and  instinctive 297 

does     suggestibility     depend 

upon 114 

ideational 315 

instinctive 315 

language  as  a  sign  of 193 

not  necessary  in  weight  dis- 
crimination   57 

not  required 89 

that  lacks  penetration 103 

Interpretation 97 

Introspection,  superannuated..  151 

Ireland,  VV 89 

Judgment 146 

acts  as  a  check 127 

Key,  comparison  of  the 145 

Kraepelin 116,  161,219 

Language,  acquisition  of 51 

as  a  sign  of   human   intelli- 
gence   193 

evolution  of 198 

intellectual     level    necessary 

for  the  formation  of 197 

lack  of  depends  on  weakness 

of  intelligence 179,  181 

of  psychology 162 


326 


INDEX 


Language,  the  relation  between 

thought  and 210 

stages  in  the  acquisition  of. .   185 

Lapsus  calami 240 

Laraze,  normal  but  unstable.. .     18 
Length  of  lines,  perception  of.      53 

L'Esprit  faux 118 

Life,  real,  a  solution  of  problems.     95 

Lisping I72 

Locksmith,  illustration  of  the . .   140 

Macolard,  Mme.,  senile  dement  298 

Manners,  lack  of  good 147 

Marie,  quoted 193 

Measuring  Scale,  applicable  to 

dements 223 

M.   Meillet,   plan  for  an  indi- 
vidual linguistic  study....  206 

Memory,  animal 88 

for  figures 39 

Memories,  slowness  in  the  re- 
call of  certain 237 

Mental  defective  distinguished 

from  the  dement 273 

Mental  instability 20 

Mental  level  of  Beauchamp. . . .  225 

types  of  character  and 25 

Merlin,  quoted 117 

Microcephalic,  Cabussel 38 

Mind,  the  genesis  of 130 

Moliere,  quoted 125 

Money,  difficult  operations 90 

wishing  to  borrow 307 

Moron,  how  a,   can  have  I'es- 

prit  faux 118 

Morons,  character  of 16 

vocabulary  of 37 

Moronity 130 

Movement 44 

quickness  of 32,  33 

Music  Box,  measuring  the  at- 
tention      33 

is  papa  ! 184 

N'importequisme 142,  172 

Number,       contrast      between 

animal  and  verbal 94 

sense 86 


Pain,  the  sense  of 58 

Papa,  music  box 185 

Paralytic,   the,  shows  indiffer- 
ence   263 

Paralytics,    excellent    subjects 

for  the  tests 223 

Paris,  fortune,  river 124 

Patience,  game  of 100,  143 

Pedagogy 152 

Pedagogical    examination,  ref- 
erence table  of 282 

Penetration,  lack  of 143 

Perception,   fineness   of  equals 

the  normal 56 

and  intelligence 51 

intelligence  of 57 

verbal 174 

weakness  of  intelligence  and 

delicacy  of 53 

Perceptions  incomplete 245 

Personality  of  the  experimenter.     36 

Philippon 250 

Photograph,  posing  for  a 33 

Pictures,  perception  of 96 

Pins,  counted 204 

Poire,  Mme.,  general  paralytic.  318 
Portraits: 

Vouzin 12-14 

Cretin 15 

Beauvisage , 17 

Laraze 19 

Denise 21,  22 

Victor 23 

Albert 74,  111 

Cabussel 79,  81 

Griffon 119 

Binet 159 

Philippon 250,  251 

Mme.  Solas 274 

Mme.  Macolard 298 

Mme.  Poire 318,  319 

Practical  life,  the  knowledge  of.  285 

Problems,  the  solving  of 95 

Pronunciation  defective 183 

Psychogenetics 9 

Psychogenetic  method,  a  new. .   159 

Psychogenesis  of  language 163 

Psychology  a  science  of  action.  152 


INDEX 


327 


Psychology  of  acquisition 171 

of  conservation 171 

experimental 159 

functional 151 

pathological 159 

structural 151 

PuUulation,  lack  of 143 

Question  only  partially  under- 
stood   257 

Reaction  time 32,  65 

Reaction     times     of     Madame 

Solas 280 

Reaction   time   shorter   in   de- 
fectives than  in  normals. . .  71 

Reading  a  barrier 131 

Rebellious,  the 11 

Reflection 31 

Resemblances,  perception  of. . .  51 

Residues 280 

Rhymes 103 

Ridiculous,    sense   of   the,    not 

lost 304 

Scribbling  of  Vouzin 44 

Sensibility,  investigation  of .  . .  .  51 
Sensitivity,  difficultiesof  study- 
ing in  the  feeble-minded. . .  52 

Sentence,  construct  a 103 

Sentences,  length  and  nature  of 

Victor's 207 

Sidis,  Boris 114 

Snow,  black 116 

Social  attention 30 

feelings,     distinctive    among 

defectives 24 

Solas,  Mmc.,  general  paralytic. .  274 

Species,  the  genus  f(jr  the 142 

Speech,  an  art 131 

articulate 189 

comprehension    always    pre- 
cedes   181 

of  automatic  recitation 189 

of  (leriomination H>n 

of  repelit  i(Hi 190 

psychological  condition  of . . .  181 

Suggestion,  imbeciles  can  resist.  114 


Suggestibility 104 

Synthesis 129 

Test,  the  reason  a  general  par- 
alytic fails  in,   is  not  the 

same  as  for  an  imbecile. . . .  272 

Tests,  of  voluntary  effort 32 

Thought,  the  adaptation  of. . . .  137 

a  scheme  of 128,  133 

consists  in  an  adaptation. . . .  147 

consists  in  what 211 

the  direction  of 133 

distinct  from  the  image 215 

not  a  passive  state 134 

origin  of  the  scheme  of 148 

power  of  directing  the 137 

tends  to  a  determination 138 

what  remains  of  a 314 

Time  of  reaction 34 

Tricolor 126 

Unconscious,    relation    of    the 

conscious  to  the 152 

Verbal  replies,  the  form  of . . . .  287 

Victor's  definitions 98 

Victor,  diagnosis  of 206 

imbecile 22 

note  book  of 48 

Vocabulary  of  Denise 170 

Voluntary  effort 32 

Vouzin 26 

idiot 12 

scribbling  of 45 

Vowels  better  pronounced  than 

the  consonants 173 

Walkers,  the  illustration  of  two 

poor 290 

Weights,  experiment  of 53 

imi)ossible    to    perceive    the 

difference 136 

Word  comprehension 190 

conditions  for  pronouncing  a.  182 
Words,  calling  up  the  maximum 

number 30 

cited 37 

definitions  of "7 


328 


INDEX 


Words,  designate  objects 183 

difficulty  in  pronouncing 238 

thoughts  without 151.314 

Writings  of  Vousin,  Victor,  etc..     44 

Writing  sample  of: 
Vouzin 45 


Writing  sample  of: 

Denise 46 

Gentil 47 

Victor 48 

Albert 48 

Wurtzburg,  method  of 148 


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